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
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THE
RHETORIC, POETIC,
AND
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
OF
ARISTOTLE,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

JOVE HONOURS ME, AND FAVOURS MY DESIGNS.

POPE'S HOMER'S ILLIAD, Book 9th, v. 717.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE three treatises of which the present volume consists, have been deservedly considered by the antients as ranking in the first class of the most exquisite productions of human wit; and even in the present frivolous age they maintain so high a degree of reputation, as to be studied at the University of Oxford. Indeed, so much penetration and profundity of thought are displayed in the composition of each, that the reader by whom they are thoroughly understood, will immediately subscribe to the encomium given to the Stagirite by the great Syrianus, *that he was the most skilful and the most prolific in his conceptions of all men*, (δεινοτατος και γονιμωτατος;) and also to the assertion of another of the antients, which may be considered as the *ne plus ultra* of eulogy, *that he dipped his pen in intellect*.

I. With respect to Rhetoric, which forms the first of these treatises, it is very nearly allied to dialectic¹ properly so called, and which is the

¹ Aristotle calls *dialectic*, and *logic* (by the same name), that art which is explained by him in his *Topics* and *Sophistical Elenchi*.

subject of the Topics of Aristotle ; and, therefore, in order to explain the nature of rhetoric, it will be requisite to compare it with dialectic, and see in what they both agree, and in what they differ.

Dialectic then is denominated from disputing, and is the art of disputing ; but rhetoric derives its name from speaking, and is the art of speaking. The art of disputing, however, consists in the ability of arguing on and defending each side of a proposed question. But the art of speaking consists in the ability of persuading the hearer to assent to either side of a question.

From this definition, it may be inferred that the subject of dialectic is every thing, so far as it is disputable with probability on each side ; and that the subject of rhetoric is every thing so far as it can be influenced by persuasion.

In the second place, it may be inferred that dialectic and rhetoric agree in this, that each discusses every thing ; that each discusses both sides of a question ; and that each proceeds not from what is true, but from what is probable. For of the two parts of a problem contradictorily opposed to each other, the one is necessarily false ; but dialectic and rhetoric discuss and defend each part of a problem. Hence they not only prove and defend what is true, but also what is false. As what is false, however, cannot be proved and defended from true, but only from probable assertions, rhetoric and dialectic do not proceed from true but from probable arguments. They also agree in this, that each does not proceed from things that are proper or peculiar, but from such as are common. For if it were requisite that they should discuss any proposed problem from peculiarities, they would be confounded with all sciences. To which it may be added, that they ought to use principles adapted to discuss the proposed problems in each part,

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part, and that common principles alone possess this adaptation. Another reason is, that they ought to discuss things from principles known to all men, and known even to those who are ignorant of particular sciences.

Again, dialectic and rhetoric agree in this, that it is the business of each to deliver certain common places, or principles, from which we may be able to dispute on any proposed problem, or speak in a manner adapted to persuade on each side of a question. They likewise agree in this, that they are not sciences, but certain powers and faculties. For sciences neither prove, nor persuade to the assent of, each part of contradiction, but that part only which is true, and is, therefore, demonstrable; but the power of effecting this is possessed both by dialectic and rhetoric. Hence, they are not sciences, but powers and faculties; for those things are properly said to be powers which are equally affected to opposites.

Dialectic and rhetoric, however, differ in this, that it is the business of the former to dispute with probability before those who are partially wise; but of the latter, to speak in a manner adapted to persuade the multitude. And because it is usual to dispute with those who are partially wise, about universal problems, abstracting from particular circumstances of persons, places and times &c.; but to dispute with the multitude about moral or political subjects, and about problems restricted to particular persons, places and times; hence dialectic for the most part discusses *universal*, and rhetoric *restricted* problems. They also differ in this, that dialectic employs a strict and contracted form of arguing; but rhetoric a more ample and dilated form. And they differ in the third place in this, that dialectic employs arguments alone in proof of what it wishes to establish; but rhetoric for the purpose of persuading not only employs arguments, but likewise
manners

manners and passions, as Aristotle copiously evinces in the course of this treatise.

II. With respect to the Poetic, the next of the treatises, it is requisite to observe, that *poetry is the art of imitating in measured diction so as to produce delight*. The proximate *genus*, therefore, of poetry is, that it is an imitative art; and the difference, through which it differs from other imitative arts, is the mode of imitating. For as the other imitative arts imitate in different modes, poetry imitates by metre, or measured diction alone.

From this definition explaining the nature of poetry, it may be briefly inferred what the subject of it is, and what its employment and end. The *subject* of poetry are *things, so far as they can be imitated in measured diction and produce delight*. The *employment* of poetry is, *the imitation itself*. And the *end* is, *the delight produced by the metrical imitation of things*. Hence it follows that poetry ought especially to imitate those things, the imitation of which is most delightful. But the imitation of admirable and probable deeds is most delightful, and which, therefore, poetry ought principally to imitate. In order, however, to imitate these, it is requisite, in the first place, that it should devise admirable and probable deeds; and in the next place, that it should express them in admirable diction, such as is the metrical. Hence the labour of poetry ought especially to be conversant in these two things; first, in the invention of the fable, viz. of admirable and probable deeds; and secondly in expressing such deeds in a measured diction which is eminently adapted to them, or in other words, which is eminently imitative of the several particulars.

It is much to be regretted that this treatise, which was perhaps originally only the first of three books written by Aristotle on poetry, is all that is left of a work, the whole of which was doubtless as admirable

as

as the part that remains. And the loss of the second and third books is particularly to be regretted, because there can be no doubt of Aristotle having treated in one of these books of the purification of the mind from depraved affections, and of the correction of the manners, as the principal and proper end, according to the antients, of right poetical imitation. I say this loss is particularly to be regretted, not only on account of the importance of the matter, and the very able manner in which it was discussed, but because an elucidation of the mode in which the mind is to be purified from depraved affections, would have fully solved a difficulty which occurs in the present treatise, and which has been insuperable to modern commentators. The difficulty I allude to is the assertion of Aristotle, *that the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from such-like passions*. For, according to the modern commentators on this treatise, the meaning of Aristotle is, that the terror and pity excited by tragedy, purify the spectator from terror and pity. The reader, however, will find in a note on this passage in the following translation, that this cannot be the meaning of Aristotle, as it contradicts what he asserts in his Ethics; and I also trust that he will subscribe to the opinion of the translator, that Aristotle meant to say, *that the terror and pity excited by tragedy purify the spectator from those perturbations which form the catastrophe of the tragedy*. Thus in the Ajax of Sophocles, the terror and pity excited by the catastrophe, purify the spectator from anger and impiety towards divinity; and in a similar manner purification is effected in other tragedies.

Notwithstanding, however, the loss sustained by the want of the 2d and 3d books of the Poetic of Aristotle, I rejoice that there is still extant a most admirable account of the different species of poetry by Proclus, the coryphæus, next to Plato and Aristotle, of all true philosophers, whose honour will grow with increase of time, and whose fame will

will swim over the vast extent of ages, when the *little critical vermin*² by whom he has been defamed will be utterly forgotten. This account is extracted from his EXPLANATION OF THE MORE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, printed at the end of his Commentaries On the Timæus of Plato, which Fabricius, the best of all modern critics, calls, OPUS ADMIRABILE; and the translation of it is as follows:

“ There are three lives in the soul, of which the best and most perfect is that according to which it is conjoined with the gods, and lives a life most allied, and through the highest similitude united to them; no longer subsisting from itself but from them, running under its own intellect, exciting the ineffable impression of *the one* which it contains, and connecting like with like, its own light with that of the gods, and that which is most uniform in its own essence and life, with *the one* which is above all essence and life. That which is second to this in dignity and power, has a middle arrangement in the middle of the soul, according to which, indeed, it is converted to itself, descending from a divinely-inspired life, and placing intellect and science as the principle of its energy, it evolves the multitude of its reasons, surveys the all-various mutations of forms, collects into sameness intellect and that which is the object of intellect, and expresses in images an intellectual and intelligible essence. The third life of the soul is, that which accords with its inferior powers, and energizes together with them, employing phantasies and irrational senses, and being entirely filled with things of a subordinate nature.

As there are, therefore, these three forms of life in souls, the poetic

² Viz. Reviewers, &c. &c. &c. and in short all those whom Swift so admirably satyrizes in his Tale of a Tub, under the appellation of *true critics*.

division,

division, also, supernally proceeds together with the multiform lives of the soul, and is diversified into first, middle, and last genera of energy. For of poetry, also, one kind has the highest subsistence, is full of divine goods, and establishes the soul in the causes themselves of things, according to a certain ineffable union, leading that which is filled into sameness with its replenishing source; the former immaterially subjecting itself to illumination, but the latter being incited to a communication of light; thus, according to the Oracle, "perfecting works, by mingling the rivers of incorruptible fire." It also produces one divine bond, and a unifying mixture of that which is participated and the participant, establishing the whole of that which is subordinate in that which is more excellent, and preparing that which is more divine alone to energize, the inferior nature being withdrawn, and concealing its own peculiarity in that which is superior. This then in short is a mania better than temperance, and is distinguished by a divine characteristic. And as every different kind of poetry subsists according to a different hyparxis, or summit of divine essence, so this fills the soul energizing from divine inspiration, with symmetry; and hence it adorns its last energies with measures and rhythms. As, therefore, we say that prophetic fury subsists according to truth, and the amatory according to beauty, in like manner we say that the poetic mania is defined according to divine symmetry.

The second kind of poetry which is subordinate to this first and divinely-inspired species, and which has a middle subsistence in the soul, is allotted its essence according to a scientific and intellectual habit. Hence, it knows the essence of things, and loves to contemplate beautiful works and reasonings, and leads forth every thing into a measured and rhythmical interpretation. For you will find many progeny of good poets to be of this kind, emulous of those that are

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truly

truly wise, full of admonition, the best counsels, and intellectual symmetry. It likewise extends the communication of prudence and every other virtue, to those of a naturally good disposition, and affords a reminiscence of the periods of the soul, of its eternal reasons and various powers.

The third species of poetry subsequent to these, is mingled with opinions and phantasies, receives its completion through imitation, and is said to be and is nothing else than imitative poetry. At one time, it alone uses assimilation, and at another time defends apparent and not real assimilation. It considerably raises very moderate passions, and astonishes the hearers; together with appropriate appellations and words, mutations of harmonies and varieties of rhythms, changes the dispositions of souls; and indicates the nature of things not such as they are, but such as they appear to the many; being a certain adumbration and not an accurate knowledge of things. It also establishes as its end, the delight of the hearers; and particularly looks to the passive part of the soul, which is naturally adapted to rejoice and be afflicted. But of this species of poetry, as we have said, one division is *assimilative*, which is extended to rectitude of imitation, but the other is *phantastic*, and affords apparent imitation alone.

Such then, in short, are the genera of poetry. It now remains to show that these are also mentioned by Plato, and to relate such particulars as are conformable to his dogmas respecting each. And in the first place, we shall discuss those wonderful conceptions respecting divine poetry which may be collected by him who does not negligently peruse his writings. For these things being previously determined, it will I think be easy to assign apt reasons respecting the subsequent species. In the Phædrus then, he denominates this divine poetry, "a possession

possession from the Muses, and a mania, and says, that it is supernally imparted to a tender and solitary soul; but that its employment is to excite and inspire with Bacchic fury, according to odes, and the rest of poetry, and its end to instruct posterity in celebrating the infinite transactions of the antients." From these words, it is perfectly evident that he calls the original and first-operating cause of poetry, the gift of the Muses. For as they fill all the other fabrications of the Father of the universe, both the apparent and unapparent with harmony and rhythmical motion, in like manner in the souls which are possessed by them, they produce a vestige of divine symmetry which illuminates divinely-inspired poetry. But since the whole energy of the illuminating power is in divine advents, and that which is illuminated gives itself up to the motions proceeding from thence, and abandoning its own habits, spreads itself under the energies of that which is divine and uniform, on this account I think he denominates such an illumination a *possession* and *mania*. He calls it a *possession*, because the whole illuminated soul gives itself up to the present effect of illuminating deity; and a *mania*, because such a soul abandons its own proper energies for the peculiarities of the illuminating powers.

In the next place, he describes the habit of the soul possessed by the Muses, and says it ought to be *tender* and *solitary*. For a soul hard and resisting, and inobedient to divine illumination, is disposed contrary to the energy of divinely-inspired possession; since it thus rather subsists from itself than from that which illuminates, and is incapable of being properly impressed with its gifts. But a soul which is possessed by other all-various opinions, and is filled with reasonings foreign from a divine nature, obscures divine inspiration, mingling with the motions thence derived its own lives and energies. It is requisite, therefore, that the soul which is to be possessed by the Muses, should

be tender and solitary, that it may be properly passive to, and perfectly sympathize with divinity, and that it may be impassive, unreceptive, and unmingled with respect to other things.

In the third place, therefore, he adds the common employment of such an aptitude, and of possession and mania from the Muses. For to excite and inspire with Bacchic fury, is the province both of that which illuminates and that which is illuminated, and which gives completion to the same thing; the former moving supernally, and the latter spreading itself under the moving cause. Excitation is indeed a resurrection and unperturbed energy of the soul, and a conversion to divinity from a lapse into generation. But Bacchic fury is a divinely-inspired motion, and an unwearied dance, as it were, towards a divine nature, giving perfection to the possessed. But again, both these are requisite, that the possessed may not incline to that which is worse, but may be easily moved to a more excellent nature.

In the fourth place he adds, that the end of this divine poetry, is to instruct posterity in celebrating the infinite deeds of the antients. Hence, he evidently testifies that human affairs become more perfect and splendid when they are delivered from a divine mouth, and that true erudition is produced in the auditors of such poetry. Not that it is adapted to juvenile tuition, but pertains to those that are already perfect in politic discipline, and require a more mystic tradition respecting divine concerns. Such poetry, therefore, instructs the hearers more than any other, when it is divine, and when its divine nature becomes manifest to its auditors. Hence, Plato very properly prefers this poetry which subsists from the Muses in tender and solitary souls, to every other human art. "For the poet," says he, "who approaches to the poetic gates without such a mania, will be imperfect, and his poetry so far as it is dictated by prudence, will vanish before that

that which is the progeny of fury." In this manner, therefore, does Socrates in the *Phædrus*, instruct us in the peculiarities of divine poetry, which differs both from divine prophesy, and the telestic art, and refer its first unfolding into light, to the gods.

With these things, also, what he says in the *Io* accords, when he is discoursing with the rhapsodist about this species of poetry: for here he most clearly evinces that the poetry of Homer is divine, and to others that are conversant with it is the cause of enthusiastic energy. For when the rhapsodist says, that he can speak copiously on the poems of Homer, but by no means on the writings of other poets, Socrates assigning the reason of this says, "It is not from art that you speak well concerning Homer, but because you are moved by a divine power." And that this is true is indeed perfectly evident. For those who do any thing by art, are able to produce the same effect in all similars; but those that operate by a certain divine power about any thing which subsists with symmetry, can no longer thus operate with respect to other things, which necessarily have the same power. Whence then, a power of this kind is derived to the rhapsodist, which particularly connects him with Homer, but no longer with other poets. Socrates afterwards teaches us, using the stone which is vulgarly called *Herculean*, as a most perspicuous example of the most perfect possession from the Muses:—"This stone then," says he, "not only draws to itself iron rings, but inserts in them a power attractive of things similar, so as to enable them to draw other rings, and form a chain of rings or pieces of iron, depending one from another."

Let us in the next place hear what Socrates adds similar to these things, respecting divine poetry:—"Thus then," says he, "the Muse makes men divine; and from these men thus inspired, others catching the sacred power, form a chain of divine enthusiasts." Here in the
first

first place, he speaks of the divine cause in the singular number, calling it the Muse, and not as in the Phædrus, a possession from the Muses, and a mania pertaining to their whole multitude, that he may refer all the number of those that are moved enthusiastically, to one monad as it were, the primary principle of poetry. For poetry subsists uniformly and occultly in the first mover, but secondarily, and in a revolved manner, in poets moved by that monad, and lastly, in a ministrant degree in the rhapsodists, who are led back to this cause through poets as the media. In the next place, by extending divine inspiration supernally, as far as to the last mixtures, he evidently at the same time celebrates the fecundity of the first moving principle, and most clearly evinces the participation of the first participants. For that poets should be able to excite others by their poems to a divinely-inspired energy, indicates that there is a most conspicuous presence in them of a divine nature. Consequent to these things, therefore, he also adds what follows respecting the possession of poets. "The best epic poets," says he, "and all such as excel in composing any kind of verses to be recited, frame not these their admirable poems from the rules of art; but possessed by the Muse, they write from divine inspiration. Nor is it otherwise with the best Lyric poets, and all other fine writers of verses to be sung;" And again afterwards he says: "for a poet is a thing light, and volatile, and sacred; nor is he able to write poetry till he becomes divine, and has no longer the command of his intellect." And lastly, he adds: "Hence it is that the poets, indeed, say many fine things, whatever their subject be, just as you do concerning Homer; but not doing it through any rules of art, each of them is able to succeed from a divine destiny, in that species of poetry only to which he is impelled by the Muse."

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In all these citations, therefore, Plato evidently establishes divine poetry in a divine cause, which he calls a Muse, in this emulating Homer, who at one time looks to the multitude, and at another to the union of the series of the Muses; as when he says, "O Muses sing," and "sing me the man, O Muse." In the middle of this principle of enthusiastic motions, and of the last echoes³ of inspiration beheld in rhapsodists according to sympathy, Plato establishes poetic mania, moving and being moved, supernally filled, and transferring to others the illumination which originates from thence, and which imparts one conjunction to the last participants with the participated monad.

With these things, also, we may co-harmonize what is said by the Athenian guest in the third book of the Laws, concerning poetry, and what Timæus says respecting poets. For the former says, "that the poetic genus is divinely-inspired; that it composes sacred hymns, and with certain Graces and Muses, relates many things that have been truly transacted:" and the latter exhorts us to follow poets inspired by Phœbus, as being the sons of gods, and knowing the concerns of their progenitors, though their assertions are not probable, and are unaccompanied with demonstrations." From all which it is easy to understand what the opinion of Plato was concerning divine poetry, and the poets characterized according to it; and that these are especially messengers of divine names, and are in an eminent manner acquainted with the affairs of their fathers. When, therefore, he takes notice of mythical fictions, and corrects the more serious part of the writings of poets, such as those respecting bonds, castrations, loves, venereal connexions, tears and laughter, we must say that he also especially testifies that these things are properly introduced, according to the

³ For *αποχηματων* in the original, read *απηχηματων*

theory,

theory which is concealed in these symbols, as under veils. For he who thinks that poets are particularly worthy of belief in affairs respecting the gods, though they speak without demonstration from divine inspiration, must certainly admire divine fables⁴; through which they deliver the truth concerning divine natures. And he who calls the poetic genus divine, cannot also ascribe to it an impious and gigantic opinion respecting divine concerns. He likewise who evinces that the assertions of poets are attended with certain Graces and Muses, must entirely consider an inelegant, unharmonious and ungraceful phantasy, as very remote from the theory of divine poets. When, therefore, in his Republic he establishes by law that poetry, and the indication through fables, are not adapted to the ears of youth, he is very far from despising poetry itself, but removes the juvenile habit, as unexercised in the hearing of such things from fiction of this kind. For as he says, in the second Alcibiades, "the whole of poetry is naturally enigmatical, and is not obvious to the understanding of every one." And hence in the Republic, he clearly says, "that a youth is not able to distinguish what is allegory, and what is not." We must say, therefore, that he entirely admits inspired poetry, which he calls divine, and thinks it proper that those by whom it is possessed should be venerated in silence. And thus much concerning the first kind of poetry, which subsists from a divine origin in tender and solitary souls.

In the next place, let us contemplate that species of poetry, which has a scientific knowledge of things, and which energizes according to intellect and prudence; which unfolds to men many names concerning an incorporeal nature, and leads forth into light many probable dogmas

⁴ Instead of reading *τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μύθοις*, after *θαυμάσιαι*, I read *τοὺς ἐνθεοὺς μύθους*.

respecting

respecting a corporeal subsistence; investigates the most beautiful symmetry in manners, and the disposition contrary to this; and adorns all these with proper measures and rhythms. The Athenian guest says, that the poetry of Theognis is of this kind, which he praises beyond that of Tyrtaeus, because Theognis is a teacher of the whole of virtue, and which extends to the whole political life. For the one admits a fidelity which receives its completion from all the virtues, expels from politics that most true vice, sedition, and leads into consent the lives of those that are persuaded. But the other praises the habit of fortitude by itself alone, and exhorts to this those that neglect the other virtues. It will, however, be better to hear the words themselves of Plato⁵: “We have too the poet Theognis a witness in our favour, who was a citizen of the Megarensians in Sicily, for he says,

Who faithful in insane sedition keeps,
With silver and with ruddy gold may vie.

We say, therefore, that such a one will conduct himself in the most difficult war, in a manner nearly as much superior to the other, as justice, temperance, and prudence, when conjoined with fortitude, are superior to fortitude alone. For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions without the whole of virtue.” Here, therefore, he admits Theognis, as partaking of political science, and all the virtues.

But in the second Alcibiades, defining the most right and safe mode of prayer, he refers it to a certain wise poet:—“To me, says he, Alcibiades, it seems probable that some wise man or other, happening to be connected with certain persons void of understanding, and observing

⁵ See the 1st book of the Laws.

them to pursue and pray for things, which it were better for them still to be without, but which appeared to them good, composed for their use a common prayer, the words of which are nearly these: King Jupiter, grant us what is good, be it or not the subject of our prayers, and avert from us what is evil though we should pray for it." For the scientific man alone knows how to distinguish the separation of good and evil, and a converse with a divine nature adapted to the middle habits of men. And on this account Socrates calls the poet that composed this prayer a wise man, as forming a judgement of the natures of those that prayed, neither through divine inspiration, nor right opinion, but through science alone, as regarding their habits and preserving that which becomes the beneficent powers of the gods. For to convert all of them through prayer to the one royal providence of Jupiter; to suspend the subsistence of good from the power of divinity; to obliterate the generation of true evils through the benevolence of a more excellent nature, and in short to assert that these things are unknown to those that pray, but are separated by divinity according to proper boundaries, is the work of wisdom and science, and not of any thing casual. Very properly, therefore, do we say that such poetry is wise and scientific. For the poetry which is able to assign right opinions to middle habits, must itself subsist according to perfect science.

In the third place, therefore, let us speak concerning imitative poetry, which we have already said, at one time assimilates things, and at another expresses them according to appearance. The Athenian guest clearly delivers to us the assimilative part of this poetry; but Socrates in the Republic describes its phantastic part; and how these differ from each other, I mean the assimilative and phantastic species of imitation, the Eleatean guest sufficiently informs us:—"For I appear, says he, to perceive two species of imitation, one, the conjectural or
assimilative

assimilative art, which then especially takes place when some one gives birth to imitation by imparting to every particular such things as are fit in length, breadth, and depth, according to the symmetries of its exemplar, and besides these things, colours also. Theæ. Do not all imitators endeavour to effect this? Guest. Not those who perform or paint any great works. For if they were to impart to them the true symmetry of things beautiful, you know that the parts above would appear smaller, and those below, larger than is fit; through the one being seen by us afar off, and the other near. Theæ. Entirely so. Artists, therefore, bidding farewell to truth, do not produce in images truly beautiful symmetries, but those which appear to be so." Very properly, therefore, I think does the Eleatean guest, at the end of the dialogue, wishing to bind the sophist by the definitive method, establish one part of the art effective of images to be assimilative, and the other phantastic; the one fabricating the image such as is the exemplar; the other preparing that which it produces to appear like that which it imitates. However, of assimilative poetry, the Athenian guest speaks separately in the second book of the Laws, where he treats of music which does not make pleasure its end, but a true and similar imitation of its exemplar, to which place we refer the reader.

But Socrates, speaking in this book of phantastic poetry, and having shown that a poet of this kind is the third from truth and imitative, compares such poetry to a picture, which represents not the works of nature but of artificers, and these not such as they are, but such as they appear. Hence, he clearly evinces that the phantastic species of poetry regards pleasure alone, and the delight of those that hear it. For of imitative poetry, the phantastic falls short of the assimilative, so far as the latter regards rectitude of imitation, but the former the pleasure produced in the multitude from the energies of the phantasy.

Such then are the genera of poetry, which are thought worthy of distinction by Plato; one, as better than science, another as scientific, a third as conversant with, and a fourth as falling off from right opinion.

These things then being determined, let us return to the poetry of Homer, and contemplate resplendent in it every poetic habit, and particularly those which regard rectitude and beauty. For when he energizes enthusiastically, is possessed by the Muses, and narrates mystic conceptions about the gods themselves; then he energizes according to the first and divinely-inspired species of poetry. But when he relates the life of the soul, the diversities in its nature, and such political concerns as pertain to it, then he especially speaks scientifically. Again, when he presents us with forms of imitation adapted to things and persons themselves, then he employs assimilative imitation. But when he directs his attention to that which appears to the multitude, and not to the truth of things, and thus seduces the souls of his hearers, then he is a poet according to the phantastic species. To illustrate what I mean, that I may begin from the last imitation of the poet, he sometimes describes the rising and setting of the sun, not as each of these is, nor as each is effected, nor imitating this in his verses, but as it appears to us through distance. This then, and every thing of this kind may be called the phantastic part of his poetry. But when he imitates heroes warring, or consulting, or speaking according to the forms of life, some as prudent, others as brave, and others as ambitious, then I should say that this is the work of assimilative poetry. Again, when in consequence of knowing either the diversity of subsistence in the parts of the soul, he unfolds and teaches it, or the difference between the image, and the soul by which it is used, or the order of the elements in the universe, viz. of earth, water, æther, heaven, or any thing else of this kind, then I should confidently assert that this originated

nated from the scientific power of poetry. And after all these, when he teaches us concerning the demiurgic monad, and the triple distribution of wholes, or concerning the bonds of Vulcan, or the connexion of the paternal intellection of Jupiter with the prolific divinity of Juno, then I should say that he is clearly enthusiastic, and that such-like fables are devised by him, in consequence of his being possessed by the Muses. But Homer himself also manifests in the bard Demodocus, an energy originating from the gods, when Ulysses says of his song, that he began it impelled by a god, that he was divinely-inspired, and that the Muse loved him, or the god that is the leader of the Muses :

The Muse, Jove's daughter, or Apollo taught
Thee aptly thus the fate of Greece to sing,
And all the Grecians hardy deeds and toils *.

And that Homer by Demodocus intended after a manner to represent himself⁷, and introduced him as a pattern of his own calamities, is an opinion sufficiently celebrated. And the verses,

With clouds of darkness quench'd his visual ray,
But gave him skill to raise the lofty lay,

appear directly to refer to the fabled blindness of Homer. He, therefore, clearly contends that Demodocus, says what he does say from

* Odyss. lib. 8. v. 488.

⁷ Homer never expressly mentions himself; but as Dio Chrysostom justly observes, "he speaks in reality like the prophets of the gods from an unapparent place, and as it were from the adytum, or secret recess of a temple." *αλλα τω οντι, ωσπερ οι προφηται των θεων εξ αφανους και αδυτου, ποθεν φθιγγουσιν.*

divine

divine inspiration. But it is well that we have mentioned Demodocus, and his divinely-inspired song. For it appears to me that the musicians which are thought worthy of being mentioned by Homer, unfold the above-mentioned genera of poetry. For Demodocus, as we have said, was divinely inspired, both in narrating divine and human concerns, and is said to have suspended his music from divinity. But Phemius, the Ithacensian bard, is principally characterized according to a mere knowledge of divine and human affairs. For Penelope says to him:

Alluring arts thou know'st, and what of old
Of gods and heroes sacred bards have told *.

The third is the lyrist of Clytemnestra, who was as it seems an imitative poet, employed right opinion, and extended the melodies of temperance to that female. Hence as long as he remained with her, she perpetrated no unholy deed, in consequence of her irrational life being charmed to temperance by disciplinative song. The fourth musician, may be placed as analogous to the phantastic species of poetry; and this is that Thamyras, with whose song the Muses being indignant, are said to have caused it to cease. For he was conversant with a music much more diversified and sensible, and calculated to please the vulgar. Hence he is said to have contended with the Muses, as preferring a more various music to that which is more simple and more adapted to those divinities, and as falling from the benevolence of the goddesses. For the anger of the Muses does not refer any passion to them; but indicates the inaptitude of Thamyras to their participation. This then is the song which is most remote from truth, which calls forth the

* *Odys.* lib. 1.

passions

passions of the soul, and is phantastic, and neither possess, with respect to imitation, right opinion, nor science. We may, therefore, behold all the kinds of poetry in Homer, but particularly the enthusiastic, according to which we have said he is principally characterized. Nor are we singular in this opinion, but as we have before observed, Plato himself in many places calls him a divine poet, the most divine of poets, and in the highest degree worthy of imitation. But the imitative and at the same time phantastic poetry, has a most obscure subsistence in Homer; since he never uses it, but for the purpose of procuring credibility from the vulgar, and when it is perfectly unavoidable. As, therefore, if a man entering into a well-regulated city, and beholding intoxication there employed for a certain useful purpose, should neither imitate the prudence in the city, nor its whole order, but intoxication itself alone, as in this case the city is not to be blamed as the cause of his conduct, but the peculiar imbecility of his judgement; in like manner I think tragic poets being emulous of the last species of Homeric poetry, should refer the principle of their error not to Homer, but to their own impotency. Homer, therefore, may be called the leader of tragedy, so far as tragic poets emulate him in other respects, and distribute the different parts of his poetry; imitating *phantastically* what he asserts *assimilatively*, and adapting to the ears of the vulgar what he composes scientifically. Homer, however, is not only the teacher of tragedy (for he is this according to the last species of his poetry,) but likewise of the whole of that which is imitative in Plato, and of the whole theory of that philosopher."

Proclus concludes his apology for Homer with observing as follows: "The reason," says he, "as it appears to me, that impelled Plato to write with such severity against Homer and the imitative species of poetry, was the corruption of the times in which he lived; for philosophy was then

then despised, being accused by some as useless, and by others entirely condemned. On the contrary, poetry was then held in immoderate admiration; its imitative power was the subject of emulation; it was considered as adequate alone to disciplinative purposes, and poets, because they imitated every thing, persuaded themselves that they knew all things, as is evident from what Socrates says in this dialogue [the Republic]. Hence Plato, indignant at the prevalence of such an opinion, shows that the poetic and imitative genus wanders far from the truth, which philosophy, the saviour of souls, imparts. For from the same benevolent wish through which he accuses the sophists, and popular orators, as unable to contribute any thing to virtue, he also blames the poets, and particularly the composers of tragedy, and such imitators as devise that which may charm their hearers, and not that which may promote virtue, and who inchant but do not instruct the multitude. But he considers Homer as deserving a similar reprehension because he is the leader of this species of poetry, and affords to tragedians the seeds of imitation. For thus it was requisite to recal the men of his age from astonishment respecting poetry, through an immoderate attachment to which they neglected true discipline. With a view, therefore, to the instruction of the multitude, to correct an absurd phantasy, and exhort to a philosophic life, he reprobates the tragedians, who were then called public preceptors, as directing their attention to nothing sane, and at the same time remits his reverence for Homer, and, ranking him in the same class with tragic poets, blames him as an imitator.

“Nor is it wonderful that the same poet should be called by him, both divine and the third from the truth. For so far as he is possessed by the Muses, he is divine, but so far as he is an imitator, he is the third from the truth.”

III. With respect to the third of these treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics,

Ethics, it is necessary to observe, that the subject of ethics, or moral philosophy, is moral entity, (viz, things which have a relation to moral actions) and moral actions themselves, and that it teaches the mode of living worthily. But moral actions are those through which a man becomes good or bad, that is, through which he becomes adapted or unadapted to obtain beatitude, which is the ultimate end of man. And to live worthily, is to live in a manner adapted to the attainment of the ultimate end, or beatitude.

In the first place, therefore, moral philosophy considers man with reference to himself, not physically but ethically, that is, so far as he is capable of being worthy or depraved, and can be well or ill-disposed with relation to beatitude. In the second place, it considers the energies of man, not only his internal, but also his external energies, so far as they are capable of being good or bad. And in the third place it considers the objects of these energies, so far as they can be worthy or depraved.

Because likewise, moral philosophy demonstrates many conclusions concerning moral entity, on this account it is a demonstrative science. And because again, it not only considers practical truths about moral entity, that is, those truths which contribute to action, but likewise many speculative truths, the knowledge of which does not contribute to action but to science, hence it is partly practical and partly speculative, though it is more the former than the latter, because moral entity is more principally considered on account of action, than on account of science.

Though moral philosophy, however, is a practical science, yet it is not properly either prudence or art. It is not art, because art is *a habit effective in conjunction with true reason, about those things which contribute*

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to particular ends. Thus, statuary is a habit producing a statue in conjunction with *true reason*, that is, with *infallible precepts*. And poetry is a habit producing a poem with true reason; while at the same time neither a poem nor a statue is the ultimate end of man, but each is only a particular end. But moral philosophy is *a habit practical in conjunction with true reason, about those things which contribute to the ultimate end of man.* It likewise delivers the true method, and infallible precepts of regulating the whole of our life, and all our actions, so as that we may obtain beatitude. Again, moral philosophy differs from prudence, because prudence is *a habit determining what this man should do, and what is now to be done, in order to the attainment of the ultimate end;* but moral philosophy alone determines universally, what is to be done in order to obtain this end, and not what this man should do, and what should now be done.

Hence, we infer that moral philosophy is *the science of living worthily, or that it is a science defining the ultimate end of man, and teaching universally the mode by which a man ought to regulate the whole of his life, and all his actions, in order to the attainment of such an end.*

Of moral philosophy, likewise, there are three parts, one which considers man with reference to himself, another which considers him as connected with a family, and a third which considers him as a member of the community. For man is naturally not a solitary, but a social animal; because since one man is not sufficient to himself for the purposes of living, and of living well, but requires the assistance of other men, every man is naturally a part of a certain multitude, and ought to live in the society of other men. But the society to which all other associations may be reduced is twofold, the one imperfect and insufficient, which is the society of those who live in
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one house and family; the other perfect, and sufficient to itself, which is the society of those who live in a city or kingdom. To a perfect city, however, it is necessary that it should contain every thing requisite to the purposes of living and of living well. And as the end of every man is the felicity of that man, so the end of a family, is the felicity of the family, and of a city, the felicity of the city. Hence, because moral philosophy is a science disposing a man to the ultimate end, it ought not only to dispose every individual of the human species to the attainment of this end, but likewise a family, and a city or kingdom. That part of moral philosophy, therefore, which teaches how the actions of every man, considered with reference to himself, are to be regulated in order to his attainment of beatitude, is delivered by Aristotle in the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics; and also in the two books entitled the Great Ethics; and in the seven books of Ethics to Eudemus. That part which teaches how the actions of a whole family are to be regulated, in order to the attainment of the ultimate end, is called economic, and is delivered by Aristotle in his two books of Economics. And that part which teaches how the actions of a whole city and kingdom are to be regulated in order to obtain felicity, is called politic, and is delivered by Aristotle in the eight books of his Politics. Because, likewise, it is more divine to procure the good of a whole city or nation, than of a man, or one family. Hence, the political part of moral philosophy is more excellent and divine than the economical part, or than the part which relates to man considered with reference to himself.

I shall only observe farther, that the Nicomachean Ethics are so inscribed, because they were written by Aristotle to his son Nicomachus; that the reader will derive great advantage by occasionally consulting

consulting the translation of the Paraphrase of an anonymous Greek writer on these ethics, by Mr. BRIDGMAN, as this translation is at once *perspicuous, accurate, and elegant*; and that Aristotle, in his moral treatises, has delivered a system of ethics in all its parts scientific and perfect.

THE

THE ART OF RHETORIC.

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BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

RHETORIC reciprocates with dialectic [or logic]; for both are conversant with such particulars, as being common may after a manner be known by all men, and pertain to no definite science. Hence, all men in a certain respect participate of both these; for all men to a certain extent endeavour to examine and sustain an argument, to defend and accuse. With respect to the multitude, therefore, some of them do these things casually; but others through custom from habit. Because, however, this is possible in both ways, it is evident that these particulars may also be reduced to a certain method. For it is possible to survey the cause why some men render what they assert probable, from custom, and others from chance. But all men now will acknowledge that a thing of this kind is the work of art.

At present, therefore, those who compose the arts of orations [i. e. who unfold the art of rhetoric,] explain only a small part of rhetoric. For credibility is the only artificial part of the art; but the other parts are additions. The rhetoricians, however, of the present day, say nothing about enthymemes which are the substantial part of credibility; but their attention is for the most part directed to things foreign to the purpose. For accusation, pity, anger, and such like passions of the soul, do not pertain to the thing itself [which is to be proved,] but to the judge. Hence, if all judicial processes were conducted in the same manner as they are at present in some cities, and especially in those that are governed by good laws, these rhetoricians would not have any thing to say. For with respect to all cities, some think it necessary that the laws should thus ordain; but this method is adopted by others, and they forbid rhetoricians to say any thing foreign to the purpose, in the same manner as in the Areopagus. And in this respect they think rightly. For it is not proper to pervert the judge, by exciting him to anger, or envy, or pity; since this is just as if some one should make the rule distorted which he intends to use. Again, it is likewise manifest that the only business of the litigant is to show that a thing either is, or is not, or that it has, or has not been done. But with respect to such things as the legislator has not defined whether they are great or small, just or unjust, these ought to be known by the judge himself, and he is not to learn them from the litigants. It is especially requisite, therefore, that laws which are rightly framed should define all such particulars as can be defined, and leave very little to be defined by the judge. And, in the first place, indeed, this is requisite, because it is more easy to obtain one person, or a few, than many that are intelligent and wise, and who are able to act the part of a legislator and a judge. In the next place, the establishment of laws, is the effect of a survey from a long series of past time; but judgments are the result of a survey from recent times; so that it is difficult for those who judge to attribute what is just and advantageous in a becoming manner. That, however, which is the greatest [reason] of all is, that the judgment of the legislator is not conversant

conversant with particulars, but with future events, and universals; but the judgment of the barrister and the judge is directed to present and definite circumstances; with which love and hatred and private advantage are frequently conjoined; so that they are no longer sufficiently able to survey the truth, but their own peculiar pleasure or pain darkens their judgment. With respect to other particulars, therefore, it is necessary, as we have said, that very little should be left in the power of the judge. But with respect to the enquiry whether a thing has been done or not, or whether it will or will not take place, or is or is not, it is necessary that this should be left to the judges; for it is not possible that these things should be foreseen by the legislator.

If then this be the case, it is evident that those rhetoricians who define [other parts of an oration except credibility] such for instance as what the proem or the narration should contain, and each of the other parts,—these exercise their art in things foreign to the purpose. For in these they effect nothing else except delivering the method by which the judge may be influenced; but they demonstrate nothing respecting artificial credibility; viz. whence some one may become enthymematic [or possess the power of discovering artificial proofs of that which is the subject of controversy]. Hence, though there is the same method respecting popular, and judicial orations, and the popular is better and more political than the method pertaining to contracts, yet rhetoricians of the present day, are silent as to the popular method, but all of them endeavour to unfold the art pertaining to the judicial genus, because it is less advantageous in popular orations to assert what is foreign to the purpose; and a popular oration is less pernicious than a judicial discussion, but is more common. For in the former the judge decides about appropriate concerns; so that nothing else is necessary than to show that the thing is as the counsellor asserts it to be. In judicial processes, however, this is not sufficient, but it is requisite to pay attention to the hearer; for the decision is concerning things of a foreign nature. Hence, the judges, looking to their own advantage, and regarding their own pleasure, gratify the litigants, but do

not decide with justice. Hence, too, as I have before observed, in many places the law forbids any thing foreign to the purpose to be said; and in these places this law is sufficiently observed by the judges themselves.

Since, however, it is evident that the artificial method is conversant with credibility; but credibility is a certain demonstration; for we then especially believe in a thing when we think it is accompanied with demonstration; and a rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme; and this in short possesses the greatest authority of all credibilities; but an enthymeme is a certain syllogism, and it is the province either of the whole, or of a certain part of dialectic to pay attention similarly to every syllogism; this being the case, it is evident that he who is eminently capable of surveying this, viz. from what propositions and how, a syllogism may be made, he will be especially enthymematic, in consequence of assuming what the particulars are with which enthymemes are conversant, and what differences they possess with respect to logical syllogisms. For it is the province of the same power to perceive truth, and what is similar to truth; and at the same time, men are by nature sufficiently adapted to [the perception of] truth, and for the most part obtain it. Hence, he who sagaciously conjectures probabilities, is disposed similarly to him who perceives truth. That others, therefore, artificially discuss things foreign to the purpose, and why they especially incline to judicial precepts, is evident [from what has been said].

But rhetoric is useful because things true and just are naturally more excellent than their contraries; so that unless judgments are formed according to what is fit, what is more excellent will be vanquished by its contrary; and this is a thing worthy of reprehension. Farther still, though we should possess the most accurate science, it is not easy when we speak to persuade some persons, by employing that science. For a scientific oration proceeds from discipline, and it is impossible from this [to persuade the unlearned,] but it is necessary [when addressing these,] to procure credibility, and frame arguments from such things as are common; just as we have asserted in the
Topics,

Topics, respecting a conference with the multitude. Farther still, the power of being able to persuade contraries, [or the ability of disputing on each side of a question] is necessary, in the same manner as in syllogisms, not in order that we may do both; for it is not proper to persuade to what is base; but that we may not be ignorant how contraries subsist, and that when another person employs those arguments unjustly, we may be able to solve them. No one, therefore, of the other arts syllogistically concludes contraries; but this is alone effected by dialectic and rhetoric; for both of them are similarly conversant with contraries; though the things which are the subjects of their consideration do not subsist similarly, but always, as I may say, things which are true, and naturally more excellent, are more syllogistic, and adapted to procure persuasion. Besides, it is absurd, that it should be shameful for a man not to be able to give assistance to his body, and that it should not be shameful for him not to be able to assist himself by the reasoning power, which is more the peculiarity of man, than the use of the body. If, however, it should be objected that he who uses unjustly the rhetorical power, may injure others in a great degree, this objection is common to every thing that is good, except virtue, and especially to the most useful things, such as strength, health, riches, and military command. For he who uses things of this kind justly, may benefit others in the greatest degree, and by using them unjustly may effect the greatest injury.

That rhetoric, therefore, is not conversant with one certain definite genus, but resembles in this respect dialectic, and that it is useful is evident. It is likewise evident, that the employment of rhetoric is not to persuade, but to perceive on every subject what is adapted to procure persuasion, in the same manner as in all other arts. For it is not the business of medicine to produce health, but to do every thing as much as possible which may procure it; since the healing art may be well exercised upon those that are incapable of being restored to health. In addition likewise to what has been said, it is the province of the same power to perceive what is persuasive, and what appears to be so, just as it is the province of dialectic to discern what is a [true,] and

and what is only an *apparent* syllogism. For the sophistical art does not consist in the power [of reasoning,] but in deliberate choice; except that here indeed [viz. in the rhetorical art,] one man will be a rhetorician from science, but another from deliberate choice. There, however, [viz. in dialectic or logic,] the sophist, indeed, is from deliberate choice, but the logician is not from deliberate choice, but from the power [of reasoning].

CHAPTER II.

Now, therefore, we shall endeavour to speak concerning the method itself, [i. e. the rhetorical art] and [show] how, and from what particulars we may be able to obtain the end proposed by this art. Again, therefore, as if defining from the beginning, let us discuss what remains. Let rhetoric then be *the power of perceiving in every thing that which is capable of producing persuasion*; for this is the employment of no other art; since each of the other arts is doctrinal and persuasive about that which is the subject of its consideration. Thus, for instance, medicine is doctrinal and persuasive about that which is salubrious and morbid; geometry, about the properties accidental to magnitudes; and arithmetic about number. The like also takes place in the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric, as I may say, appears to be able to survey about any given thing, what is adapted to produce persuasion. Hence, also, we say, that it does not possess an artificial power about any certain peculiar definite genus.

With respect, however, to things which procure credibility, some of them are without art, but others are artificial. And I call those
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without art, which are not devised by us, but exist prior [to all artificial invention,] such as witnesses, questions, writings, and other particulars of the like kind; but those are artificial which are capable of being procured methodically, and by us; so that it is requisite to use the former, and discover the latter.

Of the credibility, however, which is procured by argument there are three species. For one kind indeed consists in the manners of the speaker; another in the disposition of the hearer; and the third in the argument itself, in consequence of demonstrating, or appearing to demonstrate. Credibility, therefore, is procured through manners, when the oration is delivered in such a way, as to render the speaker worthy of belief. For about every thing, in short, we believe the worthy in a greater degree, and more rapidly; but in those particulars in which an accurate knowledge cannot be obtained, and which are ambiguous, we entirely confide in [the decision of] the worthy. It is, however, requisite that this also should happen through the oration, and not [entirely] from any previous opinion respecting the speaker. For we must not admit what some teachers of rhetoric have asserted in their art, that the probity of the speaker contributes nothing to persuasion; since nearly, as I may say, manners possess the most powerful and principal credibility. But credibility is procured through the hearers, when their passions are influenced by the oration; for we do not similarly form a judgment when we grieve or rejoice, love or hate; to which [species of credibility,] we assert that those who now deliver the art of rhetoric, alone direct their attention. Each of these particulars, however, will be elucidated by us, when we speak concerning the passions. But belief is produced through arguments, when we show what is true, or appears to be true from the probabilities pertaining to the several objects of enquiry. Since, however, credibility is effected through these things, it is evident that to obtain the three species of it [above-mentioned] is the province of him who is able to syllogize, who can survey what pertains to manners and the virtues, and in the third place what pertains to the passions, what each of them is, what quality it possesses, and from what particulars it is ingenerated

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[in the hearer,] and how ; so that it happens that rhetoric is as it were something which grows upon dialectic and the discussion concerning manners, and it is just to call it political. Hence, rhetoric assumes the form of the political [science,] and those who profess it, do so partly through ignorance, partly from arrogance, and partly from other human causes. For it is a certain part and resemblance of dialectic, as we observed in the beginning of this treatise. For neither of them is the science of any thing definite, and which shows how a thing subsists, but they are certain powers of procuring arguments. And thus we have nearly spoken sufficiently concerning the power which they possess, and how they subsist with respect to each other.

With respect, however, to proof either real or apparent, in the same manner as in dialectic, one kind is induction, another is [a true] syllogism, and a third is apparent syllogism ; thus, also, similarly in rhetoric ; for example, indeed, is induction ; but enthymeme is a syllogism. But I call enthymeme, indeed, a rhetorical syllogism ; and example a rhetorical induction. All [rhetoricians], however, who procure belief by the proofs which they adduce, effect it, either by the examples which they bring, or by enthymemes ; and in a certain respect, there is nothing else besides these. Hence, if in short it is necessary to point out any person or thing by syllogism or induction, (but this is evident to us from the analytics) it is necessary that each of those should be the same with each of these. But what the difference is between example and enthymeme is evident from the Topics. For there syllogism and induction are previously discussed ; because if it is shown in many and similar things that what we assert is true, *there*, indeed it is induction, but *here* it is example. . When, however, certain things existing, something else besides happens from these, because these subsist either universally, or for the most part ;—when this is the case, *there*, indeed, it is called syllogism, but *here* enthymeme. But it is evident that each form of rhetoric is benefitted [by these two]. For the like to what we have observed in the Methodical treatises takes place, also, in this treatise. For some orations are of the nature of examples, but others are enthymematic. And in a similar manner with

with respect to rhetoricians, some are delighted with examples, and others with enthymemes. Arguments, therefore, from examples are no less calculated to persuade [than others,] but those from enthymemes cause greater perturbation. But the reason of this, and how each of these [viz. of examples and enthymemes] is to be used, we shall hereafter explain.

Now, however, let us more fully and clearly discuss these very particulars themselves. For that which is persuasive, is persuasive to some one. And one thing, indeed, is immediately of itself persuasive and credible; but another, because it appears to be proved through things that are credible. No art, however, speculates that which is particular. Thus for instance, medicine does not speculate what is salubrious to Socrates or Callias, but what is so to such a one, or to such persons [in general]; for this is artificial. But particulars are infinite, and are not the objects of science. Nor does rhetoric speculate opinable particulars; such as what is the subject of opinion to Socrates or Hippias, but that which is the subject of opinion to such or such persons, in the same manner as dialectic. For dialectic, also, syllogizes, not from such things as are casual; since certain things appear [to be credible] even to those that are delirious; but dialectic syllogizes from such things as require to be developed by a reasoning process, and rhetoric from such things as are accustomed to take place in consultation. The employment, however, of rhetoric consists in such particulars as are the subject of our consultation, and respecting which we have no art, and it is also conversant with such hearers as are incapable of perceiving [a conclusion which is deduced] through many [media,] or of syllogizing remotely, [i. e. who are incapable of a long series of reasoning.] But we consult about those things the subsistence of which appears to be possible in both ways, [i. e. which may subsist otherwise than they do.] For with respect to such things as cannot either in the past, or future, or present time, have a different subsistence, no one consults about these, conceiving that they thus subsist. For it is not possible for any one to consult otherwise than thus [about things of this kind.] But it is possible to syllogize and collect, some

things, indeed, from such particulars as have been previously syllogistically inferred, but others from things not inferred by syllogism, but which require syllogism, because they are not probable. And it is necessary, indeed, with respect to these, that the consecution of the one should not be easy, on account of its length; for the judge is supposed to be simple; and that the other should not be adapted to persuade, because it does not proceed from things acknowledged, nor from such as are probable. Hence, it is necessary that enthymeme and example, should be conversant with such things as for the most part admit of a various subsistence. And example, indeed, requires induction; but enthymeme, syllogism. It is, likewise, necessary that enthymeme and example should consist from a few things, and frequently from fewer than those from which the first syllogism consists. For if any one of these is known, it is not necessary to say any thing [farther;] since the hearer himself will add this. Thus for instance, for the purpose of concluding that Doricus was victorious in that contest in which the victors were crowned, it is sufficient to say, that he conquered in the Olympic games; but there is no occasion to add that he was crowned because he conquered in the Olympic games; for this is known by all men.

There are, however, a few necessary things from which rhetorical syllogisms consist; for many of the particulars which are the subjects of judgment and consideration, may have a various subsistence, or subsist otherwise than they do; since men make their actions the subjects of their consultation and consideration. All actions, likewise, belong to the genus of things which are contingent, and no one of these, as I may say, is from necessity; but things which are for the most part accidental and contingent, must necessarily be syllogistically collected from other things which are of the like kind; and such as are necessary must be deduced by syllogism from necessary propositions. But this is evident to us from the Analytics. This then being the case, it is manifest that with respect to those things from which enthymemes are deduced, some, indeed, are necessary, but most of them are such as have a frequency of subsistence. For enthymemes are deduced from

from probabilities and signs; so that it is necessary each of these should be the same with each¹. For the probable is that which subsists for the most part; but not simply, according to the definition of some persons. That, however, which is assumed respecting things which may have a various subsistence has the same relation to that to which the probable is directed, as universal to particular. But with respect to signs, one, indeed, has such a subsistence as some one of particulars to that which is universal; but another, as some one of universals to that which is particular. And of these signs, that, indeed, which is necessary, is an argument; but that which is not necessary, is anonymous according to difference. I call, therefore, those things necessary from which syllogism is produced; on which account, also, a sign of this kind is *tekmerion*, or an argument. For when rhetoricians fancy that what they say cannot be solved, then they think they have adduced an argument, as being something proved and definite. For *telmar*, and *bound*, or *limit*, are the same, according to the ancient tongue. With respect to signs, however, that indeed which subsists as particular to universal, is just as if some one should say it is a sign that wise are just men; for Socrates was wise and just. This, therefore, is a sign; but what has been asserted though true may be solved; for it is unsyllogistic. The following, however, as, for instance, if some one should say, it is a sign that a certain person is diseased, for he has a fever; or that some female has been delivered, because she has milk, are necessary signs; and which are the only signs that are *tekmeria*. For these alone if true cannot be solved. But that which subsists as universal to particular, is as if some one should say, it is a sign that a certain person has a fever; for he breathes short and frequently. This, however, may be solved though it is true. For it is possible that one who has not a fever may labour under a difficulty of breathing. We have, therefore, now shown what the probable, a sign, and an argument, are, and in what they differ from each other. These, however,

¹ i. e. The propositions from which enthymemes are deduced are the same with probabilities and signs.

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are more clearly unfolded in the Analytics, where, also, it is shown from what cause some of them are unsyllogistic, but others are syllogistically deduced. And with respect to example, that it is indeed induction, and what the subjects are about which it is an induction, we have already shown. It is, however, neither as a part to the whole, nor as the whole to a part, nor as whole to whole; but that which is as a part to a part, and as the similar to the similar, when both are under the same genus, but the one is more known than the other, is example. Thus for instance, that Dionysius endeavoured to establish a tyrannical government, when he required a guard, is an example; for Pisistratus who prior to him attempted the same thing, demanded a guard, and having obtained it, tyrannized [over the Athenians;] and Theagenes over the Megarensians. All such others, likewise, as are known [to have acted in this manner] become an example of Dionysius, with respect to whom it is not yet known whether he requires a guard with a view to a tyrannical government. All these, however, are under the same universal, viz. that he aspires after a tyranny who requires a guard. And thus we have shown what the particulars are from which the credibility that appears to be demonstrative is derived.

CHAPTER III.

WITH respect to enthymemes, however, there is a great difference, of which nearly all [the professors of rhetoric] are particularly ignorant, and which is conversant with the dialectic method of syllogisms. For some enthymemes pertain to rhetoric, just as some syllogisms subsist according to the dialectic method; but others pertain to other arts and

and faculties, some of which are in existence, and others are not yet discovered. Hence, they are not understood by those that hear them, and if rhetoricians employ them more than is fit, they relinquish their own art, and exchange it for some other. But what we have said, will become more evident, by a more copious discussion. For I say that dialectic and rhetorical syllogisms are those which are formed from propositions derived from certain places. And these are such as are conversant in common about things that are just and natural, and about political concerns, and many things which are specifically different; such for instance as the place respecting the more and the less. For we cannot in any greater degree syllogize from this place, or produce an enthymeme from it respecting what is just or natural, than respecting any thing else; though these things are specifically different. But peculiar or proper syllogisms are those which consist from propositions pertaining to each species and genus. Thus for instance, the propositions respecting natural things are those from which neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism respecting ethics can be formed. And ethical enthymemes are those which are formed from propositions peculiar to ethical subjects, and from which physical enthymemes cannot be produced. The like, also, takes place in every subject. And those [dialectic and rhetorical syllogisms,] indeed, do not render a man wise in any kind of discussion, because they are not conversant with any [definite] subject; but with respect to these [that are peculiar and appropriate,] in proportion as the selection of them is better, in such proportion will he who makes the selection latently produce a science different from dialectic and rhetoric. For if he should happen to meet with the principles [of any science] the peculiar syllogisms will no longer pertain either to dialectic or rhetoric, but to that science of which he possesses the principles.

Most enthymemes, however, are derived from those forms which are particular and proper; and a few of them are derived from common [places.] As in the *Topics*, therefore, so here the species and the places of enthymemes, from whence they are to be assumed, must be distinguished. But I call species, indeed, the peculiar propositions according

according to each genus; and places, those propositions which are similarly common to all genera. We shall, therefore, speak first concerning the species.

And in the first place we shall assume the genera of rhetoric, in order that we may ascertain how many there are, and with respect to these we shall separately assume the elements and the propositions. But the genera of rhetoric are three in number; for so many, also, are the auditors of orations. For an oration is composed from three things, from the speaker, from the thing about which he speaks, and from the person to whom he speaks. The end, also, [of the speaker] is directed to this last, I mean to the hearer. But it is necessary that the auditor should either be a spectator or a judge; and that the judge should be a judge either of things past or future. He, however, who judges of future events, is as it were one who speaks in an assembly; but he who judges of past events, is as it were one who determines causes; and he who judges of the power [of the oration,] is as it were a spectator. Hence, there will necessarily be three genera of rhetorical orations, the deliberative, or that which pertains to counsel, the judicial, and the demonstrative. But of counsel, one part is exhortation, and another dehortation. For always, both those who privately give counsel, and those who publicly harrangue, do one of these, [i. e. either exhort, or dissuade.] Of judgment, however, one part is accusation, but another defence. For those that are engaged in controversy must necessarily do one or other of these. But of the demonstrative, one part is praise, and another blame. There are, also, times appropriated to each of these, to him who gives counsel, indeed, the future; for he consults about future events, and concerning these either exhorts, or dissuades. But the time which is adapted to him who judges, is the past; for always concerning things which have been done, one accuses, and another apologizes. And to him who demonstrates¹, the most appropriate time is the present; for all those who demonstrate praise

¹ It must be carefully observed, that *demonstration* in rhetoric means only the *probable proof* of a thing, and not, as in science, a syllogistic process from self-evident principles, the conclusions of which process are always *necessarily true*.

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or blame according to existing circumstances. Frequently, however, they employ the past time for the purpose of recollecting, and they form a conjecture of future events.

But the end to each of these is different; and as there are three persons there are three ends; to him who gives counsel, indeed, the end is that which is advantageous and detrimental. For the advice of him who exhorts is directed to that which is better; but he who dissuades, dissuades from that which is worse; and at the same time they assume other things with a view to this, viz. either the just or the unjust, either the beautiful in conduct, or the base. But to those who judge in courts of judicature, the end is the just and the unjust; and they also assume other things with a view to these. And to those that praise and blame, the end is the beautiful and the base in conduct; and they likewise refer other things to these. An indication, however, that the end to each of these, is what we have said it is, is this, that sometimes there is no controversy about other things. Thus for instance, he who is tried will assert that the thing was not done, or that he has committed no injury; but he will never acknowledge that he has acted unjustly; for if he did, the trial would be unnecessary. In like manner, those who give counsel frequently admit other things, but will not acknowledge that they have advised what is disadvantageous, or that they have dissuaded from what is beneficial. Frequently, however, they are not at all concerned whether it is not unjust to enslave the neighbouring people, and those who have done them no injury. In like manner, also, those who praise, and those who blame, do not consider whether the subject of their praise or blame has acted advantageously or perniciously, but frequently applaud him because, disregarding his own interest, he performed some worthy action. Thus for instance, they praise Achilles, because he gave assistance to his friend Patroclus, though he knew it was necessary that he should die himself [by giving this assistance,] and that it was in his power to live. But to Achilles, indeed, a death of this kind was more honourable; and to live, more advantageous.

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From what has been said, however, it is evident that it is necessary to possess in the first place propositions about these things. For arguments (*tecmeria*) probabilities, and signs, are rhetorical propositions. For in short, syllogism is from propositions; but enthymeme is a syllogism consisting from the above mentioned propositions.

Since, however, impossibilities cannot be performed either at present or in future, but this can only be asserted of possibilities; and since, likewise, it is not possible that things which are neither done, nor will be done, should be performed at present, or in future, it is necessary that he who counsels, he who judges, and he who demonstrates, should possess propositions concerning the possible and impossible, and whether a thing has been done or not, and whether it will be or not. Farther still, since all those who praise and blame, who exhort and dissuade, who accuse and defend, not only endeavour to show the particulars we have mentioned, but also something which is great or small, good or evil, beautiful or base, just or unjust, whether they speak of these things by themselves, or compare them with each other, this being the case, it is evident that it is requisite to have propositions concerning magnitude and parvitude, the greater and the less, the universal and the particular; such for instance as what is a greater or less good, an unjust, or a just action; and in a similar manner in other things. And thus we have shown what the things are concerning which it is necessary to assume propositions.

CHAPTER IV.

In the next place, a distinction must be peculiarly made respecting each of these; as for instance, what the subjects of consultation are; with what demonstrative orations are conversant; and in the third place what the subjects are about which judgments are employed. In the first place, therefore, it must be assumed what the kind of good or evil is about which he who advises counsels; since he does not give counsel about all things, but about such as may happen to be or not. But with respect to such things as necessarily either are or will be, of which cannot possibly exist, about these there is no consultation. Hence, neither is there consultation about all contingent events. For there are some goods from nature, and some from fortune, which notwithstanding they are contingent, and may or may not be, yet consultation contributes nothing to them. But it is evident that consultation is respecting such things as are naturally adapted to be referred to us, and the principle of the generation of which is in our power. For our attention is exerted thus far, till we find whether it is possible or impossible for us to perform such things.

Accurately, therefore, to enumerate the several particulars, and to distribute into species the subjects of popular discussion; and besides this, to determine according to truth as much as is possible concerning them, it is not necessary at present to investigate, because it is not the province of the rhetorical art, but of an art more allied to wisdom, and more true; for even now much more is attributed to rhetoric than pertains to its proper theorems. For that which we have before

observed is true, that rhetoric is composed indeed from the analytic science, and from that political science which is conversant with morals; and it is partly similar to dialectic, and partly to sophistical arguments. In proportion, however, as any one endeavours to discuss either dialectic or rhetoric, not as powers, but as sciences, so far he ignorantly destroys the nature of them, by migrating through this attempt into the sciences of certain subject *things*, instead of alone making a transition into the powers or faculties of *words*. At the same time, we shall now speak of whatever it is indeed requisite to distinguish, and which leaves matter of consideration to the political science. For nearly the subjects which are discussed by all those who give counsel, are especially five in number; and these are, concerning wealth, war, and peace; and besides these, the defence of the country, exports and imports; and legislation.

Hence, it is requisite that he who is to give counsel about wealth, should know the revenues of the country, what they are, and how, if they are deficient, an addition may be made to them; and how, if they are too small, they may be augmented. It is likewise necessary that he should be acquainted with all the expenses of the city, and know how any unnecessary expense may be removed, and that which is greater [than is fit] may become less. For men not only become richer by an accumulation of property, but also by a decrease of expense. And these things may not only be surveyed from the experience of private affairs; but in order to give counsel about these, it is necessary to be skilled in what has been discovered by others.

With respect however to war and peace, it is necessary to know the power of the city, what the forces of it are at present, how great they may be, what the nature of the strength is which is possessed, and what addition may be made to it; and farther still, what wars the city has had, and how they have been conducted. And it is not only necessary that he who gives counsel should understand these concerns of his own country, but also those of the neighbouring countries. He should likewise be particularly acquainted with those cities against whom it is thought fit to wage war, in order that peace may be made with

with the more powerful, and war undertaken against the less powerful, if requisite. He must also know the forces of these cities, whether they are similar or dissimilar. For in these, it is possible to be superior or inferior. It is likewise necessary for this purpose, that he should not only have surveyed the wars of his own country, but likewise the event of the wars of other countries. For similars are naturally adapted to be known from similars.

Farther still, with respect to the defence of the country, it is requisite not to be ignorant how it may be defended, but to know the multitude of its defenders, and the form of the defence, and the places proper for garrisons. This knowledge, however, cannot be possessed by him who is unacquainted with the country. For such knowledge is necessary, in order that if the defence is less [than it ought to be] it may be increased; that if superfluous it may be taken away; and that garrisons may be formed in more appropriate places.

Again, it is requisite to know what expense is necessary to supply the city with provision, what the country will afford, and what must be supplied from abroad. What commodities are fit to be imported, and what exported, in order that conventions and compacts may be considered accordingly. For there are two descriptions of men with whom it is necessary the citizens should preserve themselves blameless, viz. with those that are more powerful, and with those that are beneficial to them [in a commercial point of view].

And it is necessary, indeed, to be able to survey all these particulars for the sake of security; and in no small degree for the purpose of understanding the business of legislation. For the safety of the city is in the laws. Hence, it is necessary to know how many forms of government there are, what kind of things are advantageous to each, and by what they are naturally adapted to be corrupted, both among things appropriate and contrary to the polity. But I say, governments are corrupted by things appropriate, because all other polities except that which is the best, are corrupted by remission and intention. Thus for instance, a democracy, not only becomes more imbecile by remission, so as at length to arrive at an oligarchy, but it is also weakened by vehement

vehement intention ; just as an aquiline and a flat nose, not only arrive at mediocrity by remission, but likewise when they become very aquiline or flat, cause the nose to be so disposed, that it no longer appears to be a nostril. It is moreover useful for the purpose of legislation, not only to understand what is advantageous to a polity, by a survey of past events, but also to know the condition of other polities, and what is adapted to each. Hence it is evident that travelling is useful for the purposes of legislation ; since from hence the laws of nations may be obtained. But the knowledge of history is requisite to political counsels. All these particulars, however, are the business of politics, and not of rhetoric. Such, therefore, are the principal things which he who intends to give counsel ought to possess.

CHAPTER V.

LET us again, however, enumerate the particulars from which it is requisite to exhort or dissuade, both respecting these, and other things. But nearly, both privately to each individual, and in common to all men, there is a certain scope, to which choice and aversion are directed ; and this is, in short, felicity, and the parts of it. Hence, for the sake of an example, we shall assume what felicity is, and from what the parts of it consist. For all exhortations and all dissuasions are conversant with this, and with the things which contribute to it, and the contraries to this. For it is necessary to perform such things as procure this felicity, or a certain part of it, or which render it greater instead of less ; and not to do those things which corrupt or impede felicity, or produce its contraries.

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Let felicity, therefore, be [defined to be] *acting well in conjunction with virtue; or, a life sufficient to itself, or, the most pleasant life in conjunction with security; or, a prosperous condition of possessions and the body, together with a power of preserving and effecting these.* For nearly all men acknowledge that felicity is one, or more than one of these.

If, therefore, felicity is a thing of this kind, it is necessary, that the parts of it should be, nobility of birth, an abundance of friends, and these such as are worthy men, riches, a numerous progeny, and a good old age; and besides these, the virtues of the body, such as health, beauty, strength, magnitude, agonistic power; glory, honour, and prosperity; virtue, or also the parts of it, prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance. For thus a man will be most sufficient to himself, if both internal and external goods are present with him; for there are no other goods besides these. But internal goods, indeed, are both those which pertain to the soul, and those which pertain to the body; and external goods are, nobility of birth, friends, riches and honour; and besides these, we think it requisite that power and fortune should be present. For thus life will be most secure.

In a similar manner, therefore, we shall assume what each of these is. Nobility of birth then both to a nation and a city is when the people are indigenous or ancient, and their first leaders or commanders are illustrious men, and when many persons illustrious in those things which are the objects of emulation are the progeny of these. But private nobility is derived either from men, or from women, and a legitimate procreation from both. And in this nobility as well as in that of a city, it is requisite that the first authors of the race, should be illustrious either in virtue or in riches, or in something else which is honourable, and likewise that many illustrious men and women, young and old, should be the progeny of this genus.

With respect to a good and numerous offspring it is not immanifest what it is. But in a community, a good offspring is a multitude of young and worthy children; who are worthy, indeed, according to the virtue of the body, as for instance, in magnitude, beauty, strength, and agonistic power; and according to the virtue of the soul, in tem-
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perance and fortitude, which are the virtues of youth. Privately, however, the offspring is good and numerous; if the proper children both male and female, are many and worthy. But the corporeal virtue of females is, beauty and magnitude; and the virtues of their soul are temperance and sedulity without illiberality. It is requisite, therefore, to investigate both privately and publicly the existence of each of these virtues, in men and in women; for where these virtues are wanting in the women, as is the case with the Lacedæmonians, such women are scarcely half happy.

The parts of wealth, however, are money, a great quantity of land, and the possession of farms; and besides these, furniture, cattle, and slaves which are remarkable for their multitude, magnitude and beauty. All these possessions, likewise, ought to be secure, free, and useful. But those are more useful which are profitable; those are free which are subservient to enjoyment; I call those profitable which yield a revenue; and those consist in enjoyment, in which nothing is estimable besides the use. But the definition of security, indeed, is for a man to possess what he has in such a place and in such a manner, that the use of it may be in his power; and so that it may be his own property or not, when it is in his power to alienate it. But I call alienation giving and selling. In short, riches consist more in use than in possession. For the energy and the use of things of this kind are riches.

: Renown, is to be esteemed by all worthy persons, or it is the possession of a thing of such a kind as is desired by all men, or which many, or good, or wise men desire.

But honor is an indication of beneficent renown. And those, indeed, who have benefited others, are justly and especially honoured; though he likewise is honoured who is able to benefit. But beneficence is that which either pertains to safety, and such things as are the causes of existence, or to wealth, or to some other of those goods, the possession of which is not easy; and this either entirely, or in this place, or at a certain time. For many persons obtain honour from things which appear to be small; but the modes and the occasions are the causes of it.

it. The parts of honour, however, are, sacrifices, eulogies in prose and verse, rewards, sacred groves, precedency in sitting, sepulchres, statues, and public salaries; barbaric honours, such as adoration by inclining the body, giving place, and gifts which are universally valued. For a gift is the donation of possession, and an indication of honour. Hence, the ambitious and the avaricious are desirous of gifts; since gifts contain in themselves what each of these require. For possession is that which the avaricious desire, and it is also attended with honour after which the ambitious aspire.

But the virtue of the body is health, and this in such a way as to render those who use the body, free from disease. For many persons are healthy as Herodicus is said to be; and yet no one will proclaim them to be happy on account of health, because [like Herodicus] they abstain from all or the greater part of human concerns. With respect to beauty it is different in every age. The beauty, therefore, of a young man is to have a body useful for the endurance of labour, viz. for the course, and for violent action, and which is also pleasing to the view. Hence, those that contend in the five games are most beautiful, because they are naturally adapted both to violent action, and celerity. But the beauty of him who is in the acme of life, is to be capable of warlike labours, and to be terribly pleasing to the view. And the beauty of an old man, is to have a body sufficiently adapted to necessary labours, but without pain, because he has none of those diseases with which old age is defiled. Strength, also, is the power by which a man moves another thing as he pleases; and it is necessary to move another thing, either by drawing, or impelling, or lifting, or compressing, or crushing; so that he who is strong is strong in all, or in some of these. But the virtue of magnitude is to excell the multitude in length, depth, and breadth, so that the motions of the body may not be rendered slower, by this excess [of magnitude]. And the agonistic virtue of the body is composed from magnitude, strength, and celerity; for he who is swift is strong; since he who is able to hurl forth his legs in a certain respect, and to move them with celerity, and

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to a great distance is a racer. But he who can grapple and hold fast, is a wrestler. He who can drive another person away by a blow, is a pugilist; and he who can do both these is a pancratiast. But he who excells in all these, is a pentathlian, or skilled in the five games.

A good old age, also, is, when age slowly approaches unattended with pain. For neither has a man a good old age, if he becomes rapidly old; nor if he becomes old with difficulty, but attended with pain. A good old age, however, consists from the virtues of the body and from the goods of fortune. For an old age which is neither free from disease nor strong, will not be impassive to maladies, and will not be unattended with pain, or possess longevity; nor can it be permanent without [the goods of] fortune. There is, however, another certain power of living long separate from strength and health. For many live long without the virtues of the body; but an accurate discussion of these things is of no use at present.

But what the friendship of many and worthy persons is, will not be immanifest from the definition of a friend. A friend, therefore, is one who performs those things for the sake of his friend which he thinks will be beneficial to him; and he who has many such has many friends; but he with whom such men are worthy persons has worthy friends.

Moreover, prosperity consists in those goods of which fortune is the cause that either all, or most, or the greatest of these befall us. But fortune is the cause of some things, indeed, of which the arts are the cause; and likewise of many and inartificial things, as for instance, such as those of which nature is the cause. Sometimes, however, it happens that these are preternatural. For art, indeed, is the cause of health; but nature of beauty and magnitude. And in short, those goods are from fortune which are attended with envy. Fortune, also, is the cause of those goods which are contrary to reason; as when all the rest of the brothers are deformed, and one alone is beautiful; or when all the rest did not see the treasure, and one alone discovered it; or when the next person happens to be pierced with an arrow, but this man escapes; or when only one person did not come to a place where others

others were accustomed to come, but others who only came to it at that time were destroyed. For all such circumstances appear to be the effect of good fortune.

With respect to virtue, however, because it is a topic most adapted to applause, we shall then discuss it when we speak concerning praise. And thus we have shown what ought to be our aim in persuading or dissuading whether in reference to things present or future. For persuasion is contrary to dissuasion.

CHAPTER VI.

SINCE, however, the profitable is the scope proposed by him who counsels; but men counsel not concerning the end, but those things which refer to the end; and these are such as are advantageous to action; but that which is advantageous is good;—this being the case, the elements must be assumed of the good and the advantageous simply considered.

Let good, therefore, be that which is itself eligible for its own sake; and for the sake of which we choose something else. Let it, also, be that which all things desire, or which all things desire that have sense or intellect, or would desire if they had. Let it, likewise, be such things as intellect dictates to every one; and whatever the intellect of each person dictates to each, this is the good of each. It is, also, that which when present causes its possessor to be well disposed, and sufficient to himself; and is self-sufficiency. It is, likewise, that which produces or preserves things of this kind; to which things of this kind are consequent; and which prevents the contraries, and such things as

are corruptive of these. But things of this kind are consequent to food in a twofold respect; either at once, or afterwards. Thus for instance, scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline; but life subsists at one and the same time with health. And the efficient causes have a threefold subsistence, some, indeed, [in the genus of the formal cause] as to be well is effective of health; others [in the genus of the efficient cause] as food is productive of health; and others [in the genus of the disposing cause] as exercise, because this for the most part produces health.

These things, therefore, being admitted, it is necessary that the assumptions of things good and the rejections of things evil should be good; for the non-possession of evil is at once consequent to the former; and the possession of good to the latter. The assumption, likewise, of a greater instead of a less good, [is consequent to these,] and of a less instead of a greater evil. For that by which the greater surpasses the less, becomes the assumption of the one, and the rejection of the other. It is, likewise, necessary that the virtues should be good. For those who possess them are from these well disposed, and become effective of and practically good. With respect to each virtue, however, what it is, and what quality it possesses, we must speak separately. It must also be admitted that pleasure is good; for all animals naturally aspire after it; so that things which are pleasant and beautiful are necessarily good; since these are productive of pleasure. But of things which are beautiful, some indeed are pleasant; but others are themselves eligible by themselves. That we may, however, speak of them severally, it is necessary that the following things should be good: felicity; for it is eligible for its own sake, is sufficient to itself, and we choose many things for the sake of it. Justice, likewise, fortitude, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of this kind; [are necessarily good;] for they are the virtues of the soul. This is also the case with health, beauty, and the like; for they are the virtues of the body, and are effective of many things. Thus for instance, health, is effective of pleasure and life; on which account, also, it appears to be most excellent, because it is the cause of two things

things which are most honoured by the multitude, viz. pleasure and life. Wealth, also, is good; for it is the virtue of possession, and is effective of many things. A friend, also, and friendship are good; for a friend is a thing eligible of itself, and is effective of many things. This is also the case with honour and glory; for they are delightful, produce many things, and those things for which men are honoured, are for the most part attendant upon them. The power, likewise, of speaking and acting is good; for all such things are effective of good: and besides these, a good disposition, memory, an aptness to learn, sagacity, and every thing of this kind; for these powers are productive of good. In a similar manner this is the case with all sciences and arts. Life itself, also, is good; for though it were effective of no other good, yet it is eligible of itself. The just likewise is good; for it is in common something profitable. And these things are in general acknowledged to be good.

With respect, however, to those things which are dubious, syllogisms are thus framed to prove that they are good. That is good, the contrary to which is evil. This is likewise the case with that, the contrary to which is advantageous to enemies. Thus, if to be timid is especially advantageous to enemies, it is evident that fortitude is especially beneficial to citizens. And in short, the contrary to that which enemies wish, or with which they are delighted, appears to be beneficial. Hence, it was well said,

Sure Priam will rejoice¹.

This, however, is not always, but for the most part true. For nothing hinders but that sometimes the same things, may be beneficial as well to our adversaries as to us. Hence, it is said that evils conciliate men, when the same thing is pernicious to both. That, also, of which there is no excess is good; but that which is greater than it ought to be is evil. That, likewise, is good, for the sake of which

¹ Iliad, 10.

many

many labours have been endured, and much wealth consumed; for this is now an apparent good; and a thing of this kind is considered as an end, and as the end of many things. (But the end is good. Hence it is said [by Juno¹];

And fame, indeed, to Priam will redound.

And [by Ulysses²];

Longer to stay is shameful.

Whence, also, the proverb, "A water pot at the doors." That, likewise, is good which is the object of desire to many persons, and which appears to be worthy of contention. For that which all men desire is good; and the many appear to be as it were all. That, also, is good which is laudable; for no one praises that which is not good. In a similar manner that is good which both enemies and bad men praise. For it is just as if all men acknowledged it to be good, if it is acknowledged to be so by those that are badly affected. For because it is apparent, it is acknowledged to be good; just as those are bad men whom our friends blame; and those are good men whom our enemies do not blame. Hence the Corinthians conceived themselves to be reviled by Simonides, for saying,

"Ilion, however, does not Corinth blame."

That likewise is good which is preferred by some wise person, or some good man or woman. Thus Minerva preferred Ulysses, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Paris, and Homer Achilles. And in short, things which are the objects of deliberate choice are good; but men deliberately choose to perform the things we have mentioned, and such as are evil

¹ Iliad, 2.

² Iliad, 2.

³ This was probably said of those, who after they had brought a vessel full of water from a distant fountain home, suffered it to fall from their hands and to be broken at the door of the house.

to

to enemies, and good to friends. Things that are possible, also, are good; but these are twofold, viz. such as may be done, and such as may be easily done; and those things may be easily done, which are unattended with pain, or which may be effected in a short time. For that which is difficult is defined either by pain, or by length of time. Things, likewise, are good which are done according to our wish; but we wish either no evil, or less evil than good. But this will take place, if either punishment is latent, or small. Men, also, wish to possess good which is their own property, and which no other person possesses. They, likewise, wish to possess superfluities; for thus they obtain more honour. And, also, things adapted to themselves; but things of this kind are such as are fit, both according to genus and power. Things, likewise, which they fancy they are defective in, are the objects of their wish, though they should be little things. For they no less deliberately chuse to perform these. Also, things which may be easily effected; for these are possible, as being easy. But those things are most easily effected which all men, or those that are similar, or those that are inferior have performed rightly and well. Likewise, those things with which friends are gratified, or which are odious to enemies. And such things as those who admire them deliberately chuse to do. Likewise, those things in which men are ingenious and expert; for they think they shall easily accomplish them with rectitude. Also, those things which no bad man will undertake; for these are more laudable. And such things as are the objects of desire to men; for these are not only delightful, but they also appear to be more excellent. Men, also, especially chuse to do those things to which they are most propense. Thus, for instance, victory is the object of choice to the warrior; honour to the ambitious; riches to the covetous; and other characters after the same manner. Concerning the good, therefore, and the advantageous, credibility may from these things be derived.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VII.

BECAUSE, however, those [who counsel] and who acknowledge [the subjects of their deliberation] to be profitable, are frequently dubious with respect to that which is more profitable, it follows that we should in the next place speak concerning the greater good, and the more profitable. Let, therefore, that which exceeds be so much and something more; but let that which is exceeded be that which is inherent [in the thing which exceeds.] And that which is greater, indeed, and more is always referred to that which is less; but the great and the small, and the much and the few, are referred to the magnitude of many things. And that which exceeds, indeed, is the great; but that which is deficient is the small; and in a similar manner with respect to the much and the few.

We call good, therefore, that which is itself eligible for its own sake, and not for the sake of another; that which all things desire; that which he who has received intellect and prudence would chuse; and that which is effective and preservative, or to which things of this kind are consequent. But that for the sake of which [other things subsist] is the end; and the end is that for the sake of which other things subsist; but that is good to any individual which with reference to him possesses these [definitions of universal good.] Hence, it is necessary that more goods should be a greater good than one or a few goods, when the one good or the few are co-enumerated; for they transcend; but that which is inherent is exceeded. If, also, that which is greatest [in one genus] exceeds that which is greatest [in another,] the one
genus

genus will also exceed the other; and when one genus exceeds the other, that which is greatest in the one, will also exceed that which is greatest in the other. Thus, for instance, if the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman, then in short men are greater than women; and if men are in short greater than women, the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman. For the excesses of the genera, and of the greatest things in the genera subsist analogously. When, also, this thing is consequent to that, but that is not consequent to this [the latter is a greater good.] But one thing is consequent to another either simultaneously, or successively, or potentially. For the use of the consequent is inherent in the use of the antecedent; and to live is, indeed, simultaneously consequent to the being well, but the latter is not simultaneously consequent to the former. And scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline. But it follows potentially that if a man be a sacrilegious person he may commit a private theft; for he who robs a temple would also steal private property. Of two things, also, which exceed the same third, that which more exceeds is the greater; for it is necessary that it should exceed the other by that greater excess by which it exceeds the third. Those things, likewise, are greater which are effective of a greater good; for by this the efficient cause is greater. And in a similar manner that of which the efficient is greater, is also itself greater. For if that which is salubrious is more eligible than that which is pleasant, and is a greater good, health is also a greater good than pleasure. That, likewise, which is more eligible of itself, is a greater good than that which is not eligible of itself. Thus, for instance, strength is a greater good than the salubrious; for the latter is not desirable for its own sake, but the former is, which is the characteristic of good. If, also, one thing is the end, but the other is not, [the former is the greater good.] For the latter subsists for the sake of another, but the former for the sake of itself; as, for instance, to be exercised is for the sake of the good condition of the body. That, likewise, which is in a less degree indigent of another, or of other things [is a greater good;] for it is more sufficient to itself. But that is in a less degree indigent which requires fewer things, or such as are

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more

more easily procured. When, likewise, this thing cannot subsist without that, or it is not possible it can be generated without it, but that can subsist without this, [then the latter is a greater good than the former; for it is more sufficient to itself;] because that which is not indigent of another is more self-sufficient; so that it is evidently a greater good. This is also the case, for the same reason, if one thing is a principle, but another is not; and if one thing is a cause, but another is not. For without cause and principle it is impossible for a thing to be, or to be generated. When, likewise, two things are principles, that which proceeds from the greater principle is greater; and also when there are two causes, that is the greater which proceeds from the greater cause. And vice versa, when there are two principles, the principle of the greater thing is greater; and when there are two causes, the cause of the greater thing is greater. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that in both ways a thing may appear to be greater. For if this thing is a principle, but that is not, this thing will appear to be greater than that. And, also, if this thing is not a principle, [i. e. if it is the end,] but that is a principle; for the end is greater, and is not a principle; as Leodames when he accused Callistratus, said, that he who advised did a greater injury than he who performed the deed; for it would not have been done had it not been advised. But, again accusing Chabrias, he said that he who did the deed acted more unjustly than he who advised it; for it would not have been done, unless there had been one who did it. For men give advice to others for the sake of this, viz. that they may act. That which is more rare, also, [appears to be a greater good] than that which is found in abundance; as for instance, gold than iron, though it is less useful. For the possession of it is greater because it is obtained with more difficulty. After another manner, however, the plentiful is a greater good than the rare, because the use of it surpasses [the use of the rare.] For that which is frequently, surpasses that which is rarely found; whence it is said [by Pindar,]

“ Water is the best of things.”

And

And, in short, that which is procured with more difficulty [is a greater good] than that which is procured with facility; for it is more rare. After another manner, however, that which is procured with facility [is a greater good] than that which is procured with more difficulty; for it subsists as we wish it should. That, also, is greater, the contrary to which is greater. And, likewise, that of which the privation is greater. Virtue, likewise, is greater than what is not virtue, and vice than what is not vice¹; for the former are ends, but the latter are not. Those things also are greater, the works of which are more beautiful, or more base; and of those things of which the virtues and the vices are greater, the works also are greater; since such as is the subsistence of causes and principles, such also is the subsistence of events; and such as is the subsistence of events, such also is the subsistence of causes and principles. Those things, likewise, are greater, the excess of which is more eligible or more beautiful. Thus, for instance, to see accurately is more eligible than to smell [accurately]; for the sight is more eligible than the smell. To be a lover of friendship, also, is better than to be a lover of riches; so that to be a lover of friends is more beautiful than to be a lover of wealth. And on the contrary, the excesses of better things are better; and of more beautiful things more beautiful. This is also the case with those things of which the desires are more beautiful or better. For of greater things there are greater appetitions; and the desires of more beautiful and better things, are for the same reason better and more beautiful. Those things, likewise, of which the sciences are more beautiful or more worthy, are themselves more beautiful and more worthy. For such as is the subsistence of science, such also is the subsistence of that which is true. But each science is employed about its proper subject; and for the same reasons the sciences of more worthy and more beautiful things have an analogous subsistence. That, likewise, which either all, or many, or most prudent persons, or the most excellent characters have judged or

¹ By what is not virtue, and what is not vice, Aristotle means the disposition to the *perfect habit* of virtue or vice; such for instance, as *continence* and *incontinence*, which are dispositions to *temperance* and *intemperance*, which are ends.

do judge to be good or greater, necessarily thus subsists, or simply, or so far as they judge according to prudence. This, also, is common to other things. For every thing is such according to substance, quantity and quality, as science and prudence assert it to be. This principle, however, we apply to good ; for good is defined to be that, which every thing that possesses prudence would chuse. It is evident, therefore, that that thing is a greater good which prudence says is more good. That, likewise, which is inherent in better things either simply, or so far as they are better [is a greater good ;] as, for instance, fortitude than strength. This is also the case with that which a better man would chuse, either simply, or so far as he is better ; such for instance, as to be injured rather than to injure ; for this a more just man would chuse. That which is more delightful, likewise, [is a greater good] than that which is less delightful. For all beings pursue pleasure, and for the sake of it desire to be delighted. For these are the things by which good and the end are defined. But the more difficult is both that which is less painful, and that which is for a longer time pleasant. That which is more beautiful, also, [is a greater good] than that which is less beautiful. For the beautiful is either the delightful, or that which is of itself eligible. Such things, also, as men wish to be in a greater degree causes to themselves or their friends, are greater goods. This is likewise the case with things that endure for a longer, than with those that endure for a shorter time ; and with things that are more than with those that are less stable. For the use of the former exceeds in time ; but of the latter in the will. For we in a greater degree use that which is stable according to our will. Such things, also, as follow from co-ordinate and similar cases [are greater goods.] Thus, if an action which is accomplished with fortitude, is better and more eligible than that which is effected by temperance, fortitude also is more eligible than temperance, and to be brave than to be temperate. That, likewise, which all men chuse is a greater good than that which all men do not chuse. And that which is chosen by many than that which is chosen by a few. For good was defined to be that which all beings desire ; so that what is more the object of desire will be a greater

greater good. That, likewise, [is a greater good,] which is admitted to be so by those who controvert [what good is,] or which enemies, or judges, or the skilful acknowledge to be so. For that which enemies admit, is just as if all men admitted, and that which the latter admit, is equivalent to what is granted by men excelling in power and knowledge. And at one time, indeed, that is a greater good of which all participate; for it is disgraceful not to participate it; but at another time, that of which no one, or of which a few participate; for it is more rare. Things, likewise, which are more laudable are greater goods; for they are better. And in a similar manner those things of which the honours are greater; for honour is as it were a certain dignity. This is also the case with those things of which the punishments are greater. And likewise with those things which are greater, than such as are acknowledged or appear to be great. The same things, also, when divided into parts appear to be greater; for the transcendency of many things becomes apparent. Hence, the poet says, that Meleager was persuaded [by his wife] to rise to battle [by enumerating the evils which happen from a captured city.]

She paints the horrors of a conquer'd town,
The heroes slain, the palaces o'erthrown,
The matrons ravish'd, the whole race enslav'd*.

This is also the case with composition and exaggeration, as may be seen in Epicharmus; and for the same reason as in division. For composition shows an abundant excess, and appears to be the principle and cause of great things. Because, however, that which is more difficult and rare is greater, occasions, also, and ages, and places, and times, and powers produce great things. For if [any one performs a deed] beyond his power, and beyond his age, and those that resemble him, or if in this way, or in this place, or at that time, it will have the magnitude of things beautiful, good and just, and of the contraries to

* Iliad, 9, v. 588, &c. The translation by Pope.

these

these. Whence, also, the epigram on him who conquered in the Olympic games.

Some time ago so vulgar was my trade,
With a rough sack on both my shoulders laid,
From Argos to Tegea still I trudg'd,
To sell my fish, till victor here adjudg'd.

And Iphicrates passes an encomium on himself by saying,

From whence came these?

That, likewise, which is spontaneous, or springs from itself, is greater than that which is adscititious; for it is more difficult, whence also the poet says,

Self-taught am I*.

And also the greatest part of a great thing. Thus, for instance, Pericles in a funeral oration says, "That youth being taken away from a city, is just as if spring were taken away from the year." Those things, likewise, are greater which are useful in a greater necessity; such as things in old age and disease. This is also the case with that of two things, which is nearer to the end. That, likewise, which is good to a certain thing, is a greater good than that which being good simply is not good to it. And also the possible than the impossible. For the former is good to a thing itself, but the latter is not. The goods, also, which are in the end of life [are greater than others;] for those things are in a greater degree ends which are near to the end. Things, likewise, which pertain to truth are a greater good than things which pertain to opinion. But the definition of that which pertains to opinion is *that which if it were latent no one would chuse*. Whence, also, it would seem

* These are the words of Phemius in *Odys.* 22.

that

that it is more eligible to be benefitted than to benefit; for the former would be chosen though it should be latent; but to benefit latently does not seem to be a thing that would be chosen. Those things, likewise, are greater goods which we rather wish to be than to seem to be; for they pertain more to truth. Hence, also, [the sophists¹] say that justice is a small thing, because it is more eligible to seem to be than to be just; but it is not so with health. That, also, is a greater good which is more useful for many purposes; as, for instance, that which is more useful to life, to living well, to pleasure, and to the performance of beautiful actions. Hence, riches and health appear [to the vulgar] to be the greatest of things; for these contain all the above-mentioned particulars. That also is a greater good which is more free from molestation, and is attended with pleasure; for in this case there are more goods than one; so that the good is both pleasure and a privation of pain. That, likewise, of two things is the greater good, which being added to the same thing renders the whole a greater good. And those things which when present are not latent, are greater goods than those which are latent; for the former tend to truth. Hence, to be rich will be considered as a greater good than to *seem* to be rich. That also which is lovely is a greater good; and which to some things, indeed, is lovely when possessed alone; but to others when possessed in conjunction with other things. Hence, the punishment is not equal to deprive him of an eye who has but one eye, and him that has two eyes; for the former is deprived of that which is dear to him. And thus we have nearly shown from what forms it is necessary to derive credibility in exhorting and dissuading.

¹ As Thrasymachus in the Republic of Plato.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE greatest, however, and most powerful of all things, in order to the ability of persuading and counselling well is to assume all polities, and the manners and legal institutes of each, and to distinguish what is advantageous to them. For all men are persuaded by that which is advantageous; and that is advantageous which preserves the polity. Farther still, the enunciation of him who possesses the supreme power, possesses the principal authority. But dominion is divided according to polities. For as many polities as there are, so many forms also are there of dominion.

There are, however, four polities, a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy; so that the supreme power and that which judges, will be either a part or the whole of these. But a democracy, indeed, is a polity in which the magistrates are distributed by lot. An oligarchy is a polity [in which the magistracy is distributed to the rich alone,] and therefore is distributed according to estates. An aristocracy is a polity in which magistrates are chosen according to their erudition; but by erudition I mean that discipline which is appointed by the law. For those who persevere in legal institutes, govern in an aristocracy. Hence, it is necessary that these should appear to be the best of men. But a monarchy is, as the name indicates, a polity in which one person has the supreme authority. And of this polity, that which is conducted according to a certain order is a kingdom; but that which is indefinite is a tyranny.

It is also requisite not to be ignorant of the end of each polity; for those

those things are chosen [in each] which pertain to the end. And the end, indeed, of a democracy is liberty; of an oligarchy wealth; of an aristocracy, whatever pertains to erudition and legal institutes; and of a tyranny safe-guard.

It is evident, therefore, that those customs, legal institutes, and things advantageous which pertain to the end, must be distinguished, if the choice [of the several polities] is directed to this.

Since, however, credibility is not only produced through a demonstrative oration, but also through that which is ethical; (for we believe the speaker because he appears to be a person of a certain description, viz. if he appears to be worthy, or benevolent, or both these)—this being the case, it is requisite that we should possess a knowledge of the manners of each of the polities. For it is necessary that the manners of each should be most persuasive with reference to each. But these manners may be obtained through the same things. For manners become apparent from deliberate choice; but deliberate choice is referred to the end. What the particulars therefore are, to which the attention of those who exhort should be directed, as future or present; and from what forms credibility about that which is advantageous must be derived; and farther still, concerning the manners and legal institutes of polities; and through what things and how we may abound [with arguments,]—all these have been unfolded by us as much as is sufficient to the present purpose. For these particulars will be accurately discussed in the Politics.

CHAPTER IX.

AFTER these things let us speak concerning virtue and vice, and the beautiful in conduct and the base; for to these the intention of those who praise and blame is directed. For it will happen that at the same time we speak about these, those things also will become manifest from which our moral character is formed, which is the second thing that produces credibility. For we may be able to gain the credit of being virtuous ourselves, and cause another person to do the same, from the same things. Since, however, it frequently happens that without being serious, and also seriously, we praise not only man or God, but also inanimate things, and any animal that may occur;—this being the case, propositions also respecting these must be assumed after the same manner; so that we must also speak concerning these, so far as is requisite for the sake of example.

The beautiful in conduct, therefore, is that which being eligible of itself is laudable; or which being good is delightful because it is good. But if the beautiful in conduct is this, it is necessary that virtue should be beautiful; for being good it is laudable. Virtue, however, is indeed a power, as it appears of imparting and preserving good: and a power of procuring many and great benefits, and of imparting all things about all. But the parts of virtue are, justice, fortitude, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, mildness, prudence, wisdom. It is however necessary, that those virtues should be the greatest which are most useful to others, since virtue is a beneficent power. Hence, just and brave men are especially honoured; for fortitude is useful in war,

war, and justice in peace. The next to these is liberality. For the liberal freely bestow their property, and do not contend about money, of which others are so eminently desirous. But justice, indeed, is a virtue through which every one legally possesses what is his own; and injustice is that through which a man possesses the property of others, contrary to law. Fortitude is that virtue through which men perform beautiful deeds in dangerous circumstances, in such a manner as the law commands, and those who possess this virtue are subservient to the law; but timidity is the contrary to this. Temperance is a virtue through which men are disposed towards pleasures in such a way as the law commands; but intemperance is the contrary. Liberality is the beneficent use of money; but illiberality is the contrary. Magnanimity is a virtue which is effective of great benefits; but pusillanimity is the contrary. Magnificence is a virtue effective of magnitude in expense; but pusillanimity and indecorous parsimony are the contrary. Prudence is the virtue of the reasoning power, according to which it is possible to give good counsel respecting the above-mentioned good and evil pertaining to felicity. And thus we have spoken sufficiently at present of virtue and vice, and the parts of them.

With respect to other things, however, it is not difficult to see [which among them are beautiful or base.] For it is evident that such things as are effective of virtue must necessarily be beautiful; since they pertain to virtue; and also those things which proceed from virtue. But things of this kind are the indications and works of virtue. Since, however, the indications, and such things as are the works or passions¹ of virtue, are beautiful, it is necessary that such things as are the works of fortitude, or are indications of it, or are bravely accomplished should be beautiful. This must also be the case with just things, and with works which are justly performed; but not with the passions of them. For in this alone of the virtues, that which is justly done is not always beautiful; but in being punished, it is more base to be punished

¹ By the passions of virtue, Aristotle means the effects resulting from the exercise of them, on others. Thus the effect resulting from the exercise of justice on another person, is the *passion* of justice.

justly, than to be punished unjustly. And in a similar manner with respect to the other virtues. Those things, also of which the reward is honour are beautiful; and likewise those things of which honour more than riches is the reward. And such eligible things as a man performs not for his own sake. Likewise such things as are simply good, such as what a man performs for his country, neglecting his own interest. Also things which are naturally good; and such things as are good, but not to their possessor. For things which are good to their possessor, are performed for his sake [alone.] This is likewise the case with such things as are more present with the dead than with the living. For those things which are present with a man when living, have in a greater degree a subsistence for his sake. And also with such works as are performed for the sake of other things; for they have less of a subsistence for the sake of him who performs them. This likewise, is the case with such deeds as are well performed with respect to others, and not with respect to him who performs them, and also with respect to benefactors; for this is just. The like may be said of benefits [conferred on others;] for they are not attended with private advantage. This is also the case with the contraries to those things of which we are ashamed. For those who say or do, or are about to commit base actions are ashamed, as in the verses of Sappho when Alcæus said to her,

Something I wish to say, but shame prevents.

Sappho replied,

If good and upright actions you desire,
And your tongue meditates no ill to speak,
Your eyes will never be suffus'd with shame,
But freely you will what is just reveal.

This is likewise the case with things about which men fearlessly contend; for men are affected in this manner about things which tend to glory. The virtues, also, and the works of things which are naturally
more

more worthy, are beautiful; as, for instance, the virtues and works of man than those of woman. This is likewise the case with those things which procure more pleasure to others than to their possessor; on which account the just and justice are beautiful. It is also beautiful to take vengeance on enemies rather than to be reconciled to them. For retribution is just; but the just is beautiful; and it is the province of a brave man not to be vanquished. Victory, likewise, and honour are among the number of things beautiful; for they are eligible though they should be unattended with advantage, and they evince the transcendency of virtue. Public celebrations, also, of the memory of any one are beautiful; and the greater they are the more beautiful. This is likewise the case with commemorations of the dead; and also with those things which are attended with honour. Things too which possess a certain excellence, and belong to one person alone are more beautiful; for they are more worthy of being remembered. This is likewise the case with possessions that are unfruitful; for they are more liberal. Things, also, which are the peculiar property of individuals are more beautiful; and likewise such things as are indications of what is laudable among those with whom we inhabit. Thus for instance, in Lacedæmon it is beautiful to wear long hair; for it is a sign of liberty. For it is not easy for him who wears long hair to do any servile work¹. It is also beautiful not to exercise any illiberal art; for it is the province of a freeman not to live subservient to another person.

Things also which are allied to the beautiful are to be assumed², as being the same with them, both with respect to praise and blame; as if for instance, we should call a cautious and animated person, timid and insidious; a stupid, a good man; and one who is insensible in the endurance of injuries, a mild man. And after this manner we should always proceed from things which are consequent to that which is best; so as to call him who is wrathful and furious, simple; and him

¹ Because his long hair would be an impediment to servile offices.

² For the purpose of praising and blaming, we may not only use propositions, in which it is shown that something is truly beautiful or base, but also other places which have the power of causing a certain appearance of beautiful or base conduct.

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who is arrogant, magnificent and venerable. We may also praise those who err through excess, as if they were virtuous. Thus, for instance, we may call an audacious, a brave man; and a prodigal, a liberal man. For they will appear to be so to the multitude; and at the same time a paralogism will be made from cause. For if any one is prepared to encounter danger when there is no necessity for it, he will much more seem to be so prepared where it is beautiful to encounter it. And he who is profuse to any casual persons, will appear to be much more so to his friends; for *to benefit all men is the excess of virtue*. It is likewise requisite to consider by whom any one is praised; for as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians among the Athenians. It is necessary, however, to speak of that which is honourable among the several nations, as of a thing which actually exists; as for instance, among the Scythians or Lacedæmonians, or the philosophers. And in short it is requisite to refer that which is honourable to the beautiful in conduct; since it appears to approximate to it. This is also the case with such things as subsist according to fitness; as if the deeds of a man are worthy of his ancestors, and of the deeds which he has already performed. For to make an addition to the honour already acquired, contributes to felicity, and is beautiful. This likewise will be the case, if besides what is becoming, a man conducts himself with a view to what is better and more beautiful; as if being prosperous he is indeed moderate; but in adversity, he is magnanimous; or is better and more affable, the more dignified his situation in life becomes. And a thing of this kind is that saying of Iphicrates,

Some time ago so vulgar was my trade,
With a rough sack on both my shoulders laid.

And also that [inscription] of Simonides, "A woman whose father and husband were the brothers of tyrants."

But since praise is derived from actions; and the peculiarity of a worthy man is to act from deliberate choice, we must endeavour to show that he who acts, acts from deliberate choice. And for this purpose

purpose it is useful to render it apparent that a man has frequently thus acted. Hence, also, casualties, and events which result from fortune, must be assumed as pertaining to deliberate choice. For if many and similar things are adduced, it appears to be an indication of virtue and deliberate choice. But praise is an oration exhibiting the magnitude of virtue. It is necessary, therefore, to evince that actions are things of this kind [viz. that they proceed from great virtue.] An encomium, however, pertains to deeds; but those things which surround him who is praised, pertain to credibility; such as nobility and education. For it is likely that a good man will be the offspring of good parents, and that he who is thus educated will be a man of this kind. Hence, we celebrate those who act well; but deeds are the indications of habit; since we also praise him that has not acted, if we believe him to be a man of this kind. The predication, however, of beatitude and felicity, do not differ from each other, but they are not the same with praise and encomium; but as felicity comprehends virtue, so the predication of felicity comprehends these.

Praise, however, and counsel have a common form. For those things which you may propound in giving counsel, these by transposing the diction will become encomiums. When therefore we know what we have to do, and what kind of a person a man ought to be, then it is necessary adducing these as precepts to transpose and convert the diction; such for instance, as that it is not proper a man should conceive magnificently of himself on account of the gifts of fortune, but on account of those things which he possesses from himself. And thus indeed what is said, will have the force of a precept. But the following will have the force of praise. He conceived magnificently of himself, not on account of the gifts of fortune, but of those procured by himself. Hence, when you praise see what it is that you propound, and when you propound, see what it is you praise. The diction, however, will necessarily be opposite, when that which impedes, and that which does not impede are transposed.

Frequently, also, many of those things may be used, which have an
amplifying

amplifying power ; as whether a man acted alone, or first, or with a few, or whether he were the principal person in the action. For all these are beautiful. Praise likewise is increased from the consideration of times and seasons. For these have nothing in addition to what is fit. This is also the case with the consideration if a man has done a thing rightly ; for this will be considered as a great thing, and not originating from fortune, but from himself. It likewise pertains to praise, if those things which excite men [to virtue] and cause them to be honoured, were invented and prepared by him [whom we praise ;] and upon whom the first encomium was made. Thus for instance, it happened to Hippolochus to have the first encomium, and to Harmodius, and to Aristogiton to have their statues placed in the forum. The like method also must be observed in amplifying the contrary to praise. When, likewise, you do not find in him whom you praise an abundance of things worthy of applause, compare him with others, which Isocrates did from his custom of writing delamatory orations. But it is requisite to compare him whom you praise with renowned men ; for the oration has an amplifying power and is beautiful, if he is found to be better than worthy men. Amplification, however, deservedly falls upon praise ; for it consists in transcendency ; and transcendency is among the number of things beautiful. Hence, if you cannot compare him with renowned persons, yet it is requisite to compare him with others, [that are not renowned,] since transcendency seems to indicate virtue. In short, of those forms which are common to all orations, amplification, indeed, is most adapted to the demonstrative genus. For it assumes actions which are acknowledged, so that it only remains to add to them magnitude and beauty. But examples are most adapted to the deliberative genus, or that which consists in giving counsel. For we form a judgement by predicting future from past events. And enthymemes are most adapted to the judicial genus. For the fact [which is the subject of judicial discussion,] especially receives cause and demonstration, on account of its obscurity. And thus we have shown from what forms nearly all praise and blame are derived, to what we ought to

to look in praising and blaming, and from what particulars encomiums and opprobriums are produced. For these things being known, the contraries to these are apparent; since blame consists from the contraries [to praise and encomium.]

CHAPTER X.

IN the next place we must speak of accusation and defence, from how many and from what kind [of places] it is necessary syllogisms should be made. It is necessary, therefore, to assume three things; one, indeed, what the particulars are, and how many in number, for the sake of which men injure others. The second is, how they are affected. And the third is, what kind of persons, and in what condition they are [whom they attack.]

When we have therefore defined what it is to do an injury, we shall speak of what is next in order. Let then to do an injury be, to hurt another person contrary to law. But law is either peculiar or common. And I call that peculiar, indeed, according to which when committed to writing, men act politically. But common law is such institutes, as though not committed to writing appear to be acknowledged by all men. Men also act willingly when they act knowingly, and without compulsion. With respect to such things, therefore, as they do willingly, all these are not performed by them with deliberate choice; but all such things as they perform with deliberate choice, they do knowingly. For no one is ignorant of that which he deliberately chuses to do. The causes, however, through which men deliberately chuse to injure others, and to do evil contrary to law, are vice and intemper-

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ance. For if certain persons have depravity either in one, or in many things, with respect to that in which they are depraved they are also unjust. Thus for instance, the illiberal man is unjust in money; the intemperate man in the pleasures of the body; the effeminate man in sloth; but the timid man in dangers. For timid men through fear desert those that are in the same danger with themselves. But the ambitious man is unjust on account of honour; the hasty man from anger; he who aspires after conquest, from victory; the severe man through revenge; the imprudent man, because he is deceived about the just and the unjust; and the impudent man, through a contempt of renown. In a similar manner with respect to the rest, each is unjust in that which is the subject of his passion. These things, however, are evident partly from what has been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the passions.

It now remains to show for what reason, and in what condition men injure others, and whom they injure. In the first place, therefore, let us explain what we desire, and what we avoid, when we endeavour to do an injury. For it is evident that the accuser must consider how many and which of those things, which all men coveting injure their neighbours, are present with his adversary; and how many and which of these things are not present with the defendant. All men, therefore, do all things partly on account of themselves, and partly not. And of those things which they do on account of themselves, some are performed by them from fortune, but others from necessity. And of those which are performed by them from necessity, some are violently, and others naturally effected; so that all such things as men do, not on account of themselves, are partly from fortune, partly from nature, and partly from violence. But such things as they perform on account of themselves, and of which they themselves are the causes, are partly from custom, and partly from appetite; and some indeed are from a rational, but others from an irrational appetite. But the will, indeed, is an appetite of good in conjunction with reason; for no one wishes any thing else than that which he conceives to be good. But the irrational appetites are anger and desire; so that all such things as men do,

do, are necessarily performed by them from seven causes, viz. from fortune, force, nature, custom, reason, anger and desire. The division, however, of actions according to ages, or habits, or certain other things, is superfluous. For if it happens that young men are choleric, or prone to indulge desire, they do not perform things of this kind on account of their juvenile age, but on account of anger and desire. Nor yet on account of riches and poverty: but it happens to the poor indeed, to covet riches on account of their indigence; and to the rich to desire pleasures that are not necessary, through the power which they have of gratifying their desires. These, however, do not act on account of riches and poverty, but on account of desire. In a similar manner, also, the just and the unjust, and others who are said to act according to habits, do all things from these causes. For they act, either from reason, or from passion. But some, indeed, act from manners and worthy affections; and others from the contraries to these. It happens, however, that things of this kind are consequent to such like habits, and such and such to others. For immediately, perhaps, worthy opinions and desires concerning pleasures, are consequent to the temperate man, on account of his temperance; but the contraries to these are consequent to the intemperate man. Hence, divisions of this kind must be omitted; but it must be considered what [desires or opinions] are usually consequent [to certain conditions.] For whether a man be white or black, or great or little, nothing follows of things of this kind. But it is of consequence, whether he is young or old, just or unjust. And in short, such accidents as cause a difference in the manners of men, are of consequence [as to the difference of their desires.] Thus for instance, it makes a distinction, whether a man be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate. We shall, however, speak of these things hereafter.

But now let us speak of the rest. Those things then proceed from fortune of which the cause is indefinite, and which are not produced for the sake of any thing; and which have neither a perpetual, nor a frequent, nor an orderly subsistence. This, however, is evident from

the definition of fortune. But those things are produced by nature, of which the cause is in themselves and is orderly. For they happen after the same manner, either always, or for the most part. For with respect to preternatural things, it is not necessary to consider accurately whether they are produced from a certain nature, or from some other cause. Fortune, also, may seem to be the cause of such like things. But those things are effected by force, which are done by the agents themselves contrary to their desire or reason. Those things are effected by custom, which are done in consequence of having been frequently done. And those things are effected through reasoning, which are done with a view to advantage, as ranking among the above-mentioned goods, or as being an end, or as referring to the end, when they are performed on account of utility. For the intemperate, also, perform some things that are advantageous, yet not because they are advantageous, but for the sake of pleasure. And some men through anger and rage perform things which pertain to revenge. Revenge, however, and punishment differ. For punishment is inflicted for the sake of him that suffers; but revenge is for the sake of the agent, that he may satisfy [his desire of vengeance.] In what we shall hereafter say, therefore, about the passions, it will be evident what the objects are with which anger is conversant. Such things, however, as appear to be pleasant are performed on account of desire. But both that which is done from use, and that which is done from custom are delightful. For many things which are not naturally pleasant, when rendered familiar through custom are done with delight. Hence, in short, all such things as men do on account of themselves, are either good, or apparently good, are either pleasing, or apparently pleasing.

Since, however, such things as men perform on account of themselves, they perform willingly, but such things as they do not perform on account of themselves, are done by them not willingly;—hence, all such things as they perform willingly, will either be good or apparently good, will either be pleasant, or apparently pleasant. For I consider the liberation from evils, or from apparent evils, or the assumption of
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a less instead of a greater evil, in the number of good things. For in a certain respect these are eligible. And in a similar manner the liberation from things painful, or apparently painful, or the assumption of less instead of more painful things, rank among things which are pleasant.

CHAPTER XI.

WE must assume, therefore, how many and what things are useful and pleasant. Concerning what is useful, therefore, or advantageous, we have already spoken in the discussion of things pertaining to counsel.

Let us, therefore, now speak of what is delightful. But it is requisite to think that [rhetorical] definitions are sufficient, if, about the object which they define, they are neither obscure, nor accurate. Let it therefore be supposed by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, and a sudden and sensible disposition of the soul in a state conformable to nature; but that pain is the contrary. Hence, if pleasure is a thing of this kind, it is evident that the pleasant is that which is effective of the above-mentioned disposition. But that which is corruptive, or is effective of a contrary disposition, is painful.

It necessarily follows, therefore, that it is pleasant to accede to that which is according to nature, as being that which has a frequency of subsistence, and especially when those things which take place according to nature, have assumed their own nature. Those things also are pleasant which are done from custom. For that to which we are accustomed becomes now as it were natural; since custom is something

thing similar to nature. For that which is *frequently* is near to that which is *always* done. But nature pertains to that which always, and custom to that which frequently takes place. That likewise is pleasant which is not violent; for violence is preternatural. Hence, also, necessities are painful; and it is rightly said,

Painful is every necessary work.

Sedulity, likewise, study, and strenuous endeavour are painful; (for these things are necessary and violent) unless we are accustomed to them. But thus custom renders them pleasant. And the contraries to these are pleasant. Hence, indolence, cessation from labour, freedom from care, mirth, recreation and sleep, are in the number of pleasant things. For no one of these is attended with necessity. Every thing likewise which we desire is pleasant. For *desire is the appetite of that which is pleasant*. Of desires, however, some are irrational; but others are attended with reason. But I call those irrational through which we do not desire things because we are rationally of opinion that they are proper for us. And desires of this kind are such as are said to be inherent in us naturally, as are those which exist through the body; such for instance as the desire of food, thirst and hunger; and also the desire of every kind of food. This is likewise the case with the desires of gustable substances, of venereal pleasures, and in short of tangible objects, and of what pertains to the smell of fragrance, to the hearing and the sight. But the desires attended with reason, are such as are the result of persuasion. For men desire to behold and possess many things from report and persuasion. Since, however, the being delighted consists in the sensible perception of a certain passion; but the phantasy or imagination is a certain debile sense; and both to him who remembers and him who hopes, a certain imagination is consequent of that which he remembers or hopes;—if this be the case, it is evident that pleasures are present with those that have strong memories and hopes, since sensible perception is also present with them. Hence, it is necessary that all pleasant things must either
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consist in the sensible perception of what is present, or in the remembrance of what is past, or in the hope of what is future. For present things are the objects of sensible perception, but past things are remembered, and future events are the subjects of hope. Things, therefore, which are preserved in the memory are pleasant, not only such as were then delightful when they were present, but some also which were then not delightful, if afterwards they are attended with the beautiful and the good. Whence, also, it is said [by Euripides,]

'Tis pleasant when from danger free,
To recollect past misery.

And also [by Eumœus in the *Odyssey*, Book 15.]

For he who much has suffer'd, much will know,
And pleas'd remembrance builds delight in woe.

But the cause of this is, that it is also delightful not to be in possession of evil. With respect however to such things as pertain to hope, those which when present appear greatly to delight or benefit, or [at least] to benefit without pain; and in short, such things as afford delight when present,—of these the hope and the remembrance are for the most part delectable. Hence, also, it is pleasant to be enraged; as Homer [in *Iliad*, 18.] says of anger.

Far sweeter to the soul than honey to the taste.

For no one is enraged with a circumstance which it appears impossible to revenge; nor are men at all enraged, or they are enraged in a less degree, with those that are far superior to them in power. A certain pleasure, likewise, is consequent to most desires. For men rejoice with a certain pleasure, either from remembering what they have obtained, or from the hope of what they may obtain. Thus for instance, those that in fevers are afflicted with thirst, are delighted with

with remembering how they have drank, and with the hope that they shall again drink. Those also who are in love, are always delighted with some circumstance pertaining to the beloved object, when they converse, or write, and in short, in all their actions. For in every thing of this kind, by recollection they fancy that they have a sensible perception as it were of the object of their love. The beginning itself, likewise, of love is produced in all persons, when they are not only delighted with the beloved object when present, but also with the recollection of it when absent. Hence, also, when they are afflicted from the absence of the object of their love, a certain pleasure is ingenerated in their grief and lamentation. For the pain which they feel arises from the beloved object not being present; but the pleasure from the remembrance and perception in a certain respect of this object, and of what he did, and what kind of a person he was. Hence, also, the poet says [of Achilles in *Iliad*, 23.]

Thus having said, he rais'd in ev'ry one,
An ardent wish his sorrows to be gone.

Revenge likewise is pleasant. For that of which the frustration is painful, the obtaining is pleasant. But those who are enraged, are pained in a transcendent degree, if they cannot take revenge; but they are delighted with the hope of vengeance. To conquer also is pleasant, not only to those who are lovers of victory, but to all men. For there is an imagination of transcendency [in vanquishing,] of which all men possess the desire, either more or less ardently. Since, however, it is pleasant to conquer, those sports, also, must be delightful which relate to war, to playing on the pipe, and to verbal contests; for in these victory is frequently obtained. This is likewise the case with the games of dice, tennice, tables, &c. and in a similar manner with serious games. For some of these become pleasant from custom; but others are immediately pleasant, such for instance as every kind of hunting. For where there is contention, there also there is victory. Hence, the pleading of causes and contentious disputes, are pleasant to

to those that are accustomed to, and are able to engage in them. Honour, likewise, and reputation, are among the number of things most pleasant, because every one imagines that he is a man of this kind, and that he is a worthy person; and more so when others assert this of him, whom he considers as persons of veracity. Such are neighbours rather than those that live at a distance; friends, acquaintance, and fellow citizens, rather than foreigners; such as are now in being, rather than such as are yet to be born; the prudent rather than the imprudent; and the many rather than the few. For it is more likely that the above-mentioned persons should speak the truth, than those of a contrary description. For with respect to such things as a man very much despises, as children or wild beasts, no one pays any attention to the honour or opinion of these, for the sake of the opinion itself; but if he does it, it is for the sake of something else.

A friend, likewise, is among the number of delightful things; for friendly love is delectable; since no one is a lover of wine who is not pleased with wine. To be beloved, also, is delightful. For this causes the person beloved to imagine that he is a good man, which is desired by all men that are endued with sense. But to be beloved is for a man to be dear to another person, himself on account of himself. To be admired also by others is pleasant, on account of being honoured, [as the consequence of being admired.] To be flattered, likewise, and the flatterer himself are pleasant; for a flatterer is an apparent admirer, and an apparent friend. To do the same things frequently, likewise, is delightful; for what is customary is pleasing. Change also is pleasing; for it is pleasant to return to a natural condition which is effected by mutation. For to remain always in the same state, too much increases habit [and produces satiety.] Whence it is said [by Euripides in his *Orestes*,]

“ Sweet is the change of all things.”

For on this account things which are performed through intervals of time are pleasant; and the sight of our acquaintance is pleasing after

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some time has elapsed. For this is a mutation from the present time; and likewise that is rare which takes place through an interval of time. To learn, also, and to admire are for the most part delectable. For in admiration there is a desire of learning [something;] so that what is admirable is the object of desire. But in learning there is a transition into a condition according to nature¹. To benefit, likewise, and to be benefitted are among the number of things delectable. For to be benefitted is to obtain the objects of desire; but to benefit is to possess and transcend, both which are desireable. Because, however, it is pleasant to have the power of benefitting, hence, men are delighted in correcting the miscarriages of their neighbours, and in completing what is deficient. Since, also, to learn and to admire are delectable, those things must necessarily be pleasant which consist in imitation, such as painting, sculpture and poetry; and whatever is well imitated, though that of which it is the imitation should not be pleasing. For in this case, we are not delighted with the imitation, but with the reasoning by which we know what that is which is imitated; so that it happens that we learn something. A variety likewise of unexpected accidents, and narrow escapes from dangers are delectable; for all these are admirable. And because that which is according to nature is pleasant, but things which are allied are naturally conjoined with each other, hence all things that are allied and similar, are for the most part delightful; as man with man, horse with horse, and the young with the young. Hence, also, the proverb *sameness of age is delighted with sameness of age*; and, *always like to like*; and, *beast knows beast*; and, *always the blackbird to the blackbird*, and others of the like kind. Since, however, that which is similar and allied to any thing is delightful to it, but every man is especially thus affected towards himself, it necessarily follows that all men are lovers of themselves more or less; for such things [as similitude and alliance] are especially present with a man towards himself. But because all men are lovers of them-

¹ Because by learning we pass from ignorance to knowledge, which is a natural transition to such a reasonable being as man.

selves,

selves, hence, those things which are their own, must necessarily be delightful to all men; such as their works, and their orations. Hence, for the most part they love their flatterers, and those that love them, they are ambitious, and love their children; for children are their own works. It is likewise pleasant to give completion to things which are deficient; for it now becomes our own work. And because it is most pleasant to govern, it is likewise delightful to seem to be wise. For to be wise is a thing of a ruling nature. But wisdom is the science of many and admirable things. Farther still, since men are for the most part ambitious, it necessarily follows that they are delighted to rule over and reprove their neighbours. It is likewise delectable to a man to be conversant with that in which he thinks he particularly excels; as Euripides also says, "To this he eagerly applies himself, bestowing the greatest part of every day upon it, in order that he may even surpass himself." In like manner, because all recreation and relaxation is pleasant, and laughter also is among the number of things that are delectable, it necessarily follows that ridiculous things are pleasant, as well ridiculous men, as ridiculous speeches and works. Ridiculous things, however, are separately discussed by us in the treatise on Poetry. And thus much concerning things which are delectable. But things which are painful will be manifest from the contraries to these. Such, therefore, are the particulars for the sake of which men act unjustly.

CHAPTER XII.

LET us now consider what the condition is of men that do an injury, and who those are whom they injure. They are, therefore, then indeed [prepared to do an injury,] when they fancy the thing is possible to be done, and it is possible to be done by them, whether they can do it latently, or so as not to suffer punishment though it should not be done latently; or when they think that they may suffer punishment, indeed, but that the loss which they shall sustain by it, will be less than the gain which will accrue to themselves, or to those who are the objects of their care.

With respect therefore to what appears possible to be effected, and what not, this will be afterwards explained; for these things are common to all the parts of rhetoric. Those men, however, fancy themselves especially able to do an injury with impunity, who are able both to speak and act, and who are skilled in a multitude of [forensic] contests. Those, also, fancy they can escape with impunity who have a great number of friends, and especially, indeed, if they imagine themselves to be powerful in what we have mentioned; or if they are not, if their friends, or assistants, or accomplices are persons of this description. For through these they may be able to effect their purpose latently, and without suffering punishment. This will also be the case, if they are the friends of those that are injured, or of the judges. For friends are careless of injuries, and are reconciled before prosecution. The judges, also, are willing to gratify their friends, and either entirely acquit them, or inflict a small punishment. But those are adapted to be

be concealed, who have a disposition contrary to the alledged crimes; as for instance, a feeble man, when accused of striking another, and a poor and deformed man when accused of adultery. This is also the case if the crime is committed very openly, and in the eyes of all men, because in short no one would think it to be true. Or if the crimes are so great, and so many, as not to have been committed by any one person before. For men are not aware of such injuries; since all men shun those that are accustomed to act ill, in the same manner as they shun diseases; but no one avoids him that has not yet been afflicted with disease. Those, likewise, think they shall be concealed, who injure those who have none, or those who have many enemies. For if they injure the former they fancy they shall be concealed, because they are not suspected; but if they injure the latter, that they shall be concealed, because it seems incredible that they would attack those who are aware of them, and because they might urge in their defence, that they did not make the attempt [because they were certain they should find resistance.] The like may be said of those who are provided with the means of concealment, or of some place, or mode of escape which is at hand; and also of such, who if they cannot conceal themselves, can put off the cause by delay of justice, or by corrupting the judges. This too may be said of those who if they are amerced, delay or buy off the payment, or who through poverty have nothing to lose. And of those whose gains are apparent, or great, or near; but their punishments either small, or unapparent, or at a distance. Likewise where the punishment is not equal to the profit, as appears to be the case in a tyranny. And also with those that gain by the injury, but are only disgraced by the punishment. And also with those to whom the contrary happens, that the injuries procure them a certain praise, as if it should happen, as it did to Zeno, that a man in avenging an injury, at the same time revenges an injury done to his father or mother; but the punishments are either a fine or banishment, or something of this kind. For both these do an injury, whether it be done this way or that, though they are not the same persons, but contrary in their manners. Those, likewise, [are audacious in committing

ing injuries,] who have frequently either been concealed, or not been punished. This is likewise the case with those who have frequently failed in their attempts; for in things of this kind, in the same manner as in warlike concerns, there are some who are still prepared to renew the fight. And also with those to whom the delightful is immediately present, but the painful follows afterwards; or gain is immediate, but punishment posterior. For the intemperate are persons of this description; but there is intemperance with respect to all such things as are the objects of desire. Those, likewise, [confidently do an injury] to whom on the contrary the painful is immediately present, or punishment, but the delightful and the advantageous, are present afterwards and later. For the continent and those who are more prudent, pursue things of this kind. This is also the case with those who may seem to have acted from fortune or necessity, from nature, or from custom; and in short, who have erred, but have not done any injury. The like too may be said of those who have been able to obtain an equitable decision; and of such as are in want. But men are in want in a twofold respect; either as being in want of necessities, as is the case with the poor; or as being in want of superfluities, as is the case with the rich. Those also [are prone to do injuries] who are renowned, and also those who are very infamous. The former, indeed, because it will not be supposed that they have done an injury; and the latter because they will not become at all more infamous [by doing the injury.] Under these circumstances, therefore, they attempt [to act unjustly.]

CHAPTER XIII.

MEN, therefore, injure those who possess things of which they are in want, whether they pertain to the necessities, or to the superfluities of life, or the enjoyment [of pleasures.] They also injure those that live at a distance, and those that live near them; for the plunder of the latter is rapid, and the punishment attending the injury done to the former is slow; as was the case with those who plundered the Carthaginians. Men likewise injure the unwary, and those who are not on their guard, but are credulous; for it is easy to deceive all these. They also injure the indolent; for it is the province of a diligent man to avenge the injuries he has received. And likewise the bashful; for these do not contend about gain. They also injure those who have been injured by many, and who do not avenge the injuries they have received, as being according to the proverb the Mysian prey. Likewise those whom they have never, and those whom they have frequently injured. For both these are incautious; the former, indeed, as having never been injured, and the latter because they expect to be injured no more. Also those who are or may easily be scandalized; for persons of this description, neither deliberately chuse [to avenge an injury] being afraid of the judges, nor are able to persuade [others that they have been injured;] among the number of which are those who are hated and injured. Likewise, men injure those against whom there is a pretext, either because they themselves, or their ancestors, or friends, have acted ill, or would have acted ill, either to themselves, or to their ancestors, or to those that are under their protection. For, as the proverb

proverb says, *Depravity only wants a pretence*. Men, also, injure both their enemies and friends; for to injure the one is easy, and the other pleasant. Likewise those who are without friends, and who are not skilful in speaking or acting. For these either do not endeavour to revenge the injury they have received, or they become reconciled, or they finally effect nothing. Also those who derive no advantage in waiting for judgment and recompence, such as foreigners and handicraft tradesmen; for these are satisfied with a small recompence for the injuries they may have received, and such men easily cease from prosecution. Men likewise injure those as have already done many injuries to others, or who have done such injuries as they now suffer. For it seems to be something near to the not doing an injury, when any one suffers such an injury, as he is accustomed to do to others. I say, for instance, as if a man should chastise him who acted insolently towards others. They also injure those who have acted ill, or who have wished to do so, or have this wish at present, or intend to do an injury hereafter. For it is attended both with the pleasant and the beautiful; and this appears to be near to not acting unjustly. Men likewise injure those, in injuring whom they gratify their friends, or those whom they admire, or love, or their masters, or in short those with whom they live, and from whom they expect to obtain some good. Also those whom they have falsely accused, and their friendship with whom is dissolved. For things of this kind appear to be near to the doing no injury, as was the case between Calippus and Dion. They likewise injure those who unless they were injured by them, would be oppressed by others, as if with these there was no longer any place for consultation; as Anesidemus is reported to have written to Gelo, when Catabia would have been depopulated by him, that he had anticipated him, as if he intended to have done the same thing himself. Also those, to whom if they have injured them they may do many things justly by way of satisfaction; as Jason of Thessaly said, it is necessary to act unjustly in some things, in order that we may be able to do many just things.

Men likewise act unjustly in those things, in which all or many persons

persons are accustomed to act injuriously; for they fancy they shall obtain pardon for thus acting. Also in those things which can easily be concealed. But things of this kind are such as are easily consumed, such as esculent substances; or which are easily changed, either in their figure, or colour, or temperament; or which may easily be concealed in many places. But things of this kind are such as are portable, and which may be concealed in small places; and which also resemble many things which he that did the injury possessed before. Men likewise commit injuries in those things which those who are injured are ashamed to disclose; such as insolent and indecent behaviour towards the wife of a man, or towards himself, or his children. They also injure others in those things, which show the prosecutor to be a contentious person; but things of this kind are such as are of small consequence, and for which pardon is granted. And thus we have nearly shown how men are capacitated when they do an injury, in what things they act unjustly, what kind of men they injure, and on what account.

CHAPTER XIV.

Let us now distinguish between all unjust and just deeds first beginning from hence. Just and unjust deeds, therefore, are divided with reference to two laws, and with reference to the persons to whom they relate in two ways.

But I call law either proper or common. And the proper, indeed, is that which the several [cities and nations] have established among themselves. And of this law, one part is not written, but the other

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part is written. But common law is that which is according to nature. For there is something which is just, and something which is unjust in common naturally, and which all men prophetically pronounce to be so, though they have no communion nor compact with each other. And this the Antigone of Sophocles appears to intimate, when she asserts that it is just to bury Polynices, though forbidden to do so [by Creon the king,] because this is naturally just.

————— nor could I ever think,
A mortal's law of power or strength sufficient,
To abrogate th' unwritten law divine,
Immutable, eternal, not like these,
Of yesterday, but made ere time began.

And as Empedocles says with respect to not slaying that which is animated. For this is not indeed just to some persons, but not just to others,

But a fixed law in all men's breasts, where'er
Heaven's light immense shines thro' wide-ruling air.

And this is also confirmed by Alcidamas in his Messeniatic oration.

The persons, however, to whom the just and the unjust are referred, are distinguished in a twofold respect. For what ought and what ought not to be done is either referred to the community, or to one individual of the community. Hence, also, with respect to unjust and just deeds, it is possible to act justly and unjustly in two ways; viz. towards one definite person, or towards the community. For he who commits adultery, or strikes a man, injures some definite person; but he who does not fight [for his country,] injures the community.

Since, therefore, all unjust deeds receive a twofold division, and some have a reference to the community, but others to different private persons, after repeating what it is to be injured, we shall explain the rest. To be injured, therefore, is to suffer unjustly, by those who act voluntarily; for we have before defined the injuring another person to be

be a voluntary deed. Since, however, he who is injured is necessarily hurt, and is hurt unwillingly; what hurts are, indeed, is evident from what has been before said. For good and evil have been already essentially distinguished; and voluntary deeds are such as men perform knowingly. Hence it is necessary that all crimes should either be committed against the community, or against an individual, and this either by one who is ignorant, or by one who is unwilling, or by one who acts willingly and knowingly.

And of these crimes, some are the result of deliberate choice, but others are the effect of passion. Concerning the crimes therefore which are produced from anger, we shall speak when we discuss the passions. And we have already shown what are the objects of deliberate choice, and how men are disposed with respect to them.

Since, however, frequently men who confess that they have done a thing of which they are accused, either deny the name by which the accuser calls the deed, and inscribes the accusation, or deny the thing which is signified by the inscription; as for instance, that the thing was taken, indeed, but not stolen; and that such a one gave the first blow, but did not act insolently; and associated with the woman, indeed, but did not commit adultery with her; or that he committed a theft, but not sacrilege; (for he took nothing consecrated to divinity) or that he broke up land, but not belonging to the public; or that he discoursed with the enemy, but did not betray his country; on these accounts, it will be requisite to define what theft, insolent conduct, and adultery are, in order that if we wish to show these offences were committed or not, we may be able to declare what is just. Every thing, however, of this kind pertains to the question whether the thing is unjust and wicked, or is not unjust; for depravity and acting unjustly consist in deliberate choice. But appellations of this kind presignify deliberate choice; as for instance, insolent conduct and theft. For it does not follow that he who strikes another acts entirely insolently towards him, but then only if he strikes him for the sake of insulting him, as for instance, with a view to disgrace him, or to please himself. Nor does it entirely follow that if a man receives any thing latently,

that he has stolen it; but if he takes it away with a view to the detriment of him from whom he takes it, and of his own advantage. The like also takes place in other things, in the same manner as in these.

Since, however, there are two species of just and unjust things; for some indeed are written, but others are not committed to writing; of those indeed which are proclaimed by the laws we have already spoken.

But of those which are not committed to writing there are two species. And of these, some indeed consist in the excess of virtue and vice, in which are disgrace and praise, ignominy and honour and gifts; such for instance, as to be grateful to a benefactor, to benefit him who benefits, to be ready to give assistance to friends, and other things of the like kind.

But others are a supplement to the proper and written law. For the equitable appears to be just; and the equitable is that which is just, besides what is enjoined in the written law. This, however happens partly against the will, and partly with the will of the legislators. Against their will, indeed, when [the crime] is latent. But with their will when they are unable to define the thing; and it is necessary, indeed, to assert universally that the thing does not thus subsist always, but for the most part. Legislators also omit certain things willingly, which it is not easy to determine on account of their infinity; as for instance, [when they ordain a punishment] for striking a man with iron, they omit to determine the quantity and the quality of the iron. For life would not be sufficient to enumerate things of this kind. If, therefore, any thing is indefinite; but it is requisite to make a law concerning it, the legislator must necessarily promulgate the law simply. Hence, if a man having a ring on his finger lifts up his hand against, or strikes another person, according to the written law, indeed, he is guilty, and acts unjustly; but in reality, he does not act unjustly [by striking him with his ring;] and this is the equitable. If then what we have said be equity, it is evident what kind of things are equitable and not equitable, and also what kind of men are not equitable. For those things are equitable in which it is necessary to grant pardon. It is likewise

likewise equitable not to estimate errors and injuries as deserving equal punishment, nor errors and misfortunes. But misfortunes are such things as happen contrary to expectation, and not from depravity. Errors are such things as do not happen contrary to expectation, and are not from depravity; but injuries are such things as are not effected contrary to expectation, but proceed from depravity. For what proceeds from *desire*¹, emanates from depravity. It is likewise equitable to pardon human [frailties.] Also not to direct our attention to the law, but the legislator. And not to look to the action, but to the deliberate intention of him who did it. Nor to a part of a thing but the whole. Nor to consider what kind of a person a man is now, but what he always was, or for the most part. It is also the province of an equitable man rather to remember the good than the evil which he has received from another; and to be more mindful of the good which he has received, than of the good which he has done. Also to endure the being injured, patiently; and to be more willing that a controversy should be decided by words than by deeds. He is likewise more desirous that a thing should be decided by arbitration than by the suffrages of judges. For an arbitrator looks to the equitable; but a judge looks to the law. And recourse is had to an arbitrator for the sake of this, viz. that the equitable may prevail. And thus much concerning the equitable.

¹ When the whole soul is considered as divided into *reason*, *anger*, and *desire*, the last of these parts is that irrational appetite which is solely directed to external objects, and to the gratification arising from the possession of them; just as anger is an appetite directed to the avengement of incidental molestations.

CHAPTER XV.

THOSE injuries, however, are greater which proceed from greater injustice. Hence, also, [sometimes] the least injuries are attended with the greatest [injustice¹.] Thus for instance, Callistratus accused Melanopus for having defrauded the builders of the temple of three sacred vessels of an inconsiderable value. But the contrary takes place in justice. These, however, are the greatest injuries, because they transcend in power. For he who stole these three sacred vessels, would have committed any other unjust act. Sometimes, therefore, the injury is thus greater; but sometimes it is judged [to be greater] from the harm that ensues. That injury also is considered as greater, to which no punishment is equal, but every punishment is less than it deserves. And likewise that for which there is no remedy; because it is difficult and impossible to apply such a remedy. Also that for which the sufferer can obtain no recompence; for the evil is incurable; since justice and punishment are the remedies [of injuries.] Likewise, if the sufferer and he who is injured, cannot endure the attendant ignominy; for in this case he who did the injury deserves to be punished in a still greater degree. Thus Sophocles when pleading for Euctemon, because he who had been used insolently slew himself, said, that he who had done the injury ought not to be punished in a less degree, than he had punished himself who had been injured. The injury likewise is greater

¹ Sometimes injuries, though they are the least, because they are conversant with the smallest things, are seen to proceed from the greatest habit of injustice, and on this account they are the greatest,

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which a man does alone, or the first of all men, or with a few associates. The injury, also, is considered as greater which is often committed. And also that for the prevention of which laws and punishments have been explored. Thus in Argos those are punished, on whose account some new law is established, or a prison is built. The injury likewise is greater which is more brutal; and also that which is more premeditated. Likewise that which excites in the hearers of it, terror rather than pity. And rhetorical formulæ, indeed, are of this kind, viz. that a man has subverted or transgressed many just things, such as oaths, pledges of faith, and conjugal vows; for this is an exuberance of many injuries. And, also, that a man has committed an injury there where those that act unjustly are punished; as is the case with false witnesses. For where will not he do an injury who commits one in a court of justice? Likewise, that a man has done an injury which is attended with the greatest shame. And that he has injured him by whom he has been benefitted; for such a one multiplies injuries, because he acts ill, and likewise does not act well. Also, the injury is greater which a man does against the unwritten laws; for it is the province of a better man to be just, not from necessity, [but voluntarily.] Written laws, therefore, are [observed] from necessity, but this is not the case with unwritten laws. But after another manner the injury is greater which is committed against the written laws. For he who acts unjustly in those things in which he may be terrified by punishment, will much more act unjustly in those things for which no punishment is ordained. And thus much concerning a greater and a less injury.

CHAPTER XVI.

It follows in the next place that we should discuss what are called inartificial credibilities ; for these are peculiar to forensic orations. But they are few in number, viz. the laws, witnesses, compacts, examinations, and an oath.

In the first place, therefore, let us speak about laws, how they are to be used, both by him that exhorts, and him who dissuades, by him who accuses, and him who defends. For it is evident, that if the written law indeed is contrary to the affair, the common law must be used, and equity, as being more just. And it is also evident that the best decision will then be given, when the written laws are not entirely used. The equitable, likewise, always remains and never changes, and this too is the case with common law ; for it is according to nature ; but written laws are frequently changed. Hence, also, it is said in the *Antigone* of Sophocles, (for *Antigone* says as an apology, that she had acted contrary to the law of *Creon*, but not contrary to the unwritten law.)

————— nor could I ever think,
A mortal's law, of power or strength sufficient,
To abrogate th' unwritten law divine,
Immutable, eternal, not like these,
Of yesterday, but made ere time began.
Shall man persuade me, then, to violate,
Heaven's great commands, and make the gods my foes?

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It is likewise evident that the just is something true and advantageous, but not that which seems to be so; so that what is written is not law; for it does not perform the work of law. It may likewise be said that a judge is like an assayer of silver and gold; for it is his province to distinguish what is truly just from what is adulterate. And, also, that it is the business of a better man rather to use unwritten than written laws, and to abide by their decision. It must likewise be considered whether the law [in force] is contrary to a law which is approved, or is itself contrary to itself; as when the one law commands all contracts to be firmly observed; and the other forbids any contracts to be made contrary to law. It must also be considered, whether the law is ambiguous, so that it may be distorted, and then it must be seen to what part the just is to be adapted, or the advantageous, and afterwards the law is to be used. If, also, the things for which the law was established no longer remain, but the law itself remains, this we must endeavour to render manifest, and thus the law must be opposed by showing [that things being changed, the law also is to be changed and abrogated.] But if the written law is adapted to the occasion or the fact, then it must be said as the result of the best decision, that the law was established not for the sake of judging contrary to law, but in order that he may not be perjured who may happen to be ignorant what the law says. It must likewise be asserted, that no one chooses that which is simply good, but that which is good to himself. And that it makes no difference whether laws are not established, or are not used. Likewise, that in other acts it is of no advantage to dispute against the masters of them. Thus for instance, it is not expedient for one who is sick to dispute against the prescriptions of the physician; for the error of the physician is not so injurious, as it is to be accustomed to disobey a ruler. To endeavour likewise to become wiser than the laws, is that which is forbidden in celebrated laws. And thus much concerning laws.

With respect to witnesses, however, there are two kinds; for some
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are ancient; but others modern. And of the latter, some are partakers of danger, but others are exempt from it. But I call ancient witnesses the poets, and other illustrious persons whose judgements [and opinions] are manifest. Thus the Athenians made use of Homer as a witness about Salamis; the Tenedians of Periander the Corinthian, against the Sigœans; and Cleophon made use of the elegies of Solon against Critias, in order that he might show that the family of Critias was formerly contumacious. For otherwise Solon would never have said,

“ Bid Critias with his yellow locks,
His father's will obey.”

Such, therefore, are the witnesses about things that are past. But with respect to future events those who interpret oracles are witnesses; as for instance, Themistocles, when he said that the wooden wall [mentioned by the oracle] signified that the Athenians must betake themselves to their ships. Proverbs also are witnesses. Thus, if some one should deliberate whether he should form a friendship with an old man, the proverb testifies what he is to do, which says, *Never confer a benefit on an old man*. Thus, also, for him who deliberates whether he shall slay the children, whose parents he has likewise slain, there is this proverb, *He is a fool who having slain the father leaves the children*. Modern or recent witnesses, however, [who have no share in the danger,] are such as being illustrious have given a decision [in a court of justice.] For the judgements of these men are useful in the confirmation of what is doubtful. Thus, Eubulus in a court of justice, employed against Chares, what Plato had said against Archibius, *That it was common in the city for men to acknowledge themselves to be depraved*. Those also are recent witnesses, who partake of the danger [of being punished] if they appear to have given false evidence. Persons, therefore, of this description are alone witnesses in things of this kind; viz. whether the thing has been

been done or not; and whether it is, or not. But they are not witnesses concerning the quality of the thing; as, whether it is just or unjust, advantageous, or disadvantageous. Remote witnesses, however, are most worthy of belief in things of this kind; but the ancients are most worthy of belief; for they cannot be corrupted. The credibility, however, derived from witnesses [is to be employed as follows.] When, indeed, there are no witnesses, it is necessary to judge from probabilities; and this it is to employ the best decision. Probabilities, also, cannot be corrupted by money; and they are not condemned for giving a false testimony. But he who has witnesses ought to say to him that has not, that witnesses may be tried and punished, but probabilities cannot. [It may also be added,] that there would be no occasion for witnesses, if arguments from probabilities were sufficient. Testimonies, however, are either concerning ourselves, or concerning our opponents; and some, indeed, are concerning the thing itself; but others concerning the manners of persons. Hence, it is manifest that we can never be in want of useful testimony; for if the testimony does not relate to the thing, it will either be favourable to the defendant, or adverse to the plaintiff. But the testimony respecting manners, will either evince our probity, or the depravity of our opponent. Other particulars, however, respecting a witness, whether he be a friend, or an enemy, or neither, whether he be a man of reputation, or an infamous character, or neither, and whatever other differences there may be of the like kind, must be derived from the same places from which enthymemes are derived.

With respect to compacts, an oration is so far useful as it increases or diminishes [their authority;] or so far as it renders them credible, or unworthy of belief. For it is favourable to the speaker to show that the compacts possess credibility and authority; but the contrary is favourable to the opponent. The same arguments, therefore, are to be employed in showing that compacts are worthy or unworthy of belief, as we have employed in the affair of witnesses. For such

as those persons are who have subscribed and signed the compacts, [with respect to being worthy or unworthy of belief,] such also are the compacts. When, however, it is acknowledged by the litigants that compacts were made, if this acknowledgement is appropriate, the authority of the compacts is to be increased; for a compact is a private law, and is of a partial nature. And compacts, indeed, do not give authority to the law; but the laws give authority to legal compacts. And in short, the law itself is a certain compact; so that he who disbelieves in and subverts a contract, subverts the laws. Farther still, many contracts and voluntary transactions, are effected by compacts; so that if compacts lose their authority, the intercourse of men with each other must be subverted. Other things, also, which are adapted to the confirmation of compacts, the orator will perceive by himself. But if the compacts are adverse to the cause, and favourable to the opponents, in the first place those are adapted to the purpose which some one may urge to invalidate the force of the contrary law; for it is absurd that we should think laws are not to be obeyed, which have not been established rightly but by fraud, and that we should not think it necessary to observe compacts [which have been rightly made.] In the next place it must be said that a judge is a dispensator of what is just; and therefore that his attention is not to be directed to the observance of the compacts, but to that which is more just. And the just indeed is not to be perverted either by fraud, or by necessity; for it has a natural subsistence; but compacts are made both by persons who are deceived, and those who are compelled. In addition to these things, also, it is requisite to consider whether the compact is contrary to any written or common law, and to things just or beautiful; and besides this, whether it is contrary to any posterior or prior contracts. For either the posterior contracts are binding, but the prior have no authority; or the prior are right, but the posterior fallacious; and thus this contrariety of compacts may be employed with advantage. Again, it will be expedient to see whether the compacts are in any way
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adverse to the judges, and to direct the attention to other things of the like kind; for these things may in a similar manner be easily perceived.

Examinations, also, and torments are certain testimonies; and they seem to possess credibility, because a certain necessity is present with them. There is no difficulty, therefore, in perceiving what relates to these things, and in narrating what is contingent to them; as also in discussing those particulars, which if they are adapted to our purpose we may amplify [by asserting] that these alone are true testimonies. But if they are against us, and favourable to our opponent, then the evidence may be invalidated by speaking against the whole genus of examinations and torments. For men through compulsion no less assert what is false than what is true; since they endure in order that they may not speak the truth, and readily assert what is false, in order that they may be more swiftly liberated from pain. For collateral confirmation, also, it is requisite that examples should be adduced, with which the judges are acquainted.

With respect to oaths, however, there is a fourfold consideration. For we either give and take an oath; or we do neither. Or we do the one, but not the other. And of these either an oath is given, but not taken; or it is taken, but not given. Again, either we have sworn before, and are accused by our opponent of perjury, or the opponent swears and is accused of perjury. He therefore who does not offer an oath to his opponent [may say] that men are easily perjured; and that his opponent if he should take an oath, would not restore the money, but if he did not take an oath, he should think the judges would condemn him. He may also add, that as the affair is dangerous, it is better to commit it to the judges; for he believes in them, but not in his opponent. [He likewise who does not take the oath which is offered him, may say] that he does not take it, because he is unwilling to swear for money; and that if he was a bad man he would take an oath; for it is better to be depraved for the sake of something than for the sake of nothing. For by taking
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an oath he will obtain money, but otherwise not. His not taking an oath therefore will be the effect of virtue, and will not be the consequence of the fear of perjury. The saying of Xenophanes, likewise, may be adapted to this affair, that the challenge is not equal of an impious against a pious man, but is just as if a strong should call upon a weak man to fight with him. He also who takes an oath may say that he takes it, because he confides in himself, but not in his opponent. And by inverting the assertion of Xenophanes he may say, that the challenge is equal, if an impious man offers, but a pious man takes an oath. And that it is a dreadful thing he should not be willing to swear respecting those things for which he thinks it right that the judges should pass sentence on those that take an oath. But if he offers an oath, he may say that it is pious to be willing to commit the affair to the gods; and that there is no occasion [for his opponent] to require any other judges; since the judgement of the cause is committed to him through an oath. He may, likewise, say that it is absurd that his opponent should not be willing to swear concerning those things about which he requires others [i. e. the judges] to swear. Since, however, the manner in which we ought to speak, according to each [of these four modes,] is evident, it is likewise evident how we ought to speak according to these modes when combined; as for instance, if a man is willing indeed to take, but not to give an oath; or if he gives, but is unwilling to take it; or if he is willing both to give and take it; or is willing to do neither. For a combination must necessarily be made from the above-mentioned modes; so that arguments also must necessarily be composed from them. If, however, any one has before taken an oath, and which is contrary [to the present oath,] it must be said that there is no perjury. For to do an injury is a voluntary thing; but things which are done by violence and fraud are involuntary. Hence, therefore, it must be inferred that injury is committed in the mind, and not in the mouth. But if the opponent has before sworn, and is now unwilling to abide by his oath, it must be said that he subverts all things who
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does not adhere to what he has sworn; for on this account, also, judges that have taken an oath use the laws. And [it may likewise be said in the way of amplification,] shall we rejoice, indeed, that you judges should abide in the decision which you have made, after taking an oath; and shall not we abide in the oaths which we have taken? And such other things as may be said for the purpose of amplification. And thus much concerning inartificial credibility.

THE

THE
ART OF RHETORIC.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

SUCH, therefore, are the particulars from which it is requisite to exhort and dissuade, to blame and praise, to accuse and defend, and such likewise are the opinions and propositions which are useful in procuring credibility in these. For concerning these, and from these, enthymemes about each genus of orations are peculiarly derived.

Since, however, the rhetorical art is for the sake of judgement (for [the auditors of orations] judge of consultations, and justice is judgement) it is necessary that the orator should not only direct his attention to the oration, so as to consider how it may be demonstrative and credible, but he should also shew himself to be worthy of belief, and dispose his auditor to become a judge. For it is of great consequence in procuring belief, especially indeed in counsels, and afterwards in
judgements,

judgements, that the speaker should appear to be properly qualified, and that he should be well affected towards the auditors; and besides this, if the auditors also are properly disposed. That the speaker, therefore, should appear to be properly qualified, is more useful in counsels [than in judgements;] but for the hearer to be well disposed, is more useful in judgements. For the same things do not appear to those that love and hate, nor to those that are irascible and those that are mild; but either they appear entirely different, or different in magnitude. For to the friend, he concerning whom he forms the judgement, will not appear to have acted unjustly, or will appear to have acted so in a small degree; but to him who hates, the contrary will take place. And to him who desires, and is in good hope [of possessing what he desires] if that which is to come is pleasant, it also appears that it will be, and that it will be good; but to him who has no desire, and no expectation of a thing, the contrary will take place.

There are three causes, therefore, through which men become worthy of belief; for so many are the things through which we believe, besides demonstrations. And these are prudence, virtue and benevolence. For men are false in what they say, or in the counsels they give, either on account of all these, or on account of some one of these. For either they do not think rightly through imprudence; or they do not speak what appears to be true, in consequence of their depravity; or they are prudent and worthy, but not benevolent. Hence, it happens that those do not give the best counsels who know how to give them. And these are the only things through which they fail. It is necessary, therefore, that he who appears to possess all these, should be considered by his auditors as worthy of belief. Whence, therefore, men may appear to be prudent and worthy, must be derived from the divisions of the virtues; for from the same things through which a man renders himself prudent and worthy, he may also cause another to become so. Concerning benevolence, however, and friendship we must now speak, in discussing what pertains to the passions.

But the passions are those things, on account of which men being changed, differ in their judgements, and to which pleasure and pain are

are consequent. The passions, therefore, are such as anger, pity, fear, and other things of this kind, and the contraries to these.

It is necessary, however, to give a threefold division to the particulars about each. I say, for instance, about anger [we should consider] how men are disposed when they are angry, what the things are at which they are accustomed to be angry, and what the quality is of the things which are the subjects of their anger. For if we only possess a knowledge of one or two, but not of all these, it will be impossible to excite anger [in the auditors.] And in a similar manner in the other passions. As, therefore, in what has been before said, we have delivered [appropriate] propositions; we shall likewise do the same in considering the passions, and divide them after the same manner.

CHAPTER II.

LET anger, therefore, be the appetite in man of apparent revenge in conjunction with pain; in consequence of a seeming neglect or contempt of himself, or of some one belonging to him.

If, therefore, anger is this, it is necessary that he who is angry should always be angry with some particular person; as for instance, with Cleon, but not with man; and that he is angry because Cleon has done or intended to do something to himself, or to some one belonging to him. It is also necessary that a certain pleasure arising from the hope of revenge, should be consequent to all anger. For it is pleasant for a man to fancy that he shall obtain the object of his desire; but no one aspires after those things which appear to him to be impossible.

He who is angry, however, aspires after things which it is possible for him to obtain. Hence it is well said [by Achilles¹] concerning anger, that,

Anger increases in the mortal breast,
Sweeter than trickling honey to the taste,

For a certain pleasure is consequent to anger both on this account, and because the thoughts of those who are angry are entirely employed on revenge. The phantasy, therefore, or imagination which is then ingenerated in the soul, produces pleasure, in the same manner as the imagination which is ingenerated in dreams.

Since, however, neglect is the energy of opinion about that which appears to deserve no regard; (for we conceive that both good and evil, and what contributes to these are worthy of attention, but such things as are nothing, or very trifling, we conceive to be of no worth whatever)—hence, there are three species of neglect, viz. contempt, insolence and contumely. For that which men despise they neglect; since they despise that which they conceive to be of no worth; and those things which are of no worth they neglect. He also who insults another person appears to despise him; for insult is an impediment to the will of another person, not that he who offers the insult may derive a certain advantage himself, but that he may prevent the person insulted from deriving it. Since, therefore, he does not expect to derive any advantage himself, he neglects the other person. For it is evident that he does not apprehend any injury will accrue to himself from the insult; since if he did, he would be afraid, and would not neglect [the person he insults;] nor any advantage to the person insulted, which deserves to be mentioned; for if he did he would be anxious to make him his friend. He, also, who acts contumeliously towards another neglects him; for contumely is to injure and pain

¹ In Iliad, 18.

another

another person in those things in which shame befalls the sufferer, and this not that any thing else may be done to him than what is done, but that he may receive pleasure from the act. For those who return an injury do not act contumeliously, but take revenge. The cause, however, of pleasure to those that calumniate is this, that they fancy they excell in a greater degree by acting ill. Hence, young men and those that are rich are contumelious; for they fancy that they thus acquire a superiority to others. But ignominy pertains to contumely; and he who disgraces another neglects him. For that which is of no worth, has no honour either of evil or good. Hence, Achilles when angry says,

————— The affront my honour stains,
While he my valour's guerdon thus detains¹.

And,

Disgrac'd, dishonour'd, like the vilest slave².

As being enraged on account of these things. Men also think it fit that they should be greatly honoured by those who are inferior to them in birth, in power, in virtue, and in short, in that in which they very much excel another person; as for instance, the rich man excels the poor man in money; the rhetorician excels in speaking him who is unable to speak; the governor him who is governed; and he who fancies himself worthy to command, him who deserves to be commanded. Hence, it is said,

Great is the wrath of Jove-descended kings³.

And,

For tho' we deem the short-liv'd fury past,
'Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last⁴.

¹ Iliad, 9.

² Iliad, 9.

³ Iliad, 2.

⁴ Iliad, 1.

For

For men are indignant on account of their transcendency. Men, likewise, think that they ought to be greatly honoured by those by whom any one should think they ought to be benefitted; but these are such as they have benefitted, or do benefit, either they themselves, or some one belonging to them, or such as they do wish, or have wished to benefit.

It is now therefore manifest from these things, how men are disposed when they are angry, and with whom, and from what causes they are angry. For they are angry, indeed, when they are aggrieved. For he who is aggrieved desires something; whether he is aggrieved by any opposition directly made against him; as when a man is prevented from drinking that is thirsty; or if an opposition is not directly made against him, yet it appears to be made indirectly; or if any one acts contrary to him, or does not co-operate with him; or if any thing else disturbs him thus disposed,—from all these circumstances he is angry. Hence the sick, the poor, those that are in love, those that are thirsty, and in short those that desire any thing, and do not act rightly, are disposed to be angry, and are easily provoked, and especially with those that neglect their present condition. Thus for instance, the sick are angry with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their disease; the poor, with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their poverty; warriors with those that neglect them in warlike affairs; and lovers with those that neglect them in amatory concerns; and in a similar manner in other things. For each is prepared to exercise his anger against those that neglect them, by the inherent passion. Farther still, men are likewise disposed to be angry when things happen contrary to their expectation. For that which is very much contrary to opinion is more grievous, just as what is very much contrary to opinion produces delight, if that which is wished for is accomplished. Hence, also, seasons and times, and dispositions and ages render it apparent what kind of persons are easily disposed to anger, and when and where; and that when they are most in these circumstances, they are most easily excited to anger.

Men,

Men, likewise, are angry with those that laugh at, deride and mock them; for by so acting they insult them. They are also angry with those that offend them in such things as are indications of contumely. But it is necessary that these should be things of such a kind, as are not directed to any other end, and are of no advantage to those that do them; for they appear to be done solely through contumely. Men also are angry with those that defame and despise things to which they are most devoted. Thus for instance, those that are ambitious of excelling in philosophy, are angry with those who speak contemptuously of philosophy; those who pay great attention to the form and beauty of the body, are angry with those that despise it; and in a similar manner in other things. This also is much more the case, if they suspect that they either do not at all possess these things, or do not firmly possess them, or do not appear to do so. But when they fancy they very much excell in those things for which they are reviled, they pay no attention to the scoffs of others. Men are likewise angry with their friends more than with those that are not their friends; for they think it is more proper that they should be benefitted by them than not. They are also angry with those who have been accustomed to honour, or pay attention to them if they no longer associate with them as formerly; for they fancy that by so acting they are despised by them. They are likewise angry with those that do not return the kindness which they have received, nor make an equal recompense; and also with those who act contrary to them, if they are their inferiours; for all such things appear to be attended with contempt; the one indeed as of inferiours, but the other as by inferiours. They are also angry in a greater degree, if they are despised by men of no account; for anger was supposed by us to arise from undeserved neglect or contempt; but it is fit that inferiours should not despise their superiours. Men likewise are angry with their friends if they do not speak or act well, and still more so, if they do the contraries to these. Also, if they are not sensible of their wants; as was the case with the Plexippus of Antipho when he was angry with Meleager; for it is a sign of neglect not to be sensible [of the wants of a friend;] since

since those things are not concealed from us to which we pay attention. They are likewise angry with those that rejoice in their misfortunes, and in short with those who are not at all concerned when they are in adversity; for this is an indication either of hostility or neglect. Also with those who pay no attention to them when they are aggrieved; on which account they are angry with those who are the messengers of evil. And likewise with those who [willingly] hear or see their maladies; for in this case, such persons resemble either those who neglect them, or their enemies. For friends condole [with their friends] in their afflictions; and all men grieve on surveying their own maladies. They are likewise angry with five kinds of persons by whom they are neglected; with those with whom they stand in competition for honour; with those they admire; with those by whom they wish to be admired; with those whom they reverence; and with those by whom they are revered. For if they are neglected by any of these, they are in a greater degree angry. They are also angry with those who despise them, by injuring their parents, children, wives, and such as are in subjection to them, and whom it would be disgraceful in them not to assist. Likewise with those that are ungrateful; for neglect or contempt from these is unbecoming. They are also angry with such as employ irony and dissimulation towards those who are seriously employed; for irony pertains to contempt. Likewise with those that benefit others, but not themselves; for this also indicates contempt, not to think a man deserving of that which all other persons are thought to deserve. Forgetfulness also is productive of anger, as for instance, of names, though it is but a trifling thing. For forgetfulness seems to be an indication of neglect; since oblivion is produced from negligence; and negligence is inattention. And thus we have shown who the persons are by whom anger is excited, how they are disposed, and from what causes others are angry with them. It is likewise evident that an orator ought to frame his auditors to such a temper as they are in when they are angry, and show that the opponents are guilty of those things which excite anger, and that they are such persons as men are accustomed to be angry with.

CHAP.

CHAPTER III.

SINCE, however, the being angry is contrary to the being placable, and anger is contrary to placability, the disposition of those that are placable must be considered, who those persons are to whom they conduct themselves with placability, and through what causes they become so. Let placability then be a remission and suppression of anger.

If, therefore, men are angry with those that neglect them, but neglect is a voluntary thing, it is evident that they will be placable to those who do none of these things, or do them unwillingly, or appear not to have done them voluntarily. They will likewise be placable to those who wish to have done the contrary to what they have done. And also to those who are such towards themselves, as they are towards others; for no one appears to neglect himself. Likewise, to those who acknowledge [their faults,] and repent of them. For considering the pain which they feel as a punishment for what they have done, they cease to be angry. But this is evident from what takes place in punishing servants; for we punish in a greater degree such of them as deny [the fault,] and contradict us; but we cease to be angry with such of them as acknowledge they are punished justly. The cause, however, of this is that it is impudence to deny what is manifest; and impudence is neglect and contempt. We feel no shame, therefore, towards those whom we very much despise. Men are placable likewise to those who humble themselves towards them, and do not contradict them; for thus they appear to acknowledge that they are inferior to
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them;

them ; but those that are inferior are afraid ; and no one who is afraid is negligent. But that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves is evident from dogs who do not bite those that prostrate themselves. Men also are placable to those that act seriously, when they are acting seriously themselves ; for thus they appear to be thought by them worthy of attention, and not to be despised. Likewise to those who [if they have injured them in any respect, are afterwards] more grateful to them. Also to those that beg and intreat ; for such persons are more humble. And to those, that are neither contumelious, nor scoffers, nor neglectful, either of any person, or at least not of the worthy, or of such as they themselves are. And in short, men become placable from causes contrary to those which excite to anger. They are likewise placable to those whom they fear, and reverence ; for so long as they are thus disposed towards them they are not angry with them. For it is impossible at one and the same time to be angry with and afraid of a man. With those also who have done any thing through anger, they are either not angry, or they are angry in a less degree ; for such persons do not appear to have acted from neglect ; since no one who is angry is neglectful. For neglect is unattended with pain ; but anger is accompanied with pain. They are likewise placable to those that revere them, [because reverence is contrary to contempt.]

It is also evident that men are placable when they are in a disposition contrary to anger ; as when they are in sport, when they are laughing, when they are at a festival, when they are successful, when they perform any business happily, when they are full ; and in short, when they are without pain, experience a pleasure unattended with indolence, and are in good hope. They are likewise placable to those by whom they have not been molested for a long time, and through whom they have not been excited to recent anger ; for time appeases anger. Vengeance also formerly inflicted on another person, has the power of appeasing a greater anger conceived against some one. Hence, Philocrates answered well, when a certain person said, the people being enraged, why do you not defend yourself ? He replied, not yet.

But

But when will you ? When I see another person condemned. For men become placable, when they have consumed their anger upon another person ; as it happened to Ergophilus ; whom the people absolved, though they were more enraged against him than against Callisthenes, whom the day before they had condemned to death. Men also are placable towards those whom they have convicted. And likewise when they see those that are angry suffering a greater evil from their anger than they occasioned to others ; for they conceive that such a one is punished for his anger. Also if they think that they themselves have acted unjustly, and suffer justly ; for anger is not excited against that which is just ; since in this case they do not any longer fancy that they suffer undeservedly. But anger was said by us to be this, [viz. to arise from a conception of unmerited contempt.] Hence, it is necessary that offenders should first be punished by words ; for slaves also when thus punished are less indignant. Those likewise are placable who conceive that the persons on whom they inflict punishment will not perceive that they are punished by them. For anger is excited against individuals, as is evident from its definition. Hence, Ulysses [in his speech to Polyphemus] rightly calls himself *Ulysses the subverter of cities* ; as if he could not have avenged [the injuries of Polyphemus] unless he made him sensible who it was that inflicted the vengeance, and for what it was inflicted. It follows, therefore, that we are not angry with those that are not sensible ; nor any longer with those that are dead, because [we fancy] they have suffered the extremity of evils, and will not be pained by, or sensible of our revenge, which is the object of desire of those that are angry. Hence it is well said by the poet respecting Hector, who wished that the anger of Achilles towards him might cease when he was dead,

On the dead earth his rage was spent in vain.

It is evident, therefore, that those who wish to render others placable must derive their arguments from these places. For those whose anger is to be appeased, must be rendered such persons as we have described ;

but those persons with whom others are angry must be shown [by the orator] to be such as are to be feared, or that they are worthy of reverence, or that they have deserved well of them, or that they injured them unwillingly, or that they are very much grieved for what they have done.

CHAPTER IV.

LET us now show who those persons are that are the objects of love and hatred, and why they are so, defining for this purpose what friendship is, and friendly love. Let therefore, friendly love be defined to be, the wish that such things as are conceived to be good may fall to the lot of some one for his own sake, and not for the sake of him who forms the wish, and also the endeavour of him who forms the wish to procure such good to the utmost of his power. But he is a friend who loves, and is reciprocally beloved; and those persons conceive themselves to be friends, who think they are thus disposed towards each other.

These things, therefore, being supposed, it is necessary that a friend should be one who reciprocally rejoices in the good which befalls another person, and is naturally pained when that person is aggrieved, and this not on account of any thing else, but on account of the person himself. For all men rejoice when they obtain the object of their wishes, but are aggrieved if the contrary takes place; so that pains and pleasures are an indication of [good and bad] wishes. Those likewise are friends to each other; to whom the same things are good and evil. And also those who are friends and enemies to the same persons and things; for these

these must necessarily wish the same things; so that he who wishes the same things to another as to himself, appears to be a friend to that person.

Men also love those that have either benefited them, or those that are under their care; or if their kindness to them has been great, or has been cheerfully exerted, or seasonably, and for their own sake; and also such as they think, are willing to benefit others. They likewise love the friends of their friends, and those that love the same persons that they love, and who are beloved by those who are beloved by them; who are likewise enemies to those to whom they are enemies, and who hate those whom they hate, and are hated by those who are hated by them. For the same things appear to be good to all these, and to themselves; so that they wish the same good to them as to themselves; which was the definition of a friend. Farther still, men love those who are beneficent to them in pecuniary affairs, and in those things which regard their safety. Hence they honour liberal, brave, and just men; and they consider those to be such who do not live on the property of others. But men of this description are those that live by their own labour; and among these are those that live by agriculture, and of others, especially manual artificers. They also love those that are temperate, because they are not unjust; and for the same reason they love those that lead a quiet life unmolested by business. We likewise love those to whom we wish to be friends, if they appear to wish to be our friends. But men of this description are such as are good according to virtue, and are celebrated either by all men, or by the best of men, or by those who are admired by us, or by those who admire us. Farther still, men love those who are agreeable companions and with whom they can pass the day pleasantly. But men of this description are such as are ingenuous, who do not reprove the faults of others, and are not studious of contention nor morose; for all such persons are pugnacious; and those that are pugnacious appear to wish things contrary to the wishes of friends. They likewise love those that have elegant manners, and who can give and take a jest; for in both these, men strive to be facetious, as well those that are able to bear raillery,

raillery, as those that are able to rail elegantly themselves. They also love those who praise the good things which they enjoy, and especially such among these as they are fearful should not be present to themselves. Likewise those who are neat in their appearance, in their dress, and in every thing pertaining to the whole of their life. Also those, who neither reprobate the faults committed by others, nor the benefits conferred on them; for both are attended with defamation. They likewise love those that neither remember injuries, nor are observers of the faults of others, but are easily reconciled. For such as they think they are towards others, they also think they will be towards themselves. They likewise love those that are not addicted to slander, and who know no evil, but only good, either of their neighbours or them. For a good man acts in this manner. Also those that do not resist them when they are angry, or seriously employed; for such like persons are pugnacious. Likewise those that are seriously disposed towards them, as for instance, such as admire them; consider them to be worthy; are delighted with them; and are especially thus affected in things in which they themselves particularly wish to be admired, or to appear to be worthy, or pleasant persons. Men also love those that resemble themselves, and are engaged in the same pursuits, provided they are no impediment to them, and their subsistence is not derived from the same profession. For thus [what Hesiod says] will take place viz. that *the potter envies the potter*. They likewise love those who desire things of which it is at the same time possible for them to be partakers; for if not, the same thing [which we have just noticed] will thus happen. They also love those towards whom they are so disposed as not to be ashamed of things which are base only according to opinion, and towards whom they are ashamed of things which are in reality base. And likewise those by whom they are ambitious to be honoured, or by whom they wish to be emulated, and not to be envied; for these they either love, or wish to be their friends. They likewise love those with whom they co-operate in the acquisition of some good, lest greater evil should hereafter befall themselves. And also those who similarly love their friends when absent and present; on which account all men love those

those who are thus disposed towards the dead. And in short, they love those who very much love their friends, and do not forsake them; for among the number of good men, they especially love those who are good in what relates to friendship. They likewise love those who do not act with dissimulation towards them; but men of this description are such as are not ashamed to speak of their own defects. For we have already observed that towards friends, we should be ashamed of things which relate to opinion, [i. e. which are base in opinion only, and not in reality.] If, therefore, he who is ashamed has not friendly love, he who is not ashamed will resemble one who has friendly love. Men, likewise, love those who are not the objects of fear, and in whom they can confide; for no one loves him of whom he is afraid. But the species of friendship are fellowship, familiarity, alliance, and things of the like kind. Beneficence also exerted towards another person is productive of friendship, as also are acting beneficently when it is not required, and not divulging favours when they are bestowed. For thus beneficence will appear to have been exerted for the sake of the friend, and not on any other account.

CHAPTER V.

WITH respect to enmity, however, and hatred, it is evident that they must necessarily be surveyed from contraries. But the things which produce enmity are, anger, injury either in word or deed, and calumny.

Anger, therefore, arises from what pertains to ourselves; but enmity may

may exist independent of what has reference to ourselves. For if we conceive a man to be a person of a certain description, we hate him.

And anger, indeed, is always exerted towards particular persons, as for instance, towards Callias, or Socrates; but hatred is also exerted towards genera themselves. For every man hates a thief and a sycophant. And anger indeed may be cured by time; but hatred is incurable. The former, also, desires to give pain; but the latter is more desirous to do harm. For he who is angry, wishes [that he with whom he is angry] may be sensible of pain; but with him who hates this is of no consequence. All painful things, however, are objects of sensation; but those things which are especially evils, viz. injustice and folly, are in the smallest degree objects of sensation; for the presence of vice is attended with no pain. And anger, indeed, is accompanied with pain; but hatred is not; for he who is angry is pained; but he who hates feels no pain.

And the angry man, indeed, pities the subject of his anger, if many evils befall him; but he who hates, feels no commiseration for the object of his hatred. For the former wishes that he with whom he is angry may reciprocally suffer what he feels; but the latter wishes that the object of his hatred may no longer exist. From these things, therefore, it is evident, that it is possible [for an orator] to show who those are that are really enemies and friends, and to make those to be such who are not so. He may also dissolve the arguments by which his opponent endeavours to show that some persons are mutually friends or enemies; and that when it is dubious whether a thing was done from anger, or from enmity, he may persuade the adoption of that part which some one may have deliberately chosen.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VI.

WHAT kind of things are the objects of fear, and how those that are terrified are affected, will be evident from what follows. Let fear, therefore, be a certain pain or perturbation arising from the imagination of some future evil, which is either of a destructive nature, or attended with molestation. For not all evils are the objects of fear; such for instance, as injustice or slowness; but such as are capable of producing great molestation or destruction; and these, when they are not remote, but seem to be near, so as to be imminent. For things which are very remote are not the objects of fear; since all men know that they shall die, yet because death is not near, they pay no attention to it.

If, however, fear is this, it is necessary that such things should be terrible as appear to possess a great power of destroying, or are productive of such harm as is attended with great molestation. Hence, also, the indications of things of this kind are terrible; for the object of fear seems to be near. For danger is this, viz. *the approximation of that which is terrible*. Things of this kind, however, are the enmity and anger of those who are able to effect something; for it is evident that they are both willing and able; so that they are near to acting [what their enmity and anger may suggest.] Injustice, also, when it possesses power is the object of fear; for the unjust man is unjust from deliberate choice. Virtue, likewise, when insulted and possessing power is to be feared; for it is evident that vengeance, when it is insulted, is always the object of its deliberate choice; but now it

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possesses

possesses power. The fear, also, of those who are able to effect something is the object of terror; for such a one must necessarily be in preparation [for that which he dreads.]

Since, however, the multitude are depraved, are vanquished by gain, and are timid in dangers, to be in the power of another person is a thing for the most part to be feared. Hence, those who have been eye witnesses of any dreadful deed that has been perpetrated, are to be feared, lest they should divulge it, or desert [him by whom it was committed.] Those, likewise, who are able to do an injury, are always to be feared by those who are capable of being injured; for men for the most part act unjustly when they are able. Those also are to be feared who either have suffered an injury, or think that they have; for they always watch for an opportunity [of retaliating.] Those too are to be dreaded who would do an injury if they had the power; for they are afraid of retaliation; and it was supposed that a thing of this kind is the object of dread. Those, likewise, are to be feared who are competitors for the same things, and which both cannot at one and the same time possess; for between men of this description there is always hostility. Those also who are objects of dread to more powerful men, are to be feared by us; for they are more able to injure us than they are to injure the more powerful. For the same reason those persons are to be feared who are dreaded by men more powerful than themselves; and also those who have destroyed men superior to themselves in power; and those who have attacked men inferior to themselves; for either they are now to be dreaded, or when their power is increased. Among those that have been injured, likewise, and among enemies and opponents, such as are to be dreaded, are not those that are hasty and choleric, and who speak their mind freely, but those that are mild, who dissemble, and are crafty; for [what they are machinating] is obscure, or nearly so; and hence their designs are never manifest, because they are remote [from observation.]

With respect however to every thing that is dreadful, such things are more to be feared, the errors pertaining to which cannot be corrected; but it is either wholly impossible to correct them, or they cannot be corrected

corrected by those that have committed them, but by their adversaries. Those things also are to be feared for which there is no help, or in which assistance cannot easily be obtained. And in short those things are to be feared which when they do or shall happen to others, are lamentable in their consequences. With respect to things which are to be feared, and which are dreaded by men, these, as I may say, are nearly the greatest.

Let us now show the manner in which men are affected when they are afraid. If, therefore, fear is attended with the expectation of suffering some destructive evil, it is evident that no one is afraid who thinks that he shall not suffer any evil, and that no one dreads those things which he does not think he shall suffer, or those persons through whom he does not imagine he shall suffer, nor then when he does not suspect [any evil to be imminent.] Hence, it is necessary that those persons should be afraid who imagine they shall suffer some evil, and from such persons, and in such things, and at such a time. Neither, however, those who are in very prosperous circumstances, and appear to be so to themselves, imagine they shall suffer any evil; (on which account such men are insolent, neglectful and audacious; and riches, strength, a multitude of friends, and power, produce such men) nor those who think that they have now suffered dreadfully, and whose hopes with respect to futurity are extinct, as is the case with those who are led to capital punishment. But it is necessary [where there is fear] that there should be some hope of safety, and of escaping the evils which occasion their anxiety; of which this is an indication, that fear makes men disposed to receive counsel, though no one consults about things that are hopeless. Hence, when it is necessary that the orator should excite fear in his auditors, he must show them that they are such persons as may suffer [many] evils, because others greater than them have suffered them. He must also show that men similar to themselves suffer or have suffered many evils, from those through whom they did not expect to suffer, and that they have suffered these evils and then when they did not imagine they should.

CHAPTER VII.

SINCE, however, with respect to fear, it is evident what it is, and it is also evident what the objects of terror are, and how men are affected when they are afraid, it is likewise manifest from these things what confidence is, what the kind of things are in which men confide, and how confident men are disposed. For confidence is contrary to fear, and that which is the object of confidence to that which is the object of dread. Hence, *confidence is a hope attended with imagination, that those things which may be salutary to us are near at hand, but that those things which are the objects of our dread, either do not exist, or are remote.*

But the things which are effective of confidence are, events of a dreadful nature, if they are remote, and such as may be confided in if they are near. Evils also which are imminent, if they may be corrected produce confidence; and this is likewise the case when many or great auxiliaries, or both these, against evils, are present.

Confidence also is produced, when there are neither any persons who have been injured by us, nor who have injured us. And when either, in short, we have no antagonists, or they have no power, or if they have power they are our friends, or have received benefits from, or have conferred benefits on us. Confidence likewise is produced, when those to whom the same things are advantageous as are beneficial to us are many, or superior to us, or both these.

Those, however, that are confident in dangers are such as think they
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can accomplish with rectitude many things, without suffering any evil; or who, if they frequently fall into great dangers, escape from them. For men become void of perturbation in dangers in a twofold respect, either because they have not experienced them before, or because they have auxiliaries through which they may escape from them. For thus in dangers at sea, those who are unexperienced in its storms are confident they shall escape them; and also those who have assistance in themselves from their experience. Confidence likewise is produced when there is nothing to be feared from either our equals or inferiors, and those to whom we imagine ourselves to be superior. But we imagine ourselves to be superior to those whom we have either themselves vanquished, or those that are superior to, or resemble them. Men also are confident, if they think those things are present with them in a greater number, and in a greater degree, for which those who excel others are the objects of dread; and these are, an abundance of riches, strength of body, of friends, of country, of warlike apparatus, and either of all, or of the greatest of these. They are likewise confident if they have injured either no one, or not many, or not such as are the objects of fear. And in short, if they are well disposed with reference to what pertains to the gods, both as to other things, and to what is indicated by signs and oracles. For anger is attended with confidence; and not to injure, but to be injured is effective of anger; but divinity is conceived to give assistance to those that are injured. Men also are confident, when either having first attacked others, they neither do nor are likely to suffer any evil, or think that in so doing they have acted rightly. And thus much concerning things which are the objects of fear and confidence.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT kind of things, however, those are which are the objects of shame, and also those for which men are not ashamed, and towards what persons they are ashamed, and how they are disposed [when under the influence of this passion,] will be evident from what follows. But *let shame be a certain pain and perturbation with respect to evils either present, or past, or future, which apparently lead to infamy. And let want of shame or impudence be a certain contempt and impassivity with respect to these very same things.*

If, therefore, shame is that which we have defined it to be, a man must necessarily be ashamed of evils of such a kind as appear to him to be base, or to those whom he regards. But things of this kind are such deeds as proceed from vice ; such for instance as, for a soldier to throw away his shield [in battle] or fly ; for this proceeds from timidity. It is likewise base to deny a deposit ; for this is the effect of injustice. And also to lie with women with whom it is not lawful to lie, or where it is not proper, or when it is not proper ; for this proceeds from intemperance. It is likewise base, to seek after gain from minute, or disgraceful, or impossible things ; as from the poor or the dead ; whence also the proverb, *to take away from the dead* ; for this proceeds from a desire of base gain, and from illiberality. It is also base for a man not to assist others with money when he is able, or to assist in a less degree than he is able. Likewise for a man to receive pecuniary assistance from one less rich than himself, is base ; and for him to take up money at interest, and yet seem to beg ; to beg, and yet seem to demand ; to demand,

demand, and yet seem to beg ; to praise a thing, so as that he may appear to beg it ; and though repulsed, to persist no less in begging it. For all these are indications of illiberality. It is likewise base to praise a man to his face ; for this is a sign of flattery ; also to praise above measure what is good, but extenuate what is evil ; to condole immoderately with one who is afflicted ; and every thing else of a similar kind ; for these are indications of flattery. It is also base not to endure labours which more elderly or delicate men, or those that have greater authority, or in short those that are more imbecil endure ; for all these are indications of effeminacy. To be benefited likewise by another, and that frequently is base ; and also to reprobate the benefits conferred on another. For all these are indications of pusillanimity and an abject mind. It is also base for a man to speak of himself, and to promise [great things of himself ;] and likewise to attribute to himself the deeds of others ; for this is a sign of arrogance. In a similar manner in each of the other ethical vices, works, and indications, the like may be found ; for they are base and shameful.

In addition to these things also, it is shameful not to participate of those beautiful things of which all men, or all those that resemble each other, or most men participate. But by men that resemble each other I mean, those of the same nation, city, and age, and who are allied to each other ; and in short, those that are of an equal condition. For it is now base not to partake of these things ; as for instance, of such a portion of erudition, and of other things in a similar manner. But all these are more shameful when they are seen to happen to any one from himself ; for thus they proceed in a greater degree from vice, when a man is the cause to himself, of past, present, or future evils. Men likewise are ashamed of such things as lead to infamy and disgrace if they suffer or have suffered, or are to suffer them ; and these are such things as pertain to the ministrant services either of the body, or of base works, among the number of which is having the body abused. Things also are shameful which pertain to intemperance, whether voluntary or involuntary ; but things which pertain to violence are involuntary. For the endurance of such things unattended with revenge proceeds.

proceeds from sloth and timidity. These, therefore, and the like are the things of which men are ashamed.

Since, however, shame is an imagination with respect to ignominy, and shame, on account of ignominy itself, and not on account of the evils which attend it; but no one pays any attention to opinion except on account of those who form the opinion, men must necessarily feel shame in the presence of those whom they regard [when they have acted wrong.] But they regard those who admire them, and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, and with whom they contend for honours, and whose opinion they do not despise. They wish, therefore, to be admired by, and they admire those, who are in possession of some good which is honourable, or from whom they very much wish to obtain something which it is in their power to give them; as for instance, is the case with lovers. Men, however, contend for honours with those that resemble themselves. But they pay attention to prudent men, as to persons of veracity; and men of this kind are such as are more elderly, and the erudite. Men also are ashamed of what is before their eyes, and is done openly; whence the proverb that *shame is in the eyes*. On this account they are more ashamed before those that are always present with them, and who pay attention to them, because both these are before their eyes. They are likewise ashamed before those who are not obnoxious to the same crimes as themselves; for it is evident that the opinions of the latter are contrary to those of the former. Before those also they are ashamed who are not disposed to pardon such as appear to act wrong; for that which a man does himself he is said not to be indignant with in his neighbours; so that it is evident he will be indignant with crimes which he does not commit himself. They are likewise ashamed before those who divulge to many persons [any thing they have done amiss;] for there is no difference between the not appearing to have done wrong, and the not divulging it. But those divulge [the faults of others] who have been injured by them, because they observe their conduct, and also those who are given to defamation (for if they defame those who have not acted wrong, much more will they defame those that have.) Those also
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divulge [what they see or hear] who are attentive to the faults of others, such as those that deride and comic poets ; for in a certain respect they are given to defamation and are babblers. Men likewise are ashamed before those by whom they have never been repulsed, but have obtained what they wished ; for they are disposed towards them, as towards persons whom they admire. Hence, also they feel shame before those who have for the first time asked any thing of them, as not having yet done any thing by which they might lose their good opinion. Of this kind likewise are such as recently wish to be friends ; for they have perceived qualities of the most excellent nature in us. Hence, the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans was well, [when they desired his friendship.] Among those likewise who were formerly known to us we feel shame before such of them as are not conscious [of any crime we may have committed.] Men also are not only ashamed of disgraceful things, but of the indications of such things. Thus for instance they are not only ashamed of the act of venery, but likewise of the indications of it ; and not only when they do base things, but when they speak of them. In a similar manner also, they are not only ashamed before the above-mentioned persons, but before those who may divulge their actions to them, such as the servants and friends of these. In short, men are not ashamed before those whose opinion with respect to veracity, is despised by many persons ; for no one is ashamed before children and brutes. Nor are men ashamed of the same things before persons that they know, and those who are unknown to them ; but before those whom they know, they are ashamed of such things as are base in reality, and before those that are unknown, of such things as are legally base.

Men likewise when they are ashamed, are affected in the following manner. In the first place, when they are present with persons of such a description as we have shown those to be before whom they are ashamed ; but these were such as are either admired by them, or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they are in want of something advantageous, which they will not obtain if they are without renown. Men also are ashamed when they are seen

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by such persons as these, as Cydias the orator said respecting the division of the lands in Samos; for he desired the Athenians to suppose that they were surrounded by the Greeks in a circle, not only as hearers, but as spectators of their decrees. And they are likewise ashamed, if such persons are near them, or are likely to be spectators of their actions. Hence, those that are unfortunate are unwilling to be seen by those that emulate them; for emulators are admirers. Men also are ashamed when they have any thing which disgraces the actions and affairs, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or of certain other persons, with whom they have any alliance; and in short, they are ashamed before those of whom they are themselves ashamed. But these are such persons as the above mentioned, and those who are referred to them, of whom they have been the preceptors or counsellors. They are likewise ashamed if there are other persons resembling themselves with whom they contend for honorary distinctions; for from shame they both do and omit to do many things on account of men of this description. Men also feel more ashamed when they are about to be seen, and converse openly with those who are conscious [of their actions.] Hence, Antipho the poet when he was led to punishment by the command of Dionysius, on seeing those who were to be executed with him, having their faces covered as they passed through the gates of the prison, said, why do you cover your faces? Will any one of these see you to morrow? And thus much concerning shame. But with respect to impudence, it is evident that we shall abound with what is to be said about it from contraries.

CHAPTER IX.

THOSE however, to whom men are grateful, and in what they are grateful, or how they are affected when they are so, will be evident when we have defined what a favour or kindness is. Let a favour therefore, be that *according to which he who possesses a thing, is said to confer a favour on him who is in want of it, not that he may receive any thing from him, nor that any advantage may accrue to the giver, but that he who is in want may be benefited.*

But a favour is great when it is conferred, either on one who is very much in want of it, or the favour itself consists of things which are great and difficult to obtain, or is bestowed opportunely, or when he who bestows it is the only one, or the first that bestows it, or who especially bestows it. Wants, however, are appetites or desires, and of these particularly such as are accompanied with pain when the desired object is not obtained. But of this kind, are such desires as love, and also those which take place in the maladies of the body, and in dangers; for he who is in danger desires, and likewise he who is in pain. Hence, those who relieve men that are in poverty or in exile, though the relief be but small, yet on account of the magnitude of the want, and the seasonableness of the relief, they confer a favour; as was the case with him who gave a mat [to a poor exile] in the Lyceum. It is necessary, therefore, that he who confers a favour must especially confer it in the above-mentioned circumstances; but if not in these, in such as are equal or greater.

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Hence,

Hence, since it is evident when and in what things a favour is to be conferred, and how those are affected that bestow a favour, it is likewise manifest that from hence, arguments must be derived for the purpose of showing that others are or have been in such like pain and want, and that those who relieved them in such want, relieved them by supplying what was mentioned.

It is likewise manifest whence it may be shown that a favour has not been conferred, and that no gratitude is due, either by evincing that it is or has been conferred for the sake of those that bestowed it; and that is not a favour. Or it may be shown that it was conferred casually, or by compulsion. Or that a kindness was returned, but not conferred, whether knowingly or not; for in both ways one thing is given for another; so that neither in this way will it be a favour. What we have said likewise must be considered in all the categories. For it is a favour, either because this particular thing is given, or so much, or a thing of such a quality, or at such a time, or in such a place. But the signs [that a favour has not been conferred are] if less has been done than at another time. And if the same, or equal, or greater things have been conferred on enemies; for it is evident in this case, that these things have not been bestowed for our sakes. Or if things of a vile nature have been bestowed knowingly; for no one will acknowledge that he is in want of vile things. And thus much concerning conferring and not conferring a favour.

CHAPTER X.

LET us now show what pity is, how men that commiserate others are affected, and what things and persons are the objects of pity. But let pity be *a certain pain arising from an apparent destructive and dolorific evil which befalls some one undeservedly, and which he who feels this pain, or some one belonging to him may expect to suffer, and this when the evil is seen to be near.*

For it is evident that he who will commiserate another person must necessarily be one who will think that either himself, or some one belonging to him, may suffer a certain evil, and such an evil as we have mentioned in the definition of pity; or an evil similar or allied to it. Hence, neither do those who consider themselves as utterly lost feel pity; (for they do not think they shall suffer any thing further than what they have suffered) nor those who fancy themselves exceedingly happy; for they insult [those that are in calamity.] For if they fancy that every kind of good is present with them, it is evident that they must also fancy they cannot suffer any evil; since a security from evil is among the number of goods. Those, however, who are compassionate are such as think they may suffer; and such as have suffered evils; and have escaped them. Likewise elderly men, on account of their prudence and experience. Those that are feeble, and those that are more timid. Also those that are erudite; for they accurately consider the mutability of human affairs. And those that have parents, or children, or wives; for they consider their evils to be their own. Those likewise are compassionate who are not overpowered with anger or confidence;

confidence; for those that are pay no attention to futurity. And also those who are not insolently disposed; for those that are do not think they shall suffer any evil. But those are compassionate who exist between these. Nor again, are those compassionate who are very timid; for those who are terrified feel no pity, because they are occupied with their own passion. Those likewise are compassionate who think that there are some worthy persons; for he who thinks that no one is worthy will fancy that all men deserve to suffer evil. And in short, [a man is compassionate] when he is so disposed as to remember that such like evils have happened either to him, or to those belonging to him. And thus we have shown how those who compassionate others are affected.

What the things are, however, which they compassionate is evident from the definition. For all such painful and lamentable circumstances as are of a destructive nature, are subjects of commiseration. And, likewise, such evils as fortune is the cause of if they are great. But evils which are lamentable and destructive are, death, stripes, the maladies of the body, old age, disease, and the want of nutriment. And the evils of which fortune is the cause are, the privation of friends, a paucity of friends; (on which account, also, it is lamentable to be torn from friends and familiars) deformity of body, imbecility, and mutilation. It is also a subject of commiseration for some evil to happen there, where it was fit some good should have been done. And for a thing of this kind to happen frequently. Likewise for some good to be present, when no advantage can be derived from it; as was the case with the gifts which were sent to Diopithis from the king [of Persia;] for they were sent to him when he was dead. It is also a subject of commiseration, when no good happens to any one, or if it does happen, it cannot be enjoyed. These, therefore, and things of this kind are subjects of commiseration.

But men compassionate those they are well acquainted with, unless they are very much allied to them; for towards these, when they are about to suffer any evil, they are affected in the same manner as towards themselves. Hence, Amasis, when his son was led to death, did not, as they say, weep; but he wept when he saw his friend beg.

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For this, indeed, was an object of commiseration, but the former was a dreadful circumstance. For that which is dreadful is different from that which is commiserable, and has the power of expelling pity. It is also frequently useful to the contrary [indignation.] Men, likewise feel compassion [for their familiars] when some evil is near them. They also commiserate those who are similar to themselves in age, in manners, in habits, in dignities, and in birth. For in all these it is more apparent that they may suffer the like evils. For in short, it is here also necessary to assume that men feel pity for the evils of others, if they are such as they are fearful may befall themselves. Since, however, calamities which appear to be near, are the subjects of compassion, but such as happened *ten thousand years ago*, or which will happen *ten thousand years hence*, as they are neither the objects of expectation nor remembrance, are either not at all the subjects of compassion, or not in a similar degree; hence, those things which are represented by the same gestures, voices and apparel, and in short by the same action [as those who were in some calamity adopted] are necessarily more pitiable. For they cause the evil which we commiserate to appear nearer, placing it before our eyes, either as that which will be, or which has been. Calamities, likewise, which have recently happened, or which will shortly happen, are for the same reason more pitiable. Signs, also, and the actions [which have been employed by miserable men,] are pitiable; such as the garments which they have worn, and other things of the like kind. The species, likewise, and whatever else is of a similar nature, of those in calamity, as for instance, of those who are dying, are subjects of commiseration; and especially of those who are in such circumstances are worthy men. For all these things because they seem near, produce greater commiseration; because he who suffers, appears not to deserve these evils, and because the calamity is before our eyes.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XI.

To pity, however, that passion is especially opposed which they call indignation. For to the pain arising from adverse circumstances in which some one is undeservedly involved, the pain is after a certain manner opposed, which arises from the same manners, on account of the prosperity which some one unworthily obtains. And both these passions are the offspring of worthy manners. For it is necessary to condole and compassionate those who are undeservedly unfortunate in their affairs; and to be indignant with those who are undeservedly prosperous. For that which happens to any one contrary to his desert is unjust. Hence, also, we attribute indignation to the gods. Envy, likewise, may appear to be after the same manner opposed to pity, as being proximate to and the same with indignation. It is however different from it. For envy also is a turbulent pain arising from the prosperity [of another person] but is not a pain arising from undeserved prosperity, but from the prosperity of one who is equal and similar to him who is envious. Both these passions, however, agree in this, that each is pained for the prosperity of another, because he is prosperous, and not because any evil arises from thence to the subject of these passions. For if this were not the case, one of these passions would no longer be envy, and the other indignation; but each would be fear, if pain and perturbation were produced, because some evil would befall the subject of these passions from the prosperity of another.

It is however evident that contrary passions are consequent [to these perturbations.] For he who is pained on account of the unmerited prosperity

prosperity of others, will rejoice, or at least will be without pain, on account of the contraries to these, viz. those who are deservedly unfortunate. Thus for instance, no worthy person will be pained, when parricides and murderers are punished. For it is necessary to rejoice in the misfortunes of such persons. After the same manner, also, it is proper to rejoice in the prosperity of those who are deservedly fortunate. For both these are just, and cause a worthy man to rejoice; since it is necessary he should hope the same prosperity will also befall him which befall one who resembles him. And all these passions belong to the same manners.

But the contraries to these belong to contrary manners. For it is the same person who rejoices in the evils of another, and who is envious; since he who is pained at that which befalls and is present with some one, must necessarily rejoice at the privation and destruction of that thing. Hence, all these passions are impediments to pity; but they differ from the above-mentioned causes; so that all of them are similarly useful for the prevention of pity.

In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning indignation, and show with what persons, and on account of what circumstances we are indignant, and how those who are indignant are affected; and afterwards, let us speak concerning the other passions. But from what has been said, it is evident [with what persons men are indignant.] For if to be indignant is to be pained on account of some one who appears to be undeservedly prosperous, in the first place it is evident, that we cannot be indignant on account of every good. For if a man is just or brave, or has any virtue, no one can be indignant with him; nor are those the objects of pity who are contrary to these. But men are indignant at riches and power, and things of this kind, of which in short, good men are worthy. Nor are men indignant with those who possess any thing which is naturally good, such as nobility, beauty, and the like. Since, however, that which is ancient appears to be something proximate to what is naturally possessed, it necessarily follows that men are more indignant with those who possess the same good, if they have recently possessed it, and on account of this are in
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circumstances ; for those who have recently become rich are the cause of greater molestation to others, than those whose wealth is ancient, and by descent. In a similar manner, also, rulers, powerful men, those who have numerous friends, and an excellent progeny, and whatever else is of the like kind, occasion greater molestation to others. And this is also the case if any other good befalls them on account of these things. For we are more indignant with those who are recently rich when they become rulers through their riches, than with those who have been for a long time in possession of wealth ; and in a similar manner in other things. The cause, however, of this is, that those who have for a long time possessed wealth, appear to possess what is their own ; but this is not the case with those who have recently become rich. For that which appears to have always been possessed, appears to be truly possessed ; so that persons of the latter description, do not seem to possess what is their own. Because, likewise, any casual person is not worthy of every good, but there is a certain analogy and fitness ; (since for instance, the beauty of arms is not adapted to a just, but to a brave man, and illustrious marriages are not adapted to those who have recently become rich, but to those of noble birth)—hence, if a man is a worthy character, and does not obtain that which is adapted to him [so far as he is worthy,] we are indignant. We are likewise indignant when an inferior contends with his superior, and especially when he contends with him in that in which he is inferior. On this account it is said [by Homer¹,]

Hence did Cebriones in combat shun,
T' engage the valiant son of Telamon ;
For his presuming pride offended Jove,
That with a better man he durst his courage prove.

And we are also indignant if he contends with him in any thing else, [and not only in that in which he is inferior ;] as if for instance, a musician should contend with a just man ; for justice is a thing more

¹ Iliad, 11.

excellent

excellent than music. From these things, therefore, it is evident what are the objects of indignation, and why they are so ; for they are these, and things of a like nature.

But men are disposed to be indignant, if being worthy to obtain the greatest goods, they do not obtain them ; for it is not just to think those persons worthy to obtain a similar good, who are not similarly worthy ; [and when men of this description become the possessors of similar good, worthy men are indignant.] In the second place *good and worthy men are prone to be indignant ; for they judge well, and hate what is unjust.* Those, likewise, are indignant who are ambitious, and who aspire after certain actions ; and especially when they are ambitious about those things which others obtain, that are unworthy to obtain them. And in short, those who think themselves deserving of that good, which other persons think them not to deserve, are indignant with such persons, and especially when they obtain this good. Hence, men of a servile disposition, bad men, and those who are not ambitious, are not prone to indignation ; for there is nothing of this kind of which they think themselves worthy. From these things, however, it is manifest what kind of persons those are for whose misfortunes and evils, or the frustration of their wishes, we ought to rejoice, or feel no pain ; for from what has been said the opposites are apparent. Hence, unless the oration so prepares the judges when their compassion is solicited, as to convince them that those who implore their pity are unworthy to receive it, and that those who do not implore it are worthy to receive it, it is impossible to excite pity in the judges.

CHAPTER XII.

It is likewise evident what the things and persons are which occasion envy, and how those are affected that are envious, *if envy is a certain pain arising from apparent prosperity in the above-mentioned goods, when it happens to persons of a similar condition, not because this prosperity does not befall him who is envious, but because it falls to the lot of those who are the objects of envy.*

For those that envy are such as to whom certain persons are similar, or appear to be so; I mean, who are similar in birth, in alliance, in habit, in reputation, and external abundance. Men, likewise, envy who want but little of possessing every good. Hence, those who perform great actions, and are prosperous, are envious; for they fancy that whatever accedes to others is taken from themselves. Those also are envious that are remarkably honoured for a certain thing, and especially when they are honoured for wisdom, or felicity. Likewise, those who are ambitious, are more envious than those who are unambitious. Those also are envious who wish to seem to be wise, but are not so in reality; for they are ambitious of the honour which is attendant on wisdom. And in short, those are envious who are lovers of renown in any pursuit; for in this pursuit they are envious. The pusillanimous also are envious; for all things appear to them to be great.

Hence, therefore, it is evident what the goods are which are the objects of envy. For envy is excited by those actions through which men pursue glory, contend for honour, and aspire after the good opinion

opinion of others. And nearly, in all such things as are the effects of good fortune there is envy. But this is especially the case in those things which men either desire themselves, or fancy they ought to possess; or in those things, in the possession of which they are a little superior, or a little inferior to others.

It is likewise evident who the persons are that are the objects of envy; for this was at the same time shown [from what has been said about those who are envious.] For men envy those who are near to them in time, in place, in age, and in renown. Whence it is said, "That which is kindred knows how to envy." Men also envy those with whom they contend for honour; for they contend for honour with the persons above-mentioned. But no one contends with those who lived *ten thousand years ago*, or with those who will exist *ten thousand years hence*, or with those who are dead; nor yet with those who dwell at the pillars of Hercules; nor with those to whom in their own opinion, or in the opinion of others, they are far inferior. Nor in like manner, do they contend with those to whom they are much superior. Since, however, men contend for honour with their antagonists, and rivals, and in short, with those who aspire after the same things, it is necessary that they should especially envy those persons. Hence, it is said [by Hesiod] *The potter envies the potter*. Those also who have scarcely obtained, or who have not at all obtained a thing, envy those who have rapidly obtained it. Men likewise envy those who by obtaining or acting rightly in any thing, are a disgrace to them; but these are near and similar. For it is evident in this case that those who envy did not obtain the good [which those whom they envy obtained] through their own fault; so that this being painful produces envy. They also envy those who either have possessed these things, or who have obtained what it is fit for them to possess, or which they once possessed; and on this account the more elderly envy the younger. Those likewise who have spent much on the same thing, envy those who have spent little on it. It is also evident what the things and persons are in which men of this description rejoice, and in what manner they are affected. For as those who are not thus affected are pained, so those who are so affected are delighted

delighted with contrary circumstances, [i. e. they rejoice when they possess the good which those are deprived of who resemble themselves.] Hence, if the orator disposes the judges to be affected in the same manner as those are who are envious ; and if he shows that those who implore pity, or desire to obtain a certain good are such as we have said those are who are envied, it is evident that they will not obtain pity from their masters.

CHAPTER XIII.

It is likewise from hence, evident how they are affected who are emulous, and of what kind of things, and persons they are emulous. For *emulation is a certain pain arising from the apparent presence of honourable goods, and which he who emulates may possess, as falling to the lot of those who naturally resemble him, so that he who is emulous is not pained that these goods are possessed by another, but that they are not possessed by himself.* Hence, emulation is equitable, and is possessed by equitable men ; but envy is a depraved thing, and is possessed by depraved men. For he who emulates prepares himself through emulation for the attainment of good, but he who envies endeavours through envy that his neighbour may not obtain some good.

It is necessary, therefore, that those should be emulous who think themselves deserving of the good which they do not possess ; for no one thinks himself deserving of things which appear impossible to be obtained. Hence, young men, and those who are magnanimous are emulous. Those likewise are emulous who possess such goods as deserve to be possessed by illustrious men ; for these are riches, numerous

merous friends, dominion, and the like. For as they think it fit that they should be worthy men, they emulate the worthy who possess similar goods. Men also emulate those whom others think deserving of good. And likewise those whose ancestors, or kindred, or domestics, or nation or city are famous, are in these things emulous; for they think them to be appropriate to themselves, and that they are worthy of these.

If, however, honourable goods are the subjects of emulation, it is necessary that the virtues should be things of this kind; and likewise such things as are useful and beneficial to others. For benefactors and good men are honoured. Those goods also which are enjoyed by those who are proximate to us, are the subjects of emulation; such as riches and beauty which are enjoyed more than health.

It is evident, therefore, who those persons are that are the subjects of emulation; for those who possess these and such like things are emulated. But these are the above-mentioned particulars, such as fortitude, wisdom, and dominion; for rulers have the power of benefiting many. Generals likewise, rhetoricians, and all who are able to effect things of this kind are objects of emulation. This also is the case with those whom many wish to resemble, or of whom many wish to be the familiars or friends; or whom many admire, or whom they themselves admire. And likewise with those whose praises and encomiums are celebrated by poets, or the writers of orations. Men, however, despise those who are deprived of these goods, and who are defiled with the contrary vices; for contempt is contrary to emulation, and emulating to despising. But it is necessary that those who are so affected as to emulate certain persons, or be emulated, should despise those who have the evils opposite to the goods which produce emulation. Hence, they frequently despise such as are fortunate when fortune is present with them without honourable goods. And thus we have shown through what particulars the passions are ingenerated and dissolved, from which credibility is derived.

CHAPTER XIV.

IN the next place let us show what the manners of men are according to their passions, habits, ages and fortunes.

And the passions indeed, I denominate anger, desire, and the like, concerning which we have spoken before.

But habits are the virtues and vices; and of these also we have spoken before, and have also shown what the objects are which every one deliberately chooses, and what the actions which he performs. The ages are youth, the acme of life, and old age. But I call fortune, nobility, wealth, power, and the contraries to these, and in short, prosperous and adverse fortune.

Young men, therefore, are prone to desire, and prepared to accomplish what they desire. Of all the desires pertaining to the body likewise, they are especially addicted to venereal pleasures, and are intemperate in these; but they are mutable, and rapidly become fastidious in their desires. They also desire vehemently, and quickly cease to desire. For their wishes are acute, and not great, so that they resemble the hunger and thirst of those that are sick. They are likewise prone to anger, are precipitately angry, are prepared to follow the impulse of passion, and are vanquished by anger. For in consequence of their ambition they cannot endure to be neglected, but are indignant if they conceive that they are injured. And they are indeed ambitious, but they are more desirous of victory; for youth aspires after transcendency; but victory is a certain transcendency. They are also more desirous of both these [i. e. honour and victory] than of riches.

riches. But they are in the smallest degree anxious about wealth, because they have not yet experienced the want of it, as it is said in an apothegm of Pittacus upon Amphiaraus. Young men likewise are not malevolent, but ingenuous, because they have not yet beheld much depravity. They are also credulous, because they have not yet been deceived in many things. And they are full of good hope; for in the same manner as men [are heated] who are intoxicated with wine, so young men are naturally hot; and at the same time they are full of good hope, because they have not yet been frequently frustrated of their wishes. They also live for the most part from hope; for hope indeed is of the future, but memory of the past; but with young men the future is long, and the past short. For in the morning of life they do not think that they should remember any thing, but hope all things. They are likewise easily deceived for the cause already assigned; for they easily hope. They are also more brave; for they are irascible, and full of good hope; of which the former causes them to be fearless, and the latter confident; for no one who is angry is afraid, and to hope for some good produces confidence. They are likewise bashful; for they do not as yet apprehend other things to be beautiful in conduct than those in which they were instructed by law alone. And they are magnanimous; for they are not yet rendered abject by life, but are unexperienced in its necessities; and magnanimity consists in a man believing himself to deserve great things; and this is the province of one who entertains good hope. They likewise prefer beautiful to profitable conduct; for they live more from moral precepts than from reasoning; but reasoning is directed to that which is profitable; and virtue, to that which is beautiful. Youth also is a lover of friends and associates, more than the other ages, because it rejoices in society, and does not yet judge of any thing by its utility, so that neither does it seek for advantage in friendship. Youth likewise err in every thing in a greater degree and more vehemently, contrary to the precept of Chilo; for they do all things too much; since they love and hate too much, and in a similar manner with respect to every thing else. For they fancy and strenuously contend that they know all things; and this

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is the reason why they exceed in all their actions. They also injure others from insolence, and not malevolently. And they are compassionate, because they apprehend all men to be worthy and better than they are; for by their own innocence they measure others; so that they are of opinion they suffer undeservedly. They are likewise addicted to laughter; on which account also they are facetious; for facetiousness is learned contumely. Such therefore are the manners of youth.

CHAPTER XV.

ELDERLY men, however, and those who have lost the vigour of age, are nearly for the most part endued with manners contrary to those of youth. For because they have lived many years, have been deceived in many things, and have erred, and because the greater part of human affairs is bad, hence, they do not firmly assert any thing, and estimate all things less than is proper. They likewise *opine*, but *know* nothing; and being involved in doubt they always add *perhaps*, and *it may be*. And in this manner they speak on every subject; but they assert nothing stably. They are also illnatured; for illnature consists in putting the worst construction on every thing. Farther still, they are, suspicious from their incredulity, but they are incredulous from their experience. On this account likewise, they neither love, nor hate vehemently; but according to the precept of Bias they love as if they should some time or other hate, and they hate as if they should some time or other love. They are also pusillanimous, because they have become abject through length of years; for they desire nothing great or illustrious, but those things

things only which are necessary to the support of life. They are likewise illiberal; for one of the necessities of life is property; but at the same time from experience they know how difficult the acquisition of wealth is, and how easily it is lost. They are also timid, and are afraid of every thing beforehand. For they are affected in a manner contrary to youth; since they are frigid, but youth is hot; so that old age prepares the way for timidity; for fear is a certain refrigeration. They are likewise lovers of life, and especially at the close of life, because desire is directed to that which is absent, and that which is wanted is especially the object of desire. They are also lovers of themselves more than is proper; for this also is a certain pusillanimity. And they live with a view to what is advantageous, and not with a view to what is beautiful in conduct, more than is proper, because they are lovers of themselves. For that which is advantageous is good to an individual; but that which is beautiful in conduct is simply good. They are likewise more impudent than modest; for because they do not similarly pay attention to the beautiful in conduct and the advantageous, they neglect the opinion of others, as to their own actions. They are also despondent, on account of their experience [of human affairs;] for the greater part of human concerns are bad; and therefore, most of them tend to a worse condition; and also on account of their timidity. And they live more from memory than from hope; for the remainder of their life is but little; but that which is past is much. And hope indeed, is of the future, but memory is of the past. This likewise is the cause of their garrulity; for they dwell on the narration of past events, because they are delighted with the recollection of them. Their anger also is sharp, but imbecil. And their desires partly fail, and partly are weak; so that they are neither prone to desire, nor disposed to act according to its impulse, but they act with a view to gain. Hence, those who are so far advanced in age appear to be temperate; for their desires become remiss, and they are subservient to gain. They likewise live more from reasoning than from manners; for reasoning is directed to that which is advantageous; but manners are directed to virtue. They injure others also from malevolence, and not from insolence. Old men likewise are

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compassionate

compassionate as well as young men, but not from the same cause; for young men are compassionate from philanthropy, but old men from imbecility; for they fancy that all evils are near them; and this was the definition of a compassionate man. Hence, also they are querulous; and are neither facetious, nor lovers of laughter; for the querulous disposition is contrary to that which is addicted to laughter. Such, therefore, are the manners of young and elderly men. Hence, too, since every one willingly admits orations adapted to his manners, and which exhibit similar manners [in the orator], it is not immanifest what the manners are which an orator ought to express in his oration, so that they may be readily heard by the young or the old.

CHAPTER XVI.

WITH respect to those, however, who are in the acme of life, it is evident that their manners will be between those of youth and old men, so as to take away the excess of each. And they are neither very confident; for audacity is a thing of such a kind as confidence; nor very timid, but are disposed in a becoming manner with respect to both these. Nor do they confide in all men, nor disbelieve all men, but are more disposed to judge according to truth. And neither do they alone live with a view to what is beautiful in conduct, nor with a view to what is advantageous, but with a view to both. Nor are they inclined to parsimony, nor yet to luxury, but to that [mode of life] which is appropriate, and fit. They are also disposed in a similar manner with respect to anger and desire; and they are temperate in conjunction with fortitude, and brave in conjunction with temperance. For these virtues

virtues are distributed in the young and the old ; since young men indeed are brave and intemperate, but elderly men temperate and timid. In short, the advantages which are distributed among the young and the old, subsist in conjunction in those who are in the acme of life ; but such things as exceed, or are deficient in the young and the old, of these, that which is moderate and fit, [is possessed by men in the vigour of their age.] But the body, indeed, is in its acme from thirty to five and thirty years of age, but the soul about the forty ninth year. And thus much concerning the manners of youth, and old age, and those who are in the acme of life.

CHAPTER XVII.

LET us in the next place speak concerning the goods derived from fortune, through which it happens that the manners of men become such as they are. The manners, therefore, of nobility are indeed such as render him who possesses it more ambitious ; for all men when any good is present with them are accustomed to accumulate it ; but nobility is a certain dignity of ancestors. But it is peculiar to those of noble birth to despise those who resemble their ancestors, [i. e. who have recently obtained those goods which their ancestors formerly possessed ;] because remote renown is more honourable than that which is recently obtained, and is attended with greater glory.

A man, however, is noble from the virtue of lineage ; but he is generous through not degenerating from the nature [of his ancestors ;] which for the most part is not the case with men of noble birth, since many of them are abject. For there is a fertility in the progenies of men,

men, in the same manner as in the productions of the earth. And sometimes if the stock is good, illustrious men are for a time produced; but afterwards, there is again a remission of fecundity. The progeny, also, which possessed an excellent disposition degenerates into more insane manners, as was the case with the offspring of Alcibiades, and the elder Dionysius. But progeny of a stable disposition degenerate into stupidity and sloth; as was the case with the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

CHAPTER XVIII.

BUT the manners which are consequent to wealth may be easily seen by all men. For rich men are insolent and proud, and these manners they derive from the possession of wealth; since they are affected in the same manner as if they possessed every good. For wealth is as it were the test by which the worth of other things is estimated; on which account it appears that all things may be purchased by it. Rich men also are luxurious and boastful; luxurious, indeed, from their delicate mode of living, and the ostentation of their felicity; but they are boastful and of barbarous manners, because all men are accustomed to dwell upon that which is beloved and admired by them; and because they fancy that others are emulous of that which is the object of their emulation. At the same time, however, they are deservedly thus affected; for many are in want of the riches which they possess, whence, also, that saying of Simonides respecting wise and rich men, in answer to the wife of king Hiero who asked him whether it was better to become a rich than a wise man; for he replied, that it was better to be a rich man; because wise men, said he, are seen waiting
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at the doors of the rich. They are also thus affected because they fancy themselves worthy to govern; for they fancy they possess those things for the sake of which government is thought worthy of being obtained. And in short, the manners of the rich are the manners of one who is stupidly happy. The manners of the wealthy, however, who have recently become rich, differ from the manners of those who have derived their wealth from their ancestors in this, that the former have all vices in a greater degree, and with more depravity; for wealth recently acquired is at it were a certain inerudition of riches. Rich men also injure others not from malevolence, but partly from insolence, and partly from intemperance; as when from the former they strike others, and from the latter commit adultery.

CHAPTER XIX.

Thus too, most of the manners pertaining to power are nearly evident; for power has partly the same, and partly better manners than wealth. For men in power are as to their manners more ambitious and more virile than rich men, because they aspire after those employments which they are capable of performing through their power. They are likewise more diligent, as being compelled to direct their attention to things pertaining to power. They are also more venerable than severe; for dignity renders them more conspicuous; on which account they are moderate in their conduct. But venerableness is a mild and decorous gravity. And if they act unjustly, it is not in small affairs, but in things of great consequence.

Prosperity,

Prosperity, likewise, as to its parts, has the manners of the above-mentioned characters, [viz. of the noble, the rich, and the powerful;] for those prosperities which appear to be the greatest tend to these. And farther still, prosperity prepares us to abound in a good offspring, and in the goods pertaining to the body. Powerful men, therefore, are more proud and inconsiderate, on account of their prosperity. *Among the manners, however, which are attendant on good fortune, there is one which is most excellent, and it is this, that the fortunate are lovers of divinity, and are well disposed towards a divine nature; for they believe in it [in a becoming manner,] in consequence of the goods proceeding from fortune.* And thus much concerning the manners of men according to age and fortune; for the manners which are contrary to the before-mentioned, are evident from contrary [fortunes;] viz. from the fortunes of the poor, the unfortunate, and the powerless.

CHAPTER XX.

THE use, however, of persuasive orations pertains to judgement; for we no longer require arguments about things which we know, and of which we have formed a judgement. And though it be but one person alone whom the orator endeavours to exhort or dissuade, as is the case with those who admonish or persuade, yet that one person is a judge; for he whom it is necessary to persuade, is, in short, a judge. And the like takes place, whether the oration is directed against the litigant, or against the hypothesis; for it is necessary that an oration should be employed, and that the contrary arguments should be subverted, against

against which as against a litigant, the oration is made. A similar method must also be adopted in demonstrative orations; for in these the speech is directed to the spectators as to judges. In short, he alone is, simply speaking, a judge, who in political contests judges the subjects of investigation. For [in such contests] the manner in which things of a dubious nature subsist is investigated, and also those which are the subjects of consultation. Concerning the manners of politics, however, we have already spoken in what we have said about deliberative affairs; so that it is there explained in what manner, and through what particulars we may produce ethical orations. But since about every kind of orations there is a certain different end, and about all of them opinions and propositions are assumed, from which those who consult, demonstrate, and dispute, derive credibility; and farther still, since we have also discussed those particulars, from which it is possible to compose ethical orations;—it remains that we should discuss such things as are common. For it is necessary that all rhetoricians in orations [of every kind] should employ what pertains to the possible and impossible, and should endeavour to show that some things will be, and that others have been. The consideration, likewise, of magnitude is common to all orations; for all orations whether they persuade or dissuade, whether they praise or blame, accuse or defend, employ diminution and amplification. But these things being determined, let us endeavour to discuss in common what pertains to enthymemes and examples, in order that by adding what remains we may bring to an end what we proposed from the first. Of things however which are common, amplification is most adapted to demonstrative orations, as we have before observed; but that which has been done is most adapted to judicial orations; (for judgement is employed about these) and the possible, and what will be done are most adapted to deliberative orations.

In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning things possible and impossible. If then it is possible for one contrary to be or to be effected, it would seem to be possible that the other contrary also may be. Thus for instance, if it is possible that a man may be restored to health, it is also possible that he may be diseased; for there is the

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same power of contraries so far as they are contraries. And if one similar is possible, another similar likewise is possible. And if that which is more difficult is possible, that also which is more easy is possible. If, likewise, it is possible for a thing to be rendered good or beautiful, it is possible, in short, for that thing to be produced; for it is more difficult for a beautiful house, than for a house simply to exist. That also of which the beginning is possible the end is possible; for nothing is effected, nor begins to be effected of things which are impossible. Thus for instance, it will never begin to be possible, nor will it ever be possible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with the side of the square. That of which the end, likewise, is possible, the beginning is possible; for all things are produced from the beginning or principle. If that, also, which is posterior in essence, or in generation, is possible to be effected, this is likewise the case with that which is prior; as if it is possible for a man, it is also possible for a child to be generated; for the latter is prior to the former. And if it is possible for a child to be generated, it is likewise possible for a man; for a child is the beginning, [but man is the end of this generation.] Those things, also, of which the love or desire is from nature, are possible; for no one for the most part loves or desires things impossible. And it is possible for those things to be and to be effected, of which there are sciences and arts. Those things likewise are possible, the principle of the generation of which is in those things which we can compel, or persuade; and these are things than which we are more powerful, or of which we are the masters or friends. And of those things of which the parts are possible, the whole is possible; and of those things of which the whole, the parts also are for the most part possible. For if it is possible for the ornaments of the head, and a garment to be made, it is also possible for apparel to be made; and if apparel, it is likewise possible for the ornaments of the head, and a garment to be made. If, likewise, the whole genus is among the number of things possible to be effected, this is also the case with the species; and if with the species, likewise, with the genus. Thus for instance, if it is possible for a ship, it is also possible for a three-banked

banked galley to be constructed; and if a three-banked galley, a ship likewise may be constructed. And if one of those things which are naturally related to each other is possible, the other also is possible; as if the double is possible, this is also the case with the half; and if the half, the double also. If, likewise, it is possible for any thing to be effected without art or preparation, it is much more possible for it to be effected through art and diligent attention; whence, also, it is said by Agatho,

Some things by fortune may effected be,
And some by art we do, and from necessity.

And if a thing may be effected by worse, or inferior, or more imprudent persons, it may also be much more effected by persons of a contrary description; as likewise Isocrates said, that it would be a dreadful thing, if Euthynus should have learnt that, which he himself was unable to discover. But with respect to things impossible it is evident that they may be obtained from the contraries to the above-mentioned particulars.

Whether a thing, however, has been done, or has not been done, must be considered from what follows. For in the first place, if that has been done, which is less naturally adapted to have been done, that will have been effected which is more naturally adapted to have been done¹. And if that which was wont to be done afterwards has been done, that also has been done, which was usually done before; as if a man has forgotten any thing, he has once learnt that which he has forgotten. And if a man is able and willing to do a thing he has done it; for all men act, when they are willing and able; since there is then no impediment to their acting. Farther still, if a man is willing to do a thing, and nothing external impedes him, he does it. And if he is able to effect any thing, and is angry, he effects it; and this is likewise

¹ Thus it is more difficult to injure another person in deeds than in words. Hence, if some one has injured another in deeds, he has also injured him in words.

the case if he is able, and is under the influence of desire. For men for the most part do those things which they desire, and are able to effect; depraved men, indeed, from intemperance; but worthy men because they desire what is equitable. If, also, any one intended to do a thing, it is probable that he did it. And if such things are done as are naturally adapted to be done prior to a certain thing, or for the sake of it, [that thing has been done.] Thus, if it has lightened, it has also thundered. And if any one has endeavoured to do a certain thing, he has also done it. And if such things as are naturally adapted to have been done afterwards, or if that for the sake of which they are done has been effected, that also which is done prior to them, and for the sake of which they are done, has been effected. Thus, if it has thundered, it has lightened; and if a thing has been done, there has likewise been an endeavour to do it. With respect, however, to all these things, some of them are from necessity; but others for the most part subsist after this manner. And as to that which has not been done, it is evident that it may be shown not to have been done from places contrary to the before-mentioned.

Evidence, likewise, with respect to what will be done may be derived from the same things; for that which it is in the power and will of any one to do, will be done. This is also the case with things which any one is impelled to do from desire and anger, and reasoning in conjunction with power. Hence, if any one is impelled, or meditates to do a thing, it will be done; since for the most part things which are intended to be done are effected, rather than those which are not. If, also, those things are done which ought to have been done first, that likewise will be done, which ought to have been done afterwards. Thus, because before it rains the clouds ought to be collected, if the clouds are collected, it is probable it will rain. And if a thing has been done which is for the sake of something else, it is probable that the thing will be done for the sake of which the other was done; as if the foundation is laid, it is probable the house will be built.

With respect, however, to the magnitude and parvitude of things, the greater and the less, and in short things which are great and small, these

these will be evident to us from what has been before said; for in the discussion of the deliberative genus we have spoken concerning the magnitude of what is good, and in short, concerning the greater and the less. Hence, since in every oration the proposed end is good; as for instance, the useful, the beautiful, and the just, it is evident that through these, amplifications must be assumed in all orations. But besides these, to investigate any thing concerning magnitude simply and excess, is a vain discussion. For particulars are more useful [in the composition of orations] than universals. And thus much concerning the possible and impossible, and whether a thing has been done, or has not been done, and will be, or will not be; and further still, concerning the greatness and littleness of things.

CHAPTER XXI.

It now remains to speak about the credibility which is common to all [orations] since we have already spoken, about the credibility which is peculiar. But there are two kinds of the credibility which is common; viz. example and enthymeme; for a sentence is a part of an enthymeme. In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning example; for example is similar to induction; but induction is a principle¹.

But of examples there are two species; for one species indeed of example, is to speak of things that are past, but the other is, when we ourselves feign [something similar for the purpose of shewing that which

¹ As in the sciences *induction* is employed as a principle for the purpose of proving universals, so in rhetoric *example* is employed in order to unfold them.

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we wish to show.] And of this, one species is a parable, but the other fables like those of *Æsop* and the Africans. Example, however, is indeed a thing of the following kind, as if some one should say, "That it is necessary to make preparations against the Persian king, and not suffer him to subjugate Egypt; for prior to him *Darius* could not pass over [the Hellespont] till he had captured Egypt; but when he had captured it, he passed into Greece." And again, "Xerxes did not attack Greece till he had captured Egypt; but when he had captured it, he passed over into Greece; so that this king [of Persia] also, if he should take Egypt will pass into Greece. Hence, he must not be suffered to do this." But a parable is a Socratic similitude; as if some one should say, "That it is not proper magistrates should be chosen by lot; for this is just as if some one should choose *athletæ* by lot, so as not to select those who are able to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as if some one should choose by lot from a number of sailors, him who ought to be the pilot of a ship, as if it were proper that he should be chosen on whom the lot falls, and not he who is skilled in steering a ship." But a fable, is such as that of *Stesichorus* against *Phalaris*, and of *Æsop* for a certain demagogue. For, when the *Himereans* had chosen *Phalaris* for their general with absolute authority, and were about to give him a guard for his body, *Stesichorus* after other things which he had said, addressed this fable to them, "That a horse [once] had sole possession of a meadow, but that a stag coming into it, and destroying the pasture, the horse wishing to be revenged of the stag, asked a man, if he should be able in conjunction with him to punish the stag. But the man answered, that he should be able if he would suffer himself to be bridled, and let him get on his back, armed with darts. The horse, therefore, having consented, the man, having got on his back, instead of taking vengeance on the stag, made the horse his slave. In like manner said he, do you *Himerians* take care, lest wishing to be revenged of your enemies, you suffer the same things as the horse. For now you have received a bridle, in having chosen a general with absolute authority; but if you allow him a guard, and suffer him to get on your backs, you will immediately be enslaved by *Phalaris*." But *Æsop*,
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when pleading in Samos for a demagogue who was in danger of losing his life, said, "That a fox in passing over a river fell into a whirl-pool, and not being able to get out of it, was for a long time in a miserable condition, and many canine flies adhered to his skin. But a hedgehog wandering along, as soon as he saw him, commiserating his condition, asked him whether he should drive away the canine flies from him. The fox, however, would not give his permission; and being asked by the hedgehog why he would not, replied, because these indeed are now full of me, and draw but little blood; but if you drive these away, others will come who are hungry, and will drink up the rest of my blood. Thus Oh men of Samos said he, this man will no longer hurt you; for he is rich; but if you put him to death, other persons who are poor will succeed him, and by thieving the public property, will consume your wealth."

Fables, however, are adapted to popular harangues, and they have this good, that it is difficult to find things which have been similarly transacted; but it is easy to find fables¹. For it is necessary that he who is able to perceive similitude [in things] should compose fables in the same manner as parables, which it is easy to do from philosophy. It is easy, therefore, to introduce fables; but examples derived from history are more useful for the purposes of consultation; for future, for the most part resemble past events.

But it is necessary that the orator should use examples as demonstrations when he has not enthymemes; for credibility is obtained through these. And when he has enthymemes, he should use them as testimonies, and should employ examples in the epilogues of the enthymemes. For examples when they are proposed by themselves ought to be similar to inductions; but induction is not adapted to rhetorical compositions except in a few instances. And examples when adduced in confirmation of conclusions are equivalent to testimonies. But a witness is every where adapted to persuade. Hence, he who introduces

¹ Fables excell examples taken from true histories in this, that it is difficult to find true histories, but fables may be easily adduced.

examples

examples prior to enthymemes, must necessarily adduce many examples; but one example is sufficient for the purpose of confirming what has been proved by enthymemes. For a credible witness, though but one is useful. And thus we have shown how many species there are of examples, and how, and when they are to be used.

CHAPTER XXII.

WITH respect to gnomology, or the doctrine of a sentence, when we have shown what a sentence is, it will then especially become evident, about what kind of things, and when, and to what persons, it is fit to employ sentences in orations. But a sentence is an enunciation, yet not about particulars, such as what kind of person Iphicrates¹ was, but about that which is universal; yet it is not about all universals, such for instance as that a right is contrary to a curved line; but it is about those universals with which actions are conversant, and those things which in acting are eligible or to be avoided. Hence, because enthymemes are nearly syllogisms about things of this kind, if the syllogism is taken away, the conclusions and the principles of the enthymemes, are sentences. Thus for instance [what Medea in Euripides says is a sentence, viz.] “It does not become a man of a sound mind to educate his children so as to render them transcendently wise.” This, therefore, is a sentence. But the cause being added, and *the why*, the whole is

¹ Iphicrates was an Athenian, who though born in obscurity, by his industry and virtue ascended to the highest dignities of the state.

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an enthymeme; as for instance, [in the words of Medea,] "For besides the indolence which they thus acquire, they excite the baneful envy of their fellow citizens." And also, "There is no man who is in all respects happy¹." And, "There is not any man who is free²;" is a sentence; but the following words being added, it becomes an enthymeme, viz. "For he is either the slave of wealth, or of fortune."

If, therefore, a sentence is what we have said it is, there are necessarily four species of a sentence. For it will either subsist in conjunction with an epilogue, or without an epilogue. Those sentences, therefore, require demonstration, which assert any thing paradoxical, or dubious; but those that assert nothing paradoxical, are without an epilogue. But of these, it is necessary that some indeed, in consequence of being previously known, should require no epilogue, such as for instance, "Health, as it appears to us, is the best of things to man." For thus it appears to the many. But other sentences as soon as they are spoken become manifest to those that consider them; such as, "There is no lover who does not always love³." Of sentences, however, which are with an epilogue, some indeed are the parts of an enthymeme; as, "It does not become a man of a sound mind." But others are enthymematic, yet are not a part of an enthymeme; which also are especially approved. These are sentences in which the cause of what is said is apparent; as in the following, "Being a mortal do not retain an immortal anger⁴." For to say, "It is not proper to retain anger always, is a sentence; but the addition, "Being a mortal," asserts the why or the cause. Similar to this also is the sentence, "It is fit that mortals should be wise in mortal, and not in immortal concerns⁵."

¹ Ex Schenobœa Euripid. in Prologo.

² Ex Euripid. Hecubâ.

³ This is what Hecuba says to Menelaus in the Troades of Euripides.

⁴ Thus Achilles in Pope's translation of the Iliad.

Why should (alas) a mortal man, as I,
Burn with a fury that can never die?

BOOK XIX.

⁵ See this assertion beautifully opposed by Aristotle in the 10th book of his Nicomachean Ethics.

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From

From what has been said, therefore, it is manifest how many species there are of a sentence, and to what kind of things each is adapted. For in things of a dubious, or paradoxical nature, a sentence is not to be used without an epilogue, but either, an epilogue being added, the sentence must be used as a conclusion; as if any one should say, "I indeed, since it is neither proper to be envious, nor to be indolent, assert that erudition is not requisite;" or this being previously said, the former assertions must be subjoined. But in things which are not paradoxical indeed, yet are immanifest, the why or cause must be most concisely added. And to things of this kind Laconic apothegms and enigmas are adapted; as if some one should say what Stesichorus said among the Locrians, "That it is not proper to behave insolently, lest the grasshoppers should sing on the ground¹." A sententious mode of speaking, however, is adapted to him who is more advanced in age; but what he sententiously says, must be about things in which he is skilled. Hence, it is unbecoming for one who is not so advanced in age to speak sententiously, in the same manner as it is for him to mythologize. But for a man to speak sententiously about things in which he is unskilled is foolish and inerudite; of which this is a sufficient indication, that rustics are especially sententious, and easily show that they are so. To assert, however, universally, that which is not universally true, is especially adapted to lamentation and amplification; and in this case, such sentences must be adduced either at the beginning, or when you demonstrate. But it is requisite to employ sentences which are generally known and common, if they are useful [for the purpose;] for in consequence of being common, as being acknowledged by all men they appear to be true. Thus he who exhorts soldiers to encounter danger, though they have not sacrificed, may employ [what Hector says to Polydamas,]

"Without a sign his sword the brave man draws,
And asks no omen but his country's cause²."

¹ Stesichorus signified by this enigma, that if the Locrians behaved insolently to a powerful people, their country would be in danger of being laid waste by them, so that the trees being cut down, the grasshoppers (cicadæ) would be forced to sing on the bare ground.

² Iliad, 12.

And

And when those are exhorted to fight who are inferior to their opponents in force, it may be said,

“ In battle Mars to either side inclines ¹. ”

When any one likewise is exhorted to destroy the children of enemies, though they have done no injury, he may say, “ He is a fool, who having destroyed the father spares the children.” Farther still, some proverbs are also sentences ; such as the proverb, “ An Attick stranger.” Sentences likewise are to be sometimes adduced, contrary to those which are generally received. But I mean by those that are generally received, such as “ Know thyself,” and “ Nothing too much.” And sentences contrary to these are to be adduced, when either the manners will from thence seem to be better, or when the thing is spoken pathetically. But a thing is spoken pathetically, if some one being enraged should say, “ It is false that a man ought to know himself; for this man, if he had known himself would never have solicited the command of the army.” And the manners will appear to be better, if it is said, “ That it is not proper, according to the assertion of Bias to love, as if intending hereafter to hate, but rather to hate, as if intending hereafter to love.” It is necessary, however, to render the choice manifest by the diction; but if not, to subjoin the cause. Thus for instance, we may either thus speak, “ That it is necessary to love, not as they say, but as if always intending to love; for the other [i. e. he who loves as if intending hereafter to hate] loves like a treacherous person.” Or thus, “ What is generally asserted does not please me; for a true friend ought to love as one who will love always. Nor does that saying please me, Nothing too much; for it is necessary to hate vehemently bad men.”

But these sentences afford great assistance to orations, one cause of which arises from the arrogance of the hearers; for they are delighted

¹ Iliad, 18.

if any one speaking universally, happens to adduce opinions which they have formed about some particular things. My meaning, however, will be manifest from what follows; and at the same time it will be evident how these sentences are to be investigated. For a sentence is, as we have said, a universal enunciation; but the auditors are delighted when that is universally asserted, which they have pre-conceived partially. Thus for instance, if any one happens to have had bad neighbours or children, he will adopt the sentence. "That nothing is more troublesome than vicinity," and "That nothing is more stupid than the procreation of children." Hence, it is necessary to conjecture what the opinion of the audience will be about particulars, and afterwards to adduce universal sentences conformable to their opinion. And this is one use which speaking sententiously ought to possess. But there is another use of it which is superior to this; for it causes orations to become ethical. And those orations are ethical in which the deliberate intention of the speaker is manifest. All sentences, however, effect this, because he who employs the sentence, speaks universally about things which are the objects of deliberate choice. Hence, if the sentences are good, they cause the speaker to appear to be one who possesses worthy manners. And thus much concerning a sentence, what it is, how many species there are of it, how sentences are to be employed, and what advantage they possess.

CHAP

CHAPTER XXIII.

LET us now speak concerning enthymemes universally, after what manner they are to be investigated; and in the next place, let us show what are the places of enthymemes; for there is a different species of each of these. That an enthymeme, therefore, is a certain syllogism, and how it is a syllogism, we have before shown; and also in what it differs from dialectic syllogisms. For neither ought things remote to be collected, nor are all things to be collectively assumed; since the former will be obscure from their length; and the latter will be nugatory, through speaking of things which are obvious. For this is the reason why the unlearned are more capable of producing persuasion among the crowd, than the learned, since as the poets say, "The unlearned speak more elegantly to a mob." For the unlearned speak of things common and universal, [which are adapted to the comprehension of the multitude;] but the learned speak of things which they know, and which are near. Hence, rhetorical enthymemes must not be composed from every thing which is probable, but from things of a definite nature; such as are those things which appear probable to the judges, or which the judges admit. Nor is it requisite that these things should be approved by all the auditors, but it is sufficient if they are approved by the greater part of them. It is likewise requisite not only to collect from things which are necessary, but also from things which have a frequency of subsistence. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to assume, that concerning the thing of which it is requisite to speak and

and syllogize, whether by employing a political, or any other syllogism ; concerning this it is necessary to possess all or some of the things which are inherent in it ; for if we possess none of them, no conclusion can be made from nothing. I say for instance, how can we advise the Athenians to engage in war or not, unless we know what their power is, whether naval or land, or both ; how great it is ; what their revenue is ; who are their friends and enemies ; and farther still, what wars they have waged, and how they were carried on, and other things of the like kind. How likewise could we praise them, if we were not acquainted with the naval battle at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the deeds which they performed for the Heraclidæ, or any thing else of the like kind ? For all men praise others from beautiful transactions which exist, or appear to exist. In a similar manner, also, in blaming the Athenians, we must direct our attention to the contraries to these things, considering what particular of a contrary kind pertains to them, or appears to pertain to them ; such as that they enslaved the Greeks, and subdued those who fought with them against the Barbarian, and behaved most intrepidly, viz. the Aeginetæ and Potidæatæ ; and other things of the like kind, and whatever other crime may be laid to their charge. Thus too, both those who accuse, and those who defend, accuse and defend by directing their attention to inherent particulars ; but it makes no difference whether we speak of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians ; of God, or man. For he who advises Achilles, who praises or blames, accuses or defends him, must assume things which are inherent, or appear to be inherent, that from these he may in praising or blaming show whether any thing beautiful in conduct or base is inherent ; in accusing or defending may show whether any thing just or unjust is inherent ; and in advising, whether any thing advantageous or detrimental is present. The like method must also be adopted in every other thing. Thus for instance, in investigating whether justice is good or not, our attention must be directed to what is inherent in justice or in good. Hence, since it appears that this method is adopted by all men, whether they syllogize more accurately,
or

or more remissly; for their assumptions are not derived from all things, but from such as are inherent in each particular, and through reasoning; since it is evident that it is otherwise impossible to prove what they wish to prove;—this being the case, it is obvious, as we have shown in the Topics, that about each question in things contingent, and the time best adapted to them, it is necessary to have in the first place, things of a more select nature. The investigation, likewise, must be made after the same manner in things of an unexpected nature, so that our attention must not be directed to the indefinite, but to things inherent, which are the subject of the oration. Of the things inherent, likewise, the greater part and those which are nearest the subject, must be included in the oration; for by how much the greater the number of things inherent is which the orator possesses, by so much more easily will he prove that which he wishes to prove; and by how much more proximate [the particulars are which he details,] by so much the more appropriate will they be, and less common. But I call common things, indeed, such as to praise Achilles, because he is a man, and because he is among the number of demigods, and because he fought against Troy. For these particulars belong also to many others; so that praise of this kind no less pertains to Achilles than to Diomed. Things peculiar, however, are such as happen to no other person, than Achilles; such as to have slain Hector the bravest of the Trojans; and Cygnus, who being invulnerable prevented the Greeks from descending from their ships to the land; and that being very young he entered into the army, though he was not bound by an oath to fight against the Trojans. These, and other things of the like kind, are peculiar to Achilles. This, therefore, is one place of selection, and is the first topical place.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XXIV.

LET us now speak of the elements of enthymemes. But I call the same thing the element and place of an enthymeme. Let us however first speak of those things which it is necessary in the first place to discuss. For there are two species of enthymemes. And the first species contains ostensive enthymemes, which show that a thing is, or is not; but the other species is adapted to confutation. They differ also in the same manner as in dialectics an elenchus, and syllogism differ. But an ostensive enthymeme, is when the conclusion is collected from things acknowledged; and the enthymeme adapted to confutation is, when things not acknowledged are collected in the conclusion. Nearly, therefore, places have been delivered by us about each of the useful and necessary species; for propositions respecting each have been selected. Hence, we have shown from what places it is requisite to derive enthymemes about good or evil, the beautiful or the base, the just, or the unjust; and in a similar manner places have been assigned by us concerning manners, passions and habits.

Again, therefore, it remains that after another manner we should assume universally concerning all [the three genera of orations,] indicating which of them are adapted to confutation, and are ostensive, and what are the places of apparent enthymemes, but which are not enthymemes in reality, since neither are they syllogisms. But these things being rendered manifest, we shall discuss solutions and objec-

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tions, and show whence it is requisite to adduce these against enthymemes.

One place, therefore, of ostensive enthymemes is from contraries; for it is necessary to consider whether one contrary is inherent in another; subverting, indeed, if it be not inherent; but confirming if it is inherent. For instance, [we may thus show] that to act temperately is good; for to act intemperately is noxious. Or as in the Messeniac oration [of Alcidas;] for if war is the cause of the present evils, it is necessary to correct those evils with peace. For [as a certain tragic poet argues in Greek senaries,] “If it is not just to fall into anger with those who have done evil willingly; neither is it fit, if any one has acted beneficently from compulsion to be grateful to him. But if to speak falsely is, among mortals, calculated to persuade, it is requisite to think that on the contrary many things are true, which are considered by mortals as incredible. Another place is from similar cases; for it is necessary that they should be similarly inherent, or not inherent. Thus from this place it may be shown that not every thing which is just is good. For if every thing just were eligible and good, every thing which is justly done would be eligible and good; but now to die justly is not eligible. Another place is from relatives. For if some one has acted well or justly, another has suffered well or justly. And if to command is just, it is also just to obey the command; as the publican Diomedon said about the tributes. “For, said he [to the people,] if it is not disgraceful in you to sell the tributes, neither is it disgraceful in us to buy them.” And, if one man deservedly and justly suffers a loss, he who caused him to suffer it, acted well and justly. And if he who caused another to suffer a loss acted well and justly, he who sustained the loss, sustained it well and justly. In this place, however, it is possible to paralogize. For if a man died justly, he suffered justly; but perhaps not by you. Hence, it is necessary to consider separately, whether he who suffered deserved to suffer, and whether he who did the thing deserved to do it, and thus to infer what is adapted and appropriate. For sometimes a thing of this kind

kind is dissonant, and nothing impedes¹; as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes.

“ Did never any mortal hate thy mother?”

To which the answer is,

“ Distinctly this must be considered.”

Alphesibœa, also, enquiring, “ How therefore have the judges condemned thee?” Alcmaeon answered,

“ Of death deserving she was judg'd, but I
'Twas said could not have slain my mother.”

Thus, likewise, on the trial of Demosthenes, and those who slew Nicanor, because they were judged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he was justly put to death. In like manner, when a certain person was slain at Thebes, it was inquired in the court of justice whether he had been unjustly slain; as if it were not unjust to slay him who deserved to die. Another place is from the more and the less; such as, if even the gods do not know all things, much less do men. For the meaning of this is, if the more is not inherent in that in which it ought to be more inherent, it is evident that neither will it be inherent in that in which the less is inherent. But this place, that he will strike his neighbour who strikes his father, depends on this, that if the less is inherent, the more also will be inherent². And this place is useful for both purposes; viz. whether it be requisite to show that a thing is inherent, or is not. Farther still, if a thing is inherent neither

¹ That is, it may happen that a man was slain justly, and yet he who slew him, slew him unjustly.

² For it is less probable that a man will strike his father, than that he will strike his neighbour; *at least it was so in ancient times.*

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more nor less; whence it is said, [in a certain tragedy,] "Is thy father to be pitied, because he has lost a son, and is not Oeneus to be equally commiserated, who has lost his son Meleager one of the most illustrious of the Greeks?" And that if Theseus did not act unjustly [in ravishing Helen,] neither did Paris. And if the Tyndaridæ [i. e. Castor and Pollux] did not act unjustly [in ravishing the daughters of Leucippus,] neither did Paris. Likewise if Hector did not act unjustly in slaying Patroclus, neither did Paris in slaying Achilles. And if other artists are not vile men, neither are philosophers. And if generals are not vile, because they are frequently conquered, neither are sophists. And that if a private person, ought to be careful of your renown, you also ought to be careful of the renown of the Greeks. Another place consists in the consideration of time; as is exemplified in what Iphicrates says in his oration against Harmodius. For, said he, "If before I had done the thing, I had demanded a statue in case I did it, you would have granted it to me, and will you not grant it, now I have done the thing? You would not, therefore, when expecting a benefit promise a reward, and refuse it, when you have received the benefit." And again, for the purpose of persuading that the Thebans ought to permit Philip to pass through their land into Attica, it may be said, "That if he had made this request before he sent you assistance against the Phocenses, you would have permitted him. It is absurd, therefore, that because he then neglected [to ask permission,] and trusted you would grant it, that you should now deny it to him." Another place is taken from things said, and retorted on the speaker. And this mode is eminently useful, and was employed in [the tragedy of] Teucrus, by Iphicrates against Aristophon, when he enquired of him whether he would have betrayed the ships for money? And when Aristophon denied that he would, Iphicrates afterwards said, "You therefore being Aristophon would not have betrayed them, and should I being Iphicrates have betrayed them?" It is necessary, however, that he who is opposed should appear to have acted more unjustly than the opponent; for if not, it would seem to be ridiculous, if any one had said this against Aristides accusing [who was in every respect worthy

of belief,] and which ought to have been said against an accuser, who did not deserve to be credited. For in short the plaintiff ought to be considered as better than the defendant. He therefore who opposes another, should always reprobate this. And universally, that which is said is absurd, when any one reproves others in things which he himself does, or would have done [if he could;] or who persuades others to do those things which he himself does not do, nor would have done. Another place is derived from definition; such for instance as, "That which is *dæmoniacal* is nothing else than either God, or the work of God; but whoever thinks that it is the work of God, must necessarily think that there are Gods¹." And as Iphicrates said [against a certain person named Harmodius.] "He who is the best of men is most generous or noble; for there was nothing generous in Harmodius and Aristogiton, till they had accomplished some generous undertaking." He added, that he was more allied to [i. e. he more resembled] the ancient Harmodius. "For my works, said he, are more allied to the works of Harmodius and Aristogiton than thine." And as in [the oration concerning] Paris, "All men will confess that those who are intemperate are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one body." Hence Socrates said that he would not go to Archelaus [king of Macedonia.] "For it is disgraceful, said he, for him who has received a benefit not to be able to recompense him from whom he received it; just as it is disgraceful in him who has been used ill, not to return the ill treatment." For all these defining, and assuming what a thing is, syllogize about the things which are the subjects of their speech. Another place is derived from multiplicity of diction, as in the Topics, [an argument is derived,] from that which has a rectitude of subsistence [being multifariously predicated.] Another place is derived from division; as, if all men act unjustly for the sake of three things; for they act unjustly either for the sake of this, [viz. utility,] or for the sake of this, [viz. pleasure,] or for the sake of this, [viz. because they are enraged;] but

¹ This is what Socrates says to his judges in the *Apology* of Plato, and is of itself sufficient to prove that Socrates was a polytheist, independent of a great body of evidence which might be adduced in confirmation of it.

for

for the sake of two of these they could not do the injury; and the opponents themselves confess they did not do it for the sake of the third. Another place is from induction; as from [the oration inscribed] Peparethia, in which it is said, "That women every where determine truly about the birth of children." For this is evident from what happened at Athens; since when Mantias the rhetorician was dubious about his son, his doubts were dissolved by the mother of the child. This likewise happened at Thebes; for when Ismenes and Stilbo contended which of them was the father of Thessalicus, Dodonis demonstrated that he was the son of Ismenes; and on this account Thessalicus was considered as the offspring of Ismenes. And again, from the law of Theodectes, if no one would commit his horses to the care of those who do not pay a proper attention to the horses of others, nor his ships to those who destroy the ships of others, and if the like takes place in all things, we ought not to commit our safety to those who have badly attended to the safety of others. And as Alcidas says, "That all men honour the wise." For the Parians honour Archilochus, though he blasphemed them; the Chians honour Homer, though he was not their fellow-citizen; and the Mitylenans Sappho, though she was a woman. The Lacedæmonians, also, though they were in the smallest degree philologists, made Chilo one of their senators. The Italians likewise honoured Pythagoras; and the Lampsaceni buried Anaxagoras though he was a stranger, and honour him even now. Again, the Athenians by using the laws of Solon were happy; and the Lacedæmonians by using those of Lycurgus. The city of the Thebans, also, as soon as philosophers were their governors, became happy.

Another place is derived from the judgement made about the same, or a similar, or a contrary thing. And this indeed is especially the case, if it is the judgement of all men, and always; but if not, if it is the judgement of most men, or of all, or the greater part of wise men, or of good men. Or if it is the decision of those who are judges, or of those whom the judges approve, or of those against whom there is no judgement to be given, as of princes; or of those whose judgement it is not becoming to oppose, such as the gods, a father, or preceptors.

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[But of this place there are many examples,] and one is, what Autocles said against Mixidemides, "If it were well indeed for the venerable goddesses [the Furies] to plead their cause in the Areopagus, can it be improper for Mixidemides to do so?" Another is what Sappho said, "That to die is an evil; for the gods have judged it to be so; since otherwise, they themselves would die." Another is, what Aristippus said against Plato asserting something as he thought too positively, "But our associate, said he, meaning Socrates, affirms no such thing." Another example is that of Agesipolis, who at Delphi enquired of the god [Apollo,] having prior to this consulted the oracle of Jupiter Olympus, "Whether the son was of the same opinion as the father?" As if it were shameful for a son to dissent from his father. Another is that of Isocrates concerning Helen, who shows that she was a worthy character, because Theseus judged her to be so; and who also says the same thing of Paris because the goddesses preferred [his judgement to that of other men.] He likewise asserts that Evagoras was a worthy character, "because Conon when his affairs were adverse, leaving every one else came to Evagoras. Another place is from [the enumeration of] parts, as in the Topics, [where it is enquired,] "What kind of motion the soul is;" for it is either this, or that, [viz. it must either be the motion which is a change in quality, or lation, or augmentation, or generation¹.] An example of this place is from Theodectes in his oration in defence of Socrates [when he was accused by the judges:] "What temple has Socrates violated? And what gods has he not revered among those whose honours are legally established by the city?" Another place is from consequent good or evil. For since in most things it happens that some good and evil are consequent to them, we may employ consequent good for the purpose of persuading, praising, and defending, but consequent evils for the purpose of dissuading, blaming, and accusing. Thus for instance, [we may blame literary pursuits,] because envy is consequent to erudition, which is an evil;

¹ Viz. On the hypothesis that the soul is a motion of such a kind, as some one of the *corporeal* motions.

and

and [we may also praise them] because they are attended with wisdom which is a good. Hence, in the former case we may say that it is not proper to acquire erudition, because it is not proper to be envied; and in the latter, that it is proper to acquire erudition, for it is requisite to be wise. In this place the art of the rhetorician Calippus consists, to which he added what pertains to the possible, and other things, of which we have already spoken. Another place is, when about two things, and those opposed to each other, it is requisite either to exhort, or dissuade, and to use the before-mentioned place in both ways. But it differs from that place in this, that there casual things are opposed; but here contraries only. Thus for instance, a certain priest would not suffer his son to speak in public. "For if said he, you speak what is just, men will hate you; but if what is unjust the gods." It is necessary, however, on the other hand, to speak in public. For if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; but if what is unjust, men will love you. This however, is the same thing with the saying, of *buying oil and salt*. And this argument may be retorted, when to each of two contraries good and evil are consequent, each being contrary to each. Another place is, because the same things are not praised openly and secretly; but just and beautiful things are especially praised openly; and privately men are more inclined to praise what is advantageous. One of these, therefore, we must endeavour to collect. For this place is the most principal of paradoxes. Another place is derived from analogy, and was used by Iphicrates. For when the Athenians wished to compel his younger son, because he was large, to engage in public service, Iphicrates said, "That if great boys were to be considered as men, little men should be decreed to be boys." And Theodectes in the law said, "You have made mercenaries, such as Strabaces and Charidemus, citizens, on account of their probity; but you have not made exiles of those among the mercenaries, who have acted nefariously." Another place is, when in consequence of the same thing following from two things, it is shown that the things from which it happens to follow are the same. As when Xenophanes said, "That those were similarly impious, who assert that the gods were generated, and those who assert that

that they die; for in both ways it happens that at a certain time the gods do not exist." And in short, that which happens from each, is always to be assumed as the same. [This place, was also used by some one in the defence of Socrates; for he said,] "You are about to pass sentence, not on Socrates, but on his pursuit, whether it be requisite to philosophize." And, it may be said, "That to give earth and water is to become slaves; and that to participate of common peace is to do what is commanded to be done." But whichever of these is useful must be assumed. Another place is derived from this, that the same men do not always choose the same thing in a posterior or prior time, but conversely; as in this enthymeme. "If when we were exiles we fought, in order that we might return; shall we, having returned fly, in order that we may not¹ fight?" For at one time the Athenians chose to fight, that they might return to their country, and at another time they were willing to leave their country lest they should be obliged to fight. Another place is, when we affirm any thing to have been done on account of some cause, through which it might have been done, though it was not in reality done through it; as if one man should give something to another, in order that by [afterwards] taking it away, he may give him pain. Hence, also it is said [in a certain tragedy,] "The dæmon gives great prosperity to many, yet not with a benevolent intention, but in order that they may receive more conspicuous calamities." And in the Meleager of Antiphon who [that he might praise Meleager] says, "There was a concourse of people from all Greece, not for the purpose of killing the boar, but that they might be witnesses of the valour of Meleager." Another example is from the Ajax of Theodectes, in which it is said, "That Diomed preferred Ulysses [as his associate in the nocturnal adventure] not for the purpose of honouring him, but that he might have one to attend him who was his inferior." For it is possible he might have thus acted with this view. Another place is common both to litigants and counsellors, and consists in considering whatever pertains to exhortation and dissuasion, and for

¹ This example is taken from an oration of Lysias concerning the Athenians.

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the sake of which things are done and avoided ; for these are such as ought to be done when they are present. For instance, it must be considered whether a thing is possible, and easy to be effected, and whether it is beneficial either to a man himself, or to his friends ; or whether it is noxious and pernicious to his enemies, or is at least attended with greater emolument than loss. And exhortations are to be derived from these places, and dehortations from the contraries. From the same places also accusations and defences may be derived ; defence indeed, from those which pertain to dissuasion, but accusation from those which pertain to exhortation. And in this place the whole art of Pamphilus and Calippus consists. Another place is derived from things which appear indeed to be done, but are incredible, because they would not be credited, unless they were, or nearly were in existence ; and this in an eminent degree. For whatever is done, is apprehended to be done, either because it has been truly done or is of itself credible, and probable. If, therefore, a thing is incredible, and not probable, it will be true that it has been done¹ ; for it does not appear to have been done, in consequence of being probable and credible. Thus Androcles Pitheus accusing the law said, (the multitude being tumultuous whilst he was speaking) "The laws require a law to correct them." For fishes also require salt, though it may seem neither probable, nor credible, that animals nourished in salt, should require salt. And olives require oil ; though it may seem incredible, that those things from which oil is produced, should be in want of oil.

¹ When a thing partly appears to have been done, and partly seems incredible, from seeming to be incredible, it may be concluded that it has been truly done, by reasoning as follows : Whatever seems to have been done, either appears so because it is of itself credible and probable, or because it has truly been done. But this thing appears to have been done, and not because it is of itself probable, since it is rather very improbable. Hence, it appears to have been done, because it has truly been done.

CHAPTER XXV.

ANOTHER place which is adapted to confutation is derived from considering things which are not assented to; viz. from considering, if any thing is not admitted, from all times, actions, and speeches. And this indeed, may be done separately in the person of the opponent; as, "He says that he loves you [Athenians,] and yet he has conspired with the thirty [tyrants against his country.]" And separately, as to the person himself, as, "He says indeed, that I am litigious, but he cannot show that I ever sued any man." It may also be done separately, both as to the person himself, and his opponent as, "And this man indeed never lent any money, but I have ransomed many of you." Another place is useful with respect to men and things that have been calumniated, but which do not appear to have deserved it; and this consists in assigning the cause of the paradox. For there is something which gave rise to the appearance. Thus for instance, a certain woman was calumniated with reference to her son; for in consequence of embracing him, it seemed as if she had connexion with the lad. But the cause of her embracing him being assigned, the calumny was dissolved. Thus too, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses says against Ajax, that though he is braver than Ajax, yet he does not seem to be so. Another place is derived from cause, which if it exists, the effect also exists; but if it is not, neither does the effect exist. For cause, and that of which it is the cause subsist together, and nothing is without a cause. Thus Leodamas in defending himself when Thrasybulus, accusing him said, "That his name had been branded with infamy on a pillar

pillar in the Acropolis, but the inscription had been erased by the thirty tyrants," replied, "That this was not possible; for if it had taken place, the thirty tyrants would have placed more confidence in him, in consequence of his hatred to the people having been inscribed on a pillar." Another place is from considering whether it was or is possible to advise, or do, or have done a thing better than it was advised to be, or is, or was done. For it is evident, that if it does not thus subsist, it was not done; since no one willingly and knowingly deliberately chooses what is bad. This place, however, is false; for frequently, it becomes afterwards evident how it was possible to have acted better, though this was before immanifest. Another place is derived from considering when something is intended to be done, contrary to what has been done. Thus Xenophanes when the Eleans asked him, "whether they should sacrifice to Leucothea, and lament her, or not," advised them, "If they thought her a goddess, not to lament her; but if a mortal, not to sacrifice to her." Another place is derived from accusing or defending errors. Thus for instance, in the Medæa of the poet Carcinus, some persons accuse her of having slain her children, because they no longer appear; (for Medæa erred in sending away her sons) but she defends herself by saying, "That [if she had intended to commit murder] she would not have slain her children, but Jason; for in not slaying Jason, she would have acted wrong, even if she had done the other thing [i. e. slain her children.] This place, however, and species of enthymeme, formed the whole prior rhetorical art of Theodorus. Another place is derived from name; as Sophocles [of a certain woman named *Sidero*]

'Tis clear thou *iron* art, and bear'st the name.

Thus also it is usual to celebrate the gods [from the signification of their names.] Conon likewise called *Thrasymbulus*, *audacious*. And Herodicus said of *Thrasymachus*, "Thou art always *Thrasymachus* [i. e. *bold in fight*.] He also said of *Polus*, "You are always *Polus* [i. e. *a colt*.] Herodicus likewise said of *Draco* the legislator, "That his laws were

not the laws of a man, but of a *dragon*; for they were severe." Another example is derived from what Hecuba says in [the Troades of] Euripides, when speaking of Venus, "And the name of the goddess [i. e. *Aphrodite* is rightly derived from *aphrosune* [i. e. folly.] And as Chœremon [the comic poet] says, "*Pentheus* was so denominated from future *calamity*." Those enthymemes, however, which are adapted to confutation, are more approved than those that are ostensive; because the former are short collections of contraries; but parallels are more obvious to the hearer. Of all syllogisms, however, as well those that are adapted to confutation, as those that are ostensive, those especially excite perturbation [in the auditors] which manifest themselves as soon as they begin to be enunciated, yet not because their meaning is superficial. For the auditors are at the same time delighted that they foresaw from the beginning what would follow. This likewise is the case with those syllogisms which are understood as soon as they are completely enunciated.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SINCE, however, it is possible that one thing may be a syllogism, and another not, but only appear to be so; it is likewise necessary with respect to an enthymeme, that this should be, and that should not be, but should only appear to be an enthymeme; since an enthymeme also is a certain syllogism.

But there are places of apparent enthymemes; one indeed in the diction; and of this, one part, as in dialectics is, when though nothing is syllogistically concluded, yet at the last it is inferred, It is not therefore

therefore this, or that; or it necessarily is this or that. What also is said in enthymemes contortly and oppositely, appears to be an enthymeme, [though it is not so in reality;] for such a diction is the receptacle of enthymeme. And a thing of this kind appears to be from the figure of the diction. For the purpose however of speaking syllogistically in the diction, it is useful to produce the heads of many syllogisms, as, "These he saved, others he avenged, but he liberated the Greeks." For each of these is demonstrated from others. But from the conjunction of these something appears to be effected. Another place [of apparent enthymemes] is derived from equivocation; as, if some one should say "that *μῦς* *mus* a mouse is a worthy animal; for the *mysteriæ* are the most honourable of all initiatory rites." Or, if some one making an encomium on a dog, should also comprehend in his encomium the celestial dog, or the god Pan, because Pindar says, "O blessed, whom the Olympian gods call the all-various dog of the great goddess." Or if it should be said, "That it is most *dishonourable* there should be no dog; so that it is evident that a dog is *honourable*." And to say, "That Hermes is the most *communicative* of all the gods; for he alone is called *common* Hermes." Likewise to say "That *logos* speech is *most worthy*; because good men are *worthy* not of riches, but of *logos* speech;" for to be worthy of *logos* is not simply predicated. Another place consists in speaking things which are separated, conjunctively, or things which are conjoined, disjunctively. For since [each of these modes of speaking] appears to be the same, though frequently it is not the same, it is requisite to adopt whichever of these is more useful. The first example of this place is that of Euthydemus, "To know being in Sicily that there is a three-ranked galley in the Piræus¹." Another example is "That he who knows the elements of a verse, knows the verse; for a verse is the same thing [as the elements from which it is composed.] Another example of this place is, "That since twice so much of a thing is noxious, neither can the half of that quantity

¹ See Chap. v. Book ii. of the Sophistical Elenchi. This is only true disjunctively; since it is asserted of some one who at one time was in Sicily, and at another saw the galley in the Piræus.

be said to be salubrious ; for it is absurd, if two things are good, that one of them should be bad." Thus, therefore, this place is useful for the purpose of confutation. But it is ostensive as follows ; " For one good is not two evils." In short, this place is paralogistic. Again, another example is that of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, " That he deposed the thirty tyrants." For this is conjunctive. Or what is said in the Orestes of Theodectes ; for it is from division, [or is disjunctive,] viz. " It is just that she who killed her husband should die ; and it is also just that a son should revenge his father. It is just, therefore, that the mother [Clytemnestra] should be slain by the son [Orestes.]" For if these sentences are conjoined, the conclusion, perhaps will no longer be just. In this [sophism] likewise, there is a fallacy of defect ; for it is not expressed by whom it is just that the mother should be slain.

Another place consists in confirming or confuting by exaggeration. And this is when a man not showing that he has done a certain deed, amplifies the thing. For thus he causes it to appear either that he has not done the deed, when he who defends the cause amplifies, or that he did it when the accuser was enraged. Hence, it is not an enthymeme. For the hearer falsely collects that he has or has not done the deed, the thing not being demonstrated. Another place is derived from a sign ; for this also is unsyllogistic. As if some one should say, " Lovers are advantageous to cities ; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus. And, likewise, if some one should say, " That Dionysius was a thief ; for he was a depraved character." For this is unsyllogistic ; since not every depraved character is a thief, but every thief is a depraved character. Another place is derived from that which is accidental ; as in what Polycrates said of the mice, " That they aided [the city] by gnawing the bowstrings [of the enemy.]" Or if some one should say, that to be invited to supper is a most honourable thing ; for Achilles, in consequence of not being invited was enraged against the Greeks in Tenedos. But he, as being despised was angry ; and this happened because he was not invited. Another place is derived from that which is consequent ; as for instance, in

in what is said of Paris, "That he was magnanimous; for despising an association with the multitude, he dwelt in mount Ida by himself." For because magnanimous men are lovers of solitude, Paris also may appear to be magnanimous. And, "Since a certain person decorates himself, and wanders by night, he is an adulterer;" because adulterers also are men of this kind. In a similar manner [it may be proved that] mendicants and exiles are happy. "Because mendicants sing and dance in temples; and because it is permitted exiles to dwell where they please." For because, these things are present with those that appear to be happy, those also to whom these things are present, may seem to be happy. There is here however a difference in the mode; on which account this example falls into defect, [i. e. it is a fallacy of defect.] Another place is derived from that which is causeless as if it were a cause; as when that which is done together with another thing, or after it, is assumed as if it had been done for the sake of it. And this place is especially used by politicians, as by Demades, who said, "That the administration of Demosthenes, was the cause of all evils; since war happened after it." Another place is derived from a deficiency in the time when, and the manner in which a thing is done; such for instance as this, "That Paris justly ravished Helen; for the choice was given to Helen by her father [of marrying whom she pleased.]" For perhaps this choice, was not given to her always, but at first; and the authority of her father over her extended so far as to this. Or as if some one should say, "That to strike free men is insolence." For it is not entirely so, but when he who strikes was not provoked. Farther still, another place is when in litigious disputes, an apparent syllogism is produced from that which is simply, and that which is not simply; as in dialectics, it is shown that non-being is being. For non-being is non-being. And it is also shown that what is unknown is the object of science. For the unknown is the object of science, because it is unknown, [i. e. because it is *known* that it is unknown. Thus also in orations there is an apparent enthymeme, from that which is not simply probable, but is a certain

certain probable thing. This probability, however, does not take place universally, as Agatho also says, "Perhaps some one may say that this is probable, that many things which are not probable happen to mortals." For that which is unlikely happens. Hence, what is unlikely is likely. But if this be the case, that which is not probable is probable. This, however, is not simply true; but as in contentious arguments a fallacy is produced, when a limitation restraining to a part, to a place, to time, or signifying relation, is not added; so here that which is improbable is not simply probable, but is a certain probability. But the art of Corax is composed from this place. For whether the person be not obnoxious to the crime; as he who is weak escapes an action for an assault; for it is not likely that he committed an assault; or whether he be obnoxious, as being a strong man, he has the same defence, unless a certain probability is apparent. And the like takes place in other things. For a man must necessarily be obnoxious to the crime or not. Both, therefore, appear to be probable; and the one is indeed probable [in reality;] but the other, not simply, but in the way we have shown. And this it is, to make the inferior argument to be the superior. Hence men were justly indignant with what Protagoras professed to accomplish. For what he announced is false, and not true, but is apparently probable, and exists in no art, but in the rhetorical and contentious. And thus much concerning enthymemes, both the true, and the apparent.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XXVII.

It now follows that we should speak concerning the solutions of enthymemes. But it is possible to dissolve them by contrary reasoning, or by introducing an objection.

With respect to contrary reasoning, therefore, it is evident that it may be effected from the same places. For syllogisms are composed from things that are probable; but many probable things appear to be contrary to each other.

But objections are introduced, in the same manner as in the Topics, in four ways; for they are introduced either from the *same*, or from the *similar*, or from the *contrary*, or from *the judgement and authority of others*. By an objection however being introduced from the *same*, I mean as if for instance the enthymeme should be concerning love, that it is a worthy thing, an objection may be made to it in a twofold respect. For either it may be said universally, that all indigence¹ is evil; or partially that it would not be proverbially said *Cautias love*², unless there was also base love. But an objection is introduced from the *contrary*; when if the enthymeme should be, "That a good man benefits all his friends;" it may be objected, "That neither does a bad

¹ This alludes to the definition of love given by Diotima in the Banquet of Plato: for she there defines love to be desire, and desire to be want.

² This alludes to the story of Biblis, who fell in love with her brother Camus.

man act ill towards all his friends¹." An objection also is introduced from *similars*, when the enthymeme is, "That those who receive an injury always hate [the authors of it.] For it may be objected, "That neither do those who are benefited always love [their benefactor.] And objections which are introduced from the judgements of illustrious men, are as if the enthymeme were, "That it is requisite to pardon those who are intoxicated; for they err ignorantly." The objection is, "That Pittacus, therefore, does not deserve to be praised; for he should not have legally established greater punishments [for intoxication,] if he who is intoxicated errs [through ignorance.]" Enthymemes however, are derived from four things; and these four are, the probable, example, *tecmerion* [i. e. a necessary sign,] and a sign [not necessary.] But those enthymemes which are collected from things that exist for the most part, or appear to exist, are derived from probabilities. Those which are derived from the similar, either from one, or many similar things, (when the orator assuming what is universal, syllogistically collects what is particular) exist through example. But those which exist through what is necessary and real, are through *tecmerion*. And those that exist through what is universal or particular, whether it really is, or not, are through signs [which are not necessary.] But a probable thing is that which does not exist always, but for the most part. Hence, it is manifest, that enthymemes of this kind may always be dissolved, if an objection is introduced. The solution, however, is [sometimes] apparent, and not always true; for he who objects does not dissolve the enthymeme by shewing that the thing is not probable, but by showing that it is not necessary. Hence, the defendant has always the advantage of the plaintiff; through this paralogism. For since the plaintiff demonstrates through probabilities; but the solution is not the same [which shews] either that the thing is not probable, or that it is not necessary; and that which exists for the

¹ And, therefore, neither does a good man benefit all his friends, because a good man is with respect to beneficence, what a bad man is with respect to malevolence.

most

most part, is always liable to objection; (for otherwise it would not be a probability, but would be always necessary)—hence the judge, if this mode of solution is adopted, will think either that the thing is not probable, or that it must not be judged by him, in consequence, as we have said, of being deceived by false reasoning. For it is requisite that he should not only judge from things which are necessary, but also from probabilities. For this is to judge most judiciously. The solution, therefore, of an enthymeme is not sufficient, which shows that a thing is not necessary, but it is requisite that the solution should also show, that it is not probable. But this will happen, if the objection rather shows that the thing for the most part subsists. It is possible, however, that a thing may happen for the most part, or frequently, in a twofold respect, viz. either from time, or from circumstances; but principally if from both. For if things which frequently happen thus subsist, this is more probable. But signs [which are not necessary,] and enthymemes derived through a sign, are solved in the way we mentioned in the first book. For that every such sign is unsyllogistic is evident to us from the analytics. Enthymemes, however, derived from examples are solved after the same manner as enthymemes derived from probabilities. For if we can adduce a contrary example in which the thing is not so, the enthymeme is solved, because the thing is not necessary, or because many things have happened frequently, and in a different manner. But if many things have happened frequently, and in this manner, then it must be contended either that the present circumstance is not similar, or is not similarly disposed, or has a certain difference. *Tecmeria*, however, [i. e. necessary signs,] and enthymemes which are of the nature of *tecmeria*, cannot be solved in consequence of being unsyllogistic. But this is evident to us from the analytics¹. It remains, therefore, to show that what is said, [viz. that certain premises] do not exist. But if it is evident that the premises do exist, and that the enthymeme is derived from *tecmerion*, then

¹ See the Prior Analytics, Book II, Chap. 27.

the enthymeme becomes insolable. For all things now become apparent from demonstration.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

To amplify, however, and diminish are not the elements of an enthymeme; for I call the same thing an element and place. For an element as also a place, is that into which many enthymemes fall. But to amplify and diminish are enthymemes for the purpose of shewing, that a thing is great or small, as likewise that it is good or evil, just or unjust, or any thing else. And all these are the things with which syllogisms and enthymemes are conversant; so that if no one of these is the place of an enthymeme, neither are amplification and diminution.

Neither are enthymemes which have the power of solving [the arguments of the opponent] any other species of enthymeme than those which are employed in confirmation. For it is evident that he solves [the arguments of his opponent,] who either shows [the contrary to what his opponent asserts,] or introduces an objection. But he proves the opposite. Thus, if one shows that a thing has been done, the other shows that it has not been done; and if one shows that it has not, the other shows that it has been done; so that here, indeed, there will be no difference; for both use the same enthymemes; since they introduce enthymemes to show, that the thing is, or is not. An objection, however, is not an enthymeme, but (as we have shown in the Topics) it is to declare

declare a certain opinion, from which it will be evident that the conclusion is not syllogistical, or that something false has been assumed. And thus much has been said by us respecting examples and sentences; and in short respecting what pertains to the reasoning power, whence we may abound with [enthymemes,] and how we may solve them. It now remains to discuss what pertains to diction and order.

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BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

THERE are three things which it is requisite to discuss concerning an oration; one, indeed, from what particulars credibility is derived; the second, about diction; and the third, in what manner it is requisite to arrange the parts of an oration. Concerning credibility, therefore, we have already spoken, and have shown from how many things it consists, and that it consists from three things. We have likewise shown what the nature is of these three, and why credibility consists from these alone. For all men are persuaded [to believe what they hear,] either because those who judge are themselves affected in a certain way, or because they conceive the speakers to be worthy of belief, or because the thing is proved. We have also spoken concerning enthymemes, and have shown whence they ought to be derived; for some things

things indeed, are the species, but others the places of enthymemes. It now, however, remains to speak concerning diction. For it is not only sufficient to know what ought to be said, but it is likewise necessary to speak in a proper manner. And diction contributes greatly to the quality of the oration. The parts of rhetoric, therefore, were investigated [by the ancients] in that order in which they are naturally arranged. But from the nature of a thing, we ought in the first place to discover those things which are adapted to persuade. In the second place, these are to be disposed [i. e. expressed] by [an appropriate] diction. And that which is to be considered in the third place, and possesses the greatest power, though it has not yet been discussed by any one, is what pertains to pronunciation, or action. For this was but lately introduced into tragic poetry and rhapsody. For at first, the poets themselves acted the tragedies [which they composed.] It is evident, therefore, that with respect to rhetoric, there is a thing of this kind, in the same manner as with respect to poetry; which has been discussed by certain other persons, and by Glaucō the Teian.

Pronunciation, however, or action, consists in the voice, [and the principal artifice of action consists in knowing] how it is requisite to use it in each of the passions. Thus for instance, [it is necessary to know] when the voice should be loud, when soft, and when between both. How the tones of voice should be employed; such as the acute, the grave, and the middle; and what rhythms are adapted to each of the passions. For there are three things which the writers on pronunciation consider; and these are, magnitude, harmony, and rhythm. And as in political contests those who excel in action, for the most part obtain the prize, and the players now excel in it more than the poets themselves, thus also in forensic contests, through the depravity of politics, those orators gain their cause, who excel in action. The art, however, concerning rhetorical action has not yet been disclosed; since, likewise, the art concerning diction was discovered late. And it appears to be but a slight thing, if it is well examined. But since the business concerning rhetoric pertains to opinion, we must pay attention to it, not as a thing possessing rectitude, but as necessary;
since

since it is just not to require more in an oration, than that it may neither give pain, nor delight. For it is just to contend strenuously for things themselves; so that other things besides demonstration are superfluous. At the same time, however, diction is capable of producing great effects, as we have said, through the depravity of the hearer. Diction therefore possesses a certain small necessity in every discipline. For it is of some consequence with respect to the declaration of a thing, to speak in this, or in that manner; yet it is not very important, but all these, [i. e. whatever pertains to rhetoric,] depend on the imagination, and are referred to the hearer. Hence, no one teaches geometry in this way, [viz. so as to be solicitous about diction.] The art, therefore, concerning pronunciation when it is employed, produces the same effect as acting on the stage. But some persons have endeavoured to speak a little concerning it, as for instance, Thrasy-machus in his treatise On Compassion. And to be disposed to act is natural, and more inartificial; but diction is artificial. Hence again, rewards are given to those who excel in it, in the same manner as to those rhetoricians who excel in pronunciation. For written orations possess greater strength from diction, than from the sentiments they contain. The poets, therefore, gave rise to diction, as it is natural they should. For names are imitations; and of all our parts, voice is the most imitative. Hence, the poets invented the poetical arts, viz. rhapsody, [or epic poetry,] and the art of acting, [or dramatic poetry] and the other arts. Because, however, the poets, though they sing of frivolous things, appear to have acquired their renown from diction, on this account poetic diction, such as that of Gorgias, was introduced [by orators;] and even now many of the unlearned fancy that those persons speak most beautifully when they speak poetically. This, however, is not the case, but the diction of an oration, is different from that of poetry. And this is evident from the event. For the present writers of tragedies do not any longer employ the ancient poetic diction. But as from tetrameters they betook themselves to iambic verse, because this measure is of all others most similar to discourse; thus, also, they rejected such names as are foreign from familiar

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familiar conversation. Those, likewise, who at present compose hexameter verses, have rejected the names with which the first [dramatic poets] adorned their verses. Hence, it is ridiculous for those to imitate these poets, who no longer employ that mode of diction. Hence, too, it is evident that we are not accurately to discuss every thing which may be said concerning diction, but only such things as pertain to rhetorical diction. For of poetical diction we have spoken in the treatise On Poetry.

CHAPTER II.

LET, therefore, what we have written in the Poetic be surveyed; and let the virtue of diction be perspicuity; of which this is an indication, that speech does not effect its proper work unless it renders manifest [the mind of the speaker.] Another virtue of diction is, that it be neither low, nor above its dignity, but appropriate. For poetic diction perhaps is not low, and yet is not adapted to an oration. But of nouns and verbs, such as are proper render the diction perspicuous. Such other names, however, as are mentioned in the Poetic, cause the diction not to be low, but ornamented. For the introduction of unusual words, makes the diction appear more venerable; since men are affected in the same manner towards diction, as they are towards strangers, and their fellow-citizens. Hence it is necessary to render the dialect foreign. For we admire the language of foreigners; and that which is admirable is pleasant. In metre, therefore, the poet does this frequently, and there it is appropriate; for both the verse, and the subjects of the verse, are very remote from common occurrences;

rences; but in prose much fewer foreign words are to be used. For there, if either a slave, or a very young man, or one who speaks of very trifling things uses elegant language, it is more indecorous. But in the language of these persons, the becoming consists in an appropriate contraction and dilatation. Unusual words, however, should be introduced by the orator latently, and he should not seem to speak fictitiously, but naturally. For natural diction is adapted to persuade; but the fictitious has a contrary effect. For we avoid those who speak fictitiously as insidious persons, in the same manner as we avoid mixed wines. Thus, the voice of Theodorus was preferred to the voice of other actors; for his seemed to be the voice of the speaker, but the voice of the others appeared to be foreign. Unusual terms, however, will be well introduced latently, if he who frames a speech makes a selection from the accustomed dialect; which Euripides does, and was the first that showed the way to others.

But since an oration consists from nouns and verbs, and nouns have as many species as are enumerated in the treatise On Poetry; of these species, nouns taken from various tongues, or dialects, and also such as are double and fictitious, are seldom, and but in few places to be used. Where, however, they are to be used, and why but seldom, we shall afterwards show. For they produce a greater change in the language than is becoming. But the proper, the appropriate, and metaphorical, are alone useful to prosaic diction; of which this is an indication, that all men [in common conversation,] use these alone; for all men speak in metaphors, and in appropriate and proper terms. Hence it is evident, that if any one does this well, his diction will be foreign, and it may be latent that it is so, and he will speak with perspicuity. But this was defined by us to be the virtue of a rhetorical discourse. Of names or nouns, however, the homonymous are useful to the sophist; for through these they deceive. But the synonymous are useful to the poet. I call, however, proper and synonymous terms, such as *to go* and *to walk*; for both these are proper, and synonymous to each other.

What, therefore, each of these is, how many species there are of metaphor, and that metaphors can do much both in poetry and prose,

we have shown, as we have before observed, in the treatise On Poetry. But it is so much more necessary to labour about these, in prose, because it has fewer aids than verse. A metaphor also especially possesses the clear, the pleasant, and the foreign, and it is not to be taken from another person.

It is necessary, however, to use epithets and metaphors that are appropriate; and this adaptation will be obtained from the analogous. But without this there will be an apparent indecorum, because contraries are especially conspicuous, when placed by each other. As a purple garment, therefore, becomes a young, but not an old man; for the same garment is not adapted to both; thus also certain metaphors and epithets are adapted to some things, but are not adapted to others. If likewise you are willing to praise, the metaphor must be derived from that which is better in the same genus; but if to blame, it must be derived from things which in the same genus are inferior. I say for instance, since contraries are in the same genus, to say, "That a beggar prays," and "That he who prays begs," because both are petitions, it is expedient to do as we have said¹. Thus Iphicrates called Callias, *Metragurtes*, or *collector to the mother of the gods*, and not *Dadouchos*, or *torch-bearer*. But Callias replied "That Iphicrates was not initiated, otherwise he would not have called him *Metragurtes*, but *Dadouchos*." For both these offices pertained to the goddess, but that of *torch-bearer* was honourable, but that of *collector* ignoble. The flatterers of Dionysius also employed the same artifice; for they called themselves *artists*. Both these words, however, are metaphors. the one indeed, of things sordid, but the other the contrary. And robbers at present call themselves exactors. Hence, we may be allowed to say, "That he who acts unjustly errs; and that he who errs, acts unjustly; and also that he who steals, both takes, and robs." There is, however, an indecorum in what Telephus in Euripides says [of certain rowers] "That they reigned over oars, and descended into Mysia." For the word to

¹ Viz. If we wish to praise him who begs, we must say that he prays; but if we wish to blame him, we must say, that he begs.

reign

reign is greater than the dignity of the matter [i. e. of an oar.] He does not therefore conceal his artifice. There is also an error in syllables, unless they cause the words to have a pleasing sound. And this error was committed by Dionysius surnamed *Chalkous*, in his elegies. For he calls *poetry* "The *clangor* of Calliope," because both are vocal sounds. But the metaphor is bad, which is made from sounds that are not significant.

Farther still, nouns are not to be far fetched, but things which are anonymous are to be denominated by words derived from things that are allied, and of the same species, and which show as soon as they are uttered that they are allied; as in that celebrated enigma, "I saw a man agglutinating brass to a man with fire." For the passion is anonymous. But both are a certain addition. The enigma, therefore, calls the application of the cupping glass an agglutination. And in short, from enigmas that are well composed, good metaphors may be assumed. For metaphors have an obscure meaning; so that it is evident that an enigma if it is approved consists of metaphors that are well made. Metaphors also must be assumed from beautiful things. But the beauty of a name consists as Lycimnius says in sounds, or in the thing signified; and in a similar manner the deformity of a name. Farther still, there is a third thing, which solves a sophistical argument. For that which Bryson says is not true, "That no one speaks obscurely, since the same thing is signified by using this name instead of that." For this is false; since one name is more proper and more assimilated than another, and is more adapted to place the thing before our eyes. Again, this name and that signify a thing not similarly subsisting; so that thus also, one name must be admitted to be more beautiful or more deformed than another. For both names indeed, signify the beautiful and the deformed; but not so far as beautiful, or so far as deformed. Or both signify the same things, but in a greater or less degree. Metaphors, however, are hence to be derived from things which are beautiful, either in the voice, or in the power [of signification,] or to the sight, or some other sense. But it makes a difference
to

to say for instance "The rosy-finger'd morn," rather than, "The purple fingered," or which is still worse "The red-finger'd."

In epithets also, oppositions may be made from what is vile or base; as for instance, *the matricide*. But the opposition may be made from that which is better; as, *the avenger of his father*. And Simonides, when he who conquered with mules, offered him a small reward, was unwilling to compose verses on the occasion, as disdaining to celebrate in verse *semi-asses*. But when he had given him a sufficient reward, then he sung,

Hail daughters of the steeds that fly
With feet like whirlwinds swift.

Though they were also the daughters of asses.

Farther still, a thing may be praised or blamed by employing diminutives. But diminution is that which renders both evil and good less. Thus Aristophanes in his *Babylonics* calls in derision *krusion* (a golden thing) *krusidarion*, and *imation* (a garment) *imatidarion*. He also calls *loidoria* (slander) *loidoremation*, and *nosema* (disease) *nosemation*. In both appositions, however, and diminutives, it is requisite to be cautious, and to observe a mediocrity.

CHAPTER III.

FRIGIDITY may be produced in diction in four ways. In the first place in double nouns [i. e. in compound words;] as in Lycophron
when

when he says, "the many-fac'd heaven; the mighty-top'd earth; and the narrow-mouth'd shore." And as Gorgias calls some one, *a beggarly-mus'd flatterer*; and those who take an oath improperly, or properly *epiorkesantas*, and *kateuorkesantas*. And as Alcidamas [when describing some one who was in a rage,] "His soul was full of ardour, but his face was of a fiery colour." And speaking of the promptitude of a certain person to fight to the last, he calls him *telesphoros*, or *enduring to the end*. He likewise calls the power of persuading, *telesphoros*; and the bottom of the sea *kuanochroon*, or *azure-coloured*. For all these expressions appear to be poetical from duplication. This, therefore, is one cause of frigid diction.

Another cause arises from the use of ancient words. Thus Lycophron calls Xerxes *pelorion*¹ *andra*, or *an immense man*. And Sciron he calls, *sinnis aneer*, or *a pernicious man*. Alcidamas also, speaking of poetry, says no such *athurma*, or *puerile sport* is useful to poetry. And speaking of nature he uses the expression *atasthalia* or *improbability*. And of a certain person, he says, "that he was exasperated with the untamed anger of his mind."

In the third place, diction may become frigid from using epithets, which are either long, or unseasonable, or frequent. For in poetry it is becoming to say, *white-milk*. But in prose, epithets are partly more unbecoming, and partly, if they are too frequent, they cause prose to appear to be verse. Epithets, however, are sometimes to be used in prose; for they render the diction more unusual, and cause it to be foreign. But mediocrity must be regarded in the use of them, since otherwise a greater evil is produced than by speaking casually. For casual diction is not good, but the other is bad. Hence, the writings of Alcidamas appear to be frigid. For he uses epithets, not as season-

¹ That *πελωριον* is an ancient poetical word is evident from the following line, which is only to be found in the Manuscript Comment of Syrianus On the Metaphysics of Aristotle.

χασμα και μεγα χασμα πελωριον ενθα και ενθα.

i. e. (Speaking of Chaos) "It is a chasm and a mighty chasm, every way immense."

ings,

ings, but as food; since they are so frequent in his writings, so great, and so apparent. Thus for instance, he does not merely say *sweat*, but *moist sweat*. And he does not say that some one went to the *Isthmia* [or solemn games in honour of Neptune,] but *to the general assembly of the Isthmian games*. Thus too, he does not say *the laws*, but *legal institutes, the queen of cities*. Nor does he say *in running*, but *with the rapid impulse of the soul*. Nor *museum*, but *receiving the museum of nature*. And *the sad care of the soul*, [instead of merely saying *care*.] Nor does he say *favour*, but *the artificer of popular favour*. And [again he calls an orator] *the dispensator of the pleasure of the hearers*. And, *he did not hide himself in the branches* but *in the branches of the wood*. And, *he did not cover his body*, but *the shame of his body*. And, *desire the anti-rival of the soul*. But this is at the same time a double word, and an epithet; so that it becomes poetical. Thus too speaking of improbity he says, *the immense excess of improbity*. Hence, those who speak poetically produce the ridiculous and the frigid, by their indecorous diction, and also occasion obscurity by their garrulity. For garrulity dissolves perspicuity, when it is introduced to him who knows the subject, by the obscurity which it occasions. Men, however, use double, or compound words, when a thing is anonymous, and the words may be easily joined, such as *time-wasting*. But if this is done frequently, the diction becomes entirely poetical. Hence, a double diction [i. e. compound words,] are most useful to dithyrambic poets; for the language of these is sonorous. But ancient names and dialects are most adapted to epic poets; for epic poetry is venerable and superb. And metaphors are most adapted to iambics; for these as we have before observed iambic poets now use.

Again, in the fourth place, frigidity is produced in metaphors. For there are indecorous metaphors, some indeed, on account of the ridiculous; for comic poets also use metaphors. But others are indecorous from being too venerable and tragical. Metaphors likewise are obscure, if they are far-fetched; as those of Gorgias, who calls certain things, *green and sanguineous*. And, *you indeed have shamefully sown, and badly reaped these things*. For this is too poetically said. Thus too, Alcidas calls philosophy *the bulwark of the laws*; and the Odyssey *a beautiful*

beautiful mirror of human life. And again he says, “*nothing of this kind introduces puerile sport (αδύγνα) in poetry.*” For all these metaphors, from the causes already mentioned, are unadapted to procure persuasion. But what Gorgias said on a swallow which dropped its excrement as it flew towards him, is the best of tragical metaphors; for he said, “*This is shameful O Philomel.*” For if he said this to the bird, the action was not shameful; but to a virgin, it was shameful. His defamation therefore was proper, because he alluded to what the bird had been, and not to what it then was.

CHAPTER IV.

An image also is a metaphor; for it differs very little from it. For when Homer says of Achilles,

He like a lion rush'd.

It is an image. But when he says, *the lion rush'd*, it is a metaphor. For because both are brave, he calls Achilles metaphorically a lion.

An image also is useful in prose, though but rarely; for it is poetical.

Images, however, are to be introduced in the same manner as metaphors; for they are metaphors, differing in the way we have already mentioned.

But images are for instance such as what Androtion said on Idrieus, “That he resembled whelps freed from their chains.” For they bite any one that falls in their way, and Idrieus when freed from his bonds was morose. And as Theodamas assimilated Archidamas to Euxenus,

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who

who was ignorant of geometry; and this from the analogous. For Euxenus is the geometrical Archidamus. Another instance of similitude is from the [5th book of the] Republic of Plato. "That those who in battle plunder the bodies of the dead, are similar to whelps who bite stones, but do not touch those who throw them." And [in the 6th book,] it is said of the people, "That they resemble a strong, but deaf pilot." And [in the 10th book] speaking of poetical measures, it is said, "That they resemble those who are in the prime of life, but without beauty. For these in the decline of life, and verses when they are dissolved, no longer appear the same." Another instance is that of Pericles on the Samians, "That they resembled children, who take their food crying." And on the Bæotians, "That they resembled flints; for flints are struck against each other, and the Bæotians fight with each other." Another instance is that of Demosthenes on [the Athenian] people, "That they resembled those who are sea-sick." And that of Democrates who assimilated "Rhetoricians to nurses, who swallow the food themselves, and anoint the children with the spittle." And again, that of Antisthenes, who assimilated Cephisidotus who was a thin man, to frankinsence, "which delights while it consumes." For all these similitudes may be used, both as images, and as metaphors; so that it is evident that such words as are approved, and are used as metaphors, will also be images, and likewise that images are metaphors, which are in want of argument. It is always, however, necessary that a metaphor should be converted from the analogous, and be referred to the other part, and to things homogeneous. Thus if a cup may [from analogy] be called the shield of Bacchus, a shield also may appropriately be said to be the cup of Mars. From these things, therefore, an oration is composed.

CHAPTER V.

THE principle, however, of diction is to speak with propriety; and this consists in five things. And the first indeed, is in conjunctives¹, if these are disposed in such a way as their nature requires, viz. so as to be placed in an order prior and posterior to each other. Thus for instance the conjunction *indeed*, and *I indeed*, require *but*, and *but he*. It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions which correspond to each other, should neither be disjoined by a great interval, nor should have so many things interposed between them, that when a conjunction corresponding to a former one is given, the prior conjunction is forgotten; for this is appropriate but in few places. Thus, "*But I, after the thing was related to me, for Cleon came begging and entreating, went taking them along with me.*" For here, many conjunctions are inserted prior to the conjunction which was to have been assigned². But if there is a great interval between *But I*, and *I went*, the sentence becomes obscure. One thing, therefore, requisite to correct diction is a proper disposition in the conjunctions. A second is, to call things by their proper names, and not to circumscribe them [by generic and common names.] A third is, not to use ambiguous words. But these precepts are to be observed, unless the contraries to them are preferred, which those do,

¹ Under conjunctions Aristotle also comprehends prepositions, articles, and the other parts of speech, which are distinguished from noun and verb.

² i. e. Since *I went* is referred to the words *but I*, many words are interposed, from the interposition of which, obscurity is produced.

who when they have nothing to say, pretend to say something. For men of this kind in poetry, thus speak; as for instance Empedocles. For circumlocution deceives, if it be much, and the auditors are affected in the same manner as the multitude are by those who predict future events, since when they speak ambiguously, the vulgar assent to what they say. "If Cræsus passes over the river Halys, he will destroy a mighty empire." [But the reason why when we have nothing to say, we should use generic terms is] because in short, the error will be less, and on this account diviners speak through the genera of a thing. For in the game of even and odd, he will be less likely to err who says that a number is even or odd in general, than if he determines what number is so. And he who predicts that a certain event will be, is less likely to err, if he only says that it will be, than if he assigns the time when it will be. Hence, those who deliver oracles, do not define the time when a thing will happen. All these generic and ambiguous names, therefore, are to be avoided, unless they are adopted for the sake of some such purpose, as we have mentioned. A fourth thing requisite to correct diction is, as Protagoras divided the genera of nouns into masculine, feminine, and instruments [or neuter,] to employ these rightly; as "She coming and discoursing departed¹." A fifth requisite is to denominate rightly in many and few things; and in one thing; as, "But they coming, struck me²."

In short, it is requisite that what is written, should be so written as to be read and pronounced with facility. But this is not the case when there are many conjunctions; and when what is written cannot be easily pointed; and such are the writings of Heraclitus. For it is laborious to point the writings of Heraclitus, because it is immanifest what should be conjoined with the prior or posterior part; as in the beginning of his book. For he there says, "Of reason existing always,

¹ It is difficult to illustrate this example in English, but easy in Latin. Thus to say, "*illa vero reversa, et colloquuta discessit*," is right; but to say, "*illa vero reversus, &c.*" is wrong.

² Thus too in Latin, to say, "*illi vero reversi verberarunt me*" is right; but "*illi vero reversus, &c.*" is wrong.

men

men are ignorant;" since it is immanifest whether the word always pertains to the prior or to the posterior part ¹.

Farther still, a solecism is produced in composition, when to two words, another appropriate word is not conjoined. Thus to *noise* and *colour*, *seeing* is not a common [i. e. is not appropriate] word; but *sensible perception* is common. The composition also is rendered obscure, from the insertion of much which is intermediate, unless the part which corresponds to the first part of a sentence, is immediately subjoined, and the rest added; as, "My intention was, after I had mentioned such and such things to him, to go." But this obscurity would be avoided by saying, "My intention was, after I had spoken to him, to go;" and then to add, "having mentioned to him such and such things."

CHAPTER VI.

THE following particulars contribute to the amplitude of diction: To use definition [or description] instead of a name; as instead of saying a *circle* to say, *a plane figure in which all lines drawn from the middle to the circumference are equal*. But the contrary contributes to conciseness, viz. to use the name instead of the definition. Amplitude of diction is also effected, if when any thing disgraceful or indecorous is to be expressed, to use the name, when the disgraceful thing is in the definition, but the definition, if it is in the name. It is likewise effected by ren-

¹ i. e. It is dubious whether the meaning of Heraclitus is, *that men are ignorant of that reason which always exists*, or, *that men are always ignorant of the reason which exists*.

dering

dering a thing manifest by metaphors, and epithets, avoiding at the same time what is poetical. And by causing one thing to be many, [i. e. by using the plural instead of the singular number,] which the poets do. For when there is but one part, they nevertheless say, "into the Achaian parts." And instead of saying, "the complication of an epistle," they say, "the complications of epistles." Amplitude is also effected, by separating what we can conjoin, as, "this woman, this our wife." But if we wish to speak concisely, we must say on the contrary, "this woman our wife." And it is effected by using a conjunction; but if we wish to speak concisely, we must not employ a conjunction, yet the sentence must not be unconnected; as in the first case, "Going and speaking to him;" and in the second, "Going, I spoke to him." The method of Antimachus likewise is useful for this purpose, viz. to enumerate particulars, which a thing does not possess, which he does, speaking of the hill Teumessus; for he says,

"A little hill there is, expos'd to wind."

For thus we may amplify to infinity. And this may take place both in what is good, and what is bad, by enumerating what is not inherent, in whatever way it may be useful to the oration. Hence, also poets derive the words, *chordless*, and *lyreless* melody; for these words are derived from privations. But what we have just said, is adopted in metaphors, taken from the analogous; such for instance as to say, "That the sound of a trumpet is a lyreless melody."

CHAP.

CHAPTER VII.

Diction, also, will possess what is decorous, if it is pathetic and ethical, and analogous to the subject matter. But the analogous is effected by neither speaking of things grand and magnificent slightly, nor of abject things, venerably, [and magnificently;] nor giving ornament to a vile appellation. For if this is not adopted, the composition will appear to be a comedy; which is the case with that of Cleon. For some things which he writes, are just as if a man should say, "A venerable fig."

Diction becomes pathetic, by reciting insolent behaviour in the language of an angry person. But when conduct has been impious and shameful, then the diction becomes pathetic, by speaking indignantly, and cautiously¹; and when conduct has been laudable, this is effected by speaking with admiration. But in things of a lamentable nature, the pathetic is produced by a humble diction. And the like method must be adopted in other things. Appropriate diction, also, persuades to the truth of a thing. For the soul of the auditor is deceived by false reasoning, in consequence of conceiving that the orator speaks the truth; because the auditors are thus affected in such like orations. Hence, they fancy that things are as the orator says, though they are not so. The auditor, likewise, becomes similarly affected with him who speaks pathetically, though he should say

¹ i. e. As if not daring to disclose such nefarious conduct.

nothing

nothing to the purpose. Hence, many astonish the hearers, by the tumultuous manner in which they deliver their orations.

Moreover, ethical diction is a demonstration from signs, because this when appropriate is consequent to every genus and habit. But I mean by genus, indeed, age; such as a child, or a man, or an old man; [sex,] as man or woman; [and nation,] as a Lacedæmonian, or Thessalian. And by habits, I mean those things which produce the variety of conditions in life; for the lives of men are not such as they are according to every habit. If, therefore, the diction has appellations adapted to the habit, it will become ethical. For a rustic and a well educated man, will not say the same things, nor speak after the same manner. But the auditors are somewhat affected by that figure, which the writers of orations abundantly use; as, "Who does not know this? All men know it." For the auditor, from shame confesses that he participates of that knowledge, of which every one else partakes.

Opportune, however, or not opportune use is common to all the species. But the remedy in every hyperbole is that celebrated advice [self-correction;] for it is necessary that the orator should correct himself. For the thing then appears to be true, [though it may seem to be incredible,] because the incredibility of it is not concealed from the orator. Farther still, every thing analogous is not to be used at once; for thus the artifice will be concealed from the hearer. I mean for instance, that if the names are harsh, yet must not the voice, or countenance, or other appropriate things, be such as to express that harshness; otherwise, it will become manifest what each of these is. But if the names are harsh, and the voice or countenance is not adapted to such names, the artifice will be latent. If, therefore, soft things be spoken harshly, and harsh things gently, they will lose the power of persuading. But epithets and compound words, if they are numerous, and especially such as are foreign, are adapted to him who speaks pathetically. For we pardon the orator, who when enraged calls some evil *heaven-reaching*, or *immense*. These epithets, also, and compound words, may be used by the orator, when he has already moved

moved the auditors, and inspired them with a divine fury, either by praising or dispraising, or by exciting them to anger or love, which Isocrates does in his *Panegyric*, towards the end, where he has the words "fame and memory." And "those who endured." For those who are agitated with a divine fury, speak things of this kind, so that the auditors admit what is said, in consequence of being similarly affected. Hence, this form of diction is also adapted to poetry; for poetry partakes of divine inspiration. Either, therefore, this form of diction must be adopted [in the cases already mentioned,] or irony must be employed, as it was by Gorgias, and Socrates in the *Phædrus* of Plato.

CHAPTER VIII.

WITH respect, however, to the figure of diction, it is necessary that it should neither be metrical, nor without rythm. For metrical diction is not calculated to persuade. For it appears to be feigned, and calls the attention of the auditor from the subject of the oration; since he is led to expect a metre similar to the former. As, therefore, when the cryers proclaim to the people [when a slave is manumitted by his master,] "What patron will he who is manumitted chuse?" The boys antecedently to the cryer exclaim, "Cleon;"—[thus if the oration were metrical, the auditors would preoccupy the orator, and would foresee what he ought to say.] But the diction which is without rythm is indefinite. It is necessary, however, that it should be bounded, though not by metre. For the infinite is unpleasant and

unknown; and all things are bounded by number. But the number of the figure of diction is rythm, of which metres are the segments. Hence, it is necessary that an oration should have rythm, but not metre or measure; for if it has, it will be a poem. It should not, however, possess rythm accurately, but only to a certain extent.

Of rythms, however, the heroic indeed is venerable and sonorous, and requires harmony. But the iambic is the diction of the multitude. Hence, in speaking, iambics are uttered the most of all measures. But it is necessary that the prose of an oration should be venerable and very exciting. The Trochaic measure, however, is more analogous to swift dancing. But this is evident from tetrameters, which are a voluble rythm¹. The pæan therefore remains, which was employed by

¹ Heroic feet, i. e. dactyls and spondees have an even ratio, or in other words, the ratio of one to one. For a short syllable contains one time, a long syllable contains two times; but a spondee consists from two long syllables; and therefore consists from two syllables measured by an equal time, and consequently has an even proportion. A dactyl consists of three syllables, the first long, the second and third short; but a long syllable contains two times; two short syllables contain two other times; and therefore a dactyl also consists of three syllables, of which the two posterior are measured by an equal time with the first syllable, and consequently a dactyl has an even proportion. An anapest which is an inverted dactyl, has the same proportion, since it has the two first syllables short, and the third long. The heroic rythm, therefore, of dactyls and spondees, on account of its equability is full of majesty, is sonorous and magnificent, and requires harmony. Hence, it is not sufficiently adapted to prose, which ought to be without harmony, and ought to be less sonorous and less magnificent. Iambics, which consist of two syllables, the first short, and the second long, and the opposite to them, trochaics, which have the first syllable long, and the second short, have a double ratio. For a long syllable contains two times, and a short syllable one time; but iambics and trochaics consist of a long and a short syllable. Hence, they consist of two syllables, of which one has to the other the ratio of two to one, and consequently they have a double ratio. Of these, the iambic rythm is very much adapted to familiar conversation, and therefore the diction of the multitude for the most part consists of Iambics. The rythm, however, which is adapted to prose, ought to be more grand and grave than that which is adapted to the familiar diction of the vulgar; and hence, neither is the iambic rythm very fit for prose. And the trochaic rythm has too much concitation, as is evident from tetrameters, which because they for a great part consist from trochees, possess a very exciting power, and almost run. Hence, this rythm does not accord with the majesty of prose.

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by orators, and originated from Thrasy-machus; yet they were unable to say what it was. But the pæan is the third in order, and follows the above-mentioned measures; for it is in the ratio of three to two; but of the others, the one [i. e. the heroic] is in the ratio of one to one; but the other [i. e. the iambic and trochaic] in the ratio of two to one. The sesquialter, however, is consequent to these two ratios; and the pæan consists of this ratio. The other rythms, therefore, are to be rejected, from the above-mentioned reasons, and because they are metrical; but the pæan is to be assumed; for from this alone of all the rythms we have mentioned, metre is not produced; so that it is especially latent.

The foot follows which is called pæan, because it was used in the hymns of Apollo, who was denominated pæan. But a pæan is a foot consisting of four syllables, one long, and the remaining three short. If the first syllable is long, it is called a first pæan; if the second is long, it is called a second pæan; if the third, a third pæan; and if the fourth, a fourth pæan: But Aristotle here, alone distinguishes the first and fourth pæan; and omits the other two. Thrasy-machus used the first pæan in prose, whom others followed; but they could not explain what is the nature of this rythm, and what ratio it contains. This, therefore, we must endeavour to explain. A pæan then, is a foot the third in order, and contains the third ratio, viz. the sesquialter, which is the ratio of three to two. The reason of this is, because it contains four syllables, one long, and three short. But a long syllable contains two times; and three short syllables contain three times. Hence, the short syllables have to the long syllable, the ratio of three to two, i. e. a sesquialter ratio. Hence, too, a pæan ranks as the third foot. For in the first place are spondees, dactyls, and anapests, which contain the even ratio of one to one; in the second place are iambics and trochaics, which contain the duple ratio of two to one; and in the third place are pæans, which contain the sesquialter ratio of three to two. As, therefore, dactyls, spondees, and anapests, and other rythms containing an even ratio, are not adapted to prose, because they are too sonorous and magnificent; and as iambic and trochaic rythms, and other rythms containing a duple ratio are also not adapted to prose, because they are less sonorous and magnificent than is requisite; but the sesquialter ratio is a medium between the even and the double ratio, for it exceeds more than the even, and less than the double;—this being the case, it follows that the pæan rythm, is especially adapted to prose, as being less grand than the heroic, but grander than the iambic rythm, and having a middle situation between both. The truth of this is confirmed by considering that in prose we ought to avoid metre, and should use a rythm especially adapted to concealment. But heroic and iambic rythms are metrical, and are so manifest that they cannot be concealed. The rythm, however, of pæans is not metrical, and may be concealed. Hence, we ought principally to use the pæan rythm in prose, though we may also sometimes employ other feet.

At present, therefore, orators use only one pæan, and that at the beginning of their oration. It is necessary, however, that the end should differ from the beginning. But there are two species of pæans opposite to each other; of which, one is adapted to the beginning of an oration, in which way also it is used by orators. But this is that pæan, in which the first syllable is long, and the other three are short; as

Δαλογενίς μετὰ Λυκίαν,

i. e. "Delos-begotten, or Lycian," [speaking of Apollo.]

[where there are two pæans:]

and,

Χρυσότρεχα Ἑκάτη, καὶ Διός.

"O golden-hair'd Hecate, daughter of Jove,"

But in the other pæan, on the contrary, the first three syllables are short, and the last is long; as

Μετὰ δὲ γὰρ ὕδατα τ' ἠέριον ἠφαισσι νύξ.

i. e. "Night concealed after the land, the water and the ocean."

This pæan, however, terminates the course of the oration. For a short syllable, because it is imperfect causes the oration to be mutilated. But it is necessary that it should be amputated by a long syllable, and that the end of it should be manifest, yet not from the writer, nor from a paragraph, but from the rhythm. And thus we have shown that diction ought to have a proper rhythm, and should not be without rhythm; and also what the rhythms are, and how those subsist, that produce a proper rhythm in diction.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IX.

It is necessary, however, that diction should either be diffuse and one by a bond, as the dilatations in dithyrambics; or that it should be periodic, and similar to the antistrophes of the ancient poets. Diffuse diction, therefore, is ancient, as in the work of Herodotus the Thurian, the beginning of which is, "This is the exposition of history, &c.;" for this formerly, all writers used, but at present it is not used by many. But I call the diction diffuse, which has of itself no end, till the thing which is discussed be brought to a conclusion. This diction is however unpleasant, on account of the infinite; for all men wish to see the end of a thing. Hence, racers in the turnings [round the goal,] are out of breath and faint; but prior to this, when they have a prospect of the goal, their labour is not so extreme. Such, therefore, is diffuse diction.

But periodic diction, is that which consists of periods. I call, however, a period, diction which has of itself a beginning and end, and a magnitude which may easily be perceived. But diction of this kind is pleasing, and easily learnt. It is pleasing, indeed, because it subsists in a way contrary to that which is boundless; and because the hearer always fancies he obtains something, because there is always something for him which is bounded. But it is unpleasant where nothing is foreseen, and nothing effected. It is also easily learnt, because it may easily be remembered. But it may easily be remembered, because this diction has number in the periods. Hence, all men remember verse more easily than prose; for it has number by which it is measured.

It

It is necessary, however, that a period should contain a compleat, and not a mutilated and abrupt meaning, as in the iambics of Sophocles.

“Calydon, the land where Pelops reign’d¹.”

For the contrary might be thought to be true, by a division of the period; as in the above instance it would seem that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

With respect to periods, however, one is in the colons or members, but the other is simple.

But the period which is in the colons, is a perfect and distinct diction, and in which what is pronounced admits of easy respiration and does not consist in a division, like the above-mentioned period of Sophocles, but is whole and entire. A colon, however, is one part of this period. But I call the period simple which consists of one colon. It is necessary, however, that the colons and the periods, should neither be curtailed, nor prolix. For when the periods are very short, they cause the hearer to stumble frequently. For the mind of the hearer being impelled farther to the end which he had proposed to himself, stumbles as it were, when the orator stops short. But prolix periods cause the auditors to be left by the orator; just as those who in walking pass beyond the boundaries of their walk; for they leave their companions behind. In a similar manner, periods which are long, become themselves an oration, and resemble diffuse diction. Whence that jest of Democritus the Chian upon Melanippides, who dilatated in his writings instead of making antistrophes. “This man frames evil for himself in framing evil for another. But to dilate much is the worst of evils to him who does it.” For a thing of this kind may be aptly said, to those who use long colons. Very short colons, however, do not become periods. These, therefore, hurry away the

¹ The sense here apparently is, that Calydon is the soil or land over which Pelops formerly reigned, and therefore pertains to Peloponnesus, though it does not, but to Aetolia. The sense, therefore, is abrupt and mutilated.

auditor

auditor with them precipitately. But of periodic diction which consists of many colons or members, one kind is distinct, and the other opposite. And the distinct, indeed, is such as [the beginning of the Panegyric of Isocrates;] "I have often admired those who collected public assemblies, and instituted the Gymnastic contests." But the opposite is that which consists of many colons, and in which either the same thing is composed with contraries, or contraries are composed with contraries; as, [in the Panegyric of Isocrates,] "The Athenians benefitted both those that remained at home, and those that followed; for they acquired more for those that followed them, than they possessed at home; and they left sufficient for the support of those that stayed behind." Here the contraries are *staying* and *following*, *sufficient* and *more*. [And again in the same oration,] "So that to those who were in want of money, and to those who were willing to enjoy it, &c." Here *enjoyment* is opposed to acquisition. Farther still, "It frequently happens in these things, that prudent men are unfortunate, and the imprudent are prosperous." And "Immediately, indeed, they obtained the rewards of brave men, and not long after they became masters of the sea." Another example is, "He sailed indeed through the continent, but walked through the sea.—He joined the Hellespont, but dug through mount Athos." And, "Being citizens by nature, but by law deprived of a city. For some of them, indeed, perished miserably, but others were shamefully preserved." And, "Privately, indeed, they used Barbarian servants, but publicly overlooked many of their allies that were in slavery." And, "To have them when living, or leave them when dead¹." Or what a certain person said against Pitholaus and Lycophron in a court of justice, "They sold you, indeed, when they were at home; but when they came to us they were themselves bought." For all these instances, make the above-mentioned periodic opposite diction. Diction, however, of this kind is pleasing, because contraries are most known, and when placed by each other are more known; and also because they resemble a syllo-

¹ All the above examples are taken from the Panegyric of Isocrates.

gism.

gism. For an elenchus [or syllogism of contradiction,] is a collection of opposites. A thing, therefore, of this kind is antithesis.

But *adequation* takes place when the colons or members are equal; [as, "The father died in battle, the son was married at home."]

And *assimilation* is, when both the colons have similar extremes. But it is necessary that they should have similar extremes, either in the beginning or the end. And the beginning indeed has always [similar] nouns; but the end has the last syllables similar, or cases of the same noun, or the same noun. In the beginning indeed, the similar extremes are such as in the following instances. "He received *land* from him, but it was *uncultivated land*." And

Appeas'd with gifts, and mollify'd with words¹:

But the similar extremes in the end are, "They did not think that he had brought forth a boy, but that he was the cause of his birth." "In great cares, and in little hopes." Cases of the same noun, are such as, "But he deserves to have a brazen statue, though he is not worthy of brass, [i. e. of a brazen coin²]." And an instance of the repetition of the same noun is, "You while he was living defamed him, and now he is dead write ill of him." But an instance when there is a similitude alone in the last syllable is, "What evil have you suffered, if you have seen an indolent man³?" A period also may have all these at once, so as not only

¹ This instance is from the 9th book of the *Iliad*, and is what Phoenix says to Achilles.

² This is said of a most abject man.

³ The instances adduced by Aristotle are obvious in Greek or Latin, but not in English: Thus the first instance, "He received land from him, but it was uncultivated land," is in Latin, "*Agrum* accepit quodammodo *ægrum*, hoc est sterilem. And, "They did not think that he had brought forth a boy, but that he was the cause of his birth," is in Latin, "Non puerum peperisse, sed ejus causam extitisse," in which instance the last syllables are similar. Another instance is, when the colons end in cases derived from the same noun; as, "He deserves to have a brazen statue, though he is not worthy of brass," i. e. "Est profecto dignus *ænea* statua, qui non est dignus *ære*." The fourth instance is, when the same word is repeated as, "You while he was living defamed him, and now he is dead write ill of him," i. e. "Tu cum viveret dicebas

only to consist of opposite, but also of equal, and similarly ending colons. The beginnings, however, of periods are nearly [all of them] enumerated in our Theodectean Rhetoric. There are likewise false oppositions, such as Epicharmus made, "Then I was one of them, then I was with them."

CHAPTER X.

THESE things, therefore, being discussed, let us now show whence polite and the most approved diction is derived. To speak politely, therefore, is the province of an ingenious man, or of one who is exercised [in elocution.] But to show [the sources] from whence polite diction is derived belongs to this method, [i. e. to rhetoric.] We shall, therefore, unfold and enumerate what they are.

Let the beginning, therefore, be this: to learn easily is naturally delightful to all men; but names signify something. Hence such names as cause us to learn, are most pleasing. Foreign tongues, therefore, are unknown; but proper words we know. Metaphor, however, especially causes diction to be polite. For when the poet¹ says that "Old age is stubble," he produces in us learning and knowledge through the genus, [i. e. through the agreement of old age and stubble;] since both produce a defloration. The images, therefore, of poets

dicebas male, et nunc in eum scribis male." And the fifth instance is, when the similitude is only in the last syllable as, "What evil have you suffered, if you have seen an indolent man?" i. e. "Quodnam passus es malum, si hominem vidisti ignavum?"

¹ Odyss lib. 13.

produce indeed the same thing; and hence, if they are well employed, the diction will appear to be polite. For an image, as we have before observed, is a metaphor, differing from it in the collocation; on which account it is less pleasing because it is a longer [simile;] and it does not say this thing is that. Hence in a metaphor the mind does not investigate the similitude; [i. e. its attention is not diverted from the object to which it is directed.] That diction, therefore, and those enthymemes must necessarily be polite, which cause us to learn or produce in us knowledge rapidly.

Hence, neither are superficial enthymemes approved; (for we call those enthymemes superficial, which are manifest to every one, and which require no investigation) nor such as when produced, are not understood; but those only render the diction polite, which are understood as soon as they are uttered, though there was no previous knowledge of them, or which shortly after lead us to the knowledge of something, of which we were ignorant. For by the latter enthymemes discipline is as it were produced, but by no means by the former. Enthymemes, therefore, of this kind are approved, from the sense or meaning of the diction.

Urbanity, however, is produced in the figure or form of the diction, if contraries are opposed to contraries, as [in the Oration of Isocrates de Pace,] “And they thought that the *peace* which is common to the other Greeks, was *war* to their own private affairs.” For here war is opposed to peace.

Urbanity also is produced in names or words, if they are metaphorical; and the metaphor is neither foreign; for this is difficult to understand; nor superficial; for this does not affect the hearer. Farther still, urbanity in diction is produced, if the thing itself is placed before the eyes; for it is more necessary to see what has been, than what will be done. It is requisite, therefore, to pay attention to these three things, viz. metaphor, antithesis, and energy.

As, however, there are four kinds of metaphors, those are most approved which subsist according to analogy; as when Pericles said, “That youth perishing in battle was taken away from the city, just as if

if some one should take away the spring from the year." And as Leptines said of the Lacedæmonians, "That the Athenians should not suffer Greece to be deprived of its other eye." Thus too Cephisodotus, when Chares was anxious to give an account of the Olynthiac war, said indignantly, "That while he endeavoured to give the people an account of his conduct, he kept them in a furnace." And the same person once exhorting the Athenians to forage in Eubœa, said, "It was necessary that the decree of Miltiades should proceed [to the Euboic expedition.] And Iphicrates, when the Athenians had made a league with Epidaurus, and the sea coast, said indignantly, "That they had deprived themselves of the viatica of war." And Pitholaus, called the Athenian ship which was denominated *Paralus*, the club (ropalon) of the people. He also called Sestus¹, the granary of the *Pyræum*. Pericles, likewise exhorted the Athenians to destroy Ogina, as the oppthalmy of the *Piræum*. And Merocles, naming a certain worthy person said, "That he was in no respect more depraved than this person, for with respect to him, he had taken three per cent interest, but that he himself had taken ten per cent²." And the iambic of Anaxandrides upon his daughters that were a long time before they married. "The virgins have passed beyond the appointed day of wedlock³." To these may be added; what Polyæuctus said on one Speusippus who was [a restless man and] apoplectic, "That he could not be quiet, though he was bound by fortune in the Pentasyringian⁴ disease."

¹ This was a town of the Hellespont, from which every year the Athenians brought a great quantity of corn into the *Pyræum*.

² In order to understand this example, it is requisite to observe, that the word *τακος* employed here by Aristotle signifies both *usury* and a *son*. The meaning, therefore, of the passage is, that Merocles who had ten sons and was accused as a depraved usurer because he had taken ten per cent annually for the education of his ten sons, named a certain worthy man who had three sons, and took three per cent annually for their education.

³ This metaphor is taken from a term of law relative to a court of justice, i. e. *intra diem judicii non stetit*.

⁴ The *Pentasyringus* was an instrument in which there were five holes, and in which the head, arms and feet of defendants were so fixed, that they could not by any means move themselves.

disease." Cephisodotus likewise called *three-banked galleys, various baking-houses*¹. But the dog [i. e. Diogenes] called *taverns, the Attic Phiditia*². And Asion said, "That the Athenians had *poured forth* their city into Sicily;" for this is a metaphor, and places the thing before the eyes. Asion adds, ["That the Athenians had so poured forth their city into Sicily,] that Greece vociferated." For this also is after a manner a metaphor, and places the thing before the eyes. Cephisodotus also exhorted the Athenians to beware "That they did not make their assemblies hostile congresses." And Isocrates said, "[That the sophists addressed themselves] to those who *run together* in the public assemblies." And as in the funeral oration [of Lysias,] "It was but just that Greece should cut off her hair on the tomb of those who died at Salamis because her liberty was buried with their virtue." For if he had said, "That it was but just Greece should weep, in consequence of virtue being buried [with those who died at Salamis]" it would have been [only] a metaphor, and the thing would have been placed before the eyes. But the words "liberty was buried with virtue," have a certain antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, "The path of my oration is through the midst of the transactions of Chares." For this is a metaphor according to analogy; and the words, "through the midst," places the thing before our eyes. And to say, "To call on dangers to give assistance to dangers," is to place the thing before the eyes, and is a metaphor. Another instance is that of Lycoleon in defence of Chabrias, "Neither will you revere his suppliant brazen statue?" For this is a metaphor in the present time, but not always, and places the thing before the eyes. For he being in danger, the statue supplicates for him; and supplication is attributed to an *inanimate* statue, which is the property of an *animated* thing. And, "A *monument* of the works of the city." And, "They meditated by every possible way to have

Because, therefore, apoplexy renders a man immoveable, Polyæctus called Speusippus *pentesyringus*.

¹ Because as baking-houses supplied the city with bread, so the three-banked galleys supplied it with corn.

² The *Phiditia* were the banquets or suppers of the Lacedæmonians.

groveling

groveling conceptions'." For to meditate is to increase something. And again, "That god enkindled the light of intellect in the soul." For both [light and intellect] accord in illuminating. And, "For we do not dissolve war, but defer it²." For both *deferring* and *a peace of this kind* signify something future. And to say, "That the compacts of peace are a trophy much more beautiful than those which are procured in war. For the latter are obtained for things of small consequence, and through one fortune; but the former, for every battle³." For both [a trophy and a compact] are indications of victory. And "That cities through the censure of men suffer great punishment⁴." For punishment is a certain just injury. And thus we have shown how polite diction may be derived from metaphor according to the analogous and from placing a thing before the eyes.

CHAPTER XI.

LET us now show what we mean by placing a thing before the eyes, and what is to be done in order to effect this. I say then, that those words place a thing before the eyes which signify things energizing.

¹ This instance is taken from Isocrates in Panegyric concerning the abject manners of the Persians.

² This also is from the Panegyric of Isocrates, where he speaks of the Greeks of his time who made a peace which was neither firm, nor lasting.

³ This also is from the same oration of Isocrates.

⁴ The analogy here consists in this, that as those who violate the laws suffer a detriment in money, through fine, thus cities when they are badly conducted, suffer through censure a detriment in honour.

Thus

Thus for instance to say "That a good man is a square" is metaphorical; for both a good man and a square are perfect; but it does not signify energy. But to say, "Possessing a flourishing acme" signifies energy. Likewise to say, "But you as liberated," indicates energy. And,

"Then with impetuous feet forth rush'd the Greeks¹."

Here the word *impetuous* is energy, and a metaphor². Thus too energy is every where exhibited by Homer, who speaks of inanimate things as animated, through a metaphor. But to produce energy in every thing [as he does] is very much applauded; as in the following instances,

"Back on the ground then roll'd the shameless stone³."

And,

"The arrow flew⁴."

And,

"Longing to strike⁵."

And,

"Trojan and Grecian darts in earth then stood,
And long'd to gorge themselves with human blood⁶."

And,

"The furious pointed dart then pierc'd his breast⁷."

For in all these instances, because the things are animated, they appear to energize. For to be *shameless* and *furious*, &c. are energies.

¹ Both this and the instance that follows it are taken from Isocrates.

² From the Iphigenia of Euripides.

³ Because it is taken from the energy employed by runners in the act of running.

⁴ From Odys. 11, where the labour of Sisyphus is described.

⁵ From Iliad, 13.

⁶ This is from the same place as the above, in which Homer attributes to an arrow the vital energy of desiring.

⁷ Iliad, 15.

⁸ From the 15th Iliad where Homer speaking of a dart hurled by Menelaus, ascribes to it fury.

But

But Homer has added these through metaphor from analogy. For as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is an impudent person to him whom he impudently torments. Homer, likewise, in his celebrated images attributes to inanimate things the proper energies of such as are animated, as,

“Th’ afflicted deeps tumultuous mix and roar ;
The waves behind impel the waves before,
Wide-rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the shore¹.”

For he makes every thing moving and living; but energy is imitation. Metaphors, however, ought to be derived, as we have before observed, from things familiar and not obvious; just as in philosophy, it is the province of a sagacious man to survey the similar in things very different from each other, as Archytas says, “That an *arbiter* and an *altar* are the same thing; for he who is injured flies to both these.” Or if some one should say “That an *anchor* and *cremastra* are the same thing².” For both perform an office which is in a certain respect the same; but they differ in this, that the one is fixed above, and the other beneath. To say also that cities are anomalous [is another instance of an appropriate metaphor taken from things very dissimilar.] For as a superficies is said to be anomalous because one part rises above another, so a city may be said to be anomalous when some of the citizens in it surpass others in power.

Polite diction, however, is for the most part effected through metaphor and previous deception. For the diction which not only causes us to learn something of which we were before ignorant, but also something about which we had been before deceived, is more polite and pleasant, since the mind passing from error to truth is delighted, and says to itself, “How true is this which I have learnt? I was in an error.” Of apothegms, likewise, those are polite, which imply something different from what the words at first seem to signify; as that

¹ *Iliad*, 13, The translation by Pope.

² A *cremastra* was a hook fixed in the ceiling of a house so that things might be suspended from it, and it resembled an anchor,

apothegm

apothegm of Stesichorus, "That the grasshoppers would sing to them on the ground¹." Good enigmas, also, are for the same reason pleasing; for they cause us to learn something, and are metaphorical. And as Theodorus says, "It is pleasing to say something new." But this is effected, when what is said is paradoxical, and (as he says) is not conformable to prior opinion; but as in ridiculous assertions is slightly transformed. This likewise is capable of being effected by jests, in which the letters of the words are somewhat changed; for these [pleasantly] deceive the hearer. And also in verse; for something is said different from what the hearer expected.

"He walk'd along, with *chilblains* (*χιμειλα*) on his feet." But the hearer expected it would have been said that he had *sandals* (*πιδιλα*) on his feet. This kind of jest, however, ought to be immediately manifest. Paragrams, or jests formed by the mutation of letters are produced, when that is not signified which the word at first sight seemed to signify, as that jest of Theodorus upon Nikon the harper. For [Nikon having been vexed by a certain person,] Theodorus deriding him said *θραττει σε*, which appears as if he had said, "*He disturbs you,*" *θραττει σε*, and deceives the hearer. For in reality he said, "*He makes you a Thracian*."² Hence, this is pleasing to him who learns [the true meaning of what is said.] For unless the hearer apprehended that Nikon was a Thracian, the jest would not appear to be polite. Thus, also, to say *Βουλει αυτον περσαι*, seems at the first view to signify "Are you willing to vex him?" [But the true meaning is, "are you willing to make him a favourer of the Persians, and a betrayer of the Greeks?"]

It is requisite, however, that each sense of the ambiguous word should be adapted to him of whom it is said. Another example is such as the following: The *arche* of the sea was not to the Athenians

¹ This was said by Stesichorus of the Locrians, and signified that their country would be so desolate, that no tree would remain, on which the grasshoppers could ascend, so that they would be forced to sing on the ground.

² By this he wittily insinuated that the mother of Nikon was a Thracian servant.

the

the *arche* of evils; for they derived advantage from it¹." And as Isocrates says, "The *arche* of the sea was to the city [i. e. to the Athenians] the *arche* of evils." For in both these instances the real meaning is different from what at the first view it appears to be, and the hearer knows that what is asserted is true. For to say "that *arche* was *arche*, is to say nothing to the purpose; but this is not what is said in the above instances; nor is that denied which is asserted, but the word has another meaning. In all these instances, however, if the word is appropriately employed, whether it be an homonymous word, or a metaphor, then the diction is proper. As if [the name of some one were Anaschetus (*ανασχετος*)] and it should be said that *Anaschetus* is not *anaschetus*, [i. e. *importunate*]; for he who says this denies the homonymous signification of the word. And this is appropriately effected, if the word is always used twice. Again, "O *hospes* [i. e. guest] you will not become more *hospes* than is requisite." And, it is not necessary that *hopes* should always be *hopes*." For this also is foreign. The same thing also is effected in the celebrated saying of Anaxandrides. "It is a beautiful thing to die, prior to having done any thing deserving of death." For this is the same thing as to say, "It is worth while to die, when not deserving to die." Or, "It is worth while to die, when not deserving of death, or not doing things worthy of death." The form of diction, therefore, is the same in these instances; but in proportion as they are shorter, and contain a greater opposition, in such proportion they are more elegant and pleasing. The cause, however, of this is, that we in a greater degree learn something from opposition; and that this is more rapidly effected by brevity. But it is always necessary that the person should be present on whom the thing is said, or that it should be rightly said, if the assertion is true, and not superficial; for these two things may exist separately. Thus for instance, to say, "It is necessary to die free from all faults;" and "It is requisite that a worthy man should marry a worthy woman," [is true,] but is not politely said. But to say, "It

¹ For the word *αρχη* *arche* signifies both *dominion* and *the beginning*.

is worth while to die, when not deserving to die," is both true, and politely said. The diction, also, will appear to be more polite, the more it contains of those things from which politeness is derived; as, if the words are metaphorical, and metaphors of such a kind, and if there is antithesis, adequation and energy.

Images, likewise, as we have before observed, are always after a manner approved metaphors; for they are always derived from two things, in the same manner as an analogous metaphor. Thus we say that *a shield is the cup of Mars*, and that *a bow is a stringless harp*. When we thus speak, however, the assertion is not simple. But to say that *a bow is a harp*, or *a shield a cup*, is a simple assertion. They assimilate, however, as follows: as, a player on the flute to an ape¹; and a short-sighted man to a trickling lamp; for in both there is a contraction. But images are celebrated when they contain a metaphor. For it is to assimilate to say that *a shield is the cup of Mars*; that *a ruinous building is a worn out garment*; and that *Niceratus*, according to the assimilation of Thrasy-machus, *was Philoctetes bit by* [the poet] *Pratys*. For Thrasy-machus said this, in consequence of seeing Niceratus vanquished by Pratys in a poetical contest, and through this neglecting his person. In these similitudes, however, poets fail unless they are proper, even if they are celebrated. I mean for instance, when they say,

" He carries legs like parsley bent."

And,

" As Philammon with Corycus² yok'd
In contest."

¹ For apes sit in a contracted posture with their hands on their mouth; and players on the flute, while they inflate it, seem to imitate apes.

² Philammon and Corycus were two athletæ, neither of which was easily vanquished by the other. The similitude, however, is unapt through which two athletæ contending with each other with equal powers are compared to two oxen drawing the same yoke. In the Oxford edition it is τῷ κορυμῷ instead of τῷ Κορυμῷ, as if Philammon was yoked in contest with a *kind of ball*, instead of being yoked with *Corycus*.

And

And all such things are images. But that images are metaphors has been frequently observed by us.

Proverbs likewise are metaphors from species to species, [i. e. in which one species is predicated of another on account of agreement in the same genus.] Thus of him who expects to derive advantage from a certain thing, if he should afterwards suffer a loss from it, it is said, *as the Carpathian the hare*¹. For both suffered the evil we have mentioned. And thus we have nearly assigned the cause whence and why diction is polite.

Celebrated hyperboles also are metaphors; as of one who had contusions on his face, "You would have thought him to be a basket of mulberries;" for the part under the eyes is red; but this hyperbole is much too great. An hyperbole, however, may differ from an hyperbole in the diction; as, instead of saying Philammon yoked in contest with Corycus, it might be said, "You would have thought it was Philammon fighting with Corycus." And instead of saying, "He carried legs as distorted as parsley," it might be said, "I should have thought that he had not legs but parsley, they are so distorted." Hyperboles, however, are puerile; for they indicate a vehement [motion of the soul.] Hence, they are especially used by those who are angry. [Thus Achilles, in Iliad 9, speaks hyperbolically, when he says he is not to be appeased by the gifts of Agamemnon,]

"Tho' bribes were heap'd on bribes in number more,
Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore."

And,

"Atrides' daughter never shall be led,
An ill match'd consort to Achilles' bed;
Like golden Venus though she charm'd the heart,
Or vied with Pallas in the works of art."

¹ We are informed by Pollux (lib. 1) that once there were no hares in the island Carpathus, and that the Carpathians finding that animal was very good food, brought a male and female hare into their island. Because, however, hares are very prolific, they multiplied so exceedingly in a short time, as to destroy all the fruits of the land to the great detriment of the Carpathians. Hence, it came to be said proverbially of all those who suffered a loss from any thing from which they expected to derive advantage, *As the Carpathian the hare*.

The Attic rhetoricians, also, especially use hyperboles; on which account it is unbecoming in an old man to speak hyperbolically.

CHAPTER XII.

It is however requisite not to be ignorant that a different diction is adapted to each genus of orations. For *graphic* and *agonistic* diction; [i. e. the diction employed in *writing* and *at the bar*] are not the same; nor forensic, and that which is employed in popular harangues.

But it is necessary to know both these kinds of diction. For to know the one is to know how to speak properly; and by a knowledge of the other, we are not compelled to be silent, when we wish to impart something to others, which those suffer who do not know how to write. But graphic diction, or the diction pertaining to writing, is indeed most accurate; but the agonistic, or that which belongs to the bar is most adapted to action. Of this latter, however, there are two species; one ethical; but the other pathetic. Hence, also, players chuse dramas of this kind, and poets chuse such like players [to act their fables.] Those poets, likewise, are most approved, whose fables delight, not only when acted, but also when read; such as those of Chæremon, whose diction is as accurate as that of any writer of orations; and among the dithyrambic poets, those of Licymnicus. When orations also are compared with each other, those which are written, will appear when recited in forensic contests to be jejune. On the other hand, those orations which when publicly delivered, are heard with applause, if they are perused when written, will appear to be unpolished and inaccurate; the reason of which is that they are [merely]

[merely] adapted to forensic contests. Hence, those which are adapted to action, when deprived of action, in consequence of not accomplishing their proper work appear to be jejune. Thus for instance, disjointed sentences, and frequent repetition, are rightly rejected in the diction pertaining to writing; but rhetoricians use these in the diction which belongs to the bar; for both these are adapted to action. This repetition, however, ought to be delivered with a change of the voice; which as it were prepares the way for action; as, "He it is who robbed you; he it is who deceived you; he it is who at last endeavoured to betray you;" as Philemon the player also did, whilst he acted in the *Gerontomaria* of Anaxandrides, when Rhadamanthus and Palamedes speak; and also in the prologue of the play called *the Pious*, where I is frequently repeated. For if such repetitions are not accompanied with action, the actor, [according to the proverb,] will seem to carry a beam. The like also must be observed with respect to disjointed sentences; such as, *I came, I met him, I requested him*. For it is necessary that these should be accompanied with action, and not, as if only one thing was said, pronounced with the same manner, and the same tone of voice. Farther still, disjointed diction, possesses something peculiar; since in an equal time, many things appear to be said. For the conjunction [or connective copula] causes many things to be one; so that if it is taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one thing will be many. Hence, he amplifies who says, "I came, I spoke to him, I supplicated him much; but he seems to despise whatever I have said, whatever I do say." Homer also intends to do this, when speaking of Nireus [in the 2d book of the *Iliad*,] he says,

" Three ships with Nireus sought the Trojan shore,
Nireus, whom Aglæe to Charopus bore,
Nireus, in faultless shape and blooming grace,
The loveliest youth of all the Grecian race."

For he of whom many things are said, must necessarily be frequently mentioned. If, therefore, he is frequently mentioned, many things
also

also appear to be said of him. Hence, Homer though he has only mentioned Nireus in one place, amplifies from paralogism¹, and mentions him here, though he did not intend to mention him in any other place afterwards.

The diction therefore adapted to popular harangues perfectly resembles *sciagraphy*²; for the greater the number of the spectators, the more remotely is such a picture to be seen. Hence, in both accuracy is superfluous, and both become worse through it. But judicial diction is more accurate; and it is requisite that the diction should be still more accurate, which is addressed to one judge; for this is the least thing in rhetorical diction. For that which is appropriate to, and that which is foreign from a thing, are more easily perceived. In this case, also, contention is absent; so that the judgement is pure. Hence, the same rhetoricians are not celebrated in all these kinds of diction; but where action is especially necessary, there accuracy is in the smallest degree requisite. And where voice, and especially a loud one is required, there action is necessary.

Demonstrative diction, therefore, is most proper for writing; for demonstrative orations are composed in order that they may be read. But judicial diction is the next in order. It is however superfluous to divide diction into the pleasing and magnificent. For why may it not as well be divided into the temperate and liberal, or into any other ethical virtues. For it is evident that the particulars already mentioned will render it pleasing, if the virtue of diction has been rightly defined by us. For why ought it to be perspicuous, and not abject, but decorous; since it will not be perspicuous either if it be verbose,

¹ Homer by thrice repeating the name of Nireus, causes us to think that much will be said of him in the Iliad, and therefore by this repetition, though he no where else mentions him in the whole Iliad, yet he so impresses the name and renown of Nireus on the memory of the reader, as if much would be said of him.

² *Sciagraphy* was by the Greeks denominated a picture, which is only adumbrated and not coloured. Pictures of this kind, when seen at a great distance, seem to be perfected, but if inspected when near, they then appear to be only, what they are in reality, adumbrated.

or

or concise ; but it is evident that the medium between these is appropriate. The particulars, also, before-mentioned, render diction pleasing, if usual and foreign words are well mingled together, and likewise rythm, and that which is calculated to persuade from the decorous. And thus much concerning diction, as well in common about every, as in particular about each genus.

CHAPTER XIII.

It now remains that we should speak concerning the order of diction. But there are two parts of an oration ; for it is necessary to speak of the thing which is the subject of discussion, and then to demonstrate. Hence, it is impossible for him who narrates a thing not to demonstrate, or that he should demonstrate, without previous narration. For he who demonstrates, demonstrates something, and he who propounds, propounds for the sake of demonstrating. Of these [necessary parts] of an oration, however, the one is the proposition, but the other the confirmation ; in the same manner as in the sciences, one thing is a problem, but another a demonstration. But the division which rhetoricians now make is ridiculous. For narration belongs to a forensic oration. But in the demonstrative and deliberate genus, how can there be a narration such as they say there is, or those things which are urged against the opponent ? Or how can there be a peroration of things demonstrative ? The proem, however, the comparison, and the repetition, then take place in orations to the people, when there is
altercation ;

altercation; (for in these there is frequently accusation and defence;) but not so far as there is consultation in these. But neither does peroration belong to every forensic oration; for it is not requisite, when the oration is short, or the thing can easily be remembered; since this peroration it would happen that something would be taken away from the length of such an oration. The necessary parts of an oration, therefore, are proposition and proof.

And these, indeed, are proper or peculiar parts. But the most numerous parts of an oration are, the proem, the proposition, proof, and peroration. For what is said against the opponent, pertains to proof; and the comparison is an amplification of our arguments, so that it is a certain part of the proof; for he demonstrates something who does this. Neither the proem, however, nor the peroration is a part of the proof, but each is subservient to recollection. If, therefore, any one makes a division of things of this kind, like the followers of Theodorus, narration, pre-narration, supernarration, confutation and superconfutation, will be different from each other. It is necessary, however, that he who speaks of a certain species and difference of a thing, should give a name to it; for, if not, it will become vain and nugatory. And this fault of needlessly introducing new names was committed by Lycimnius in his Art of Rhetoric, when he speaks of irruption, aberration, and ramification.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE proem, therefore, is the beginning of an oration; which in [dramatic] poetry is the prologue; and in playing on the pipe the prelude. For all these are principles or beginnings, and as it were preparatory to what follows. And the prelude, indeed, is similar to the proem of the demonstrative kind of orations. For as those that play on the pipe connect the prelude with the beginning of the song; thus, also, in demonstrative orations, immediately after the orator has mentioned what he wishes to say, it is necessary to collect aptly with it what is to follow; of which all rhetoricians adduce as an example, the proem of Isocrates in his oration in praise of Helen. For Isocrates begins his encomium with blaming the sophists, which has nothing in common with the praise of Helen; and yet because he has aptly conjoined it with the argument he has obtained praise. But the proems of demonstrative orations are derived from praise or blame; as in the proem of Gorgias to his Olympiac oration, "O Greeks, this is a thing worthy of general admiration." For he praises those who instituted the public spectacles. Isocrates on the contrary blames them, "Because they honoured indeed with gifts the virtues of the body; but appointed no reward for wise men." The proems also of demonstrative orations are derived from counsel and advice, such for instance as, "That it is requisite to honour good men; on which account he [the orator] has undertaken to praise Aristides." Or [as he who wrote an oration in praise of Paris;] for he says "That it is neither requisite to praise those who are celebrated, nor those who are of no account, but those

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those who are good, and at the same time obscure men, such as was Paris the son of Priam." For he [who thus begins his oration] is one that gives counsel. Farther still, the proems of demonstrative orations are derived from forensic proems; but this is from things pertaining to the hearer, if the oration is concerning something paradoxical, or difficult, or much celebrated, so as to require pardon from the auditors; such for instance as the proem of Chærilus, "But now since all things are divulged." The proems, therefore, of demonstrative orations are derived from these things; viz. from praise and blame; from exhortation and dissuasion, and from those things which are referred to the hearer. It is necessary, however, that the proems should either be foreign, or appropriate to the oration.

With respect to proems of the forensic kind, it is necessary to assume, that they are able to effect the same thing as the prologues of dramatic, and the proems of epic poems. For dithyrambic proems are similar to those of the demonstrative kind; as, "On account of thee, and thy gifts or spoils." But in dramatic and epic poems, the proems are a specimen of what is to follow, that the reader may foresee what the subject of them is, and that his mind may not be kept in suspense. For that which is indefinite causes the mind to wander. The poet, therefore, who delivers into the hands of the reader the beginning of his poem, makes him follow with attention the rest of it. Hence, Homer,

"The *wrath* of Peleus' son O goddess sing."

And,

"The *man* for wisdom's various arts renown'd,
Long exercis'd in woes, O Muse resound."

And another poet,

Again O Muse inspire my verse and sing
How from the Asian land, a mighty war
Spread over Europe.

Tragic poets also indicate respecting the drama, though not immediately,

diately, as Euripides does, yet they indicate what it is in the prologue, as Sophocles [in the Oedipus,]

“ Polybius was my father.”

And after the same manner Comic poets. The most necessary and proper office, therefore, of a proem is this, to unfold the end for the sake of which the oration was composed ; on which account, if the end is manifest, and the subject matter is trifling, the proem must be omitted. Other species of proems, however, which are used by orators, are remedies, and things of a common nature. And these are derived from the speaker and the hearer, from the subject matter, and from the opponent. From the orator, therefore, and the opponent, those proems are derived which pertain to the dissolving or making an accusation. But these must not be similarly employed [by the plaintiff and defendant.] For by the defendant, what pertains to accusation must be introduced in the beginning, but by the plaintiff at the end of the oration. But for what reason, it is not immanifest. For it is necessary that the defendant when he is about to introduce himself should remove all impediments, so that he must dissolve the accusation at the beginning of his speech ; but the opponent should be criminated by the plaintiff at the end, in order that the hearers may remember the better. What, however, pertains to the auditor consists in rendering him benevolent to the orator, and enraged with the opponent. Sometimes, also, it is advantageous to the cause, that the auditor should be attentive, and sometimes that he should not ; for it is not always beneficial to render him attentive. Hence, many orators endeavour to excite laughter in their hearers. A summary account of a thing also contributes to celerity of apprehension ; and this is likewise effected by the orator appearing to be a worthy man. For the audience are more attentive to men of this description. But they are attentive to great things, to things pertaining to themselves, to admirable, and to delightful things. Hence, it is necessary to inform the audience that the oration will be concerning things of this kind. On the contrary, if

the orator wishes the audience not to be attentive to the cause, he must say that the subject matter is a thing of small consequence, that it does not pertain to them, and that it is a troublesome affair. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant that all such things are foreign to the oration ; for they pertain to a depraved hearer, and to one who attends to what is foreign to the purpose. For if he were not a person of this description, there would be no occasion for a proem, except so far as it is requisite to give a summary account of the affair, in order that the oration as a body, may have a head. Farther still, to render the audience attentive if it should be requisite, is common to all the parts of an oration ; because universally the audience are less attentive to what is said in the progress, than in the beginning of the oration. Hence it is ridiculous to endeavour to procure attention in the beginning of the oration, because then all the hearers are especially attentive. Hence, attention is to be procured, wherever occasion offers ; [by saying for instance] " Give me your attention ; for this business is not more mine than yours." And, " I will relate to you a transaction of such a nature, that you have never heard of any thing so dreadful, or so admirable." But this is, as Prodicus says, when the audience are drowsy, to promise to say something to them from his demonstration, estimated at fifty drachms¹. It is evident, however, that the proem is referred to the auditor, not so far as he is an auditor ; for all orators in the proems either criminate, or dissolve fear ; as [from the Antigone of Sophocles,] " I will tell O king, though it was not my intention to have come hither as a messenger." And [from the Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides,] " Why do you preface ?" A proem also is necessary when the cause is bad, or appears to be bad ; for in this case it is better to discuss any thing else, than to dwell upon the cause. Hence, servants do not [directly] reply to the question they are asked, but their answer is circuitous and prefatory. But we have shown whence it is requisite to render the audience benevolent, and have explained every thing else of

¹ Prodicus boasted that he had a demonstration which would render those who used it victorious in all causes, and he was accustomed to teach it for fifty drachms.

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this kind. Since, however, it is well said [by Ulysses to Minerva, in *Odyss.* 14,] "Give me as a friend, and a man to be pitied, to reach Phœacia's land," it is necessary to pay attention to these two things¹. But in proems of the demonstrative kind, it is necessary to make the auditor fancy, that either himself, or his race, or his pursuits, or something else belonging to him, is praised together with the person who is the subject of the oration. For what Socrates says in the *Menexemus* of Plato, is true, "That it is not difficult to praise the Athenians among the Athenians, but among the Lacedæmonians." But the proems of popular orations are derived from those of the forensic kind; for these have not naturally any themselves; since the audience are well acquainted with the subject. And the thing itself is not in want of any proem, but a proem is here requisite either on account of the orator, or the opponents, or if the audience should not think the affair of just so much consequence as it is, but of greater or less consequence. Hence it is necessary either to criminate the opponent, or to dissolve the accusations against him, and either to amplify or diminish the affair. But for the sake of these things a proem is requisite. Or a proem is necessary for the sake of ornament; since without this the oration will appear to be carelessly composed. And such is the encomium of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without any previous extension and graceful movement of his arms [like the *Athletæ* before they engage,] he immediately begins, "Elis a happy city."

¹ viz. That the defendant may appear to be a good man, and to deserve commiseration.

CHAPTER XV.

WITH respect, however, to the dissolution of crimes objected by the opponent, one mode is derived from those things through which the ill opinion of the audience may be removed ; for it makes no difference whether this opinion arises from what is said, or not ; so that this mode is universal. Another mode consists in obviating such particulars as are dubious, either by showing that the thing which is the subject of doubt does not exist, or that it is not noxious, or that it is not noxious to this person, or that it is not so pernicious [as the opponent contends it to be,] or that it is not unjust, or that it is not greatly so, or that it is not disgraceful, or that it is a thing of small consequence. For things of this kind are the subjects of contention. And this mode was adopted by Iphicrates against Nausicrates. For he confessed that he did what he was accused by Nausicrates of having done, and that he did harm to the person, but did not act unjustly. Or he that has injured another, may say that he has made him a compensation ; so that if what he did was noxious, yet it was beautifully done ; if painful, yet it was beneficial ; or something else of the like kind may be said. Another mode consists in showing that the deed [which is objected to as a crime] was an error, or happened from misfortune, or from necessity. Thus Sophocles said, "That he trembled, not as his accuser said, that he might seem to be an old man, but from necessity ; for he was not willingly eighty years of age." An excuse also may be made by asserting that the deed was not done with a view to that end it is said to have been done by the opponent. Thus he who is accused of having injured another

another person may say, "That it was not his intention to injure him, but that the injury was accidental. And that it would be just to hate him, if the injury had been done by him voluntarily. Another mode consists in considering whether the opponent himself, or some of his kindred have now, or formerly, been involved in the crime which he objects to the defendant. Another mode consists in showing that those also are involved in the crime, whom the opponent confesses not to be obnoxious to the accusation; as if the opponent should confess, that this man though he is an adulterer is pure in his conduct, then this and this man also will be pure. Another mode consists in showing that if the opponent has accused others falsely before, it is probable that he now falsely accuses the defendant. Or if it is shown that those who are now accused, have been at another time falsely accused; for then it is probable that now also they are falsely accused. In order, likewise, to remove a bad opinion it may be said, that the same persons, who at another time have been suspected of a crime, though no one has accused them, have been found to be innocent. Another mode consists in reciprocally criminating the accuser; for if the accuser is unworthy of belief, it is absurd that his assertions should be credible. Another mode consists in showing that the present cause has been decided before; as Euripides does in the action against Hygiænonotes, which is called *antidosia*, who accused him as an impious person. For when he objected to Euripides, that in that verse of his,

"The tongue has sworn, but unsworn is the mind."

he persuaded men to perjure themselves, Euripides replied, "That his accuser acted unjustly, in bringing decisions into a court of justice, which had formerly been made in the contest pertaining to Bacchus; for in that tribunal, he had defended the verse, and would again defend it, if he was willing to accuse him in that place." Another mode consists in reprobating false accusations, and in showing how great an evil calumny is, and that it is also attended with the evil of producing other judicial processes.

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The place, however, which is derived from symbols is common to both [i. e. to him who accuses, and to the crimination.] Thus Ulysses [in the tragedy called *Teucer*,] “accuses *Teucer* [as the friend of the *Trojans*,] because he was allied to *Priam*.” For *Hesione* [the mother of *Teucer*,] was the sister of *Priam*. But *Teucer* replied, “That his father *Telamon* was an enemy to *Priam*; and that he (*Teucer*) did not discover to the *Trojans* the spies which the *Greeks* sent to *Troy*.” Another place pertains to the accuser, and consists in praising in a small degree, in order to blame afterwards more copiously; and if the opponent has performed any great deed, to mention it concisely; or having enumerated many of his good deeds, [which do not pertain to the cause,] to blame one of his actions, which does pertain to it. But accusers of this kind, are most artificial and unjust; for they endeavour to injure by good deeds, mingling them with one evil deed. It is common, however, to the accuser, and to him who dissolves the crime, since it is possible that the same thing may have been done for the sake of many things,—it is common to the accuser indeed, to represent the affair in the worst, but to him who dissolves the crime, to represent it in the best point of view. Thus it may be said, “That *Diomed* preferred *Ulysses* [as his associate in the night adventure in *Iliad*. 10,] because he thought *Ulysses* to be the best of the *Greeks*.” Or it may be said, “That he did not prefer him for this reason, but because he alone was not his antagonist, as being a man of no consequence.” And thus much concerning accusation.

CHAPTER XVI.

BUT narration in demonstrative orations, is not continued, but distinguished into parts. For it is necessary [in demonstrative orations] to enumerate those actions, from which the oration is composed. For an oration of this kind is composed, so as to be partly inartificial (since the orator is not the cause of any of the actions,) and partly artificial. This, however, consists in showing, either that the thing is, if it is incredible, or what the quality, or quantity of it is, or in exhibiting all these. On this account, sometimes it is not requisite to narrate every thing, because thus to demonstrate is adverse to facility of remembrance. [Thus for instance, it may be said,] "That from these things it appears that he is a brave man; but from those, a wise, or just man." And the one oration is more simple, [i. e. the oration in which every thing is narrated in a continued series without any confirmation and amplification;] but the other [in which there is confirmation and amplification,] is various and not elaborate. It is necessary, however, to call to mind things and persons known and celebrated; on which account the greater part of celebrated persons and things do not require narration; as if, for instance, you should be willing to praise Achilles; for all men are acquainted with his actions; but it is requisite to make use of these actions. But if you were willing to praise Critias, narration is necessary; for he is not known by many persons.

At present, however, rhetoricians ridiculously say that narration should be rapid; though what a certain person said in reply to a baker

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who asked, "whether he wished that he should make soft or hard bread," may be applied to these. For his answer was, "Is it not possible to make good bread, so that it may be neither hard nor soft, but of a moderate condition?" For it is requisite neither to make a long narration, as neither is it necessary to make a long exordium, nor to dwell on the credibility of what is narrated; since here also propriety consists neither in rapidity, nor conciseness, but in mediocrity. But this is effected by narrating such things as render the affair manifest; or such things as induce the audience to believe that the thing has been done, or that the person has been hurt, or the injury has been committed, or that the transactions were of that magnitude which the orator wishes the hearers to believe they were. Things, however, of a nature contrary to these are to be adduced by the opponent. The orator, likewise, should insert in his narration such things as pertain to his own virtue; such as, "But I always admonished him to act justly, and not to desert his children." Or he should insert in his narration such things as pertain to the depravity of another person; [as in the above instance.] "But he answered me, that wherever he was he should have other children," which Herodotus [in Euterpe] says, was the answer of the Egyptians, when they revolted from their king. Or he should insert such things as are pleasing to the judges. To the defendant, however, narration is less necessary; but the subjects of controversies are, whether a thing has been done or not, whether it is detrimental or not, whether it is unjust or not, and whether it is a thing of so much consequence or not. Hence, the defendant must not dwell upon a thing that is acknowledged, unless something is said in opposition to his statement of the affair. For then he must show, that admitting the thing to have been done, yet it was not unjust. Farther still, it is necessary to narrate things which have not been done, as if they had been done, if they are calculated to produce commiseration or indignation. Examples of this are, the fabulous narration of Ulysses to Alcinous, and again to Penelope, which is effected in thirty

* This is supposed to be said by an orator against some one who had deserted his children.

verses.

verses. Another example is that of Phayllus, [who contracted a very long poem which was called] the circle, and also the prologue of Euripides in his Oeneus. But it is necessary that the narration should be ethical; and this will be effected, if we know what produces manners. One thing, therefore, which produces them is, a manifestation of deliberate choice; and manners are good or bad from the quality which they possess. But deliberate choice is such as it is from the end. On this account mathematical discussions are not ethical, because they do not contain in themselves deliberate choice; for they have not that for the sake of which a thing is done [i. e. they do not consider the end;] but this is the business of Socratic discussions; for these consider things of this kind. The oration also expresses manners, which exhibits such things as are consequent to manners; such as, "That at the same time he said these things, he went away;" for this manifests audacity, and rusticity of manners. The oration likewise is rendered ethical by not speaking as if from a syllogistic process, like rhetoricians of the present day, but as if from deliberate intention; as, "I have wished," And, "For this was the object of my deliberate choice; since though I should desire no emolument from it, it is a better thing." For the one [i. e. to speak as if from a syllogistic process] is the province of a prudent man; but the other, [i. e. to speak from deliberate intention,] is the province of a good man. For it belongs to a prudent man to pursue what is beneficial, but to a good man to pursue what is beautiful in conduct. If, however, what you narrate is incredible, then the cause is to be explained; an example of which is from the Antigone of Sophocles, "That she was more anxiously concerned for her brother, than for her husband or children; for she might repair the loss of her husband and children [by marrying again;] but her mother and father having descended to Hades, she could never have another brother." But if you cannot assign the cause, you may say, "That you are not ignorant you relate what is incredible, but that you are naturally disposed not to admit any thing disgraceful." For mankind do not believe that any action is performed willingly, except it is advantageous. Again, that the narration may be ethical, it is requisite that it should be pathetic; and

and this is effected by relating such things as are consequent to the passions, which are known to the audience, and which particularly relate either to the orator, or his opponent; as, "But he departed looking after me;" and as Aeschines says of Cratylus, "That he hissed, and clapped with his hands." For these things are adapted to persuade; because these things which the audience know, are symbols of what they do not know¹. Many things also of this kind may be assumed from Homer; as [in *Odyss.* 19.]

"Then o'er her face the beldam spread her hands."

For those who begin to weep, cover their eyes with their hands. In the beginning of the oration, likewise, you should introduce yourself as a worthy, [and your opponent as an unworthy] man that the audience may survey you and your opponent as such. But this should be done latently. And that this may be easily accomplished may be seen from those who announce any thing to us; for concerning things of which we know nothing, we at the same time form a certain opinion [of their truth or falsehood.] In many places, however, it is necessary to narrate, and sometimes not in the beginning of the oration.

But in a popular oration, there is no need of narration, because no one makes a narration of future events. If, however, there should happen to be narration in it, it will be of past events, in order that by recalling them into the memory, there may be a better consultation about such as are future, either employing on this occasion accusation or praise; but then he who does this, will not perform the office of a counsellor. If, however, that which is narrated is incredible, then you ought to promise the audience, that you will immediately assign the cause of it, and leave it to the audience to believe or not as they please. Thus Iocasta in the *Oedipus* of Carcinus, when she says some-

¹ For since the audience know that it is the province of an impudent man to hiss and clap with his hands, the orator by narrating these things persuades them that he who thus acted was an impudent man, of which perhaps they were ignorant.

thing

thing incredible in answer to him who asks her concerning his son, always promises [that she would prove the truth of what she had said.] And the Aemon of Sophocles [employs the same art.]

CHAPTER XVII.

It is necessary, however, that credibility should be demonstrative. But it is requisite to demonstrate (since controversy is respecting four things) by adducing a demonstration of the controverted subject. Thus for instance, if it is controverted whether a thing has been done, it is especially necessary in a judicial process to give a demonstration of this; or if it is controverted whether this man has been injured, or whether he has been injured to the extent alledged, or whether justly or not. And in a similar manner of the existence of the thing controverted. Nor must we be ignorant that in this controversy alone, one of the persons must necessarily be depraved; for here ignorance is not the cause, as if certain persons were disputing about justice; so that this controversy but not others must be diligently discussed. But in demonstrative orations the amplification will for the most part consist in showing that actions have been beautiful and beneficial; for it is necessary to believe in facts. For demonstrations are seldom given of these things unless they are incredible, or another person is supposed to be the cause of them. In popular orations, however, it may be contended that a thing will not be; or that what is advised will take place, but that it is not just; or that it is not beneficial, or that it is not of such great consequence. It is likewise necessary to see whether the opponent has asserted any thing false, which does not pertain

pertain to the cause; since from this as from a sign it may be inferred that he has also spoken falsely in other things.

Examples, however, are indeed most adapted to popular orations; but enthymemes to judicial orations. For the former are conversant with the future; so that examples must necessarily be derived from past events. But judicial orations are conversant with things which exist, or do not exist, in which there is in a greater degree demonstration and necessity. For that which has been done is attended with necessity. Enthymemes, however, must not be adduced in a continued series, but must be mingled [with other things more pleasant and easy;] since if this is not done, they will be detrimental to each other; for there is a boundary of quantity. [Hence, in Homer in *Odyss.* 4. Menelaus praises Pisistratus the son of Nestor, for the mediocrity of his speech.] “Dear youth, you have said just as much as a wise man would have said.” For he does not praise him that he said *such* things, *but so much and no more*. Nor must enthymemes be investigated in every subject; for if this [precept] is not observed, you will do that which some of those who philosophise do, who syllogistically collect things more known and credible, than the propositions from which they are deduced. When, likewise, you wish to excite the passions, do not introduce an enthymeme [i. e. abstain from argument;] for the enthymeme will either expel the passion, or will be introduced in vain. For motions which exist at one and the same time expel each other, and either destroy themselves, or become imbecil. Nor when the oration is ethical is it proper at the same time to search for any enthymeme; for demonstration has neither the power of expressing manners, nor deliberate choice. Sentences, however, must be used both in narration and confirmation; for they are ethical; as, “And I indeed entrusted him with this, though I knew that it was not proper to believe in any man.” But if you wish to speak pathetically, you may say, “And I do not repent though I have been injured; for gain is with him, but justice with me.” It is not without reason, however, that popular orations are more difficult than such as are judicial; because they are conversant with the future; but the
judicial

judicial are conversant with the past, which is scientifically known to diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said. For he did not predict about future events, but about such past events as were immanifest. And the law is an hypothesis in judicial orations; but he who possesses the principle, can more easily discover the demonstration. Popular orations, likewise, have not many digressions; such for instance as, a digression to the opponent, either respecting himself, or which may produce the pathetic; but such orations admit these, the least of all things, unless they depart from their proper employment. It is requisite, therefore, that he should digress, who is in want of arguments; and this method is adopted by the Athenian rhetoricians, and also by Isocrates. For giving counsel he accuses the Lacedæmonians, in his Panegyric; but in his oration concerning Peace, he accuses Chares. In demonstrative orations, however, it is requisite to insert praise as an episode, as Isocrates does; for he always introduces something which he may praise. And Gorgias employed the same art, who said, "That he should never be in want of an oration." For if he speaks of Achilles, he praises Peleus, afterwards Aeacus, and afterwards the God [i. e. Jupiter, the great grandfather of Achilles.] In a similar manner he praises the fortitude of Achilles. He, therefore, who has demonstrations, may speak both ethically and demonstratively. But if you have not enthymemes, you may speak ethically. And it is more adapted to a worthy man that he should appear to be a good man, than that he should deliver an accurate oration. Of enthymemes, however, those which are adapted to confutation are more approved, than those which are demonstrative; because such things as produce confutation are evidently more syllogistic; for contraries when placed by each other become more known.

Arguments, however, which are employed against the opponent are not specifically different [from those which we employ in our own defence;] but it pertains to credibility, to dissolve some things by objection, and others by syllogism. It is also necessary both in consultation and in a judicial process, that he who first pleads his cause, should in the first place confirm his cause, but afterwards should
dissolve

dissolve or extenuate the arguments contrary to his own. But if the opposing arguments are many, these must be first confuted, as Callistratus did in the Messeniatic assembly; for he first refuted what his adversaries could say, and then said what conduced to his own cause. He, however, who speaks in the second place, ought first to encounter the reasoning of his adversary, dissolving it, and syllogizing in opposition to it, and especially if the arguments of his opponent have been approved. For as the soul is not favourably disposed towards those who have been already accused of crimes, after the same manner neither does it willingly attend to an oration, if the opponent appears to have spoken well. In order to prepare the mind of the auditor, therefore, to hear an oration, it is necessary first to show that what the opponent has said is false. Hence, the orator must fight against either all the arguments of his opponent, or the greatest of them, or those which are most approved, or those which may be easily confuted, and thus render his own arguments credible. [Thus Hecuba in Euripides,]

“But first the goddesses I will assist;
For Juno,” &c.

For here Hecuba first confutes what was most infirm. And thus much concerning confirmation.

But with respect to manners, since for a man to say certain things about himself, is either invidious, or is attended with circumlocution or contradiction; and to speak of another person is attended either with slander or rusticity;—hence, it is necessary to introduce another person speaking, as Isocrates does in his oration against Phillip, and in his Antidosis; and as Archilochus blames. For he makes the father [Lycambes] say concerning his daughter, in an Iambic verse, “There is nothing which may not be expected to be done, and nothing which will not be sworn to, through money.” And in another Iambic, the beginning of which is, “I care not for the riches of Gyges,” he introduces Charon the artist speaking. Thus, also, Aemon [the son of Creon,

Creon; and the husband of Antigone,] in Sophocles, while he supplicates his father Creon for the life of Antigone, commemorates the praises of Antigone not from his own proper, but from another person. It is necessary also to change enthymemes, and sometimes to change them into sentences; as, "It is requisite that those who are intelligent should form compacts with enemies, when they are in prosperity; for thus they will be attended with the greatest advantage." But this is done enthymematically as follows: "For if it is then requisite to form compacts, when they are most useful, and replete with the most advantageous conditions, it is also necessary that they should be made in prosperity."

CHAPTER XVIII.

WITH respect to interrogation, it is then especially seasonable to employ it, when something is said by the opponent of such a nature, that by the addition of one interrogation, an absurdity will ensue. Thus Pericles asked Lampo concerning the mysteries of Ceres, who was called the saviour goddess; but Lampo replied, "That it was unlawful for one who was uninitiated to hear them related." Pericles, however, again asked him, "If he knew these mysteries." And Lampo replying that he did, "And how is this possible, said Pericles, since you are uninitiated?" In the second place, it is seasonable to employ interrogation, when one of the premises [from which something follows favourable to our cause] is perspicuous, but the other will be evidently granted by the opponent; for then it is requisite to interrogate concerning such premise, and immediately conclude, without

interrogating concerning the other premise, which is perspicuous. Thus Socrates when Melitus accused him of not believing there were Gods, asked him whether he thought there was any such thing as a demoniacal nature; and when Melitus acknowledged that he did, Socrates also asked him, whether demons were not either the sons of the Gods, or something divine. But Melitus granting that they were, Is it possible, therefore, said Socrates, that any one can believe that there are sons of the Gods, and yet that there are no Gods? Farther still, interrogation may likewise be seasonably employed, when we wish to show that the opponent contradicts himself, or asserts something paradoxical. In the fourth place, it may be opportunely employed, when the opponent can only answer to what is said sophistically, by asserting that a certain thing is and is not, or partly is, and partly is not, or in a certain respect is, and in a certain respect is not; for the auditors are disturbed by such answers, and are dubious as to their meaning. When, however, none of the above-mentioned opportunities occur, interrogation must not be employed; for if it should happen that the opponent answers properly, and eludes the interrogation, he who interrogates will appear to be vanquished. For many questions must not be asked on account of the imbecility of [the mind of] the auditor. Hence, it is especially necessary that enthymemes should be contracted.

It is likewise requisite to reply to ambiguous questions, by logically dividing, and not speaking concisely. But to things apparently true, a solution must immediately be given with the answer, before the opponent can add a second interrogation, or syllogize. For it is not difficult to foresee what he wishes to infer. This, however, and the solutions, [i. e. the mode of avoiding and solving captious interrogations,] will be manifest to us from the Topics. If the question, also, of the opponent produces a conclusion [against us,] it will be opportune in the answer to assign the cause why it does so. Thus, Sophocles being asked by Pisander, whether he was of the opinion of the other senators that a dominion of forty persons should be established? He replied that he was. And when he was again asked, "Does not this

this appear to you to be a base thing? He said, It does." "Have you therefore, Pisander replied, given your assent to this base deed?" "I have, said Sophocles, for no better measure could be adopted," Thus, too, that Lacon [who had been an Ephorus, or senator,] when he was desired to give an account of his conduct while he was in administration, was asked by some one, "Whether his colleagues appeared to him to have been justly condemned. He replied they did." But the other, then said "Did not you also decree the same things together with them." He acknowledged that he did. "Is it not therefore just, the other replied, that you also should be put to death." "By no means said Lacon. For they did these things, having received money for doing them; but I did not; since my conduct was the result of my own judgement." Hence, neither is it proper to interrogate after the conclusion, nor to interrogate concerning the conclusion itself, unless much truth is contained in it.

With respect to ridicule, however, since it appears to possess a certain use in contests, and it is necessary, as Gorgias rightly said, that the serious arguments of the opponent should be dissolved by laughter, and his laughter by serious arguments, we have shown in the Poetic, how many species of ridicule there are. But of these species, one indeed is adapted to a liberal man, and another is not. The orator, therefore, must assume that species of ridicule, which is adapted to the occasion. Irony, however, is more liberal than scurrility. For he who employs irony, produces the ridiculous for his own sake; but he who employs scurrility, for the sake of another person.

CHAPTER XIX.

EPILOGUE, however, or peroration is composed from four things; from that which may cause the auditor to think well of the orator, and ill of his opponent; from amplification and extenuation; from that which may excite the passions of the auditor; and from recalling to the memory [what has been said.] For it is natural, after demonstration, for the orator to show, that what he has asserted is true, and that what his opponent has said is false; and thus to praise, and blame, and conciliate the good opinion of the audience. But of two things, it is requisite that the orator should direct his attention to one of them, viz. either to show that he is good to the audience, or that he is simply a worthy man; and that his opponent is bad to the audience, or that he is simply a bad man. We have shown, however, what the places are from which things of this kind are to be derived, viz. whence it may be inferred that men are worthy or depraved. In the next place, it is requisite to amplify or extenuate, according to nature, what has now been demonstrated. For it is necessary that it should be acknowledged a thing has been done, if the orator intends to speak of its magnitude; for the increase of bodies, is from pre-existent substances. But we have already shown whence the places of amplification and extenuation are to be derived. After these things, however, since it is evident what their quality and quantity are, the orator should excite the passions of the auditor; but these are, pity and indignation; anger and hatred; envy, emulation and contention. And we have before shown the places of these. Hence, it remains that in the peroration the

the orator should recal into the memory of the audience what has been before said. But this is to be done in such a way, as others improperly teach us to do in proems; for that a thing may be easily understood, they order us to repeat it frequently. In proems, indeed, it is necessary to speak of the thing, [which is the subject of discussion] lest the audience should be ignorant what that is which is to be decided; but here [in peroration,] the arguments which have been employed, must be summarily repeated. The beginning, however, of the peroration should be, "That the orator has accomplished what he promised;" so that he must then explain what those things are of which he has spoken, and on what account they were discussed by him. But the repetition should be made from a comparison of what has been said by the opponent. And it is requisite to compare either such things as have been said on the same subject, both by the orator and his opponent; or such things as have not been said by both of them on the same subject; as, "And he indeed said *this* on the subject, but I *that*, and for these reasons." Or the repetition should be made from irony; as, "For he said *this*, but I *that*;" and, "What would he have done, if he had shown that *those* things were transacted, and not *these*." Or from interrogation; as, "What has not been shown?" Or thus, "What has the opponent shown?" Either, therefore, the repetition must be thus made, or it must be made from comparison, or the orator must repeat in a natural order what he has said. And again, if he is so inclined, he may repeat what his opponent has said. That mode of diction, however, is adapted to the conclusion of the oration, which is called disjunctive, in order that it may be an epilogue, and not an oration; such as, "I have said, you have heard, you are masters of the subject, judge for yourselves."

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CHAPTER I.

LET us speak concerning poetry itself, and the species of it, what power each of the species possesses, and how fables must be composed, so as to render poetry such as it ought to be ; farther still, let us show from how many and what kind of parts poetry consists ; and in a similar manner with respect to such other things as pertain to this method, beginning for this purpose conformably to nature, first from such things as are first.

The épopée, therefore, and tragic poetry, and besides these comedy, and dithyrambic poetry, and the greatest part of the art pertaining to the flute and the lyre, all these are entirely imitations. They differ, however, from each other in three things ; for they differ either by imitating through instruments generically different, or by imitating different things, or by imitating in a different, and not after the same manner. For as certain persons assimilating, imitate many things by colours and figures, some indeed through art, but others through custom, and others through voice ; thus also in the above mentioned

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arts,

arts, all of them indeed produce imitation in rythm¹, words and harmony, and in these, either separately assumed, or mingled together. Thus for instance, the arts pertaining to the flute and the lyre, alone employ harmony and rythm, and this will also be the case with whatever other arts there may be which possess a power of this kind; such as the art of playing on pipes formed from reeds. But the arts pertaining to dancing imitate by rythm, without harmony; for dancers through figured rythms, imitate manners, and passions, and actions. The epopee, however, alone imitates by mere words, viz. metres, and by these either mingling them with each other, or employing one certain genus of metres, ~~which method has been adopted~~ [from ancient to the present times.] For [without this imitation,] we should have no common name, by which we could denominate the Mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, and the dialogues of Socrates; or those whose imitation consists in trimetres, or elegies, or ~~certain~~ other things of this kind; except that men conjoining with measure the verb *to make*, call some of these elegiac-poets, but others epic-poets, not as poets according to imitation, but denominating them in common according to measure. For they are accustomed thus to denominate them, if they write any thing medical or musical in *measure*, [i. e. in verse.] There is, however, nothing common to Homer and Empedocles except the measure; on which account, it is just indeed to call the former a poet; but the latter, a physiologist rather than a poet. In a similar manner though some one mingling all the measures, should produce imitation, as Chæremon does, who wrote the Centaur, which is a rhapsody mingled from all the measures, yet he must not on this account be called a poet. And thus much concerning these particulars. There are, however some kinds of poetry which employ all the before mentioned [instruments of imitation;] viz. rythm, melody and measure, such as dithyrambic poetry and the Nomi, and also tragedy and comedy. But these differ, because some of them use all these at once, but others

¹ *Rythm* is defined by Plato in his *Laws* to be, *orderly motion either of the body, or the voice.*

partially.

partially. I speak, therefore, of these differences of the arts in which imitation is produced.

CHAPTER II.

SINCE, however, imitators imitate those who do something, and it is necessary that these should either be worthy or depraved persons; (for manners are nearly always consequent to these alone, since all men differ in their manners by vice and virtue)—this being the case, it is necessary, in the same manner as painters, either to imitate those who are better than men of the present age, or those who are worse, or such as exist at present. For among painters, Polygnotus indeed, painted men more beautiful than they are [at present,] but Pauson, painted them less beautiful, and Dionysius painted them so as to resemble men of our times. It is evident, however, that each of the before mentioned imitations, has these differences; and imitation is different, by imitating different things after this manner. For there may be dissimilitudes of this kind in dancing, in playing on the flute, and in playing on the lyre; and also in orations and mere measure. Thus Homer imitates better men than such as exist at present, but Cleophon men similar to those that now exist, and Hegemon the Thasian who first made parodies, and Nicocharis who wrote the *Deliad*, imitate men worse than those of the present age. In a similar manner in dithyrambics and the *Nomi**, [there may be an imitation of better and worse men,] as Ti-

* Lyric poems, such as those of Pindar, and in short, hymns in praise of Bacchus, are called *dithyrambics*. The *Nomi* were poems originally composed in honour of Apollo, and derived their name from being sung by shepherds among the *pastures*.

motheus and Philoxenus, have imitated the Persians and the Cyclops. By this very same difference also, tragedy is separated from comedy. For the intention of comedy indeed is to imitate worse, but of tragedy, better men than such as exist at present.

CHAPTER III.

THERE is also a third difference of these, and this consists in the manner in which each of them may be imitated. For by the same [instruments,] the same things may be imitated, the poet sometimes speaking in his own person, and sometimes in that of another, as Homer does; or speaking as the same person without any mutation; or imitating every thing as acting and energizing. But imitation consists in these three differences, as we said in the beginning; viz. it differs either because it imitates by different instruments, or because it imitates different things, or imitates in a different manner. Hence, Sophocles will partly be the same imitator as Homer, for both of them imitate celebrated characters; and partly the same as Aristophanes; for both of them imitate persons engaged in acting and performing; whence also it is said that certain persons call them *dramatists*, because they imitate those who are engaged in *doing* something. On this account the Dorians vindicate to themselves the invention of tragedy and comedy; of comedy indeed the Megarensians, as well those who are natives of Greece, as being invented by them at the time when their government was a democracy, as those who migrated to Sicily. For the poet Epicharmus derived his origin from thence, who was much prior to Chonnides and Magnes. But some of those Dorians who inhabit

inhabit Peloponnesus claim the invention of tragedy, making names, an indication of this. For it is said that they call their villages *komai*, but the Athenians *demoi*; as if comedians were not so denominated from *komazein*, or the celebration of festivals, but from wandering through villages, in consequence of being ignominiously expelled from cities. The verb *poiein* also, or to make is by the Dorians denominated *δρᾶν*, *dran*, but by the Athenians *prattein*. And thus much concerning the differences of imitation, as to their number and quality.

CHAPTER IV.

Two causes, however, and these physical, appear in short, to have produced poetry. For imitation is congenial to men from childhood. And in this they differ from other animals, that they are most imitative, and acquire the first disciplines through imitation; and that all men delight in imitations. But an indication of this is that which happens in the works [of artists.] For we are delighted on surveying very accurate images, the realities of which are painful to the view; such as the forms of very savage animals, and dead bodies. The cause, however, of this is that learning is not only most delightful to philosophers, but in a similar manner to other persons, though they partake of it but in a small degree. For on this account, men are delighted on surveying images, because it happens that by this survey they learn and are able to infer what each particular is; as, that *this* is an image of *that*; since, unless we happen to have seen the realities, we are not pleased with the imitation of them, but the delight we experience arises either from the elaboration of the artist, or the colour of the resemblance,

resemblance, or some other cause of the like kind. But imitation, harmony and rhythm being natural to us, (for it is evident that measures or metres are parts of rhythms) those who are especially adapted to these things, making a gradual progress from the beginning, produced poetry from extemporaneous efforts. Poetry, however, was divided according to appropriate manners. For men of a more venerable character, imitated beautiful actions, and the fortunes of those by whom they were performed; but more ignoble men, imitated the actions of depraved characters, first composing vituperative verses, in the same manner as the other composed hymns and encomiums. Prior, therefore, to Homer, we cannot mention any poem of this kind; though it is probable that there were many such. But if we begin from Homer, we may adduce examples of each kind of poems; such for instance as his *Margites*¹, and some others, in which as adapted to reprehension the measure is Iambic. Hence, also, vituperative verse is now called Iambic, because in this metre, [those ancient poets after Homer] defamed each other. Of ancient poets likewise, some composed heroic poems, and others Iambic verses. But as Homer was the greatest of poets on serious subjects; and this not only because he imitated well, but also because he made dramatic imitations; thus too he first demonstrated the figures of comedy, not dramatically exhibiting reprehension but the ridiculous. For as in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to tragedy, so is the *Margites* to comedy. Of these poets, however, who were appropriately impelled to each kind of poetry, some, instead of writing Iambics, became comic poets, but others instead of writing epic poems, became the authors of tragedies, because these forms are greater and more honourable than those. To consider, therefore, whether tragedy is now perfect in its species or not, as well with reference to itself, as to theatres, is the business of another treatise. Both tragedy and comedy, therefore, were at first exhibited in extemporaneous verse. And tragedy, indeed, originated from those who sung dithyrambic

¹ This was a satirical poem, the name of which is derived from *μαργος* or *μαργος*, foolish, ignorant.

verses ;

verses ; but comedy, from those who sung Phallic verses¹, which even now in many cities are legally established. Thus comedy became gradually increased, till it arrived at its present condition. And tragedy having experienced many mutations, rested from any further change, in consequence of having arrived at the perfection of its nature. Eschylus also, first brought the number of players from one to two. He likewise diminished the parts of the chorus, and made one of the players act the first part of the Tragedy. But Sophocles introduced three players into the scene, and added scenic decoration. Farther still, tragedy having acquired magnitude from small fables, and ridiculous diction, in consequence of having received a change from satyric composition, it was late before it acquired a venerable character. The metre also of tragedy, from tetrameter became Iambic. For at first tetrameter was used in tragedy, because poetry was then satyirical, and more adapted to the dance. But dialogue being adopted, nature herself discovered an appropriate metre ; for the Iambic measure is of all others most adapted to conversation. And as an indication of this, we most frequently speak in Iambics in familiar discourse with each other ; but we seldom speak in hexameters, and then only when we exceed the limits of that harmony which is adapted to conversation. Again, tragedy is said to have been [at length] adorned, with a multitude of episodes, and other particulars. Let, therefore, thus much suffice concerning these things ; for it would perhaps be a greater labour to discuss every particular.

¹ These were verses in honour of the rural deities.

CHAPTER V.

COMEDY, however, is as we have said, an imitation indeed of more depraved characters, yet it does not imitate them according to every vice, [but according to those defects alone which excite laughter;] since the ridiculous is a portion of turpitude. *For the ridiculous is a certain error, and turpitude unattended with pain, and not of a destructive nature.* Thus for instance, a ridiculous face, is something deformed, and distorted without pain. The transitions, therefore, of tragedy, and the causes through which they are produced, are not unknown; but we are ignorant of the changes that comedy has experienced, because it was not at first an object of serious attention. For it was late before the magistrate [who presided over the games,] gave the chorus to comedians, but prior to that period, the choruses were voluntary. Comedy, however, at length having obtained a certain form, those who are said to be the authors of it are commemorated. But it is unknown who it was that introduced masks, or prologues, or a multitude of players, and such like particulars. Epicharmus, however, and Phormis, began to compose fables; which, therefore, [as both of them were Sicilians] originated from Sicily. But among the Athenians Crates, rejecting the Iambic form of comedy, first began universally to compose speeches and fables. The epopee, therefore, is an attendant on tragedy, as far as pertains to measured diction alone, since through this it is an imitation of worthy persons and actions. But it differs from tragedy in this, that it has a simple metre, and is a narration. It also differs from it in length. For tragedy is especially bounded by
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one period of the sun, [i. e. by one natural day,] or admits but a small variation from this period; but the epopee is not defined within a certain time, and in this it differs from tragedy; though at first tragedy no less than epic poetry, was not confined to any portion of time. With respect to the parts, however, of the epopee and tragedy, some are the same in both, but others are peculiar to tragedy. Hence he who knows what is a good or bad tragedy, knows also what kind of epic poetry is good or bad. For those things which the epopee possesses are also present with tragedy; but the epopee has not every thing which tragedy contains.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING hexameter imitative poetry, therefore, and comedy, we shall speak hereafter. Let us now, however, speak concerning tragedy, assuming the definition of its essence as deduced from what has been already said. *Tragedy, therefore, is an imitation of a worthy or illustrious, and perfect action, possessing magnitude, delivered in pleasing language, using separately the several species of imitation in its parts, and not through narration but through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions*¹. But I say it is *an imitation delivered in pleasing language,*

¹ When Aristotle says that *tragedy through pity and fear effects a purification from such like passions*, his meaning is, that it purifies from those perturbations, which happen in the fable, and which for the most part are the cause of the peripetia, and of the unhappy event of the fable. Thus for instance, Sophocles through pity and terror excited by the character of Ajax, intends a purification from anger and impiety towards the gods, because through this anger and impiety,

language, viz. in language possessing rhythm, harmony, and melody. And, it *uses separately the several species of imitation*, because some parts of the tragedy are alone perfected through metres, and again others through melody. Because, however, tragedians produce imitation by acting, in the first place the ornament of the sight [i. e. the scenic apparatus,] will be a certain part of tragedy, and in the next place the melopoeia [which comprehends rhythm, harmony, and melody,] and the diction. For in these imitation is produced. But I call diction indeed,

those misfortunes happened to Ajax; and thus in other instances. For it must by no means be said that the meaning of Aristotle is, that tragedy through terror and pity purifies the spectators from terror and pity; since he says in the 2d book of his *Ethics*, "that he who is accustomed to timid things becomes timid, and to anger becomes angry, because habit is produced from energies." Hence, we are so far from being able through the medium of terror and pity in tragedy, to remove terror and pity from the spectators, that by accustoming them to objects of commiseration and terror, we shall in a greater degree subject them to these passions. Indeed, if tragedy intended through pity to purify from pity, and through fear to purify from fear, it would follow that the same passion of the soul would be contrary to itself; for contraries are cured by contraries. Hence, fear would be contrary to itself, and pity would be contrary to pity. Hence, also energies would be contrary to their proper habits, or rather the same energies and habits would be contrary to each other, which is repugnant to reason and experience. For we see that energies and habits are increased and established from similar energies.

By no means, therefore, does Aristotle oppose Plato, in ascribing this purifying effect to tragedy. For when Plato expels tragic poets from his Republic, it is because they are not serviceable to youth who are to be educated philosophically. For a purification from all the passions is effected by philosophic discipline; but tragedy only purifies from some of the passions, by the assistance of others, viz. by terror and pity; since it is so far from purifying the spectators from terror and pity, that it increases them. To which we may add, that philosophic discipline is not attended with the mythological imitation of ancient tragedy, which though it harmonizes with divine natures, and leads those who possess a naturally good disposition to the contemplation of them, yet it is not useful to legislators for the purposes of virtue and education, nor for the proper tuition of youth. For the good which such fables contain is not disciplinative, but mystic, nor does it regard a juvenile, but an aged habit of soul. For Socrates in the Republic justly observes, "the young person is not able to judge what is allegory, and what is not; but whatever opinions he receives at such an age, are with difficulty washed away, and are generally immoveable."

None of the English translators and commentators On the Poetic of Aristotle, that I have seen appear to have had the least glimpse of this meaning of the passage, though I trust it is sufficiently obvious that it is the genuine meaning of Aristotle.

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the composition of the metres ; and melopoeia, that the whole power of which is apparent. Since, however, tragedy is an imitation of action, and action is effected by certain agents, who must necessarily be persons of a certain description both as to their manners and their mind (for through these we say that actions derive their quality) hence there are naturally two causes of actions, *dianoia*¹ and manners, and through these actions all men obtain or are frustrated of the object of their wishes. But a fable indeed, is an imitation of action ; for I mean by a *fable* here, the composition of things. By *manners* I mean those things according to which we say that agents are persons of a certain description ; and by *dianoia* that through which those who speak demonstrate any thing, or unfold their meaning. It is necessary, therefore, that the parts of every tragedy should be six, from which the tragedy derives its quality. But these are, fable and manners, diction and *dianoia*, sight and melopoeia. Of these parts, however, two pertain to the instruments by which tragedy imitates ; one, to the manner in which it imitates ; and three to the things which it imitates. And besides these, there are no other. Not a few tragic poets, therefore, as I may say, use all these species [i. e. parts] in composing tragedies. For every tragedy has a scenic apparatus, manners and a fable and melody, and in a similar manner *dianoia*. But the greatest of these is the combination of the incidents. For tragedy is an imitation not of men, but of actions, of life, and of felicity and infelicity. For felicity consists in action, and the end [of tragedy,] is a certain action, and not a quality. Men, however, are persons of a certain character or quality, according to their manners ; but according to their actions, they are happy, or the contrary. The end of tragedy, therefore, does not consist in imitating manners, but actions, and hence it embraces manners on account of actions ; so that things and fable are the end of tragedy. The end, however, is the greatest of all things ; for without

¹ *Dianoia* *διανοία* in a general way, may be defined to be *διεξοδική του λόγου ενεργεία* i. e. *the discursive energy of reason*. But accurately speaking, it is *that power of soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect*. This latter definition, however, pertains to it, so far as it is not influenced in its reasonings by imagination and false opinions.

action, tragedy cannot exist; but it may exist without manners. For most modern tragedies are without manners; and in short, many poets are such as among painters Zeuxis is when compared with Polygnotus. For Polygnotus indeed, painted the manners of good men; but the pictures of Zeuxis are without manners. Farther still, if any one places in a continued series ethical assertions, and dictions and conceptions well framed, he will not produce that which is the work of tragedy; but that will be in a much greater degree a tragedy, which uses these as things subordinate, and which contains a fable and combination of incidents. To which may be added, that the greatest parts of the fable by which the soul is allured are the peripetiae, [or changes of fortune]; and recognitions. Again, it is likewise an indication of this, that those who attempt to write tragedies, acquire the power of expressing a thing in tragic diction, and representing manners accurately, before they possess the ability of composing the fable, as was nearly the case with all the first poets. The fable, therefore, is the principle, and as it were the soul of tragedy; but manners rank in the second place. For tragedy resembles the art of painting; since the most beautiful pigments laid on the canvas [promiscuously] would be less pleasing to the view, than an image painted with a white colour alone, [i. e. than a picture in which there is nothing but light and shade.] Tragedy also is an imitation of action, and on this account is especially an imitation of agents. But *dianoia* ranks in the third place. And this is *the ability of unfolding what is inherent in the subject, and is adapted to it*, which ability is the peculiar power of politics and rhetoric. For ancient poets represent those whom they introduce as speaking politically; but poets of the present day represent them as speaking rhetorically. Manners, however, are a thing of such a kind as to render manifest what the deliberate choice is, in those things in which it is not apparent whether the speaker is influenced by choice or aversion. Hence some speeches are without manners. But *dianoia* ² is that through which it is shown that
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² *Dianoia*, therefore, cannot be as I have seen it translated, *sentiment*. For can any thing be more obvious than that the power through which it is shown that a thing is or is not, and which
universally

a certain thing is, or is not, or which universally enunciates something. And the fourth part of tragedy is diction. But I say, as was before observed that *diction is an interpretation through the denomination of a thing, and which also has the same power in verse and prose.* The melopoeia, however, ranks in the fifth place, which is the greatest of condiments. But the sight [i. e. the scenic apparatus,] possesses indeed an alluring power, yet it is most inartificial, and is in the smallest degree appropriate to poetry. For the power of tragedy remains, even when unaccompanied with scenic apparatus and players. And farther still, the art of constructing the scenic apparatus possesses greater authority than the art of the poet.

CHAPTER VII.

THESE things being defined let us in the next place show what the combination of the incidents ought to be, since this is the first and greatest part of tragedy. But let it be granted to us, that tragedy is the imitation of a perfect and whole action, and which possesses a certain magnitude ; for there may be a whole which has no [appropriate] magnitude. A whole, however, is that which has a beginning, middle and end. And the beginning is that which necessarily is not itself posterior to another thing ; but another thing is naturally adapted to be posterior to it. On the contrary the end is that, which is itself naturally adapted to be posterior to another thing, either from neces-

universally enunciates something, must be *discursive*, agreeably to the definition we have before given of *dianoia* ? But how is this to be effected by sentiment ?

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sity, or for the most part; but after this there is nothing else. But the middle is that which is itself posterior to another thing, and posterior to which there is something else. Hence, it is necessary that those who compose fables properly, should neither begin them casually, nor end them casually, but should employ the above-mentioned ideas [of beginning, middle and end.] Farther still, that which is beautiful, whether it be an animal, or any thing else which is a composite from certain parts, ought not only to have this arrangement of beginning, middle and end, but a magnitude also which is not casual. For the beautiful consists in magnitude and order. Hence, neither can any very small animal be beautiful; for the survey of it is confused, since it is effected in nearly an insensible time. Nor can a very large animal be beautiful; for it cannot be surveyed at once, but its subsistence as one and a whole eludes the view of the spectators; such as if for instance, it should be an animal of ten thousand stadia in length. Hence, as in bodies and in animals it is necessary there should be magnitude, but such as can easily be seen; thus also in fables, it is necessary, indeed, there should be length, but this such as can easily be remembered. The definition, however, of the length [of the fable] with reference to contests and the senses, [i. e. with reference to external circumstances,] cannot fall under the precepts of art. For if it were requisite to perform a hundred tragedies [in one day,] as is said to have been the case more than once, the performance ought to be regulated by a clepsydra [or hour-glass.] But the definition of the length of the fable according to the nature of the thing, is this, that the fable is always more beautiful the greater it is, if at the same time it is perspicuous. Simply defining the thing, however, we may say, that every fable has an appropriate magnitude, when the time of its duration is such as to render it probable, that the transition from prosperous to adverse, or from adverse to prosperous fortune which it relates, has taken place, the necessary or probable order of things being preserved, through which one thing follows from, and after another.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE fable, however, is one, not as some fancy, if one person is the subject of it; for many things and which are generically infinite happen [to one and the same man;] from a certain number of which no one thing results. Thus, also, there are many actions of one man, from which no one action is produced; on which account all those poets appear to have erred who have written the Heracleid, and Theseid, and such like poems. For they fancied that because Hercules was one person, it was fit that the fable should be one. Homer, however, as he excelled in other things, appears likewise to have seen this acutely, whether from art, or from nature. For in composing the Odyssey, he has not related every thing which happened to Ulysses; such as the being wounded in Parnassus, and pretending to be insane, when the Greeks were collected into one army against the Trojans; one of which taking place, it was not necessary or probable that the other should happen; but he composed that poem from what relates to one action, such as we say the Odyssey is; and he has composed the Iliad in a similar manner. It is requisite, therefore, as in other imitative arts, one imitation is the imitation of one thing, thus, also, [in tragedy,] the fable should be the imitation of one action, since it is an imitation of action, and of the whole of this, and that the parts of the transactions should be so arranged, that any one of them being transposed, or taken away, the whole would become different and changed. For that which when present or not present produces nothing perspicuous, is not a part of the fable.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IX.

It is however evident from what has been said, that it is not the province of a poet to relate things which have been transacted, but to describe them such as they would have been had they been transacted, and to narrate things which are possible according to probability, or which would necessarily have happened. For an historian and a poet do not differ from each other, because the former writes in prose and the latter in verse; for the history of Herodotus might be written in verse, and yet it would be no less a history with metre, than without. But they differ in this, that the one speaks of things which have been transacted, and the other of such as might have happened. Hence, poetry is more philosophic, and more deserving of serious attention than history. For poetry speaks more of universals, but history of particulars. *Universal*, however, consists indeed in relating or performing certain things which happen to a man of a certain description, either probably or necessarily, and to which the attention of poetry is directed in giving names to men: but *particular* consists in narrating what Alcibiades did, or what he suffered. In comedy, therefore, this is now become manifest. For comic poets having composed a fable through things of a probable nature, they thus give names to the persons they introduce in the fable, and do not like Iambic poets, write poems about particular persons. But in tragedy the ancient names are retained. The cause, however, of this is that the possible is credible. Things, therefore, which have not yet been done, we do not yet believe to be possible; but it is evident that things which have been
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been done are possible; for they would not have been done, if it was impossible that they should. Not, indeed, but that in some tragedies there is one or two of known names, and the rest are feigned; but in others there is no known name; as for instance, in the tragedy of Agatho called *the Flower*. For in this tragedy, the things and the names are alike feigned, and yet it no less delights [than if they were not feigned.] Hence, ancient fables which are the subjects of tragedy, must not be entirely adhered to. For it is ridiculous to make this the object of investigation, because such fables are known but to a few, though at the same time they delight all men. From these things, therefore, it is evident that a poet ought rather to be the author of fables than of metres, because he is principally a poet from imitation. But he imitates actions. Hence, though it should happen that he relates [as probable] things which have taken place, he is no less a poet. For nothing hinders but that some actions which they might performed, are such as it is both probable and possible have been have happened, and by the narration of such he is a poet.

Of simple fables, however, and actions the episodic are the worst. But I call the fable episodic, in which it is neither probable, nor necessary that the episodes follow each other. Such fables, however, are composed by bad poets, indeed, on their own account; but by good poets, on account of the players. For introducing contests [among the players] and extending the fable beyond what it will admit, they are frequently compelled to distort the connected order of things. Tragedy, however, is not only an imitation of a perfect action, but also of actions which are terrible, and the objects of commiseration. But actions principally become such, and in a greater degree, when they happen contrary to opinion, on account of each other. For thus, they will be more admirable, than if they happened from chance and fortune; since, also, of things which are from fortune, those appear to be most admirable, which seem to be as it were adapted to take place. Thus the statue of Mityus [in Argos] by falling, slew him who was the

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cause of the death of Mityus, as he was surveying it. For such events as these, seem not to take place casually. Hence, it is necessary that fables of this kind should be more beautiful.

CHAPTER X.

OF fables, however, some are simple, and others complex; for the actions of which fables are the imitations, are immediately things of this kind. But I call the action simple from which taking place, as it has been defined, with continuity and unity, there is a transition without peripetia, or recognition. And I call the action complex, from which there is a transition, together with recognition, or peripetia, or both. It is necessary, however, that these should be effected, from the composition itself of the fable, so that from prior transactions it may happen that the same things take place either necessarily, or probably. For it makes a great difference whether these things are effected on account of these, or after these.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XI.

BUT peripetia, indeed, is a mutation, as we have before observed, of actions into a contrary condition; and this, as we say, according to the probable, or the necessary. Thus in the Oedipus [Tyrannus of Sophocles,] the messenger who comes with an intention of delighting Oedipus, and liberating him from his fear respecting his mother, when he makes himself known, produces a contrary effect. Thus too, in the tragedy called Lynceus, he indeed is introduced as one who is to die, and Danaüs follows with an intention of killing him; but it happens from the transactions of the tragedy, that Lynceus is saved, and Danaüs is slain. And recognition is as the name signifies, a mutation from ignorance to knowledge, or into the friendship or hatred of those who are in prosperous or adverse fortune. The recognition, however, is most beautiful, when at the same time there are peripetiæ, as in the Oedipus [Tyrannus of Sophocles.] There are, therefore, also other recognitions. For sometimes it happens, as we have before observed, that there are recognitions of things inanimate, and casual. And if some one has performed, or has not performed a thing, there is a recognition of it; but the recognition which especially pertains to the fable and the action, is that which we have mentioned. For a recognition and peripetia of this kind, excite either pity or fear; and tragedy is supposed by us to be an imitation of actions which produce fear and commiseration. Again, it will happen that infelicity and felicity will be in such like recognitions; since recognition is a recognition of certain persons. Farther still, of recognitions, some are of one

person only with reference to another, when it is evident who the other person is, but sometimes it is necessary to recognize both persons. Thus Iphigenia was recognized by Orestes, through the sending an epistle; but another recognition was requisite to his being known by Iphigenia.

CHAPTER XII.

Two parts of the fable, therefore, viz. peripetia and recognition, are conversant with these things; but the third part is pathos [or corporeal suffering.] And of these we have already discussed peripetia and recognition. Pathos, however, is an action destructive, or lamentable; such as death when it is obvious, grievous pains, wounds, and such like particulars. But we have before spoken of the parts of tragedy which it is requisite to use as species. The parts of tragedy, however, according to quantity, and into which it is separately divided are as follow: prologue, episode, exode, and chorus. And of the parts pertaining to the chorus, one is the *parodos*, but the other is the *stasimon*. These [five] parts, therefore, are common to all tragedies; but the peculiar parts are those which are derived from the scene, and the commi. And the prologue, indeed, is the whole part of the tragedy, prior to the entrance of the chorus. The episode is the whole part of the tragedy, which is between all the melody of the chorus. The exode, is the whole part of the tragedy, after which there is no further melody of the chorus. And of the chorus itself, the *parodos*, indeed, is the first singing of the whole chorus; but the *stasimon* is the melody of the chorus, without trochee and anapaest. And the *commus*, is the
common

common lamentation of the chorus and the scene. We have, therefore, before shown what the parts of tragedy are which must necessarily be used; but the parts of it according to quantity, and into which it is separately divided, are these.

CHAPTER XIII.

IN the next place we must show, as consequent to what has been said, to what the attention ought to be directed of those who compose fables, and whence the work of tragedy is derived. Since, therefore, it is necessary that the composition of the most beautiful tragedy, should not be simple, but complex, and that it should be imitative of things of a dreadful and commiserable nature (for this is the peculiarity of such an imitation)—in the first place it is evident, that it is not proper worthy men should be represented as changed from prosperity to adversity, for this is neither a subject of terror nor commiseration, but is impious. Nor must depraved characters be represented as changed from adverse to prosperous fortune; for this is the most foreign from tragedy of all things, since it possesses nothing which is proper; for it is neither philanthropic, nor commiserable, nor dreadful. Nor again must a very depraved man be represented as having fallen from prosperity into adversity. For such a composition will indeed possess the philanthropic, but will neither excite pity or fear. For the one is conversant with a character which does not deserve to be unfortunate; but the other, with a character similar [to most of the spectators.] And pity, indeed, is excited for one who does not deserve to be unfortunate; but fear, for one who resembles [the multitude;] so that the event

event will neither appear to be commiserable, nor terrible. It remains, therefore, that the man who exists between these must be represented. But a character of this kind is one, who neither excels in virtue and justice, nor is changed through vice and depravity, into misfortune, from being a man of great renown and prosperity, but has experienced this mutation through a certain [human] erroneous conduct; such as Oedipus and Thyestes, and other illustrious men of this kind. Hence, it is necessary that a fable which is well composed, should be rather simple than twofold, (though some say it should be the latter,) and that the persons which are the subjects of it should not be changed into prosperity from adversity, but on the contrary into adversity from prosperity, not through depravity, but through some great error, and that they should be such persons as we have mentioned, or better rather than worse than these. But the truth of this is indicated by that which has taken place. For ancient poets adopted any casual fables; but now the most beautiful tragedies are composed about a few families; as for instance, about Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes and Telephus, and such other persons as happen either to have suffered, or perpetrated things of a dreadful nature. The tragedy, therefore, which is most beautiful according to art, has this composition. Hence, Euripides is erroneously blamed by those, who accuse him of having done this in his tragedies, and for making many of them terminate in misfortune. For this method as we have said, is right; of which this is the greatest indication, that in the scenes, and contests of the players, simple fables which terminate unhappily, appear to be most tragical, if they are properly acted. And Euripides, though he does not manage other things well, yet appears to be the most tragic of poets. The fable, however, ranks in the second place, though by some it is said to be the first composition, which is of a twofold nature, such as the Odyssey, and which terminates in a contrary fortune, both in the better and worse characters [which it exhibits.] It appears, however, to rank in the first place, through the imbecility of the spectators. For the poets [by whom it is composed] accommodate themselves to the spectators, and compose fables conformable

formable to their wishes. This pleasure, however, is not [properly] derived from tragedy, but is rather adapted to comedy. For these, though the persons in the fable are most hostile to each other, as Orestes and Aegisthus, yet in the end they depart friends, and one of them does not die through the other.

CHAPTER XIV.

TERROR and pity, therefore, may be produced from the sight. But they may also be excited from the condition itself of the things, [i. e. from the combination of the incidents,] which is a more excellent way, and the province of a better poet. For it is necessary that the fable should be so composed without any scenic representation, that he who hears the things which are transacted, may be seized with horror, and feel pity, from the events; and in this manner he who hears the fable of Oedipus is affected. But to effect this through scenic representation is more inartificial, and requires great expence. Those, however, who produce not the terrible, but the monstrous alone through scenic representation, have nothing in common with tragedy. For it is not proper to seek for every kind of pleasure from tragedy, but for that which is appropriate. Since, however, it is necessary that the poet should procure pleasure from pity and fear through imitation, it is evident that this must be effected [in the representation of things of a terrible and commiserable nature.] We must explain, therefore, what kind of events appear to be dreadful or lamentable. But it is necessary that actions of this kind should either be those of friends towards each other, or of enemies, or of neither. If, therefore, an enemy kills
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an enemy, he does not exhibit any thing which is an object of pity, neither while he kills him, nor when he is about to kill him, except the evil which he who is slain suffers. And this will be the case, when one of those who are neither friends nor enemies kills the other. But when these things happen in friendships, as when a brother kills a brother, or a son his father, or a mother her son, or a son his mother, or intends to do it, or does any thing else of the like kind, it is not only a lamentable circumstance on account of the evil which is suffered, but also because it is inflicted by one by whom it ought not to be inflicted. Fables, therefore, which have been received [from the ancients] are not to be dissolved [i. e. destroyed.] I mean for instance, such as the fable of Clytemnestra slain by Orestes, and of Eriphile slain by Alcmaeon. But it is necessary that the poet should invent the fable, and use in a becoming manner those fables which are delivered [to him by tradition.] What, however, we mean by using fables in a becoming manner, we will explain more clearly, For the action may take place in such a way as the ancients have represented it, viz. accompanied with knowledge; as Euripides represents Medea killing her children. An action may also be done, by those who are ignorant of its dreadful nature, and who afterwards recognize the friendship [which they have violated,] as in the Oedipus of Sophocles. This, therefore, is external to the drama. But it may also be introduced into the tragedy itself; as in the Alcmaeon of Astydamas, or Telegonus [the son of Ulysses by Circe,] in the Ulysses Wounded. Farther still, besides these there is a third mode, when some one is about to perpetrate through ignorance an atrocious deed, but recognizes that it is so before he does it. And besides these, there is no other mode. For it is necessary to act, or not; and knowingly, or not knowingly. But of these, to intend to perpetrate the deed knowingly, and not to perpetrate it, is the worst; for it is wicked and not tragical; because it is void of pathos. Hence, no poet introduces a character of this kind except rarely; as in the Antigone [of Sophocles,] in which Hæmon [endeavours to kill his father] Creon, [but does not effect his purpose.] For the action here ranks in the second place. But it is better to
perpetrate

perpetrate the deed ignorantly, and having perpetrated to recognize [the enormity of it;] for then it is not attended with wickedness, and the recognition excites horror. The last mode, however, is the best; I mean, as in the *Cresphontes* [of Euripides,] in which Merope is about to kill her son, but does not in consequence of recognizing that he was her son. Thus too, in the *Iphigenia in Tauris* [of Euripides,] in which the sister is going to kill the brother, [but recognizes him;] and in the tragedy called *Helle*, the son is about to slay his mother, but is prevented by recognizing her. Hence, as we have formerly observed, tragedies are not conversant with many families; for poets were enabled to discover a thing of this kind in fables, not from art, but from fortune. They were compelled, therefore, to direct their attention to those families, in which calamities of this kind happened.

And thus we have spoken sufficiently concerning the composition of things, [i. e. the combination of the incidents] and have shown what kind of fables ought to be employed.

CHAPTER XV.

WITH respect to manners, however, there are four things to which the attention ought to be directed; one, indeed, and the first, that the manners may be such as are worthy. But the tragedy will indeed possess manners, if, as we have said, the words or the action render any deliberate intention apparent; containing depraved manners, if the deliberate intention is depraved; but worthy manners, if the deliberate intention is good. But manners are to be found in each genus; for both a woman and a man servant may be good; though perhaps of
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these, the one [i. e. the woman] is more imperfectly good [than the man,] and the other is [generally speaking] wholly bad. In the second place, the manners must be adapted to the persons. For there are manners which are characterized by fortitude, but it is not adapted to a woman to be either brave or terrible. In the third place, the manners must be similar. For this, as we have before observed, differs from making the manners to be worthy and adapted. In the fourth place, they must be uniform; for if he is anomalous, who exhibits the imitation, and expresses such like manners, at the same time it is necessary that he should be uniformly unequal. The example, however, of depraved manners is indeed, not necessary; such for instance as that of Menelaus in the Orestes [of Euripides;] but an example of unbecoming and inappropriate manners is, the lamentation of Ulysses in the tragedy of Scylla, and the speech of Menalippe [in Euripides;] and the example of anomalous manners, in the Iphigenia in Aulis [of Euripides]. For Iphigenia supplicating does not at all resemble the Iphigenia in the latter part of the tragedy. It is requisite, however, in the manners, as well as in the combination of the incidents, always to investigate, either the necessary, or the probable; so that such a person should say or do such things, either necessarily, or probably; and that it be necessary or probable, that this thing should be done after that. It is evident, therefore, that the solutions of fables ought to happen from the fable itself, and not as in the Medea of Euripides from the machinery, and in the tragedy called the Iliad, from the particulars respecting the return of the Greeks to their country. But machinery must be employed in things which are external to the drama, which either happened before, and which it is not possible for men to know, or which happened afterwards, and require to be previously proclaimed and announced. For we ascribe to the gods the power of seeing all things, but we do not admit the introduction of any thing absurd in the fable; since if is introduced, care must be taken that it is external to the tragedy; as in the Oedipus of Sophocles. Since, however, tragedy is an imitation of better things, it is necessary that we should imitate good painters. For these in giving an appropriate

appropriate form to the image, preserve the similitude and increase the beauty. Thus also, it is requisite that the poet in imitating the wrathful and the indolent, and those who are similarly affected in their manners, should form an example of equity, or asperity; such as Agatho and Homer have represented Achilles. These things indeed, it is necessary to observe; and besides these, we should pay attention to such particulars as are consequent from necessity to the scenic representation. For in these, errors are frequently committed. But concerning these things, we have elsewhere sufficiently spoken.

CHAPTER XVI.

WHAT recognition, however, is, we have before shown. But with respect to the species of recognition, the first indeed is the most inartificial, is that which most poets use through ignorance, and is effected through indications. But of these, some are congenial, such as the lance with which the earth-born race [at Thebes,] were marked, or the stars on the bodies of the sons of Thyestes in the tragedy of Carcinus. Other indications, however, are adventitious. And of these, some are in the body, as scars; but others are external, such as necklaces; and such as the indication through a small boat, in the tragedy of Tyro: These signs also may be used, in a better or worse manner. Thus Ulysses through his scar, is in one way known by his nurse, and in another by the swineherds. For the recognitions which are for the sake of credibility, are more inartificial, and all of them are of this kind; but those which are from peripetia, such as were made [by Euryclea]

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in washing the feet of Ulysses, are better. And those recognitions rank in the second place, which are made by the poet, on which account they are not inartificial. Thus Orestes in the *Iphigenia* [in *Tauris* of Euripides,] recognizes his sister, and is recognized by her. For she indeed recognizes her brother through a letter, but he recognizes her through indications. Orestes, therefore, says what the poet pleases, but not what the fable requires; on which account it is near to the above mentioned error; since other things might have been equally well said. Thus too in the *Tereus* of Sophocles, the voice of the shuttle produced a recognition¹. But the third mode of recognition is through memory, from the sensible perception of something, as in the *Cyprii* of Dicæogenes; for on seeing the picture a certain person weeps. And in the narration at the court of Alcinous; for Ulysses on hearing the lyrist [singing the fortunes of the Greeks at Troy,] and recollecting [the story] weeps; whence also he is recognized [by Alcinous]. The fourth mode of recognition is derived from syllogism, as in the *Coephoræ* [of Eschylus]—a similar person is arrived—there is no similar person but Orestes,—Orestes, therefore, is arrived. Thus too in the *Iphigenia* of Polyides the sophist. For it was probable that Orestes would syllogistically conclude, that because his sister had been immolated, it would likewise happen to him to be sacrificed. Thus also in the *Tydeus* of Theodectes, [a certain person coming for the purpose of finding his son, says] “I came to discover my son, and I shall be put to death.” Another example also is in the *Phinidæ*. For the women on seeing the place syllogistically inferred what their fate would be, viz. that they should perish in this place; for they were exposed in it from their infancy. There is also a certain recognition which is produced from the paralogism of the theatre; [i. e. of the spectator] as in the *Ulysses Pseudangelus*. For the one person says, he should know the bow, which he had not seen; but the other, as

¹ i. e. Perhaps, the sound made by the shuttle as Philomela was weaving, occasioned her to be recognized.

if

if he must be known through this, on this account paralogizes¹. The best recognition, however, of all, is that which arises from the things themselves, astonishment being excited through probable circumstances; as in the Oedipus of Sophocles and the tragedy of Iphigenia; (for it is probable that she would be willing to send letters) since such things alone are without fictitious signs and necklaces. But the recognitions which rank in the second place, are those which are derived from syllogism.

CHAPTER XVII.

It is necessary, however, that the poet should compose fables, and elaborate his diction, so as that he may especially place the thing before the eyes of the spectator. For thus the poet perceiving most acutely, as if present with the transactions themselves, will discover what is becoming, and whatever is repugnant will in the smallest degree be concealed from his view. An indication of this is the fault

¹ Perhaps the fable of this tragedy was composed as follows: Penelope conceiving that Ulysses still lived, was unwilling to marry any one of the suitors; but a false messenger respecting the death of Ulysses is introduced to Anticlea the mother of Ulysses by the suitors. This false messenger pretends that he had formerly attended Ulysses at the Trojan war, and affirms that Ulysses is dead. To prove, likewise, that what he says is true, he adds, that he could distinguish the bow of Ulysses from ten thousand other bows. A great quantity of bows are then placed before him, among which is the bow of Ulysses, which he knows through a sign perhaps which had been taught him by the suitors. In consequence of this, Anticlea thus paralogizes: This man knew the bow; he could not have known it unless he had been with Ulysses; this person, therefore, has attended Ulysses, and is a true messenger of his death. Then becoming desperate through grief she destroys herself.

with

with which Carcinus is reproached. For Amphiaraus departs from the temple, which is concealed from the spectator who does not perceive it. But this is wanting in the representation, and the spectators are on this account indignant. For the poet as much as possible should co-operate with the scenery; since those are naturally most adapted to persuade who are themselves under the influence of passion. Hence, also, he agitates others who is himself agitated, and he excites others to anger who is himself most truly enraged. Hence, poetry is the province either of one who is naturally ingenious, or of one who is insane. For of these characters, the one is easily fashioned, but the other is prone to ecstasy. It is likewise necessary that the poet should universally exhibit the fables composed by others, and those which he composes himself, and afterwards introduce and insert episodes. But I say that he should in this manner direct his attention to what is universal. Thus for instance in the *Iphigenia* [in *Tauris* of Euripides,] a certain virgin being led to the altar that she might be sacrificed, and vanishing from the view of those who were to sacrifice her, and being brought to another country in which it was a law to sacrifice strangers to a certain goddess, she is made the priestess of these rites. Some time after, it happened that the brother of the priestess came to this place; but on what account? Because some god had ordered him for a certain reason which does not pertain to the universal [composition of the tragedy,] to come thither, but why he did so is foreign to the fable. The brother, therefore, coming, and being made captive, is recognized by his sister, when he is going to be sacrificed; whether as Euripides says [by an epistle,] or as Polyides feigns, speaking according to probability, because he said, it was not only requisite that the sister but that he also should be sacrificed:—and hence safety arises. After these things the poet having given names to the persons should insert the episodes; and he must be careful that the episodes are appropriate. Thus the insanity through which Orestes was taken captive, and his being saved through expiation, are appropriate. In dramas, therefore, the episodes are short, but by these the epopee is lengthened. For the fable of the *Odyssey* is short, viz. the fable of a certain person wander-
ing

ing for many years by himself, and with Neptune for his foe. And besides this, his domestic affairs being so circumstanced, that his wealth is consumed by suitors, and stratagems are formed against the life of his son. But at length, driven by a tempest, he lands on his own coast, and recognizing certain persons, he attacks the suitors, and is himself saved, but destroys his enemies. This, therefore, is the peculiarity of the fable, but the rest is episode.

CHAPTER XVIII.

IN every tragedy, however, there is a bond [or plot] and a solution of it. And external circumstances indeed, and some of those that are internal, frequently form the bond; but the rest form the solution. I call, however, the bond, the whole of that which extends from the beginning to the part which is last, from which there is a transition to good fortune; but I denominate the solution that part which extends from the beginning of the mutation to the end. Thus in the Lynceus of Theodectes, the past transactions, and the capture of the son, are the bond; but the part which extends from the charge of murder to the end, is the solution. But of tragedy, there are four species; for so many parts of it have also been enumerated. And one species indeed is complex, of which the whole is peripetia and recognition. But another species is pathetic; such as the tragedies of Ajax and Ixion. A third species is ethical; such as the Phthiotides and the Peleus. But the fourth species is such as the Phorcides [of Eschylus] and the Prometheus, and the tragedies which represent what passes in Hades. It is especially necessary, therefore, that the poet should endeavour to have

have all these species; or at least that he should have the greatest and most of them, especially since men of the present age calumniate the poets. For as there have been good poets in each part of tragedy, men of the present times require one poet to excell in all the parts. But it is just to call tragedy different and the same, though not perhaps with any reference to the fable. Those tragedies, however, ought rather to be called the same, of which there is the same plot and solution. But many poets connect the fable well, and solve it badly. It is necessary, however, always to labour to effect both these, and not to make tragedy an epic system. But I call that tragedy an epic system, which consists of many fables; as if some one should compose a tragedy from the whole fable of the Iliad. For in the Iliad, on account of its length, the parts receive an appropriate magnitude. But in dramas, the effect produced would be entirely contrary to expectation. The truth of this is indicated by such as have represented [in one tragedy] the whole destruction of Troy, and not some part of it, as the Niobe or Medea of Euripides, and who have not acted like Eschylus; for these have either failed of their purpose, or have contended badly; since Agatho also failed in this alone. But in peripetiæ, and in simple actions, such poets have admirably effected their purpose. For this is tragical and philanthropic. This, however, takes place, when a wise but a depraved man, such as Sisyphus, is deceived; and a brave but an unjust man is vanquished. But this is probable, as Agatho says. For it is probable that many things may take place contrary to probability. It is necessary likewise to conceive the chorus to be one of the players and a part of the whole, and that it co-operates with the players, not as in Euripides, but as in Sophocles. But with other Tragedians, the part assigned to the chorus does not more belong to that fable, than to any other tragedy; on which account the chorus sing embolima [or songs inserted in the fable,] of which Agatho was the inventor. What difference, however, does it make, to sing embolima, or to adapt the diction of one drama to another, or the whole episode?

CHAP.

CHAPTER XIX.

WE have, therefore, now discussed the other parts of tragedy. And it remains that we should speak concerning diction and dianoa [i. e. the discussive energy of reason]. The particulars, therefore, respecting dianoa are unfolded in the treatise On Rhetoric. For the discussion of it is more the province of that treatise. But those things pertain to dianoa, which it is requisite to procure by a reasoning process. And the parts of these are, to demonstrate, to solve, and to excite the passions; such as pity, or fear, or anger, and the like, and besides these, to amplify and extenuate. It is evident, however, that in things, also, it is requisite to derive what is useful from the same forms, when it is necessary to procure objects of pity, or things of a dreadful, or great, or probable nature. Except that there is this difference, that things in tragedy ought to be rendered apparent without teaching, but in an oration they are to be procured by the orator, and produced through the oration. For what employment would there be for the orator, if the things should appear of themselves pleasing, and not through the oration? But of things pertaining to diction, there is one species of theory respecting the forms of it, which it is the province of the player to know, and of him who is a master artist in a thing of this kind. Thus, for instance, it is requisite he should know, what a mandate is, what a prayer, narration, threats, interrogation and answer are, and whatever else there may be of this kind. For from the knowledge or ignorance of these, the poetic art incurs no blame of any moment. For who would think that Homer

errs in what he is reproved for by Protagoras? viz. That while he fancies he prays, he commands, when he says,

The wrath of Peleus' son, O goddess, *sing*.

For, says he, to order a thing to be done, or not to be done, is a mandate. Hence, this must be omitted as a theorem pertaining to another art, and not to poetry.

CHAPTER XX.

Of all diction, however, the following are the parts; viz. element, [or letter] syllable, conjunction, noun, verb, article, case, and sentence. Element, therefore, indeed, is an indivisible vocal sound; yet not every such sound, but that from which an intelligible vocal sound is adapted to be produced. For there are indivisible vocal sounds of brutes, no one of which I call an element of diction. But the parts of this indivisible sound are, vowel, semivowel, and mute. And a vowel, indeed, is that which has an audible sound, without the concurrence of another sound; such as *a* and *o*. But a semivowel is that which has an audible sound, with the concurrence of another sound; as *s* and *r*. And a mute is that which even with the concurrence of the tongue, has of itself, indeed, no sound, but becomes audible in conjunction with things which have a certain sound; as *g* and *d*. But these differ by the forms of the mouth, by places¹, by density and

¹ i. e. The different organs of speech, from which letters are denominated nasal, dental, labial, &c.

tenuity

tenuity of aspiration, by length and shortness; and farther still, they differ by acuteness and gravity, and by a medium between both these; the theory respecting each of which pertains to the metrical art. But a syllable is a sound void of signification, composed from a mute, and an element which has sound, [i. e. from a vowel, or semivowel]. For *gr* without *a* is a syllable¹, and also with *a*, as *gra*. The speculation, however, of the differences of these, pertains also to the metrical art. But a conjunction is a sound void of signification, which neither impedes nor produces one significant sound adapted to be composed from many sounds, and which may be placed either at the beginning or the end of the period, unless something requires that it should be placed by itself at the beginning; such as *μεν, ητοι, δη*. Or it is a sound non-significant, composed from more sounds than one, but naturally adapted to produce one significant sound. An article is a sound void of signification, which shows the beginning or end, or distinction of a word²; as *το φημι*, and *το περι*, and others of the like kind. Or it is a sound void of signification, which neither impedes nor produces one significant sound naturally adapted to be composed from many sounds, both in the extremes and in the middle. But a noun is a composite sound, significant without time, of which no part is of itself significant. For in double [or composite] nouns, we do not use the parts as of themselves significant. Thus in the word *θεοδωρος*, *Theodorus*, [though *theos* signifies God and *doron* a gift,] yet *doron* signifies nothing. A verb is a composite sound, significant with time, of which no part is of itself significant, in the same manner also as in nouns. For *man* or *white* does not signify in conjunction with time; but *he walks*, or *he did walk*, signify, the former indeed the present, and the latter the past time. But case pertains to noun or verb. And one case, indeed, [in nouns] signifies that something is said of this thing, or is attributed to

¹ *Gr* is an instance of a syllable composed of a mute and a semivowel; and *gra* of a syllable composed of a mute, a vowel, and a semivowel.

² This description is most obscure, but the sense seems to be, that an article is a sound which of itself does not signify any thing definite, but merely serves to indicate a significant sound, before or after which it is placed, or which it distinguishes from other words.

this thing, and the like ; but another is that which pertains to one thing or many things ; as *men*, or *man*. And another case pertains to action, such as what relates to interrogation or demand. For did *he walk*? Or *walk* is a case of a verb according to these species. And a sentence is a composite significant sound, of which certain parts of themselves signify something ; for not every sentence is composed from nouns and verbs ; (since the definition of man [a rational mortal animal,] is a sentence without a verb) but there may be a sentence without verbs. A sentence, however, will always have some part significant ; as in the sentence *Cleon walks*, the word *Cleon* is significant. But a sentence is one in a twofold respect ; for it is either that which signifies one thing, or that which becomes one from many conjunctions. Thus the *Iliad*, indeed, is one by conjunction ; but the definition of man is one, because it signifies one thing.

CHAPTER XXI.

WITH respect to the species of a noun, one is simple ; and I call the simple noun that which is not composed from things significant ; but another is twofold. And this either consists of that which is significant, and that which is without signification, or of words which are significant. A noun also may be triple and quadruple, as is the case with many of the nouns of the Megalotæ ; such as *Hermocaïcoxanthus*¹. But every noun is either proper or foreign, or metaphorical, or orna-

¹ This is a noun composed from the names of the three rivers Hermus, Caicus, and Xanthus.

mental,

mental, or invented for the purpose, or protracted, or contracted, or changed. But I call that a proper name, which is used by every one; and that a foreign name which is used by other nations. Hence, it is evident that the same noun may be both foreign and proper, though not to the same people. For the word *Σιγύρον*¹, is proper to the Cyprians, but foreign to us. But a metaphor is the transposition of a noun to a signification different from its original import, either from the genus to the species, or from the species to the genus; or from species to species, or according to the analogous. I call, however, a transposition from genus to species, such as,

“ There station’d is my ship ².”

For to be moored is something pertaining to the being stationed. But a transposition from species to genus is such as,

———“ Ten thousand valiant deeds
Ulysses has achiev’d ³.”———

For ten thousand is a great number, and is now used instead of many. And a transposition from species to species is such as,

“ The brazen falchion drew away his life.”

And,

“ Cut by the ruthless sword.”

For here *to draw away*, is used instead of *to cut*; and *to cut* is used instead of *to draw away*; since both imply the taking something away. But I call a transposition according to the analogous, when the relation of the second term to the first, is similar to that of the fourth to the

¹ A dart made entirely of steel.

² Odyss. lib. 1.

³ Iliad. lib. 2.

third ;

third; for then the fourth is used instead of the second, or the second instead of the fourth. And sometimes that to which a thing is related is added instead of the thing itself. I say, for instance, a cup has a similar relation to Bacchus, that a shield has to Mars. Hence, a shield may be called the cup of Mars, and a cup the shield of Bacchus. Again, evening has a similar relation to day, that old age has to life. It may therefore be said that evening is the old age of day, and that old age is the evening of life; or as Empedocles calls it, "The setting of life." In some instances, also, where there is no analogous name, this method may be no less similarly employed. Thus, to scatter grain is to sow; but there is no name for the scattering of light from the sun, and yet this has a similar relation to the sun that sowing has to grain. Hence, it is said,

"———Sowing his god-created flame."

This mode of metaphor may likewise be used differently, when calling a thing by a foreign name, something belonging to it is denied of it; as if a shield should be called the cup, not of Mars, but without wine. But a noun invented for the purpose, is that in short which not being adopted by certain persons, is introduced by the poet himself. For it appears that there are certain nouns of this kind; as substituting *ερνται*¹ instead of *κερατα* for *horns*, and calling a *priest* *αρητηρ*, instead of *ιερευς*. And a noun is protracted or contracted, partly by using a vowel longer than the proper one, or by inserting a syllable; and partly by taking something away, either from the word itself, or the inserted syllable. A protracted noun, indeed, is such as *πολος* for *πολεος*, and *πηληϊαδεω* for *πηλειδου*; and such as *κρι*, and *δω*², are contracted nouns; and,

——— *μια γινεται αμφοτέρων εφ*³.

——— The sight of both is one.

¹ *ερνται* is derived from *ερν*, which, according to Hesychius, signifies *buds*, or *scions*.

² For *κριθη*, *δωμα*.

³ For *οφης*.

And

And a noun is changed when part of it is left, and part is invented by the poet; as,

Δεξιτερον κατα μαζον.

“ In the right breast¹.”

Instead of δεξιον. Farther still, of nouns some are masculine, others feminine, and others between, [or neuter]. And the masculine, indeed, are such as end in *n* and *r*, and such as are composed from mutes; but these are two, ψ and ξ . The feminine nouns are such as are composed from vowels, and always end in long vowels; as, for instance, in *n* and *ω*, or in long *α*. Hence, it happens that the number of terminations for masculine and feminine are equal; for the terminations of ψ and ξ are the same. No noun, however, ends in a mute, or in a short vowel; and only three nouns end in *ι*, viz. *μελι*, *κομμι*, and *πεπερι*. But five end in *υ*; viz. *πυυ*, *καρυ*, *γρυ*, *δου*, and *ασυ*. And the neuter nouns end in these, and in *υ* and *ο*².

¹ Iliad, lib. 5.

² The whole of this doctrine pertains rather to grammar than to philosophy or poetry, and is very mutilated and imperfect. Hence, the critics suspect that the text is greatly corrupted. But, as my design in translating the works of Aristotle, was to unfold his philosophy to the English reader, I shall leave to the *critical vermin* of the present day, the disquisition of *this* and every other *comparative trifle* that may occur.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE virtue of diction, however, consists in being perspicuous, and not abject. The diction, therefore, is most perspicuous, which is composed from proper nouns, but then it will be abject. But an example of this is the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. It will, however, be venerable, and remote from the vulgar idiom by the use of unusual words. But I call unusual words, such words as are foreign, the metaphorical, the lengthened, and every word except the proper [name of a thing]. If, however, language wholly consisted of such words as these, it would be either an enigma, or a barbarism. If, therefore, it were composed from metaphors, it would be an enigma ; but if from foreign words, a barbarism. For the idea [i. e. the definition] of an enigma is this, the conjoining things impossible with the inherent properties of a thing. From the composition, therefore, of [proper] names, it is not possible to effect this, but it may be effected by a metaphor ; as "I saw a man conglutinating brass to a man with fire ;" and others of the like kind. But from the composition of foreign words a barbarism is produced. Hence language should be moderately mingled with these. Foreign, therefore, metaphorical, and ornamented words, and the other species that have been mentioned, cause the diction neither to be vulgar nor abject ; but proper words cause it to be perspicuous. The protracting, however, contracting, and changing of names, contribute in no small degree to the perspicuity of the diction. For the use of words in a way different from their proper and usual signification, causes the diction to be not vulgar ; but the adoption
of

of words in their accustomed meaning, renders it perspicuous. Hence those do not blame rightly, who reprobate this mode of speech, and like the ancient Euclid ridicule the poet, for the facility with which verse might be composed, if the quantity of syllables might be lengthened at pleasure, making iambics even in common discourse ; as

And,

Ἦτι Χερὶν ἰδοὶ Μαραθῶντα ἑαδίζοντα.

Οὐκ ἂν γπαμμεν, τὴν ἐκείνου ἐξ ἀλλεγορέων,

It is evident, therefore, that the use of this mode of diction is ridiculous. But measure is common to all the parts of diction. For the same effect would be produced by the improper and ridiculous use of metaphors, foreign words, and other forms of diction. But we may see what splendor the appropriate use of them gives to epic poetry, by putting the words in metre. And he who transfers proper names into foreign words, into metaphors, and the other forms, will see that what we have said is true. Thus, for instance, Aeschylus and Euripides made the same iambic verse, but by only changing one word, from its proper and usual to a foreign signification, the one verse appears beautiful, and the other mean. For Aeschylus indeed, in his *Philoctetes*, writes,

A cancerous ulcer feeds upon my foot.

But Euripides instead of *εσθίει*, *feeds*, uses the word *δοιναται*. And, [in the verse of Homer, *Odyss.* 9]

Νυν δὲ μ' ἐνὶ ὀλίγῳ τε καὶ οὐτιδανῷ καὶ ἀκίῳ,

by inserting proper [and common] words, it will be,

Νυν δὲ μ' ἐνὶ μικρῷ τε καὶ ἀσθενικῷ καὶ αἰδῷ².

² In this verse Polyphemus complains that he was deprived of sight by Ulysses, a *little*, *weak*, *vile* man. But Homer instead of using the word *μικρός*, *little*, uses *ὀλίγος*, which signifies *few*. Instead of *ασθενικός*, *puny*, he uses *οὐτιδανός*, which signifies *a man of no account* ; and *ἀκίος*, *powerless*, instead of *αἰδής*, *obscure*.

2 N

And,

And,

Διφρον αιμελιον καταδεις, ολιγην τε τραπεζαν.

Διφρον μοχθηρον καταδεις, μικραν τε τραπεζαν¹.

And,

Ηἴονες βοουσιν. [Iliad. 17.]

Ηιονες κραζουσιν.

i. e. If instead of saying the shores *rebellow*, we should say the shores *resounded*. Again, Aripkrades ridicules the tragic poets for employing modes of diction, which no one would use in common conversation; such as *δωματων απο*, and not *απο δωματων*, i. e. *home from*, and not *from home*; *σεθεν* [for *σου*;] *ιν* [for *αυτον*;] and *Αχιλλεως περι*, and not *περι Αχιλλεως*, i. e. *Achilles about*, and not *about Achilles*; and other expressions of the like kind. For all such forms of language, because they are not in common use, remove vulgarity from the diction. But of this he was ignorant. It is, however, a great thing to use each of the above-mentioned modes in a becoming manner; and also compound and foreign words. But the greatest thing is to employ metaphors properly. For this alone cannot be acquired from another, but is an indication of an excellent genius; since to employ metaphors well, is to survey similitude. But of words, the double indeed [or compound,] are especially adapted to dithyrambic verse; the foreign to heroic, and metaphors to iambic verse. And in heroic verse indeed, all the above-mentioned words are useful; but for iambics, because they especially imitate common discourse, those words are adapted which may be used in conversation. And words of this description are, the proper, the metaphorical, and the ornamental. And thus much may suffice concerning tragedy, and the imitation in acting.

¹ In this verse, which is from the 21st book of the Odyssey, Homer, for the purpose of signifying an *ignoble seat*, calls it by a foreign word, *αιμελιον*, and not by the usual word, *μοχθηρον*; and he calls the *table*, not *μικραν*, *small*, but *ολιγην*, *few*.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CONCERNING the poetry, however, which is narrative and imitative in metre, it is evident that it ought to have dramatic fables, in the same manner as tragedy, and should be conversant with one whole and perfect action, which has a beginning, middle, and end, in order that like one whole animal it may produce its appropriate pleasure ; and that it may not be like the custom of history, in which it is not necessary that a manifestation should be made of one action, but of one time, viz. of such things has happened in that time, respecting one, or more persons, the relation of each of which to each other is just as it may happen. For as the sea-fight at Salamis, and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, though they happened at the same time, contributed nothing to the same end ; thus also in successive times, one thing may sometimes be connected with another, from which no one end is produced. Nearly, however, most poets do this. Hence, as we have before observed, in this respect also Homer will appear to be divine, when compared with other poets, because he did not attempt to sing of the whole of the Trojan war, though it had a beginning and an end. For if he had it would have been very great, and not sufficiently conspicuous ; or if it had been of a moderate size, it would have been intricate through the variety of incidents. But now having selected one part of the war, he has made use of many episodes from the other parts ; such as the catalogue of the ships, and other episodes, with which he has adorned his poem. Other poets, however, have composed a fable about one man, and one time, and one action,

2 N 2

consisting

consisting of many parts ; as the authors of the Cypriacs, and the lesser Iliad. With respect to the Iliad and Odyssey, therefore, one or two tragedies only could be made from each. But many might be made from the Cypriacs ; and from the lesser Iliad more than eight ; such as the Judgment of the Arms, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus, Eurypylus, the Ptochia, [or Ulysses in the character of a beggar,] the Lacænæ, the Destruction of Troy, the Return of the Greeks, Sinon, and the Troades.

CHAPTER XXIV.

AGAIN, it is requisite that the epopee should have the same species as tragedy. For it is necessary that it should be either simple, or complex, or ethical, or pathetic. The parts also are the same except the music and the scenery. For it requires peripetia, recognition, and passion ; and besides these, the reasoning and the diction should be well-formed ; all which were first used by Homer, and are used by him sufficiently. For in each of his poems he has introduced all these ; the Iliad indeed containing the simple and pathetic ; but the Odyssey the complex ; for through the whole of it there is recognition and the ethical. And besides these things, he excelled all poets in diction and reasoning. The epopee, however, differs from tragedy in the length of the composition, and in the metre. But the proper boundary of its length we have before described ; for it should be such that the beginning and the end may be seen at one view. This, however, will be effected if the compositions are shorter than those of the ancient poets, and brought to the same length with the multitude of tragedies that are performed at one time. But it is the peculiarity of the epopee to possess

possess abundantly the power of increasing in magnitude ; for tragedy is not capable of imitating many actions that are performed at the same time, but that part only which is represented in the scene, and acted by the players. In the epopee, however, in consequence of being a narration, many events may be introduced which have happened at the same time, which are so connected as to contribute to the same end, and from which the bulk of the poem is encreased. Hence, this contributes to its magnificence, transports the hearer to different places, and adorns the poem with dissimilar episodes. For similitude of events rapidly produces satiety, and causes the failure of tragedies. But heroic metre [i. e. hexameter verse,] is found by experience to be adapted to the epopee. For if any one should attempt narrative imitation in any other metre, or in many metres mingled together, the unfitness of it would be apparent. For heroic metre is of all others the most stable and ample. Hence it especially receives foreign words and metaphors. For narrative imitation excels all others. But iambics and tetrameters are of a motive nature ; the one being adapted to dancing, but the other to acting. It would, however, be still more absurd, to mingle them together, as Chæremon did. Hence, no one has composed a long poem in any other measure than the heroic, but as we have said, nature herself teaches us that hexameter verse is adapted to the epopee. Homer, indeed, deserves to be praised for many other things, and also because he is the only poet who was not ignorant what he ought to do himself. For it is requisite that the poet should speak in his own person as little as possible ; for so far as he speaks in his own person he is not an imitator. Other poets, therefore, take an active part through the whole poem, and they only imitate a few things, and seldom. But Homer, after a short preface, immediately introduces a man or a woman, or something else that has manners ; for there is nothing in his poem unattended with manners. It is necessary, therefore, in tragedies to produce the wonderful ; but that which is contrary to reason is better fitted to be received in the epopee. Hence, the wonderful is excited in the highest degree from the agent not being seen. In the next place, the particulars respecting the pursuit of Hector,

Hector,

Hector, would appear ridiculous [when placed before the eyes] in the scene ; the Greeks indeed standing still, and not pursuing, and Achilles making signs to them not to engage. But in the epopee this is concealed. The wonderful, however, is pleasing ; of which this is an indication, that all men when they wish to gratify their hearers, add something to what they relate. Homer also in the highest degree taught others how to speak falsely [i. e. to make false narrations] in a proper manner. But this is a paralogism. For men fancy that when the consequent follows from the antecedent, the consequent may be converted, and that the antecedent will follow from the consequent. This, however, is false. For the antecedent may be false ; but this being otherwise, the consequent will necessarily follow. For through knowing the consequent to be true, our soul paralogizes, and concludes that the antecedent also is true¹. Again, things which are impossible but probable, are to be preferred to such as are possible but improbable. Fables also should not be composed from irrational parts, but as much as possible indeed, they should have nothing irrational in them : If, however, this is impossible, care should be taken that the irrational circumstance does not pertain to the fable, as in the case of Oedipus not knowing how Laius died. For it must not be brought into the drama, like the narration of the Pythian games in the Electra, or him who in the tragedy of the Mysians, comes from Tegea to Mysia without speaking. It is ridiculous, therefore, to say, that otherwise the fable would be destroyed ; for such fables should not at first be composed. But if they are composed, and it appears more reasonable that they should be, the absurdity also must be admitted ; since the irrational circumstances in the Odyssey, such as Ulysses being left on the shore of Ithaca by the Phœacians, would evidently have been intolerable, if they had been fabricated by a bad poet. But now the poet conceals the absurdity, and renders it

¹ The moderns, from being ignorant of this very important truth, have committed the greatest errors in the mathematical sciences : for they have not been aware how possible it is to deduce *true conclusions* from *false principles*. See my *Elements of the True Arithmetic of Infinites*.

pleasing

pleasing by the addition of other delightful circumstances. The diction, likewise, should be laboured in the sluggish parts of the poem, and which are neither ethical nor ratiocinative. For a very splendid diction conceals the manners and the reasoning.

CHAPTER XXV.

WITH respect to the objections of critics, and the solutions of those objections, the number and quality of their species will become apparent from surveying them as follows. Since the poet is an imitator, in the same manner as a painter, or any other person who makes likenesses, it is necessary that he should always imitate one of three things. For he must either imitate things such as they were or are, or such as they are said and appear to be, or such as they ought to be. But these must be enunciated either by [common] diction, or by foreign words and metaphors. For there are many properties of diction; and we concede these to the poets. Besides this, there is not the same rectitude of politics and poetry, nor of any other art and poetry. But of poetry itself, the error is twofold; the one indeed essential, the other accidental. For the error is essential, when it attempts to imitate that which is beyond its power; but accidental, when it attempts to imitate improperly; as if, for instance, a horse should be described as moving both its right legs together. Or an error in each of the arts is accidentally committed in poetry, as in medicine, or any other art, when it fabricates things that are impossible. These, therefore, whatever they may be, are not the essential errors of poetry. Hence, the objections of critics must be dissolved from

from surveying these particulars. For in the first place, indeed, the poet errs, if what he fabricates is impossible according to the art itself; but it will be right if the end of poetry is obtained by it. For we have before shown what the end is. Thus, for instance, the end of poetry will be attained, if the poet thus renders what he fabricates, or any other part of the poem, more capable of producing astonishment. An example of this is the pursuit of Hector. If, however, this end can be obtained in a greater, or even a less degree, and that according to the art pertaining to these things, then the fault will not be entitled to excuse. For it is requisite if possible to be entirely without error. Farther still, it should be considered whether the error ranks among things pertaining to the poetic art, or to some other art. For it is a less fault not to know that a hind has no horns, than to make a bad imitation of a hind. Besides this, also, if the poet is blamed for not imitating things as they truly are, the solution is, that he imitates them as they ought to be. Thus Sophocles said, that he described men such as they ought to be, but Euripides such as they were. Hence, such must be the solution to this objection. If, however, it should be objected, that the poet neither represents things such as they are, nor such as they ought to be, he may say that he represents them conformably to the general opinion, as, for instance, in things pertaining to the gods. For perhaps it is neither better thus to speak, nor true, but it is just as it may happen, as Xenophanes observes, "In these things there is nothing certain." Perhaps, however, it may be said, that it is not better, indeed, thus to speak, but that the thing did at that time thus subsist; as in this instance concerning the arms [of the soldiers of Diomed:]

" A wood of spears stood by, that fix'd upright,
Shot from their flashing points a quivering light."

IL. 10.

For such was the order in which they were then placed, as it is now with the Illyrians. With respect, however, to the enquiry whether a thing is said or done by any one well or ill, we must not only direct
our

our attention to the thing itself which is done or said, and see whether it is good or bad, but we must also consider the person by whom it is done or said, viz. concerning whom, or when, or to whom, or on what account, he speaks or acts; as whether it is for the sake of a greater good, or in order to avoid a greater evil. But it is requisite to dissolve some objections by directing the attention to diction; as, for instance, to foreign words [in Homer;]

“ On mules the infection first began.” IL. 1.

For perhaps *ουνης* does not signify *mules*, but *guards*. And in what he says of Dolon,

——“ his form was bad.” IL. 10.

It may be said that *ειδος κακος*, does not signify a body without symmetry, but a deformed face. For the Cretans call a man with a good face *ευειδης*. And,

“ Mix purer wine.” IL. 9

For *ζωροτερος* may not mean wine undiluted with water, such as those who are addicted to intoxication delight in, but wine poured out rapidly. But a thing is said metaphorically, as,

“ The other gods and men——
Slept all the night.” IL. 2.

For *all* is metaphorically used for *many*; since all is a certain great multitude. And,

Alone unbath'd —— IL. 18.

is said of Orion metaphorically. For that which is most known, is called *alone* or *sole*¹. Objections also may be solved from accent, as Hippias the Thasian solved the following passages :

¹ Viz. It is called so comparatively with reference to what is less known. And it is most known of this constellation, that it does not appear to set in the ocean.

And,

διδόμεν δὲ οἱ [εὐχος ἀρισθαί τ']

—— το μὲν ἢ καταπύσσεται ὀμβρῶν³.

——“ Of some stately oak the last remains,
Or hardy fir, unperish'd by the rains.” POPE, IL. 23.

Objections likewise may be solved by the division of the sentence, [or interpunction ;] as in the following instance from Empedocles,

Αἶψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μαθὼν ἀθανάτ' εἶναι,
Ζωρὰ τε πρὶν ἡκρίτο⁴.——

Or by ambiguous expressions, as [in Iliad. 10.]

—— παρῶχην δὲ πλεὺν νύξ,

[τῶν δυο μοιραν, τρίτῃ δ' ἐτι μοῖρα λελαιπία⁵.]

“ Night of two parts the greater share had wan'd,
But of her empire still a third remain'd.”

For the word greater is ambiguous. Or objections may be solved from the custom of diction ; as when it is said that wine is κεκραμμένον, *mixed* ; whence the poet,

——“ Greaves of new-wrought tin.” IL. 21.

³ This line is not extant, and what is supplied is from the conjecture of some learned men. It alludes to the order given by Jupiter to the dream in Il. 2. to deceive Agamemnon. Here, if *διδόμεν* is read with an accent in the antepenult, it will signify *damus*, and will imply that Jupiter promises Agamemnon glory from the battle ; but if it is read with an accent in the penult, so as to be the infinitive Ionic, it will signify *dare*. It will therefore imply that Jupiter orders the dream to *give the hope* of victory to Agamemnon.

⁴ If this is read with the circumflex on the *ον*, it will signify that the oak became putrid by the rain, which is absurd ; but if it is read with an acute accent and spiritus lenis, it will signify *not*, and will imply, that the oak was not rotted by the rain.

⁵ The sense here depends on the punctuation. For if the comma is put after *ζωρὰ* in the second line, instead of *πρὶν*, the sense will be, “ Immediately those things were made mortal which before had learnt to be immortal, and pure which before were mixed.” But if the comma is put after *πρὶν* instead of *ζωρὰ*, the sense will be, “ that those things which before were pure, were mixed.”

⁶ In the original this line in the brackets is wanting, but there can be no doubt of it having been inserted by Aristotle, because without it there is no ambiguity. But the ambiguity is occasioned by the word *πλεὺν*, which may either signify *more than*, or *the greater part of*.

And

And those that work on iron are called braziers. Whence Ganymede is said

———“To pour out wine for Jove;” IL. 20.

though the gods do not drink wine. But this may be considered as metaphorically said. It is necessary, however, when a word appears to signify something of a contrary nature, to consider how many significations it may have in the passage before us; as,

“Five plates of various metal, various mould,
Compos’d the shield, of brass each outward fold,
Of tin each inward, and the middle gold;—
There stuck the lance:——— POPE, IL. 20.

For here the word *stuck* implies that the lance was impeded by the golden plate. Many objections, however, may be solved by paying attention to the many contrary opinions which the poet might follow. For the opinion of the multitude is frequently contrary to that of the poet¹. Or as Glauco says, “some men presuppose irrationally, and reason from their own decision: and in consequence of being led by appearances, reprobate whatever is contrary to their opinion.” This was the case with respect to Icarius [the father of Penelope]. For the multitude fancy that he was a Laconian. On this supposition, therefore, it is absurd that Telemachus should not meet him, on his arrival at Lacedæmon. Perhaps, however, the truth is as the Cephælenians say, viz. that Ulysses married among them, and that Icadius, and not Icarius [was his father in law]. It is probable, therefore, that this objection is erroneous. In short, it is necessary to refer the impossible either to the poetry, or to that which is better, or to opinion. For so far as pertains to poetry, probable impossibility is more eligible, than the improbable and possible. For the poet may imitate things not as they are, but as it is better for them to be, just as Zeuxis painted [Helen more beautiful than she was]. For it is necessary that the

¹ From the obscurity of the original, I have been obliged to paraphrase this passage.

pattern in imitation should be transcendent. The objection, also, that something is irrational may be solved by saying, that sometimes it is not irrational; for it is probable that what is improbable may have happened. But with respect to the solution of subcontraries, these are to be considered in the same manner as *elenchi*¹ in arguments, if the same thing [is affirmed or denied,] and with respect to the same thing, and after the same manner, and whether it is the same person [who affirms and denies]. It must, likewise, be considered whether he speaks from his own opinion, or adopts the opinion of some wise man. The reprehension [of poets] will however be right, through which it is shown that they have without any necessity devised something irrational or depraved. Thus irrationality is devised [without any necessity] by Euripides in his Egeus, and impiety, in the character of Menelaus, in his Orestes. These reprehensions, therefore, may be derived from five species. For they are either made because impossibilities are introduced, or absurdities, or what is hurtful, or subcontraries, or as errors committed against the rectitude of art. But the solutions may be surveyed from the above-mentioned number; for they are twelve.

CHAPTER XXVI.

It may however be asked, whether epic or tragic imitation is the more excellent. For if that imitation is the better which is less troublesome to the spectator, and such an imitation pertains to better

¹ Elenchi are defined by Aristotle in his treatise on Sophistical Elenchi, to be *sylogisms of contradiction*;

spectators,

spectators, that which imitates every thing is evidently attended with molestation. For such imitation supposes that the spectators will not perceive what is acted without the addition of much movement; just as bad players on the flute turn themselves round, when it is requisite to imitate a discus [in its circumvolution;] or when they sing of Scylla [drawing ships,] draw to themselves the coryphæus, or leader of the band, [in order to imitate this drawing]. Tragedy, therefore, resembles this imitation. For players of the first eminence express a few things by gesture and motion; but players of the second rank express nearly every thing by these. Hence, Myniscus called Callipides an ape, in consequence of carrying his imitation to a great excess. And there was also an opinion of this kind concerning Pindar [the player]. But as players of the first are to players of the second eminence, so is the whole art of tragedy to the epopee. They say, therefore, that the epopee is calculated for equitable and worthy persons, on which account it does not require scenery; but that tragedy is calculated for the vulgar. Hence, tragic imitation which is troublesome to the spectator, will evidently be inferior to epic imitation.

In the first place, however, this accusation does not pertain to the poet, but the actor; since it is possible in reciting epic poetry to pay too much attention to action, as Sosistratus did, and likewise in singing, as Mnastheus of Opus did. In the next place, neither is all motion to be despised, since neither is all kinds of dancing, but only that which is bad; and hence Callipides was blamed, as others now are for not imitating free women. Farther still, tragedy, in the same manner as the epopee, may attain its end without motion [and gesture;] for by reading, it is manifest what kind of a thing it is. If, therefore, it is in other respects better, it is not necessary that it should be accompanied with motion and gesture. In the next place tragedy has every thing which the epopee possesses. For it may use metre, and it has also music and scenery, as no small parts, through which the pleasure it produces is most apparent. To which may be added, that it possesses perspicuity, both when it is read,
and

and when it is acted. The end too of its imitation is confined in less extended limits. For being crowded into a narrower compass, it becomes more pleasing than if it were extended through a long period of time. Thus, for instance, if the Oedipus of Sophocles were put into as many verses as the Iliad, [it would be less pleasing]. Again, the imitation of the epopee of whatever kind it may be, has less unity [than tragic imitation;] of which this is an indication, that from any kind of epic imitation many tragedies may be produced. Hence, if he who writes an epic poem should choose a fable perfectly one, the poem would necessarily either appear short, as if curtailed, or if it should be accompanied with length of metre, it would seem to be languid. But if he should compose one fable from many fables, I mean, if the poem should consist of many actions, it would not possess unity. Thus, the Iliad and Odyssey contain many such parts, which of themselves possess magnitude, though these poems are composed as much as possible, in the most excellent manner, and are most eminently the imitation of one action. If, therefore, tragedy excels in all these particulars, and besides this, in the work of art, (for neither tragic nor epic imitation, ought to produce a casual pleasure, but that which we have mentioned) it is evident that it will be more excellent than the epopee, in consequence of attaining its end in a greater degree. And thus much concerning tragedy, and the epopee, as to themselves, their species, and their parts, their number and their difference, what the causes are of their being good or bad, and also concerning the objections which may be made to them, and the solutions of the objections

THE

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BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

• EVERY art and every ^{method} method, and in like manner every ^{action} action and deliberate choice, appear to aspire after a certain good. Hence, it is well said, that *the good* is that which all things desire. Of ends, however, there appears to be a certain difference; for some of them are energies; but others of them besides these are certain ^{works} works. But in those things in which there are certain ends besides the actions, in these the ^{works} works are naturally adapted to be better than the energies. Since, however, there are many actions and arts, and sciences, there will also be many ends. For the end of medicine is health; of the ship-building art, a ship; of the military art, victory; and of the economic art, wealth. But such arts as are of this kind are [arranged] under one certain power; just as the bridle-making art is arranged

2 P

under

under the equestrian art, and such other arts as pertain to equestrian instruments. Both this art, however, and every warlike action are arranged under the military art. And after the same manner other arts are arranged under other powers. But in all these, the ends of those arts which are architectonic, or master arts, are more eligible than all the ends of the arts which are subordinate to the master arts. For the latter are pursued for the sake of the former. It makes, however, no difference, whether the energies themselves are the ends of actions, or something else besides these; in the same manner as in the above-mentioned sciences.

CHAPTER II.

IF, therefore, there is a certain end of action^α, which we wish [to obtain] for its own sake, ^αbut we desire other things on account of this, and our choice is not directed to all things for the sake of something else (for thus there would be a progression to infinity, so that ^αappetite would be empty and vain)—if this be the case, it is evident that this end will be the good, and that which is the most excellent. Will not, therefore, the knowledge of this end be of great importance with respect to life? For by having, like archers, a mark at which we may aim, we shall obtain what is fit in a greater degree. If this, however, be the case, we must endeavour to adumbrate ^αwhat it is, and show to what science or power it belongs. But it would seem that it belongs to that power which is the most principal; and is especially architectonic. And the political power [or science] appears to be ~~a~~ thing of this kind. For this ordains what sciences ought to be instituted in

^αcities, ^αand ^αthe end of our action, and it is the most dignified of all sciences.

cities, and which of them ought to be learnt by the several individuals, and to what extent. We likewise see that the most honourable of the powers or ^{faculties} ~~faculties~~, are arranged under this power ; as, for instance, the military, the economical, and the rhetorical powers. Since, however, the remaining practical sciences ^{are used in} use this political science, and since it also ^{is the principle of} legally establishes what ought to be done, and from what it is requisite to abstain, the end of this science will comprehend in itself the ends of the other sciences ; so that this will be ^{the highest} human good itself. For though the good of an individual and a ^{state} city is the same, yet to obtain and preserve the good of a ^{state} city, appears to be something greater and more perfect. For we must be satisfied, indeed, if we can ^{only} effect the good of an individual alone ; but it is more beautiful and divine to effect the good of a nation ^{or of} and cities. These are the things, therefore, which ^{our present common subject} the method being political requires.

The ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν,
Even if identical in the cases of
the state and the individual,
is yet more important in the
case of the state.

CHAPTER III.

It will, however, be discussed sufficiently, if it is rendered perspicuous according to its subject matter. For accuracy must not be similarly investigated in all discussions, as neither in all the ^{works of} art. Things ^{small, common} beautiful, however, and just, with which the political science is conversant, possess so great a difference, and are involved in so much ambiguity, that [to some persons] their subsistence appears to be from law only, and not from nature. What is good, likewise, possesses a certain ambiguity of this kind, because it happens that many persons are injured by it. For some have ^{been ruined} perished through wealth, but others through fortitude. We must be satisfied, therefore,

in speaking about and from such things, if we can indicate the truth by a rude adumbration, and if our conclusions in discussing things ^{these} which ^{must} have a frequency of subsistence, ^{from premises which only amount to generalities, our conclusions, being of a similar nature} are similar in accuracy to the things themselves. After the same ^{sense} manner, likewise, it is requisite to admit every thing ^{whatever} that has been said. For it is the province of an erudite man so far to investigate the accurate in each genus of things, as the nature of the thing will admit; since it appears to be a similar thing to ^{accept plausible reasoning from} assent to a mathematician, ^{when speaking probably,} and to require demonstrations from a rhetorician. Every one, however, judges well of those things which he knows, and of these is a good judge. Hence, the man who is learned in any thing judges well of that thing; but he in short forms a proper judgment about every thing who is learned in every thing. Hence, a youth is not a proper ^{student} auditor of the political science, for he is unskilled in the actions pertaining ^{to} ^{the business of} life. But reasonings are from and about these. ^{hence} And besides this, if he yields to his passions, he will in vain, and without any advantage, be ^{a student} an auditor [of ethical doctrines;] since the end here is not knowledge, but action. It makes, however, no difference whether a person is a youth as to his age, or has juvenile manners. For the defect is not from time, but from living, and engaging in every pursuit from passion; since the knowledge of such persons, in the same manner as that of the intemperate, is ^{only proper theoretical and contingent} useless. But a knowledge of these things will be very advantageous to those whose appetites and actions are conformable to reason. And thus much by way of preface concerning the ^{student} auditor [of ethics] how he ought to admit [discussions of this kind,] and what we propose [to consider in this treatise].

CHAP.

CHAPTER IV.

REPEATING, therefore, what we have said, since all knowledge and deliberate choice aspires after a certain good, let us show what that is which we say the political science desires, and what the supreme good is of all actions. By name, therefore, it is nearly acknowledged by most men; for both the vulgar and the learned call it felicity. But they conceive that to live well and to act well, are the same thing as to be happy. Concerning felicity, however, what it is, they are dubious; and the multitude do not form the same opinion of it as the wise. For some of them indeed conceive it to rank among the number of things which are clear and evident, such as pleasure, or wealth, or honour; but others assert it to be something else. Frequently, likewise, the same person forms a different opinion of it; for when diseased he conceives it to be health, but when poor, riches. And those who are conscious of their ignorance, admire those who assert something grand, and above their comprehension. Some too, besides these many goods, are of opinion that there is another good subsisting by itself, which is the cause to all these of their being good. To examine, therefore, all the opinions, would perhaps be a vain undertaking; but it will be sufficient to consider those that are most eminent, or which appear to be in some respect reasonable. We must not, however, be ignorant that arguments from principles and to principles differ from each other. For Plato well doubts about and investigates this, whether the way is from principles or to principles; as in a race from the president of the games to the goal, or the contrary. For we must begin from things that

that are known, ^{and} But these subsist in a twofold respect. For some things are known ^{as objects} to us, but others are simply known ^{in their own nature}. Perhaps, therefore, we should begin from things known to us. Hence, it is necessary that the auditor of discussions about things ^{properly} beautiful and just, ^{and} and in short about political concerns, if he is to be benefited, should be ^{well trained} adorned with worthy manners. For the principle is this, ^{and this may serve as perfect principle} that the thing is so [viz. that certain actions are worthy, and others are unworthy;] and if this is sufficiently apparent, it is not at all requisite to know *why* it is so. But such a one either possesses, or will easily acquire [ethical] principles. Let him, however, who has neither of these, hear what Hesiod says: (Εργα, l. 295) *and*

“ He the first rank of excellence maintains
Who from himself in ev’ry thing is wise,
And what ev’n to the end is best foresees :
He too is good who yields to wise advice.
But he who neither from himself is wise,
Nor to assent to others can endure,
Is but a useless, despicable man.”

*He who learns all things of himself, is best,
And good is he who hears the sage's behest;
But he who'll never learn himself, nor heed
Sublime wisdom, is a fool indeed*

CHAPTER V.

LET us, however, return from whence we have digressed. For it seems that men do not unreasonably form an opinion of good and felicity from [the different kinds of] lives. The vulgar, indeed, and the most worthless part of mankind, place felicity in pleasure; and on this account they embrace the life which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure. For there are three kinds of lives which especially take the lead, the one we have just mentioned, the political life, and the third is

is the contemplative life. The multitude, therefore, appear to be perfectly servile, deliberately choosing the life of cattle; and they support their opinion by the example of many persons in power, who have preferred a voluptuous life, and have lived like Sardanapalus. But men of elegant minds, and those who are addicted to practical concerns, place felicity in honour; for this is nearly the end of the political life. This, however, appears to be more superficial than the good which is the object of our investigation. For honour seems to be rather in the persons that honour, than in him who is honoured. But we prophesy that good is something appropriate, and of which it is difficult to deprive its possessor. Farther still, it seems that men pursue honour in order that they may believe themselves to be worthy persons. They seek, therefore, to be honoured by wise men, and by those to whom they are known, and with a view to virtue. It is evident, therefore, that according to these men virtue is more excellent than honour. Perhaps, however, some one may apprehend that this [viz. virtue] is rather the end of the political life. But even this appears to be more imperfect [than the chief good ought to be]. For it appears to be possible that he who possesses virtue may sleep, or be unemployed through the whole of his life, and besides this may be afflicted with evils, and experience the greatest misfortunes. But no one would proclaim a man thus living to be happy, unless for the purpose of defending his position. And concerning these things indeed enough; for we have spoken sufficiently about them in our miscellaneous writings. But the third life is the contemplative, which we shall make the object of our consideration hereafter. The life, however, which is engaged in the acquisition of riches, is a certain violent life, and it is evident that wealth is not the good which we investigate; for wealth is useful, and for the sake of something else. Hence, the things which have been before mentioned may be considered as ends rather than wealth; for they are loved on their own account. It appears, however, that neither does felicity consist in these; though many arguments are adduced to prove that it does. These things, therefore, we shall dismiss.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VI.

PERHAPS, however, it is better to consider universal good, and enquire how it is said to subsist, though such an enquiry as this will be arduous, because the men who have introduced ideas are our friends¹.

¹ Nothing can show in a clearer point of view that Aristotle was not in reality hostile to the Platonic doctrine of ideas, than the objections which he adduces against the existence of good considered as subsisting by itself, and the cause of all participated good. For the facility with which his objections may be answered sufficiently proves what we have elsewhere observed, that his opposition to this doctrine of Plato is made by him with no other view than to guard it from being perverted by men of superficial understandings. Previous, therefore, to a solution of the objections of Aristotle, it will be requisite to relate briefly the opinion of Plato concerning the good. The principle of the universe then was divinely denominated by Plato, *the one, and the good*, the former of these appellations denoting his transcendent simplicity, and causality, and the latter his subsistence as the object of desire to all things. This principle, likewise, as being *the one*, is celebrated by Plato as superessential, because being, so far as being, cannot subsist without multitude. All things, therefore, derive their subsistence from this principle through its goodness, and are expanded towards and aspire after it, as from thence deriving the perfection and good which they are naturally adapted to receive.

When Aristotle, therefore, says, "Perhaps it is better to consider universal good," the *universal* here must not be understood in the same way as in logical speculations; for there the universal which is predicated of many things is of posterior origin, but here it is prior to the many, and the many derive their subsistence from it. In short, as all ideas, considered according to their first subsistence in a divine intellect, are *wholes* and *universals*, having an essence prior to and exempt from the forms which are in bodies, much more must *the good* or the ineffable principle of things be called universal, as being the whole of all wholes, and comprehending all things in itself superessentially and ineffably. Hence, the objection of Aristotle, as we shall see, applies only to that universal good which is the subject of logical predication, and not to that which is the principle of the universe; for the former is posterior, but the latter prior to the many.

But

But it may perhaps seem to be better, and indeed necessary to the salvation of truth, to subvert the opinions even of our friends. For both being our friends [i. e. Plato and truth,] it is holy to give the preference to truth. Those, however, who have introduced this opinion, do not make ideas of things in which they admit there are the prior and the posterior. Hence, neither do they establish an idea of numbers. But good is predicated of essence, of quality, and of relation. That, however, which has a subsistence per se, and essence, are naturally prior to that which subsists as a relative. For this [i. e. a relative] resembles the branch of a tree, and an accident of being; so that there will not be a common idea in these. Again, good is predicated in as many ways as being; for it is predicated in essence, as god and intellect, [which are essences and are said to be good;] and in quality, as the virtues; in quantity, as the moderate; in relation, as utility; in time, as occasion, and in place, as a habitation, and after the same manner in the other predicaments. It is evident, therefore, that there will not be a certain common universal and one good; for it would not be predicated in all the categories, but in one alone¹. Farther still, since
of

¹ Plato, as we have before observed, denominated *the one*, *the ineffable*, and *the good*, the common cause of all beings, and arranged it above all things; for he says that it is the cause of all things, but is no one of all things. On this account it is above being, and is not being; not as falling off from being, but as situated above all being. All secondary goods, therefore, are referred to it as the common good, and which is participated by all goods. For every good posterior to this ineffable principle, being something else, is good according to the participation of it, so far as each is capable of participating of it. But *the good itself* has a super-expanded subsistence, and is nothing else than *the good*. On this account also, it is properly and primarily one, as not to be surveyed in conjunction with any thing else. What impossibility, therefore, will follow, if being the cause of all things, and imparting to every thing being, which is predicated according to the ten categories, it is said to be common to all things, as being their cause, and the universal good, as being prior to all that multitude of goods, to which it imparts being and goodness, and which by the participation of and relation to it, are said to be good? Aristotle, indeed, himself, in the beginning of this treatise praises those who assert *the good* to be that which all things desire; so that by using the words *the good*, and *which all things desire*, it is evident that he accords with Plato in acknowledging the first and most universal good. For by Plato and his disciples, the term, *the good*, is given to the first and universal good. And

of things which subsist according to one idea, there is also one science, of all goods there would be one certain science; but now there are many sciences of things which are under one category. Thus, for instance, with *occasion* the art of commanding an army is conversant in war, but the medical art in disease. And with the *moderate* indeed, the medical art is conversant in food, but the gymnastic art in labour².

It

Aristotle by adding, *which all things desire*, evinces that this is the most universal and the first good. For if all things desire it, it is necessarily above all things; since the term *all* does not permit us to conceive any being external to it. But *the good* is above all things, the first, the most causal, and the most universal of all things, not as in, nor as secondary to the many; for how can that which is first desire that which is second? It is evident, therefore, that Aristotle does not in reality oppose the doctrine of Plato concerning universal good.

² Again, it is evident that what Aristotle now says, does not by any means subvert the subsistence of the first good, and which is nothing else than *the good*. For that it is this which benefits all things, and that every thing by an analogous participation of it is said to be good, will not be doubted by any one endued with intellect. For what if one thing is more good, but another less; or if one thing is nearer to, but another more remote from it; or if one thing is good per se, i. e. essentially, as health of body, and virtue of soul; but another thing is something which contributes to these, as diet and exercise, and a certain medicine and remedy; or as some malady, and severe discipline of the body; in order that the soul may become robust and impassive. For there is an order in all things, so that among them one thing is more honourable, but another is second, and another is third in honour, and so on. The participation of good also is present with every thing according to its order. And if order is good, as disorder is evil to beings, how is it reasonable to suppose that good should not be imparted to things in an orderly manner? Or will any one require that all things should be co-ordinate, of a similar form, and a similar nature? But if this were the case, the difference of all beings, their essence, and their order, would be subverted; nor would there be any order or harmony in them, but all things would be casually confused. Or if there is order and ornament in them, and all things are from one, except that they are not the same either according to species or genus, but there is a great difference in them, so that some are subordinate but others transcendent,—if this be the case, some things will be superior, but others inferior, and some will be nearer to, but others more remote from *the good*, and the participation of the first will be analogous in each. If, therefore, natures are different, and the honour and order adapted to each, is it not necessary that the soul in contemplating each, should apply itself appropriately to each, and appropriately survey each, and that it should frame arts and sciences conformably to the genera and species of things, and survey their natures according to that which is analogous in each? For intellect being liberated from matter and body, surveys all things collectively and at once, and comprehends things multiplied unitedly, impartibly, things which are numerated specifically, and indivisibly things which

It may, however, be doubted what their intention is in denominating every idea *itself*, since in man *itself*, and in man, there is one and the same definition of man; for so far as man there is no difference between them. But if this be the case, neither so far as good [will good itself and goods differ³;] nor will it be in a greater degree good, from being eternal; since neither is that which is white for a long time, more white than that which is white only for one day⁴. The Pythagoreans, however,

which are divisible. But soul desires indeed to comprehend the collected energy of intellect, aspiring after the perfection it contains, and the one simple form of its intellection. Not being able, however, to obtain the at once collected intelligence of intellect, it runs and as it were circularly dances round intellect, and by the transitions of its projections divides the impartibility of forms. Hence, it conceives different modes of knowledge, in order that applying itself appropriately to each object of knowledge, it may acquire a knowledge of all things. For as a different nature and order are adapted to a different thing, so likewise a different mode of knowledge is adapted to a different thing, viz. when the knowledge is co-ordinate to the thing known. As, therefore, there is not the same co-ordinate knowledge of all beings so far as beings, so neither of all partial goods is there one co-ordinate knowledge so far as they are good, nor of occasions, so far as they are occasions, nor of things moderate, so far as they are moderate, nor of other things which are assumed similarly to these. And as it is by no means wonderful if each being so far as each, is this thing or that, as for instance, physical, or mathematical, or divine, and still farther celestial or terrestrial, aquatic or ærial, or fiery, and so of the rest, and that they are known by different modes of knowledge; thus also the mode of co-ordinate knowledge by which occasion, or the moderate, or any thing else is known, is different. Hence, all goods as participating of one first good are referred to one, and it will be the province of the same science to know all of them, as referred to and participating of it; but so far as each has a subsistence by itself, and so far as it is this particular thing, it pertains to a different art and science adapted to its proper nature and perfection.

³ In order to solve the doubt of Aristotle, it may be asked, how *the good* will be the same, and subsist after the same manner, in an immaterial and material nature, in an image and its paradigm, in that which is simple, and that which is composite, and in that which subsists according to participation, and that which is imparticipable? Or how can there be the same definition of the very nature of a thing, in things so separated from each other as we have mentioned, unless the image and its archetype, received the definition of essence after the same manner? Besides, according to Aristotle himself, in things material and physical, the definition is then perfect when matter and form concur with each other; but if we should assume the same definitions in things immaterial, immaterial will be material natures. This, however, is impossible. There will not, therefore, be the same definitions of things prior to material, and material entities.

⁴ It may, however, be said in answer to this, that eternal good is in a greater degree good than that which is ephemeral. For if being is to every thing better than non-being, to exist perpetually

however, appear to speak more probably concerning the good ; for they place *the one* in the co-ordination of things good ; whom Speusippus also seems to have followed. But the discussion of these things pertains to another treatise⁵. A certain doubt, however, presents itself concerning the particulars we have just mentioned, because reasons are not assigned concerning every good ; but things which are of themselves the objects of pursuit and love, are predicated according to one species ; and those things which are effective of these, or in a certain respect preserve them, or impede their contraries, are predicated on account of these, and after another manner. It is evident, therefore, that goods may be predicated in two ways ; and that some things,

tually will be better than to exist only for a time ; since when existence is cut off from that which exists only for a time, then it is not being, but non-being ; and the eternal then existing, is better than non-being. A more excellent good, however, is said to be more excellent by intension ; but that in which the essence of good has intension, is in a greater degree good. Neither is there the same comparison with each other, of that which endures for a long, with that which endures for a short time, and of the eternal with that which continues only for a day. For that which continues for a short, and that which continues for a long time, may partake of the same nature ; but that which is eternal, and that which is ephemeral, cannot. For as that which is ephemeral consists of a material and flowing essence, and is indeed passing into existence, but never really is, so the eternal consists of an immaterial and unflowing essence, and has real being, and is above generation.

⁵ Pythagoras made two co-ordinations of things, one as follows :

Finite	Straight
Odd	Light
One	Square
Right	Rest
Male	Good.

But the other is :

Infinite	Crooked
Even	Darkness
Multitude	Oblong
Left	Motion
Female	Evil.

The Pythagoreans, however, by placing *the one* in the co-ordination of things good, indicated its perfective and preserving nature. For every thing is perfected in this, and is benefitted and preserved by abiding in unity, since it is thus undissipated and undivided. But when it loses its oneness, it also loses its being.

indeed,

indeed, are good per se, but others are good on account of these. Separating, therefore, goods per se from things useful, let us consider whether they are predicated according to one idea. But what kind of goods can be said to be good per se? Are they such as are pursued alone, apart from other things, such as to be wise, to see, and some pleasures and honours? For these, though we pursue them on account of something else, yet at the same time may be ranked by some one among goods which are good per se. Or is the good per se nothing else except idea? Form, therefore, or idea, will be vain⁶. But if these also rank among goods which are good per se, it will be requisite that the same definition of the good should be conspicuous in all of them, just as there is the same definition of whiteness in snow and ceruse; but of honour, and prudence, and pleasure, there will be other and different definitions, so far as they are goods. The good, therefore, is not something common according to one idea⁷. In what

⁶ If, however, to be wise, to see, the pleasure arising from contemplation, and the honor of wise men, are, as Aristotle says, goods per se, yet they are not so per se as subsisting from and by themselves, as the archetypes of other things which are images, and energizing so as to generate things similar to themselves; for such are the prerogatives of ideas according to Plato. But they are said to be per se, not as essences, but as things to be pursued on their own account. Aristotle, therefore, cannot be serious in what he says, since the objection is sophistical, arising from the term per se being predicated multifariously.

⁷ If, however, according to Aristotle, those things are goods per se, which are alone objects of pursuit, and are not desired for the sake of something else, and this definition according to him is adapted to all the goods he has enumerated, and to such others as are of the same kind, will there not be one definition in all of them so far as they are goods? For the question is not whether so far as honor, and wisdom, and pleasure, there is one definition of them, but whether there is one definition of them so far as they are goods. What hinders then there being a certain idea of good per se, to which goods per se are referred? And, in the next place, each of these is not said to be good by an equal measure, as neither are all white things said to be equally white. For as these are said to be white from the participation of one colour, whiteness, and there is one definition indeed of whiteness, but the participation of this is not effected after the same manner in all of them, thus, also, there is one idea of goods, of which all goods per se participate, so that there is the same definition in them, so far as they participate of the same form. The good, however, which is participated is one thing, and that which is surveyed by itself, and has an imparticipable subsistence, or a subsistence not con-subsistent with any thing subordinate,

what manner, however, is it said that there is one idea of the good? For it does not resemble things which are fortuitously homonymous. Is it because all gods are from one and are referred to one good? Or is it rather according to analogy? For as sight is in the body, so is intellect in the soul, and another thing in another^a. Perhaps, however, these things must be omitted at present; for the accurate discussion of them will be better adapted to another philosophy. And in a similar manner concerning idea. For even if there is some one good which is predicated in common, or which is something itself separate by itself, it is evident that it can neither be practicable, nor acquired by man. But now that which is practicable by man, and which he may obtain, is the object of investigation. Perhaps, however, the knowledge of this separate good may to some one appear to be better with respect to those goods which may be acquired, and which are practicable. For having this as an exemplar, we may in a greater degree know those things which are good for us, and by knowing may more easily obtain them. This assertion, therefore, has indeed a certain probability, but it seems to be dissonant to the sciences. For all the sciences aspire after a certain good, and investigate that which is wanting, omitting the knowledge of it; though it is not reasonable to suppose that all artists are ignorant of and do not search for an aid of such great importance. It is likewise dubious what advantage a weaver or a carpenter would derive to their arts from the knowledge of the good itself; or how he who surveys the idea itself of the good, will become

subordinate, is another; to which the multitude of resemblances, and which differ from each other, are referred. For that each of many goods is and is said to be good from participation is evident from this, that each of these is not equally good. But there being participation, it is evident that it will be according to the imparticipable, to which the participations are referred.

^a Ideas do not subsist in this way, but as things which are from themselves, and as wholes and paradigms. Each, likewise, is one with respect to a multitude which participates of, is referred to, and resembles it. The similitude, however, of the participants of ideas to ideas themselves is not convertible. For here the image resembles its archetype, but the archetype by no means resembles the image; since if this were the case as there would be a common similitude between the two, another idea would be requisite from which this similitude is derived, and thus there would be a procession to infinity.

more

more skilled in medicine, or in commanding an army⁹. For it appears that the physician does not in this way consider health, but that he considers the health of man, and perhaps rather the health of this particular man. For he restores to health an individual. And thus much concerning these things.



CHAPTER VII.

Now, however, let us return to the investigated good, and show what it is. For it appears that there is a different good in a different action and art; since there is one good in the medical art, another in the art of commanding an army, and in a similar manner in the remaining arts. What therefore is the good in each? Is it not that for the sake of which other things are effected by that art? But this in the medical art indeed is health, in the art of commanding an army is victory, in the art of building a house, is a house, and something else in another art. And in every action and deliberate choice it is the end; since all of them¹ perform other things for the sake of this.

⁹ Though a survey of the idea itself of *the good* may be of no service to the arts, and for the common purposes of the merely animal life, yet we may say with Plato in the 7th book of his Republic, that "He who is not able by the exercise of his reasoning power, to define the idea of *the good*, separating it from all other objects, and piercing, as in a battle, through every kind of argument; endeavouring to confute, not according to opinion, but according to essence, and proceeding through all the dialectical energies with an unshaken reason, is in the present life sunk in sleep, and conversant with the delusions of dreams; and that before he is roused to a vigilant state, he will descend to Hades, and be overwhelmed with a sleep perfectly profound,"

¹ i. e. Every art, action, and deliberate choice.

Hence,

Hence, if there is one certain end of all actions, this will be the practical good; but if there are many ends, these will be practical goods. The reasoning, however, in its transition arrives at the same thing [as was asserted by us in the beginning^a]. But we must endeavour to render this still more clear. Because, therefore, it appears that there are many ends, and of these we choose some on account of others, such as wealth, flutes, and, in short, instruments; it is evident that all ends are not perfect. That however which is most excellent, appears to be something perfect; so that if there is only one certain perfect end, this will be what we investigate; but if there are many, it will be the most perfect of these. We denominate, however, that which is pursuable for its own sake; more perfect than that which is pursuable for the sake of something else; and that which is never eligible on account of another thing, than things which are eligible both on their own account, and for the sake of something else^b. In short, the completely perfect is that which is always eligible on its own account, and never on account of something else. Felicity, however, especially appears to be a thing of this kind; for we always choose this on its own account, and never on account of any thing else. But we choose honor, and pleasure, and intellect, and every virtue, on their own account, indeed, (for though we should derive no farther advantage than what the possession of them affords, yet each of them would be the object of our choice) yet we also choose them for the sake of felicity. No one, however, chooses felicity for the sake of these, nor, in short, for the sake of any thing else. The same thing also appears to happen from that which enables a man to be sufficient to himself; for perfect good appears to be self-sufficient. But we call the self-sufficient that which is not only sufficient to him who lives a solitary

^a *Viz.* That the end of every action will be good, and that which is most excellent.

^b Some things are eligible solely on their own account, as joy and happiness: others are eligible on their own account and for the sake of something else, as health, sight and wisdom; for they are not only in themselves desirable, but also for the sake of felicity; and other things are eligible for the sake of other things only, such as bodily labour, taking medicine when ill, the practice of physic, and of the other arts.

life,

life, but which is also sufficient to parents, and children, to a wife, and, in short, to friends and fellow-citizens; since man is naturally a political animal. A certain boundary, however, must be assumed of these things; for if good is to be extended to parents and their offspring, and to the friends of friends, there will be a procession to infinity. But this, indeed, we shall consider hereafter. We call, however, the self-sufficient that which subsisting by itself alone makes life eligible, and in want of nothing. But we think that felicity is a thing of this kind. And besides this, we think that it is the most eligible of all things, and is not connumerated [with any other good;] for if it were connumerated with even the smallest good, it is evident that it would be more eligible; since that which is added would become an excess of good. But a greater good is always more eligible. Felicity, therefore, appears to be something perfect and sufficient to itself, being the end of actions.

Perhaps, however, to say that felicity is the best of things, is to assert that which is acknowledged by all men; but it is requisite that we should yet more clearly say what it is. Perhaps, therefore, this will be effected, if the work of man is assumed. For as to the player on the flute, to the statuary, and to every artist, and in short to those who have a certain work and action, the good and the excellent appear to be in the work; this also may appear to be the case with man, if he has a certain work. Whether, therefore, are there certain works and actions indeed of a carpenter and a shoe-maker; but of man is there no work, and is he naturally indolent? Or shall we say, that as of the eye, the hand and the foot, and in short of each of the parts of the body, there appears to be a certain work, so likewise of man, shall we admit that besides all these there is a certain work? What then will this work be? For to live appears to be common also to plants [as well as to men]. But the peculiar work of man is now investigated. The nutritive and augmentative life, therefore, must be rejected. And a certain sensitive life will be consequent to this. — It appears, however, that this also is common to a horse and an ox, and to every animal. A certain practic life, therefore, accompanied

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with reason remains. But of this, one kind is obedient to reason, but the other possesses reason, and energizes discursively. Since this life, however, is predicated in a twofold respect [i. e. according to energy and according to habit,] it must be admitted to subsist according to energy; for this appears to be predicated according to a more principal mode of subsistence. But if the work of man is the energy of soul according to reason, or not without reason; and we say that the same thing is the work of the human species and of a worthy man, just as the same thing is the work of a harper and of a good harper, and in short, this is the case in all things, excellence according to virtue being added to the work; for the work of a harper is to play on the harp, and of a good harper to play well on it;—if this be the case, and we admit the work of man to be a certain life, and this to be the energy of the soul, and actions in conjunction with reason, but by a worthy man, these things are well and beautifully performed, and every thing is well accomplished according to its proper virtue;—if this be the case, human good will be the energy of soul according to virtue. But if there are many virtues, it will be the energy of soul according to the best and most perfect virtue; and besides this, in a perfect life. For as one swallow does not make spring, nor one day; so neither does one day, nor a little time, make a man blessed and happy. Let this, therefore, be a description of the good; for it is necessary, perhaps, [as in a picture,] first to delineate, and afterwards add the colours. But it would seem, that any one may be able to educe, and distinctly arrange things which are well delineated, and that time is the inventor of, or a good co-operator with, things of this kind; whence, also, accessions are made to the arts; for any one may add to what is wanting. It is also requisite to call to mind what has been before said, and not to search for accuracy similarly in all things, but investigate it in each according to the subject matter, and so far as is appropriate to the method [pertaining to the enquiry]. For a carpenter and a geometrician investigate a right angle differently; the former, indeed, so far as is useful to his work; but the latter explores what it is, or what the quality is which it possesses; for he is a contemplator of
of

of truth. After the same manner, therefore, we must proceed in other things, lest what is superfluous should become more abundant than the works themselves. Neither must the cause be required similarly in all things, but in some, as, for instance, concerning principles, it is sufficient to have shown properly *that* they are. But the subsistence of a thing (*το οτι*) is the first thing and the principle. Of principles, however, some are surveyed by induction, others by sense, others from a certain custom, and others in a different way. But we should endeavour to discuss every thing, so far as its nature permits, and should earnestly apply ourselves to define well; for this is of great importance with respect to what is consequent. The principle, therefore, appears to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things which are objects of enquiry become manifest through it.

CHAPTER VIII.

FELICITY, therefore, must be considered by us, not only from the conclusion, and the particulars from which its definition consists, but also from the assertions of others concerning it. For every thing which is inherent in a thing accords with the truth; but what is true is rapidly dissonant with what is false. Since goods, therefore, have a twofold distribution, and some of them are said to be external, but others pertain to the soul and the body, we call those pertaining to the soul, the most proper and principal goods; but we place the psychical⁴ actions and energies about the soul. Hence, it is well said, according

⁴ *ψυχ.* Pertaining to the soul.

to this opinion, which is ancient, and assented to by those who philosophize [that felicity is the energy of the soul according to virtue]. It is also rightly said, that certain actions and energies constitute the end [i. e. felicity;] for thus felicity will consist in the goods pertaining to the soul, and not in external goods. With this reasoning, likewise, the assertions accord, that the happy man lives well, and acts well; for nearly felicity will be a certain living well and acting well. It appears, moreover, that every thing which is sought for in felicity is inherent in the definition we have given of it. For to some, indeed, felicity appears to be virtue, to others prudence, and to others a certain wisdom; but to others it appears to be these things, or some one of these, accompanied with pleasure, or not without pleasure. Others, also, comprehend [in the definition of felicity,] external affluence. But of these opinions, some are supported by the authority of many and ancient men, and others by a few and renowned men. It is not, however, reasonable to suppose that either of these have wholly erred, but that they have erred in some one particular, and are right in most things. With those, therefore, who say that felicity is every virtue, or a certain virtue, our assertion accords; for it is the energy of the soul according to virtue. Perhaps, however, it differs in no small degree to conceive that what is most excellent consists in possession, or to conceive that it consists in use, and that it consists in habit, or in energy. For it is possible that habit when inherent, may be effective of no good, as in him who is asleep, or who in some other way is inactive; but this cannot be the case with energy. For he [who possesses virtue in energy] necessarily acts, and acts well. But as in the Olympic games, not the most beautiful and the strongest are crowned, but those who contend; for some of these are victorious; so those who act rightly obtain those things in life which are beautiful and good. The life also of these is in itself delectable [independent of external pleasure]. For to be delighted, is among the number of things pertaining to the soul. But to every one that is delightful of which he is said to be a lover; as a horse, to a lover of horses, and a spectacle, to a lover of spectacles. After the same manner, also, just things are
delightful

delightful to a lover of justice, and in short what pertains to virtue to a lover of virtue. Things, therefore, delectable to the multitude are hostile to each other, because they are not naturally delightful; but to the lovers of what is beautiful in conduct, those things are delectable which are delectable by nature; and such are the actions according to virtue; so that they are delectable to these, and are so per se. The life also of these, is not at all in want of pleasure, as a certain appendage, but contains pleasure in itself. For in addition to what has been said, he is not a good man who does not rejoice in beautiful actions; for neither would any one call him just who does not rejoice in acting justly, nor him liberal, who does not rejoice in liberal actions; and in a similar manner in the other virtues. If this, however, be the case, actions according to virtue will be of themselves delectable, but they are also good and beautiful, and especially each of these, if the worthy man judges well concerning them; but he judges in the way we have said. Felicity, therefore, is a thing most excellent, most beautiful, and most delectable. Nor are these to be separated from each other according to the Delian inscription: "That which is most just is most beautiful; but to be well is the best of things: and for a man to obtain the object of his love, is the most delectable of things." For all these are inherent in the best energies; but we say that felicity is all these, or one of them, and that the most excellent. At the same time, however, it appears, as we have said, that external goods are requisite to felicity⁵; for it is impossible, or not easy to perform beautiful actions without the assistance of externals; since many things are indeed performed as it were through instruments, by

⁵ To a felicity in every respect complete and perfect, as far as is possible to man in the present life, external goods are requisite; though a truly worthy man will still be worthy, and *essentially* happy, if derived of them. I say he will still be *essentially* happy, because his felicity consists in intellectual energy, and of this he can never be deprived by any adverse circumstances, because the energy of intellect is the same with its essence. I refer the reader who is desirous of seeing a specimen of this perfect felicity, to my translation of the life of Proclus by Marinus, prefixed to my translation of Proclus On Euclid. Such an instance as is there exhibited of complete felicity in one man, is hardly perhaps to be paralleled in all antiquity; and it would be folly to attempt to find a parallel to it in modern times.

means

means of friends, and wealth, and political power. The privation also, of some things, such as nobility, a good offspring, and beauty, defile a blessed condition of being ; for he cannot be entirely happy who is very deformed in his body, or of ignoble birth, or who leads a solitary life, and is deprived of children. And perhaps he can in a still less degree be entirely happy, if his children are very vicious, or, being good, die. As we have said, therefore, [a completely happy life,] requires such a prosperity as this ; whence also some arrange prosperity, but others virtue, in the same place with felicity.

CHAPTER IX.

HENCE, also, it is doubted whether felicity is a thing which may be acquired by discipline, or custom, or in some other way by exercise ; or whether it accedes by a certain divine allotment, or from fortune. If, therefore, any other thing is the gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable to suppose that felicity also is the gift of divinity, and especially because it is the best of human concerns. This, however, will perhaps be more adapted to another discussion. But it appears, that though it should not be sent by divinity [to men,] but is procured through virtue, and a certain discipline, or exercise, it belongs to the most divine of things ; for the reward and end of virtue appears to be most excellent, and something divine and blessed. Felicity also will be a thing very common ; for it is able to be present, through a certain discipline and attention, to all men who are not mutilated with respect to virtue. But if it is better that felicity should be acquired after this manner¹, rather than from fortune, it is reasonable that it should be so

¹ i. e. Either from divinity, or through the exercise of virtue.

acquired ;

acquired ; since natural productions subsist in such a way as it is most beautiful for them to subsist ; and in a similar manner things which are produced by art, or by any other cause, and especially such as are produced by the most excellent cause. To commit, however, the greatest and most beautiful of things to fortune, would be very lawless and reprehensible. The object of investigation, likewise, is apparent from the definition of felicity ; for we have said that it is a certain energy of the soul according to virtue. But of the remaining goods, some indeed are present from necessity, but others co-operate, and are naturally adapted to be useful organically. These things, also, will accord with what we have said in the beginning. For we established the end of the political science as the best end ; but this pays the greatest attention to the citizens, in order to render them characters of a certain description, and that they may be good men, and practisers of beautiful actions. Reasonably, therefore, do we neither call an ox, nor a horse, nor any other [irrational] animal happy ; for it is not possible that any one of them, can partake of such an energy as this. Through this cause, likewise, neither is a child happy ; for he is not yet, on account of his age, a practiser of things of this kind. But those children who are said to be happy, are proclaimed to be blessed through hope, [that when they become men they will obtain the rational energy in perfection]. For felicity, as we have said, requires perfect virtue, and a perfect life. For many mutations and all-various fortunes happen in life ; and it is possible that he whose affairs are in the most prosperous condition, may in old age fall into the greatest calamities, as in heroic poems it is fabled concerning Priam. But no one would call him happy who experiences such misfortunes, and who dies miserably.

CHAPTER X.

SHALL we say, therefore, that no other man is to be proclaimed happy as long as he lives, but that according to Solon it is requisite to look to the end of life? If, however, we admit this, is a man, therefore, then happy when he dies? Or is this perfectly absurd, especially to those who say as we do, that felicity is a certain energy? But if neither we call him who is dead happy, nor this was the intention of Solon, but his meaning is, that a man may then be securely proclaimed blessed, as being now out of the reach of evils and misfortunes;—even this also is attended with a certain doubt. For there appears to be a certain good and evil to him who is dead, if there is also to him who is alive, but without sensation, such as honour and ignominy, and in short, the prosperity and adversity of his descendants. This, however, also presents us with a difficulty. For it is possible that to the offspring of him who has lived to old age blessedly, and has died rationally, many mutations may happen, and that some of them may be good, and may obtain a life according to their desert, but that the contrary may take place with others. It is likewise evident that there may be an all-various apostacy in them from the manners of their parents. It would, therefore, be absurd, if he who is dead should also be changed together with them, and should at one time become happy, and again be miserable. It is likewise absurd, that the affairs of descendants should not for a certain time be of any consequence whatever to parents.

Let us, however, return to the former subject of doubt; for perhaps that which is now investigated may be surveyed from it. If, therefore,
it

it is necessary to look to the end of life, and then to proclaim each man blessed, not as being now blessed, but because he was so before; is it not absurd when he is happy [i. e. while he is living,] that what is present with him [i. e. felicity] should not be asserted of him with truth, because we are unwilling to proclaim the living happy, on account of the mutations of life, and because we apprehend felicity to be something stable, and by no means easily to be changed; but fortunes frequently circulate about the same persons. For it is evident if we should follow fortune, we must frequently call the same man happy and again miserable, thus evincing the happy man to be like the *chamæleon*, and possessing an infirm stability. Or shall we say that it is indeed by no means right to follow fortune? For living well or ill is not among the gifts of fortune, but human life, as we have said, requires the goods of fortune. The energies, however, according to virtue, are the mistresses of felicity, but the contrary energies are the mistresses of the contrary. That also which is now the subject of doubt, bears testimony to our assertion. For in no human affairs is there so much stability, as in the energies according to virtue; since they appear to be more stable than even the sciences themselves, and of these very energies those that are most honourable, are also most stable, because blessed men principally and most assiduously live in these. For this appears to be the cause that oblivion does not happen concerning them. The object of investigation, therefore, is present with the happy man, and he will be such through life. For always, or the most of all men, he will perform and contemplate things pertaining to virtue, will bear the changes of fortune most beautifully, and in the most perfectly elegant manner, as being truly good, and a square¹ without blame. Since, however, many things happen from fortune, and which differ in magnitude and parvitude, it is evident that prosperous, and in a similar manner, adverse circumstances when they are small, are of no consequence to the life of man;

¹ i. e. A cubic body, which having each of its superficies a square, can stand erect on each of them. Thus also the happy man, on account of his perfect virtue, will energize with undeviating rectitude in every fortune.

but that such as are great and numerous, if they are indeed prosperous, render life more blessed; for they are also naturally adapted to adorn life, and the use of them is beautiful and good; and that, on the contrary, if they are adverse, they oppress and injure beatitude. For they bring with them molestation, and are an impediment to many energies. At the same time, however, even in these the beauty of good conduct shines forth, when a man bears many and great misfortunes easily, not through an insensibility of pain, but in consequence of being generous and magnanimous. But if energies are the mistresses of life, as we have said, no one who is blessed will become miserable^{*}; since he will
never

^{*} That a truly good man, under the pressure of certain very great misfortunes is not blessed, nor yet miserable, but in a condition between felicity and misery, is an assertion which when rightly understood, is not dissonant from the doctrine of the best of the Platonists. For it is requisite to the perfection of felicity, that it should subsist in the most perfect energy; but some calamities may be so great as to render this impossible. Even in this case, however, the felicity of the truly worthy man will continue *essentially* the same, though it will not be the same in *perfect energy*; but may then be said to be, as it were, in a *dormant* state. The truth of this is most beautifully illustrated by Plotinus in his book *On Felicity*, from which the following is an extract.

“The wise man is never oppressed with evil, through ignorance of his own concerns, nor changed by the fortunes of others, whether prosperous or adverse; but when his pains are vehement, as far as it is possible to bear he bears them; and when they are excessive they may cause him to be delirious; yet he will not be miserable in the midst of the greatest pains, but his intellectual light will assiduously shine in the penetralia of his soul, like a lamp secured in a watch tower, which shines with unremitted splendour, though surrounded by stormy winds and raging seas. But what shall we say, if through the violence of pain he is just ready to destroy himself? Indeed, if the pain is so vehemently extended, he will, if sensible, consult what is requisite to be done, for in these circumstances the freedom of the will is not taken away. At the same time it must be observed, that things of this kind do not appear to men excellent in virtue so dreadful as to others, nor yet reach to the inward and true man. If any one, however, objects that we are so formed by nature, that we ought to grieve for domestic misfortunes, he should understand that, in the first place, all men are not so affected, and in the next place, that it is the business of virtue to reduce the common condition of nature to that which is better, and to something more honest than the decisions of the vulgar. But it is more honest to consider as things of no moment all that appear grievous to our common nature. For the wise man is not as one rude and unskilful, but like a strenuous wrestler vigorously repels the strokes of fortune, endeavouring to throw his fortitude on the ground; since he knows that such things are displeasing to a common nature, but that to such a nature as his own they are not really grievous, but are terrible only as it were to boys. Hence, he contemplates even the slaughter and
destruction

never do any thing that is odious and base. For we are of opinion, that the man who is truly good and wise, will bear all fortunes in a becoming

destruction of cities, the rapine and prey, like the scenes in a theatre, as nothing more than certain transmutations, and alternate changes of figures; and weeping and distress every where as delusive and fictitious. For in the particular acts of human life, he knows it is not the interior soul and the true man, but the exterior shadow of the man alone, which laments and weeps, performing his part on the earth as in a more ample and extended scene, in which many shadows of souls and phantom scenes appear.

But what shall we say when the wise man is no longer himself, in consequence of being overwhelmed with disease? We reply, that if in such a state it is allowed he may retain his proper virtue, like one in a deep sleep, what is there to prevent his being happy? Since no one would deprive him of felicity in sleep, nor consider that interval of rest as any hindrance to the happiness of the whole of life. Again, if it is said, how can he be happy, though endued with virtue, while he does not perceive himself virtuous, nor energizes according to virtue? We reply, though a man does not perceive himself to be healthy, he may nevertheless be healthy; and again, he will not be less beautiful in his body, though not sensible of his beauty; and will a man be less wise if he does not perceive himself to be wise? But perhaps some one may say, that wisdom should be accompanied with sense and animadversion, for felicity is present with wisdom in energy: We reply, if this energy of wisdom was any thing adventitious, there might be some weight in the assertion, but if the subsistence of wisdom is situated in a certain essence, or rather in essence itself, this essence will neither perish in him who is asleep or delirious; or is denied to be any longer conscious of his felicity. And, indeed, the energy of this essence resides in the soul of such a one, and is an energy perpetually vigilant; for then the wise man considered as wise energizes, whether he be in a dormant state, or overwhelmed with infirmity. But an energy of this kind is not concealed from the whole itself, but rather from some particular part; just as with respect to the vegetable energy in its most flourishing state, an animadversion of such an energy, does not transmigrate into the external man by means of a sentient nature; and if we were entirely the same with our vegetable power, there is no doubt but we should energize whenever such a virtue was in energy. Since, however, the case is otherwise, and we are the energy of that which is intelligent, we energize in consequence of its energy.

Perhaps, indeed, such an energy is concealed from us because it does not reach any sentient power; for to this purpose it should energize through sense as a medium. But why should not intellect energize, and soul about intellect, preceding all sense and animadversion? For it is requisite there should be some energy prior to animadversion, since the energy of intellect is the same with its essence. But animadversion appears to take place when the energy of intellect is reflected; and when that which energizes according to the life of the soul rebounds as it were back again, like images in a mirror quietly situated in a smooth and polished place, so as to reflect every form which its receptacle contains. For as in things of this kind, when the mirror is not present, or is not properly disposed, the energy from which the image was formed is indeed

becoming manner, and from existing circumstances will always perform the most beautiful deeds ; just as a good general will use the army under his

present, but the resemblance absent ; so with respect to the soul, when it energizes in quiet, certain resemblances of thought and intellect beam on our imagination, like the images in the smooth and polished mirror ; and in a sensible manner, as it were, we acknowledge that our intellect and reason energize together with the former knowledge. But when this medium is confounded, because the harmony of the body is disturbed, then intellect and reason understand without an image, and intellection is carried on without imagination. Hence, intelligence may be considered as subsisting together with the phantasy, while, in the mean time, intelligence is something very different from the phantasy. Besides it is easy to discover many speculations of men when vigilant, and worthy actions, in the performance of which it is evident that we do not perceive ourselves to speculate and act. For it is not necessary that he who reads should be conscious he is reading, especially when he reads with the greatest attention ; nor that he who acts vigorously should acknowledge his vigorous energy ; and the same consequence ensues in a variety of other operations : so that sensible animadversions appear to render more debile the actions which they attend ; but when they are *alone*, they are then pure, and seem to possess more of energy and life. And, hence, when worthy men live in such a state, it follows that they live in a more perfect manner ; since their life is not at that time diffused into sense, and by this means remitted in its energy, but is collected into itself, in one uniform, intellectual tenor.

Nor are the wise man's energies entirely prevented by the changes of fortune, but different energies will take place in different fortunes, yet all of them equally worthy, and those perhaps more worthy which rightly compose jarring externals. For the greatest discipline always resides with him, and this more so, though he should be placed in the ball of Phalaris. For what is there pronounced in agony, is pronounced by that which is placed in torment, the external and shadowy man, which is far different from the true man, who dwelling by himself, so far as he necessarily resides with himself, never ceases from the contemplation of the supreme good.

But he who does not place the wise man in such an exalted intellect, but subjects him to the power of fortune, and to the fear of evil, certainly presents us with a mixed character and life, composed from good and evil, and which possesses nothing great, either pertaining to the excellency of wisdom, or the purity of goodness. Felicity, therefore, cannot consist in a common life ; and Plato rightly judges that the chief good is to be sought from above ; that it must be beheld by him who is wise, and wishes to become happy in futurity ; and that he must study to approach to its similitude, and to live its exalted life. It is requisite, therefore, to possess this alone, in order to obtain the end of life ; and the wise man will consider all besides as certain mutations of place, which in reality confer nothing to felicity. In every circumstance of being he will conjecture what is right, and act as necessity requires, as far as his abilities extend. To which we may add, that though he lives a life superior to sense, he will not be hindered from taking a proper care of the body with which he is connected, always acting similar to the musician,

his command in the most warlike manner, and a shoemaker from the leather with which he is supplied will make the most beautiful shoe ; and the same thing will take place with all other artists. If this, however, be the case, the happy man will never become miserable ; nor yet if he should fall into the calamities of Priam, will he be blessed. Nor again, is he various and easily changed ; for he is not easily moved from felicity, nor by any casual misfortunes, but by such as are great and numerous. And after such calamities as these, he will not again become happy in a short time, but if he does recover his felicity, it will be in a certain long and perfect time, in which he will become a partaker of things of a great and beautiful nature. What then prevents us from calling the man happy who energizes according to perfect virtue, and who is sufficiently supplied with external goods, not for any casual time, but through a perfect life ? Or ought we to add, that he must also thus live and die conformably to nature ? Since the future is unapparent to us, and we admit that felicity is an end, and entirely and in every respect perfect. But if this be the case, we must call those among the living blessed to whom the particulars we have mentioned are and have been present ; but we must denominate them blessed as men. And thus much concerning these things.

musician, who cares for his lyre as long as he is able to use it ; but when it becomes useless and ceases any longer to perform the office of a lyre, he either changes it for another, or abstains entirely from its exercise, having an employment independent of the lyre, and despising it lying near him as no longer harmonious, he sings without its instrumental assistance. Yet this instrument was not bestowed on the musician from the first in vain, because it has often been used by him with advantage and delight."

CHAP.

CHAPTER XI.

THAT the good or bad fortune, however, of descendants, and of all friends, should contribute nothing [to the happy man,] appears to be a thing very unfriendly, and contrary to the opinions of mankind. But since many things happen, and which possess an all-various difference, and some of them pertain to us in a greater, but others in a less degree, to discuss them severally appears to be a long and an infinite undertaking. It will, therefore, perhaps be sufficient to speak of them universally, and to adumbrate what they are. As of the calamitous circumstances then which happen to the happy man, some have a certain weight, and are of importance in life, this is likewise the case with respect to all his friends. It makes a difference, however, whether each of the calamities happens to the living or the dead, and the difference is much greater than whether the illegal and dreadful deeds which are the subject of tragedy, have been formerly perpetrated, or are perpetrated now. In this way, therefore, the difference may also be collected. Perhaps, however, it ought rather to be doubted concerning the dead, whether they partake of any good or ill. For it appears from these things, that though something should arrive to them, whatever it may be, whether good, or the contrary, it is something debile and small, either in its own nature, or to them. But if it should possess a certain power, yet it cannot be so great, or of such a kind, as to make those happy who are not so, or to deprive those of blessedness who are. The prosperity,

prosperity, therefore, and in a similar manner the adversity of friends, appears to contribute something to the dead, yet with respect to them, they are of so little consequence, as neither to make those that are happy unhappy, nor effect any thing else of the like kind.

CHAPTER XII.

THESE things being disoussed, let us consider, with respect to felicity, whether it is among the number of things laudable, or rather of things honourable; for it is evident that it does not consist in power. It seems, therefore, that every thing which is laudable, is praised because it possesses a certain quality, and is in a certain respect referred to something. For we praise the just and the brave man, and in short the good man, and also virtue, on account of works and actions. We likewise praise the strong man, and the racer, &c. because they are naturally adapted to possess certain qualities, and have reference in a certain respect to something good and worthy. But this also is evident from the praises which pertain to the gods; for they appear to be ridiculous when referred to us. This, however, happens, as we have said, because praise subsists from relation. But if praise is given to things of this kind, it is evident that no praise can be given to the most excellent things, but something greater and better pertains to them, as also appears to be the case. For we proclaim the gods to be blessed and happy, and we also proclaim the most divine of men to be blessed; and in a similar manner we celebrate what is good. For no one praises felicity, in the same way as he does justice, but he proclaims it to be blessed, as something more divine and excellent than

than justice. Eudoxus, likewise, in his defence of pleasure, appears to have given it the palm of victory in a proper manner; for in consequence of its not being praised, as being among the number of good things, he considered this as an indication that it was more excellent than things that are laudable. But god and *the good* are things of this kind; for other things also are referred to these. For praise, indeed, is given to virtue; since from this we are enabled to perform beautiful deeds. Encomiums, however, pertain to deeds, and in a similar manner to bodies and souls. The accurate discussion, however, of these things, is perhaps more adapted to a treatise on Encomiums; but to us it is evident, from what has been said, that felicity is among the number of things honourable and perfect. It seems, likewise, that it is so, because it is a principle; for we all of us do every thing else for the sake of this; but we admit that the principle and the cause of what is good, is something honourable and divine.

CHAPTER XIII.

SINCE, however, felicity is a certain energy of the soul, according to perfect virtue, we must direct our attention to virtue; for perhaps we shall thus also speculate better concerning felicity. But it seems that he who is skilled in the administration of public affairs, labours especially about this; for he wishes to make the citizens worthy persons, and obedient to the laws; and as an example of these we have the legislators of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and any others there may have been of this kind. If, however, the speculation itself is of the political science, it is evident that the enquiry will be conformable

formable to our intention from the beginning. But our discussion must be concerning virtue, viz. human virtue; for we investigate human good, and human felicity; and we call human virtue, not the virtue of the body, but of the soul; and we say that felicity is the energy of the soul. If, however, this be the case, it is evident that he who is skilled in the administration of public affairs, ought to know whatever pertains to the soul; just as he who intends to cure the eyes ought to have a knowledge of the whole body¹; and this in a greater degree, by how much more honourable, and excellent, the political is than the medicinal science. Of physicians, likewise, the more elegant are busily employed about the knowledge of the body. He, therefore, who is skilled in the administration of public affairs, must direct his attention to the soul; but he must direct his attention to it for the sake of these things, and so far as is sufficient to the objects of enquiry. For to consider the soul still more accurately, is perhaps more laborious and difficult than the present discussion requires. We have also said some things sufficiently concerning it in our popular writings, and those must be consulted; such as that one part of the soul is irrational, but another rational. But whether these parts are separated, in the same manner as the parts of the body, and every thing which is partible, or they are two parts in definition [alone,] and are naturally inseparable, as in the periphery of a circle the convex and the concave, is of no consequence in the present discussion. Of the irrational part, however, one part resembles the common and vegetative power; I mean the power which is the cause of nutrition and increase. For such a power as this may be admitted to exist in every thing that is nourished, in embryos, and also in perfect animals; since it is more reasonable that this power should exist in them than any other. The virtue, therefore, of this power appears to be common and not human. For this part seems especially to energize in sleep, but a good and a bad man can in the smallest degree be distinguished in sleep; whence it is

¹ That the physician who intends to cure a part, ought to have a knowledge of the whole body, is inculcated by Plato in the Charmides.

said that the happy differ in no respect from the miserable during the half of life. But this happens reasonably; for sleep is an inactivity both of the worthy and the depraved soul; except so far as certain motions gradually arrive at the soul, and on this account the phantasms of worthy are better than those of worthless men. But of these things enough. The nutritive part, therefore, must be omitted, since it is naturally destitute of human virtue.

There appears, however, to be another certain irrational nature of the soul, which nevertheless participates in a certain respect of reason; for we praise the reason of the continent, and also of the incontinent man, and that part of the soul which possesses reason; for it rightly excites to the most excellent deeds. There appears, however, to be in them [i. e. both in the continent and incontinent] something else naturally contrary to reason, which wars against and resists reason. For, indeed, as the paralyzed parts of the body, if we wish to move them to the right hand, are on the contrary moved to the left, thus, also, it is in the soul. For the impulses of the incontinent are in a direction contrary [to the dictates of reason]. In bodies, however, we see that which is moved contrary [to the intention of the will], but in the soul we do not see [that which is moved contrary to reason;] though perhaps we ought nevertheless to think that in the soul, also, there is something opposite to reason, which is adverse and proceeds in a direction contrary to it; but it is of no consequence in what manner it is different from reason. This part, however, appears, as we have said, to participate of reason. It is obedient, therefore, to the reason of the continent man; and perhaps it is still more obedient to the reason of the temperate and brave man; for all things are in concord with his reason. It appears, therefore, that the irrational part is twofold; for the vegetable part in no respect participates of reason; but the part which desires, and, in short, the orectic part, participate in a certain respect of reason, so far as they are attentive and obedient to it. In this way, therefore, we say that a man has a regard for, or pays attention to (*εχειν λογον*) his father and his friends, and not after the same manner as he has a regard for the mathematical sciences. But that

that the irrational part is in a certain respect obedient to reason, admonition and all reproof and exhortation indicate. If, however, it be requisite to say that this part also possesses reason, that which possesses reason will be twofold; the one, indeed, properly, and in itself; but the other resembling a child attentive to his father. Virtue, likewise, is distributed according to this difference. For we say that of the virtues some are dianoëtic [or belong to the power which reasons scientifically,] but others ethical. And we denominate, indeed, wisdom, intelligence, and prudence, dianoëtic virtues; but liberality and temperance ethical virtues. For when we speak concerning the manners of a man, we do not say that he is wise, or intelligent, but that he is mild or temperate. We likewise praise a wise man according to habit; but we call the laudable habits, virtues.

THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

SINCE, however, virtue is twofold, one kind being dianoëtic, but the other ethic; the dianoëtic, indeed, for the most part receives both its generation and increase from doctrine; on which account it requires experience and time; but the ethic is produced from custom, from whence, also, it derives its name, which declines but a little from *ethos*, *ethos*, custom. From which, likewise, it is evident, that no one of the ethical virtues is ingenerated in us by nature; for nothing that has a natural subsistence can by custom be brought to act differently from its natural tendency. Thus, a stone which naturally tends downward, cannot be accustomed to tend upward, though some one should hurl it upward ten thousand times; nor can fire be accustomed to tend downward; nor can any thing else among the things which have
natural

natural tendencies different from these, be accustomed to any other tendency than that which it has from nature. The virtues, therefore, are neither from nature, nor are ingenerated in us preternaturally, but they are produced in us in consequence of our being naturally adapted to receive them, and becoming perfect through habit. Again, with respect to such things as are ingenerated in us by nature, of these, we first receive the powers, but afterwards employ the energies of those powers; which is evident in the senses. For it is not from frequently seeing, or frequently hearing, that we receive these senses, but, on the contrary, having these senses we use them, and we do not have them by using them. With respect to the virtues, however, we receive them by first energizing according to them, in the same manner as in the other arts; for those things which it is necessary to do, in consequence of having learnt how to do them, these by doing we learn how to do. Thus, by building we become builders, and by playing on the harp we become harpers. Thus too, by acting justly we become just, prudent by acting prudently, and brave by acting bravely. But what happens in cities bears testimony to the truth of this. For the legislators by accustoming the citizens [to virtue] render them worthy characters; and this indeed is the intention of every legislator; but such as do not effect this well, err. And in this one polity differs from another, the good from the bad. Farther still, from the same things, and through the same things, every virtue is generated and corrupted; and in a similar manner every art. For from playing on the harp both good and bad harpers are produced; and analogously builders of houses, and all other artists. For from building well, they will be good builders, but bad from building ill; since if it were not so, there would be no occasion for a preceptor, but all men would be [naturally] good or bad artists. The like also takes place in the virtues. For by acting in our compacts with men, we become some of us indeed just, but others unjust; and by acting in things of a dreadful nature, and by being accustomed either to be terrified or to be confident in danger, some of us become brave, but others timid. The reasoning, likewise, is similar with respect to desire and anger; for some men, indeed, become

become temperate and mild, but others intemperate and irascible ; these from being in this way conversant with these things, but those from being conversant with them in that way. And in one word, habits are produced from similar energies. Hence, it is necessary to render energies endued with a certain quality ; for habits follow from the differences of these. It is of no small consequence, therefore, to be thus or thus accustomed immediately from our youth, but it is of very great consequence ; or rather, it is every thing.

CHAPTER II.

SINCE, therefore, the present treatise is not for the sake of theory, like other discussions ; for our attention is not directed to this business, that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become good men, since otherwise no advantage would be derived from it ;—this being the case, it is necessary to consider with respect to actions how they are to be performed ; for as we have said, they are the mistresses of the qualities which habits possess. To act, therefore, according to right reason is common¹, and is now assumed to be so. We shall, however, hereafter speak concerning this, and show what right reason is², and how it subsists with reference to the other virtues. But this must be previously granted, that every treatise of practical affairs ought only to be an adumbration, and not an accurate discussion, as

¹ Viz. In order that actions may be good, it is universally requisite that they should be performed according to right reason.

² In the 6th Book.

also

also we observed in the beginning, because reasonings are required conformable to the subject matter; and in practical affairs, and things contributing to them, there is nothing stable, as neither is there in things which are salubrious³. Such, therefore, being the universal reason, in a still greater degree will the discussion of particulars be deficient in accuracy; for it neither falls under art, nor under any precept. It is, however, necessary that those who are engaged in practical affairs should always direct their attention to an opportune time, in the same manner as in medicine, and in the pilot's art. But though the present discussion is of this nature, we must endeavour to give it assistance.

In the first place, therefore, this must be observed, that things of this kind [viz. actions which produce in us the habits of the virtues,] are naturally adapted to be corrupted by excess and defect, as we see in strength and health, [which are the virtues of the body]; (for it is necessary to use things apparent as testimonies, in things which are unapparent), since exercises which are excessive, and also those which are deficient, corrupt the strength of the body. In like manner meat and drink, when taken in too great or too small a quantity, corrupt the health; but these when commensurate, produce increase, and preserve it. This, therefore, is also the case in temperance and fortitude, and the other virtues. For he who flies from and is afraid of all things, and endures nothing, becomes timid; and he who in short is afraid of nothing, but marches up to all things, becomes audacious. In a similar manner, he indeed who gives himself up to the enjoyment of every pleasure, and abstains from none, is intemperate; but he who flies from all pleasures, like rustic men, is an insensate person. For temperance and fortitude are corrupted by excess and defect, but are preserved by mediocrity. Not only, however, generations, increments and corruptions, are produced from and by the same things, but the energies also [of the virtues] will subsist after the same manner; since

³ For things salubrious are changed, together with the dispositions of bodies, and the mutations of time.

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this likewise is the case in other things which are more apparent ; as, for instance, in strength. For strength is produced by taking much food, and enduring many labours, and the strong man is especially able to do both these. Thus, too, it is in the virtues ; for by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and having become temperate we are especially able to abstain from them. The like also takes place in fortitude ; for by being accustomed to despise things of a terrible nature, and to endure them, we become brave, and having become brave, we are especially able to endure terrible things.

CHAPTER III.

It is necessary, however, to consider as an indication of habits the pleasure or pain which is attendant on actions. For he who abstains from corporeal pleasures, and is delighted in so doing, is a temperate man ; but he who is grieved when he abstains from them is intemperate. And he, indeed, who endures dreadful things, and is delighted with his endurance, or feels no pain from it, is a brave man ; but he who feels pain from the endurance of them, is a timid man. For ethical virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains. For we act basely through the influence of pleasure ; but we abstain from beautiful conduct through the influence of pain. Hence, it is necessary, as Plato says, to be so educated in a certain respect immediately after our youth, that we may be delighted and pained with things from which it is requisite to feel pleasure or pain ; for this is right education. Farther still, if the virtues are conversant with actions and passions, but pleasure and pain

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are consequent to every passion and action, on this account also virtue will be conversant with pleasures and pains. The punishments, likewise, which are inflicted through these, indicate the truth of this; for they are certain remedies; but remedies are naturally adapted to operate through contraries. Again, as we have also before observed, the nature of every habit of the soul is referred to and conversant with those things, by which it is adapted to become better and worse. But habits become depraved through pleasures and pains, by pursuing or avoiding these, either such as ought not to be pursued or avoided, or when it is not proper, or in such a way as is not proper, or in as many other modes as such things are distinguished by reason. Hence, some persons define the virtues to be certain apathies and tranquillities; but they do not define them well, because they speak simply, and do not add, in such a way as is proper, and when it is proper, and such other additions as are usually made. It is admitted, therefore, that virtue is a thing of this kind, which is conversant with pleasures and pains, and practises things of the most excellent nature; but vice is the contrary. From what has been said, likewise, we may obtain still greater evidence about these things. For as there are three things which pertain to choice, and also three which pertain to aversion, viz. the beautiful in conduct, the advantageous, and the delightful, and three the contraries to these, the base, the disadvantageous, and the painful; the good man, indeed, acts rightly in all these, but the bad man erroneously, and especially in what pertains to pleasure. For pleasure is common to all animals, and is consequent to every thing which is the object of choice; for the beautiful and the advantageous appear to be delightful. Again, pleasure is co-nourished with all of us from our infancy; on which account also it is difficult to wipe away this passion with which our life is imbued. We likewise direct our actions by pleasure and pain, as by a rule, some of us in a greater, and others in a less degree. On this account, therefore, it is necessary that the whole of this discussion should be conversant with these things; for to rejoice or be pained properly or improperly, is of no small

small consequence in actions. Farther still, it is more difficult to fight with pleasure, than with anger, as Heraclitus says. But both art and virtue are always conversant with that which is more difficult; for that which is well done is better when it is effected with greater difficulty. Hence, on this account, also, the whole business both of ethics and politics, is conversant with pleasures and pains. For he who employs these well will be a good man, but he will be a bad man who employs them badly. We have shown, therefore, that virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains, and that it is increased and corrupted by the same things by which it is produced, when they do not exist after the same manner; and that it likewise energizes about the things from which it originated.

CHAPTER IV.

It may, however, be doubted what our meaning is in asserting, that men by acting justly become just, and temperate by acting temperately; for if they act justly and temperately, they are already just and temperate; just as those who perform things pertaining to grammar and music, are grammarians and musicians. Or shall we say, that this is not the case in the arts? For it is possible that a man may do something grammatical both from chance and the suggestion of another person. He will, therefore, then be a grammarian if he both does something grammatical and grammatically, that is, according to the grammatical art which he possesses. Again, neither is the thing similar in the arts and the virtues; for things produced by the arts contain in themselves efficient excellence. It is sufficient, therefore,

to these to be effected with a certain mode of subsistence; but things which are performed according to the virtues, are not done justly or temperately, if they subsist in a certain way, but if he who does them does them in consequence of being disposed in a certain way. And, in the first place, indeed, if he does them knowingly, in the next place, if with deliberate choice, and also deliberately choosing to do them on their own account; and, in the third place, if he does them with a firm and immutable disposition of mind. These things, however, are not con-numerated as requisites to the possession of the other arts, except the knowledge of them alone. But to the acquisition of the virtues, the knowledge of them is of little or no efficacy, while the other particulars pertaining to them are capable of effecting no small thing, but are all-powerful; and these are obtained from frequently acting justly and temperately. Things, therefore, are said to be just and temperate, when they are such as a just or temperate man would perform. But he is a just and temperate man, not who [merely] does these things, but who does them so as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, therefore, that a man becomes just from acting justly, and temperate from acting temperately; but that from not doing these things, no one will ever become a good man. The multitude, however, do not thus act, but flying to words they fancy they shall philosophize, and thus become worthy characters; acting similarly to sick persons, who attentively indeed hear what the physicians say, but do nothing which they order them to do. As, therefore, these by such a method of cure, never have their body in a healthy condition, so neither is the soul of those ever well who thus philosophize.

CHAP.

CHAPTER V.

IN the next place, we must consider what virtue is. Since, therefore, three things are produced in the soul, viz. passions, powers, and habits, virtue will be some one of these. But I call passions, indeed, desire¹, anger, audacity, envy, joy, love, hatred, cupidity, emulation, pity, and, in short, those things to which pleasure or pain are consequent. And I denominate powers, those things according to which we are said to be susceptible of the passions; viz. according to which we are able to be angry, or pained, or are inclined to pity. But I call habits those things according to which we are well or ill disposed towards the passions. Thus, for instance, with respect to being angry, if we are vehemently or remissly disposed towards it, we are badly affected; but if moderately, we are well affected; and in a similar manner with respect to the other passions. Neither the virtues, therefore, nor the vices are passions; because we are not said to be worthy or depraved according to the passions, but we are said to be so according to the virtues or vices; and because according to the passions we are neither praised nor blamed. For neither he who is afraid, nor he who is angry is praised, nor is he who is simply angry blamed, but he who is angry after a certain manner; but we are praised or blamed according to the virtues and vices. Farther still, we may be angry and

¹ By *desire*, as I have before observed in a note on the Rhetoric, is to be understood that irrational appetite, which is solely directed to external objects, and to the gratification arising from the possession of them.

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afraid without any deliberate intention of being so ; but the virtues are certain deliberate elections, or are not without deliberate choice. In addition to this also, we are said to be moved according to the passions, but we are not said to be moved according to the virtues and vices, but to be disposed in a certain way. On this account neither are the virtues powers ; for we are neither said to be good nor bad from being able simply to suffer, nor are we through this either praised or blamed. And again, we possess powers indeed from nature ; but from nature we do not become either good or bad. We have, however, spoken concerning this before. If, therefore, the virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are habits. And thus we have shown what virtue is generically.

CHAPTER VI.

It is necessary, however, not only to show that virtue is a habit, but likewise to show what kind of a habit it is. We must say, therefore, that every virtue, renders that of which it is the virtue well disposed, and causes its work to be well accomplished. Thus, for instance, the virtue of the eye, causes both the eye and the work of it to be good ; for by the virtue of the eye we see well. In a similar manner the virtue of a horse causes the horse to be good for the race, for carrying his rider, and sustaining the enemy in battle. But if this be the case in all things, the virtue of man also will be a habit, from which man becomes good, and from which he accomplishes his own work. And how this indeed will be effected we have already shown ; but it will again be now manifest, if we consider what the quality is of the nature
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of virtue. In every thing, therefore, which is continued and divisible, it is possible, indeed, to assume the more, the less, and the equal; and this either with respect to the thing itself, or with reference to us. But the equal is a certain middle between excess and defect. I call, however, the middle of a thing, that which is equally distant from each of the extremes, and which is one and the same in all things. But with reference to us the middle is that which neither exceeds nor falls short of the becoming. This, however, is neither one nor the same in all things. Thus, for instance, if ten things are many, but two a few, six are assumed as a medium with reference to the thing, for six equally surpasses and is surpassed. But this is a middle according to arithmetical proportion. The middle or medium, however, with reference to us, is not thus to be assumed. For if to eat ten pounds, is to eat much, but two pounds a little, it does not follow that the master of the gymnastic exercises will order six pounds to be eaten; for this perhaps will be too much or too little for him who is to take food. For Milo, indeed, it would be too little; but for him who is beginning the exercises it would be too much. And the like must be understood of the course and wrestling. Thus, therefore, every scientific man will avoid excess and defect, but will search for the medium, and make this the object of his choice. He will, however, explore that medium, which is not the middle of the thing, but is a middle with reference to us. If, therefore, every science thus well accomplishes its work, when it looks to the middle, and refers its works to this; whence it is usual to say of works that are well finished, that nothing can be added to or taken away from them, acknowledging by this, that excess and defect corrupt that which is excellent in them, but that mediocrity preserves this; and if good artists, as we say, operate looking to this, but virtue, in the same manner as nature, is more accurate and better than all art; if this be the case, it will tend to the medium as a boundary. I speak, however, of ethical virtue; for this is conversant with passions and actions; but in these there is excess and defect, and the middle. Thus, for instance, it is possible to be afraid, to be confident, to desire and abhor, to be angry and to pity, and, in short, to be pleased and pained
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in a greater and less degree, and to be both these improperly. But to have these passions when it is proper, and in such things, towards such persons, and for the sake of that which, and as, it is proper—this is the middle and the best, and pertains to virtue. In a similar manner also in actions, there is excess and defect, and the middle; but virtue is conversant with passions and actions, in which the excess indeed is erroneous, and the defect is blamed, but the medium is praised and possesses rectitude: and both these pertain to virtue. Hence, virtue is a certain medium, and tends to the middle as a boundary. Again, to err is manifold; for evil, as the Pythagoreans conjecture, belongs to the infinite, and good to the finite; but it is only possible to act rightly in one way. Hence, the one is easy, but the other difficult; it is easy indeed, to deviate from the mark, but difficult to hit it; and on this account, excess and defect belong to vice, but the medium to virtue. For,

Simple the good, all-various are the bad.

Virtue, therefore, is a pre-elective habit, [or a habit accompanied with deliberate choice] existing in a medium with reference to us, and which is defined by reason, and in such a way as a prudent man would define it. It is also the medium between two vices, the one being characterized by excess, but the other by defect. And further still, it is defined by this, that some of the vices fall short of, but others surpass the becoming, both in passions and actions, but virtue both discovers and chooses the medium. Hence, according to essence, and the definition which explains the very nature of a thing, virtue is a medium; but according to that which is best, and subsists well, it is a summit. Not every action, however, nor every passion, receives a medium; for some passions as soon as they are named, are complicated with depravity, such as malevolence rejoicing in the evils of others, impudence, envy; and in actions, adultery, theft, and murder. For all these, and others of the like kind, are thus denominated, because they are themselves bad, and not the excesses, nor the defects of them. Hence, it is not possible at any time to act rightly in these, but they are always attended

attended with error. Nor does acting well, or not acting well, in things of this kind, consist in committing adultery, when, and as it is proper, but simply to do any of these things is to act wrong. To require, therefore, a medium in these, is just as if some one should think it proper that there should be a medium, excess, and defect, in doing an injury, and in acting timidly and intemperately ; for thus there would be a middle of excess and defect, and an excess of excess, and a deficiency of defect. As, however, there is no excess and defect of temperance and fortitude, because the middle is in a certain respect the summit ; so neither is there a middle, excess and defect in those passions and actions, but in whatever manner they are exerted they are attended with error. For, in short, neither is there a middle of excess or defect, nor are there excess and defect of the middle.

CHAPTER VII.

It is necessary, however, not only to assert this universally, but also to adapt it to particulars. For in what is said concerning actions, universal assertions indeed, are more common, but those that are particular are more true ; since actions are conversant with particulars, with which assertions ought to accord. These, therefore, are to be assumed from description. Of fear and confidence, therefore, fortitude is the medium. Of the characters, however, which exceed, the one indeed which exceeds by a privation of fear is anonymous ; but that which exceeds in confidence is audacious. And he who exceeds in being afraid, but is deficient in confidence, is timid. In pleasures and pains, however, though not in all pleasures, [but in such as are cor-

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poreal, and in those especially which pertain to the touch,] and in a less degree in pains, the medium indeed is temperance, but the excess intemperance. But those who are deficient in the pursuit of pleasures do not very frequently occur; on which account neither have they obtained a name. They may, however, be called insensate. In giving and receiving money, the medium indeed is liberality, but the excess and defect are prodigality and illiberality; in which men exceed and are deficient in a contrary way. For the prodigal indeed exceeds in spending money, but is deficient in receiving it; and the illiberal man exceeds in receiving, but is deficient in spending money. At present, therefore, we think it sufficient summarily to adumbrate these things. but afterwards we shall discuss them more accurately. With respect to wealth, however, there are also other dispositions of the mind; and the medium indeed, is magnificence. For the magnificent differs from the liberal man in this, that the former is conversant with great, but the latter with small things. The excess, however, is an ignorance of elegance and decorum, and illiberal profusion, but the defect is an indecorous parsimony in spending money. And these vices differ from those which surround liberality; but in what they differ, we shall afterwards show. With respect to honour and ignominy, the medium indeed is magnanimity, but the excess is called a certain inflation of the mind, and the defect pusillanimity. As we have said, however, that liberality corresponds to magnificence, but differs from it in this, that it is conversant with small things, so to magnanimity which is conversant with great honour, another certain virtue corresponds, and which also is itself conversant with what is small. For it is possible to aspire after honour in such a manner as is proper, and more and less than is proper. But he who exceeds in his desires of honour is said to be ambitious, he who is deficient is unambitious, and the middle character between both is anonymous. The dispositions also are anonymous, except the disposition of the ambitious man, which is denominated ambition. Hence, the extremes contend for the middle place. And we indeed sometimes call the middle character ambitious, and sometimes unambitious; and sometimes we praise the ambitious, and

and sometimes the unambitious man. But from what cause we do this will be shown hereafter. Now, however, conformably to the manner in which we begun, let us speak about the rest.

With respect to anger, therefore, there is likewise excess, defect and a medium; but since these are nearly anonymous, we call the middle character a mild man, and the medium mildness. But of the extremes, let him who exceeds be wrathful, and the vice be wrathfulness. And let him who is deficient be a man void of anger, and the defect a privation of anger. There are likewise three other media, which have, indeed, a certain similitude to each other, but differ from each other. For all of them are conversant with the communion of words and actions; but they differ, because one of them is conversant with the truth which is in them, but the others are conversant with the delectable. And of this (viz. the delectable) one kind consists in jest, but another in all the concerns of life. We must, therefore, also speak concerning these, in order that we may in a greater degree perceive, that in every thing the medium is laudable, but the extremes are neither right nor laudable, but reprehensible. Of these, therefore, the greater part also are anonymous; but we must endeavour, in the same manner as in the rest, to give names to them, for the sake of perspicuity and the facility of understanding what follows.

With respect to truth, therefore, the middle character may be called veracious, and the medium, truth; but of dissimulation, that kind which exaggerates may be called arrogance, and he who possesses it an arrogant man; and that which extenuates may be called irony, and he who employs it may be denominated ironical, or a dissembler. With respect, however, to the delectable, and that kind which consists in jest, the middle character, indeed, may be called facetious, and the disposition itself facetiousness; but the excess may be denominated scurrility, and he who possesses it a scurrilous man; and he who is deficient may be called a rustic man, and the habit itself, rusticity. In the other species of the delectable, which pertains to the concerns of life, he who delights in such a way as is proper, is a friend, and the

medium is friendship ; but he who exceeds, if it is not with a view to any advantage, is studious of pleasing, but if for the sake of advantage, is a flatterer. And he who is deficient, and in all things unpleasant, is contentious, and difficult to be pleased. There are, likewise, media in the passions, and in things pertaining to the passions ; for bashfulness is not a virtue, and yet the modest man is praised. For in these things, one indeed is called the middle character, another is said to exceed, and another to be deficient. And he indeed who exceeds, and is bashful in all things, is as it were astounded ; but he who is deficient, and is not ashamed of any thing, is impudent ; and the middle character is the modest man. Indignation is a medium between envy and joy for the calamities of others ; but these habits are conversant with the pain and pleasure arising from what happens to others. For he who is propense to indignation, is indeed pained from those that do well undeservedly ; but he who is envious, surpassing the indignant man, is pained from all that do well ; and he who rejoices in the calamities of others, is so much deficient in feeling pain [from the prosperity of bad men,] that he is delighted with it. These things, however, are discussed by us elsewhere, [i. e. in the 2nd book of the Rhetoric]. With respect to justice, however, since it is not predicated simply, we shall make it the subject of discussion hereafter, [viz. in the 5th book,] and show how each of its parts is a medium. In a similar manner, also, we shall speak concerning the rational [or intellectual] virtues [in the 6th book].

CHAP.

CHAPTER VIII.

SINCE, however, there are three dispositions of the soul, two indeed of vices, of which the one subsists according to excess, but the other according to defect, and since virtue is one of these dispositions, and is a medium, all these three dispositions are in a certain respect opposed to all. For the extremes are contrary to the middle, and to each other, but the middle is contrary to the extremes. For as the equal is, with reference to the less, greater, but with reference to the greater, less; thus the middle habits exceed with reference to the deficiencies, but are defective with reference to the excesses, both in passions and actions. For the brave with reference to the timid man appears to be audacious, but with reference to the audacious man, timid. In a similar manner, also, the temperate man with reference to him who is insensate appears to be intemperate, but with reference to the intemperate man, insensate. But the liberal when contrasted with the illiberal man appears to be a prodigal, but when compared with the prodigal, illiberal. Hence, the extremes propel the medium each to the other, and the timid calls indeed the brave man audacious, but the audacious man calls him timid; and analogously in the other extremes. These, however, being thus opposed to each other, there is a greater contrariety in the extremes to each other, than to the medium; for these are more remote from each other than from the medium; just as the great is more remote from the small, and the small from the great, than both of them are from the equal. Farther still, in some extremes there appears to be a certain similitude to the medium, as in audacity to fortitude, and in prodigality

prodigality to liberality; but in the extremes there is the greatest dissimilitude to each other. Things, however, which are very distant from each other, are defined to be contraries; so that those things which are more distant are more contrary to each other. But to the medium, in some things, indeed, the deficiency is more opposed, and in others the excess. Thus, to fortitude, audacity, indeed, which is an excess, is not opposed, but timidity, which is a defect; and to temperance, the want of sensibility, which is an indigence, is not opposed, but intemperance, which is an excess. This, however, happens from two causes; one indeed from the thing itself; for one of the extremes being nearer to, and more similar to the medium than the other, hence, not this, but the contrary is more opposed to it. Thus, for instance, since audacity appears to be more similar and nearer to fortitude, but timidity appears to be more dissimilar, on this account we oppose the latter to fortitude rather than the former. For things which are more distant from the medium, appear to be more contrary. This, therefore, is one cause from the thing itself; but another cause is from ourselves. For those vices to which we are naturally more adapted, appear to be more contrary to the medium. Thus, because we are naturally more adapted to pleasures, we are more easily impelled to intemperance than to moderation in the pursuit of pleasure. Those things, therefore, are said to be in a greater degree contraries, to which a greater accession is made; and on this account intemperance, which is an excess, is more contrary to temperance [than the other extreme].

CHAPTER IX.

THAT ethical virtue, therefore, is a medium, and how it is so, and that it is a medium between two vices, the one existing according to excess, but the other according to defect, and that it is such in consequence of looking to the medium in passions and actions as to a mark, has been sufficiently shown. Hence, also, it is laborious to be worthy; for in every thing it is laborious to obtain the middle. Thus, the middle of a circle cannot be discovered by every one, but by him who is skilled [in geometry]. In like manner, to be angry, and to give and spend money, is in the power of every one, and is easy; but to be angry, and to give and spend money to whom, and as much, and when, and on what account, and as it is proper, cannot be accomplished by every one, nor is it easy. For this is to act rightly, and is rare, and laudable, and beautiful. Hence, it is necessary that he whose attention is directed to the medium as to a mark, should first recede from that which is more contrary, as Calypso also admonishes,

Far from the smoke and waves direct the helm ¹.

For of the extremes, the one, indeed, is more erroneous, but the other less. Since, therefore, it is difficult to obtain the medium accurately,

¹ This, however, was not the admonition of Calypso, but of Ulysses to his pilot, in consequence of the advice he had received from Circe. The passage is in *Odyss.* 12. v. 219.

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by making a second* navigation, as they say, the least of the evils must be assumed; but this will especially be effected in the way we have mentioned. It is likewise requisite to consider what the vices are to which we are most propense; for different men are naturally prone to different vices. But this will be known from the pleasure and pain with which we are effected. We ought, however, to draw ourselves to the contrary part; for by removing ourselves very far from error, we shall arrive at the medium, which those do who straighten distorted pieces of wood. But in every thing we should especially avoid the delectable and pleasure; for we are not uncorrupted judges of it. In the same manner, therefore, as the Trojan nobles were affected towards Helen, we ought to be affected towards pleasure, and in every thing [where pleasure is concerned,] to employ their decision; for thus by dismissing it, we shall err in a less degree. By thus acting, therefore, in short, we shall be especially able to obtain the medium. Perhaps, however, this is difficult, and principally in particulars; for it is not easy to determine how, and with whom, and on what account, and for how long a time, it is requisite to be angry. For we, indeed, sometimes praise those who are defective in anger, and call them mild; but at other times we praise those who are exasperated, and call them virile. He, however, who deviates but a little from rectitude, whether he inclines to the more or to the less, is not blamed; but he who deviates much from it; for the error of such a one is not latent. It cannot, however, be easily determined to what extent, and how much he is blameable; as neither is this easy in any other sensible thing. But things of this kind rank among particulars, and the judgment of them pertains to sense. Thus much, therefore, is indeed manifest, that the middle habit is in all things laudable; and that it is necessary at one time to incline to excess, and at another to deficiency; for thus we shall easily obtain the medium, and rectitude of conduct.

* i. e. If we fail in the first, we must make a second navigation; if we cannot use sails, we must employ oars, in order that our voyage may be as prosperous as circumstances will permit.

THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

SINCE, therefore, virtue is conversant with passions and actions, and praise and blame accompany things of a voluntary nature, but pardon, and sometimes pity, such as are voluntary, it is perhaps necessary that those who speculate concerning virtue, should define the voluntary and involuntary. This will also be useful to legislators, in conferring rewards, and inflicting punishments. But those actions appear to be involuntary which are done by force, or through ignorance. And the violent is that the principle of which is external, being of such a nature, that it contributes nothing to the advantage of him who acts, or of him who suffers; as if, for instance, the wind, or men who are the masters of some one, should bring him to a certain place. With respect to such things, however, as are performed through the fear of

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greater evils, or for the sake of something beautiful in conduct; as if a tyrant who is the lord of parents and children, should command some one to do a certain base action, and on these conditions, that if he did it, his parents and children should be saved, but if he did not, they should die;—with respect to such things as these, it is dubious whether they are involuntary, or voluntary. Something of the like kind also happens in losses at sea, when in a tempest the goods of the ship are thrown overboard; for simply considered, no one throws them into the sea willingly, but every one who is endued with intellect does so for his own safety and that of the rest of the crew. Such like actions, therefore, are mixed; but they are more similar to voluntary actions; for they are then eligible when they are performed; but the end of the action is according to opportunity. A thing, therefore, must be said to be done voluntarily or involuntarily, then when it is done. But he threw his goods into the sea voluntarily; for the principle of moving the organic parts in such like actions is in the man himself. But those things of which the principle is in himself, he has the power to perform or not. Such things, therefore, are voluntary. Simply considered, however, they are perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any one of these on its own account. But in such like actions, men are sometimes praised, when they endure something disgraceful or painful, for the sake of great and beautiful circumstances; and if they do otherwise, they are blamed. For to endure the most disgraceful things, with a view to nothing beautiful or moderate, is the part of a bad man. To other things, however, no praise is given, but pardon is granted to them, when a man does what he ought not to do, in consequence of being compelled by such things as surpass human nature, and which no one can endure. And perhaps there are some things which we ought never to do by any compulsion, but we ought to suffer the most dreadful evils, and die rather than do them; for those circumstances appear to be ridiculous which compelled the Alcæon of Euripides to kill his mother. It is, however, sometimes difficult to judge what is to be chosen in preference to something else, and whether *this* is to be endured instead of *that*; and it is still more difficult to persevere

persevere in our decisions; since for the most part, things which are expected, are attended with molestation, and things which we are compelled to do are base. Hence, both praise and blame are given to those that act from compulsion, and to those who do not. What kind of things, therefore, are to be called violent? Shall we say, that they are then simply to be called so, when the cause is in things external, and the agent contributes nothing to the action? But things which are of themselves involuntary, indeed, but are now eligible, and are eligible instead of certain other things, and the principle of which is in the agent,—these are of themselves indeed, involuntary, but now, and instead of certain other things, are voluntary. They are, however, more similar to voluntary actions; for actions are conversant with particulars; and these are voluntarily performed. It is not, however, easy to show what things are to be chosen in preference to others. For there are many differences in particulars. But if it should be said that things delectable and beautiful are violent; for they compel us to act, being external;—if this should be said, all things will thus be violent. For all men do every thing for the sake of these. And those, indeed, who act from violence, and unwillingly, act painfully; but those who are influenced by the delectable, act with pleasure. It is therefore ridiculous for a man to accuse external things, and not himself, when he is easily captivated by things of this kind, and to consider himself as the cause of beautiful actions, but delectable things as the causes of his base actions. Hence, the violent appears to be that the principle of which is external, and to which the thing compelled contributes nothing.

Every thing, however, which is done from ignorance is not voluntary. But that is involuntary which is attended with pain and repentance. For he who does any thing from ignorance, and is not at all indignant with the action, does not indeed perform it willingly, because he acts from ignorance; nor yet again, does he perform it unwillingly, in consequence of feeling no pain from the action. Of those, therefore, who act from ignorance, he who repents of what he has done, appears to have acted unwillingly; but he who does not repent, since he is a

different character from the other, may be said to have acted not willingly. For since he is a different character, it is better that he should have a proper name. To act *from ignorance*, likewise, appears to be a different thing from acting *ignorantly*; for he who is intoxicated or enraged, does not appear to act *from ignorance*, but from some one of the above-mentioned circumstances; yet not knowingly, but *ignorantly*. Every depraved man, therefore, is ignorant what ought to be done, and from what actions he should abstain; and from error of this kind men become unjust, and in short bad. But an action ought to be called involuntary, not if he who does it is ignorant of what is advantageous; for ignorance in the deliberate choice of a thing, is not the cause of involuntary conduct, but of depravity. Nor is the ignorance of universal the cause of it; for men are blamed on this account; but it arises from the ignorance of particulars, in which, and about which every action is conversant. For in these there is pity and pardon; since he who is ignorant of any one of these acts involuntarily. Perhaps, however, it will not be amiss, to define what and how many [the particular circumstances are which render an action involuntary]. They are, therefore, the circumstance of the principal agent, the circumstance of the instrumental agent, the circumstance of the end, and the circumstances of the action itself. No one, therefore, will be ignorant of all these unless he is insane. But it is evident that neither will he who acts be ignorant of them; for how can he be ignorant of himself. A man, however, may be ignorant of what he does; as is the case with those who say that they have spoken unawares, or that they did not know that what they said was arcane, as Eschylus with respect to the mysteries¹; or as when some one throws a catapulta, not knowing what he throws. A person, also, may fancy like Merope, that a son is an enemy, and that a spear which has a sharp point, is blunt like a ball, or that a stone is a pumice. A man, likewise, striking another with a view to his safety, may kill him, and wishing

¹ Eschylus had divulged the mysteries in one of his tragedies, for which he was tried in the Areopagus, but was acquitted by showing that he was not initiated.

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to show the mode of exercise in wrestling, he may strike him whom he wished to instruct. As there is ignorance, therefore, in all these particulars, in which there is action, he who is ignorant of some one of them, appears to have acted involuntarily, and especially in those things which are of principal importance. But those appear to be of principal importance, in which there is action, and that for the sake of which action is undertaken. Since the involuntary, therefore, is denominated from an ignorance of this kind, it is besides this necessary that the action should be painful, and attended with repentance. But as the involuntary is that which is done from violence, and through ignorance, the voluntary will appear to be that of which the principle is in the agent, who knows the particulars in which the action consists. For perhaps it is not well said, that actions which are produced through anger or desire are involuntary. For in the first place, indeed, if this were admitted, no other animal would act voluntarily, nor would children. And in the next place, whether are any of the actions which we perform through the influence of desire or anger, done by us voluntarily? Or, shall we say that worthy actions are performed by us voluntarily, but base actions involuntarily? Or would not this be ridiculous, since there is one cause of both these? Perhaps too, it is absurd, to call those things involuntary, after which it is requisite to aspire. But it is necessary to be angry with certain things, and to desire others, such as health and discipline. It appears, however, that things involuntary are painful, but that those which are the objects of desire are delectable. Again, what difference is there between the errors which are caused by reason or by anger, with respect to their being involuntary? For both are to be avoided. The irrational passions also, do not appear to be less human; but the actions of man proceed both from anger and desire. It would be absurd, therefore, to consider these as involuntary.

CHAP.

CHAPTER II.

HAVING, therefore, defined the voluntary and involuntary, it follows that we should discuss pre-election, or deliberate choice. For deliberate choice appears to be most allied to virtue, and that by this [as a rule] a judgment may be formed of manners more than by actions. Deliberate choice, therefore, appears indeed to be a voluntary thing, yet it is not the same with what is voluntary, but the voluntary is more extended. For of the voluntary, children, and other animals, partake, but they do not partake of deliberate choice. And we say, indeed, that things which we do suddenly, are done voluntarily, but not according to deliberate choice. But those who call it desire, or anger, or will, or a certain opinion, do not appear to speak rightly. For deliberate choice is not common to us and irrational animals; but desire and anger are. And the incontinent man indeed, acts from the influence of desire, but not from deliberate choice. On the contrary, the continent man acts from deliberate choice, and not from the impulse of desire. And desire indeed is contrary to deliberate choice, but desire is not contrary to desire. Desire, likewise, is conversant both with that which is delectable, and that which is painful, but deliberate choice is neither conversant with the painful, nor the delectable. Much less is deliberate choice anger; for in the smallest degree do things which are effected through anger appear to be effected by deliberate choice. Nor yet is it will, though will appears to be near to it. For deliberate choice indeed, is not among the number of things impossible, and if any one should say that he deliberately chooses

chooses impossibilities, he would appear to be stupid. The will, however, is directed to things which are impossible, as, for instance, to immortality. And the will indeed is also conversant with things which can by no means be accomplished by him who wills ; as that a certain player, or person engaged in athletic contests, may be victorious. No one, however, deliberately chooses things of this kind, but such only as he thinks can be effected through himself. Farther still, the will, indeed, is more directed to the end, but deliberate choice to things pertaining to the end. Thus, we wish to be well, but we deliberately choose those things through which we become well ; and we wish indeed to be happy, and we say that this is our wish ; but it is not fit to say, that we deliberately choose to be happy. For, in short, deliberate choice appears to be conversant with the things that are in our power. Neither, therefore, will deliberate choice be opinion ; for opinion, indeed, appears to be conversant with all things, and no less with things eternal and impossible, than with things in our power. Opinion, likewise, is divided into the false and the true, and not into good and evil ; but deliberate choice is rather divided into the latter than into the former. In short, therefore, perhaps no one will say that deliberate choice is either the same with opinion [in general,] or with some particular opinion. For by deliberately choosing good or evil, we become affected with a certain quality ; but this does not happen to us through forming an opinion. And we deliberately choose indeed, to obtain, or avoid, or to do something of the like kind ; but we form an opinion of what it is, or to what it is advantageous, or in what manner ; and we do not very much opine to obtain or avoid it. And deliberate choice indeed is praised, because it pertains to that of which it is necessary to partake more abundantly, or with rectitude ; but opinion is praised for its truth. We likewise deliberately choose those things which we especially know to be good ; but we form an opinion of things which are not very much known to us. And the same persons do not appear to deliberately choose and opine the most excellent things, but some indeed opine that which is better, but from vice choose those things which ought not to be the objects of choice. It is, however, of no consequence

consequence whether opinion precedes or follows deliberate choice ; for our attention is not directed to this, but to the consideration whether deliberate choice is the same with a certain opinion. What then, or what kind of a thing is deliberate choice, since it is no one of the above-mentioned particulars ? It appears, therefore, to be a voluntary thing. Not every thing, however, which is voluntary is the object of deliberate choice, but that which has been the subject of previous deliberation ; for deliberate choice is accompanied with reason and the discursive energy of reason. And this the name appears to signify, the object of deliberate choice being that which is eligible in preference to other things.

CHAPTER III.

BUT whether do men consult about all things, and is every thing a subject of consultation, or about certain things is there no consultation ? Perhaps, however, that must be called a subject of consultation, not about which some stupid or insane person consults, but which is an object of consultation to a man endued with intellect. Concerning eternal things, however, no one consults, such as concerning the world, or the diagonal and side of a square, because they are incommensurable. Nor does any one consult about things which are in motion, but which are always *passing into existence* (*γινόμενον*) after the same manner¹, whether from necessity, or naturally, or from some other cause, such as conversions and risings. Nor does any one consult about things

¹ Meaning the heavenly bodies, concerning which see the treatise On the Heavens.

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which subsist differently at different times, such as about drought and rain; nor about fortuitous events, such as the discovery of a treasure; nor yet about all human concerns; for no Lacedæmonian consults how the polity of the Scythians may be governed in the best manner; since none of these things can be effected by us. But we consult about things which can be performed by us; and these are the rest of things which we have not mentioned. For nature, necessity and fortune appear to be causes; and besides these intellect, and every thing which energizes through man. The individuals, however, of the human species consult about things which may be performed by them. And indeed in those sciences which are accurate and sufficient to themselves, there is no consultation; as for instance, there is no consultation about letters; for there is no contention how we should write. But such things as are effected by us, yet not always after the same manner, about these we consult; as about things pertaining to medicine, and the art of procuring money, and about the art of the pilot more than about the gymnastic art, because the former is much less accurate than the latter. In a similar manner also, we consult about the rest; but we consult more in the arts than in the sciences; for we dissent more about them. Consultation, however, takes place in things which have a frequency of subsistence, but of which the event is immanifest, and in things in which there is the indefinite. In things also which are of great importance, we employ counsellors, distrusting our own judgment as not sufficient. We consult, however, not about ends, but about things pertaining to ends. For neither does a physician consult whether he shall heal the sick, nor a rhetorician whether he shall persuade, nor the politician whether he shall establish equitable legislation, nor does any one of the remaining characters consult about the end; but proposing a certain end, they consider how, and by what means it may be obtained. If also it appears that this end is to be obtained through many media, they consider through which of them it may be obtained in the easiest and best manner. But if through one medium, they consider how it may be accomplished through this, and through what likewise this may be obtained, until they arrive at the first cause,

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which is discovered in the last place. For he who consults appears to investigate and analyze in the above-mentioned manner, as if he were investigating and analyzing a diagram². It appears, however, that not every investigation is a consultation; for mathematical enquiries are not consultations; but every consultation is an investigation; and that which is last in analysis is first in generation. And if indeed in consulting, we meet with an impossibility, we desist from consultation; as if there should be occasion for money, and this cannot be procured. But if that about which we consult appears to be possible, then we endeavour to obtain it. Those things, however, are possible which may be accomplished through ourselves; for things which are accomplished through our friends, are in a certain respect effected through ourselves; since the principle is in us. But at one time instruments are explored, and at another time, the use of them, and in a similar manner in other things; at one time indeed, that being investigated through which [the end may be obtained,] and at another time the manner. Man, therefore, as we have said, appears to be the principle of actions; but consultation is about things which may be performed by man; and actions are for the sake of other things. Hence the end will not be the object of consultation, but things which pertain to ends. Neither, therefore, will particulars be the objects of consultation; as, whether this thing is bread, or is well-baked, or is made as it ought to be; for these things pertain to sense; but if a man always consults, there will be a procession to infinity. The object of consultation, however, and the pre-eligible or object of deliberate choice, are the same, except that the object of pre-election or deliberate choice is something which is now definite; for *the pre-eligible is that which is preferred from*

² He who consults, the end being proposed which is not immediately in his power, investigates the medium by which it may be obtained, and if this medium also is not immediately in his power, he explores another, and afterwards another, till he discovers the first medium, which is immediately in his power, and in the discovery of which the consultation is terminated, and the accomplishment begins, through which the end is generated and obtained. The first medium, therefore, which is the last in the analysis, or investigation, is the first in generation or accomplishment. For that which is immediately in our power, as it is discovered last, is arranged first.

consultation.

consultation. For every one ceases to investigate how he shall act, when he has reduced the principle to himself, and to that part of himself which ranks as the leader; since this part is that which he deliberately chooses. But this also is evident from the ancient polities which Homer has imitated; for the kings of these polities announced to the people what they had deliberately chosen to do. Since, however, that which is pre-eligible is an object of consultation, appetible of things which are in our power, *pre-election also, or deliberate choice, will be an appetite of or tendency to things in our power, accompanied with consultation*³; for forming a judgment in consequence of having consulted, we desire conformably to consultation. We have, therefore, adumbrated what pre-election is, and what the things are with which it is conversant, and have shown that it belongs to things which have reference to ends.

CHAPTER IV.

THAT will, however, pertains to the end, we have shown; but this end to some persons appears to be the good, and to others apparent good. But it happens to those who say that the object of the will is

³ This definition of pre-election (*προαίρεσις*) was also adopted by the Stoics, and this sense of the word is of the utmost importance in their philosophy. Mrs. Carter, however, in her translation of Epictetus, which is as good as a person ignorant of philosophy can be supposed to make, uniformly translates this word, wherever it occurs, *choice*, as if it was *αἵρεσις*, and not *προαίρεσις*. But *choice* is a very different thing from *pre-election*, or *deliberate choice*, since the former may be without, but the latter is necessarily attended with deliberation. A certain person translates this word *preference*; but this is just as erroneous a translation as *choice*. For it is possible to prefer one thing to another without deliberation, as, for instance, an Englishman to a Scotchman; but such preference is not pre-election.

the good, that what he wills who does not choose rightly, is not an object of will; for if it were an object of will, it would also be good. It may, however, happen to be bad. And it happens to those who say that the object of the will is apparent good, that the object of the will has not a natural subsistence, but is what appears to any one [to be eligible]. A different thing, however, appears to be eligible to a different person; and if it should so happen, contraries appear to be eligible. If, therefore, these things are not approved, we must say that simply and in reality the good is indeed the object of the will, but that apparent good is the object of the will to every one. To the worthy man, therefore, real good is the object of the will, but to the bad man casual good; just as in bodies, to such as are well-disposed, those things are salubrious which are in reality so, but other things to such as are diseased. And the like takes place in things that are bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and each of the rest. For the worthy man judges of every thing rightly, and in every thing the truth presents itself to his view. For according to every habit, there are things beautiful and delectable which are peculiar to that habit. And perhaps the worthy man very much excels others in this, that he sees the truth in every thing, being as it were the rule and measure of things. But with the multitude deception is present on account of pleasure; for pleasure, though not good, appears to be so. The multitude, therefore, choose the delectable as good, but fly from pain as an evil.

CHAPTER V.

SINCE the end, therefore, is the object of the will, but things pertaining to the end are the objects of consultation and deliberate choice, the actions which are conversant with these, will be actions of deliberate choice and voluntary. But with these the energies of the virtues are conversant. Virtue, therefore, also is in our power; and in a similar manner vice. For in those things in which to act is in our power, not to act is also in our power; and in those things in which we have the power not to act, we have likewise the power to act. Hence, if to act worthily is in our power, not to act basely will likewise be in our power; and if we have the power of not acting worthily, we have also the power of acting basely. But if to act, and in a similar manner not to act worthily and basely, are in our power, and this is to be good or bad, it will be in our power to be worthy or depraved characters. And to say [with a certain tragic poet,] that, "No one is willingly depraved nor unwillingly blessed," seems to be partly false, and partly true. For no one is unwillingly blessed, but depravity is voluntary; or unless this is admitted, what we have just now asserted must be controverted, and it must not be said that man is the principle and generator of actions in the same manner as he is of children. But if these things are admitted, and we cannot refer them to any other principles than those which are in our power, it follows that those things are in our power, and are voluntary, of which also the principles are in our power. The truth of this appears to be attested, both privately by individuals, and publicly by legislators themselves; for they castigate and punish those who act depravely,

depravely, if they do not act from compulsion or from ignorance of which they were not the causes. But they honour those that act well, in order that they may excite these, and impede those. No one, however, exhorts others to the performance of such actions, as are neither in our power, nor are voluntary ; because no advantage can be derived from persuading us not to be hot, or be in pain, or be hungry, or any thing else of the like kind ; for notwithstanding the persuasion we shall no less suffer these things. For legislators also punish a man for his ignorance, if he appears to be the cause of his ignorance. Thus double punishments are ordained for those that are intoxicated ; for the principle is in themselves, because they have the power of not becoming intoxicated ; and this [i. e. intoxication] is the cause of their ignorance. They likewise punish those who are ignorant of any thing which is legally established, which ought to be known, and which it is not difficult to know. And in a similar manner in other things, which men appear to be ignorant of from negligence, and of which it is in their power not to be ignorant ; for it is in our power to pay attention to what ought to be known.

Perhaps, however, [it may be said that] a man is a person of such a character, that he cannot pay attention ; but such persons are themselves the causes of their characteristic qualities, in consequence of living negligently. The causes likewise of men being unjust, or intemperate, are in themselves, in consequence of the former acting wickedly, and of the latter spending their time in drinking, and things of the like kind. For energies in every thing render those who employ them similar to such energies. This, however, is evident from those who exercise themselves in any contest or action ; for they persevere in energizing. To be ignorant, therefore, that in every thing, from energizing about that thing, habits are produced, is the province of a very insensate man. Again, it is absurd to suppose, that he who acts unjustly is unwilling to be unjust, or that he who acts intemperately is unwilling to be intemperate. But if any one does those things from which he will be unjust, not ignorantly, he will be unjust willingly. Nevertheless, though he should wish, he will not cease to be unjust, and

and become just ; for neither does he who is diseased become well [by wishing to be so,] even though it should happen that he is voluntarily diseased, by living intemperately and disobeying his physicians. Prior, therefore, to his living intemperately, it was in his power not to be diseased, but after having abandoned himself to intemperance, it was no longer possible ; as neither is it possible for him who has thrown a stone, to resume it. At the same time it was in his power to emit from his hand and hurl the stone ; for he contained the principle of action in himself. Thus, also, to the unjust and intemperate man, it was possible, from the beginning, not to be unjust and intemperate ; on which account they are voluntarily so ; but when they are become such characters, it is no longer possible for them not to be so.

Not only, however, the vices of the soul are voluntary, but in some persons, also, the vices of the body, which likewise we reprehend ; for no one reprehends those who are naturally deformed ; but we blame those who are so through the want of exercise, and from negligence. The like also takes place in imbecility, and mutilation. For no one would reproach a man who is blind from nature, or disease, or a blow, but would rather pity him ; but every one would reprove him who is blind from drinking wine to excess, or from any other species of intemperance. Of the vices, therefore, pertaining to the body, those indeed, that are in our power are blamed, but those which are not, are not reprehended. But if this be the case, in other things, also, the vices which are reprehended, will be in our power. If, however, some one should say that all men aspire after apparent good, but that we have no authority over the phantasy, and that such as every one is, such, also, does the end appear to him to be ;—if, indeed, every one is to himself in a certain respect the cause of habit, he will also be in a certain respect the cause to himself of the phantasy [i. e. of the conception which he forms of a thing in his imagination]. But if no one is the cause to himself of bad conduct, but he acts evilly from an ignorance of the end, fancying that by so acting, he shall obtain the greatest good ; and if the desire of the end is not spontaneous, but it
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is requisite that every one should be born endued as it were with sight, by which he may judge rightly, and may choose real good; and if, also, he is naturally of a good disposition in whom this is well implanted by nature; for that which is greatest and most beautiful, and which, can neither be obtained nor learnt from another person, but which such as a man is naturally, such he possesses, and to be naturally inclined to this well and beautifully, will be a perfect and true natural goodness of disposition;—if these things are true, why will virtue more than vice be voluntary? For the end appears, and is similarly posited both to the good and the bad man, either by nature, or in some other way; but referring other things to this, they act in any manner whatever. Whether, therefore, the end, whatever it may be, is not apparent to every one from nature, but there is also something with him [who acts,] or whether the end is natural, yet because a worthy man performs other things voluntarily, and therefore virtue is voluntary, vice also will be no less voluntary. For in a bad as well as in a good man, there is similarly a power of acting from himself in what he does, though the intention of the end is not in our power. If, therefore, as we have said, the virtues are voluntary; for we ourselves in a certain respect are the concauses of habits, and in consequence of being disposed in a certain way, we propose to ourselves a certain end;—if this be the case, the vices also will be voluntary, for a similar reason. We have, therefore, spoken in common concerning the virtues, have adumbrated the genus of them, and have shown that they are media and habits; we have likewise unfolded what the things are from which they are produced, and have shown that they are caused by energies, and are the principles of energies, similar to those by which they are generated; that they are likewise in our power, and are voluntary things, and this in such a way as right reason shall ordain. Actions, however, and habits are not similarly voluntary; for of actions we are the lords from the beginning to the end, since we have a knowledge of particulars; but of habits, we are only lords of the principle. The accession, however, of particulars is not known as it is
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in diseases; but because it is in our power thus to use, or not to use particulars; on this account our habits are voluntary. Resuming, therefore, the discussion of each of the virtues, let us show what they are, what the quality of the things is with which they are conversant, and how they subsist; but at the same time it will be manifest how many there are. And in the first place let us consider fortitude.

CHAPTER VI.

THAT fortitude, therefore, is indeed a medium which is conversant with fear and audacity, has been already observed by us. But we evidently fear things of a terrible nature; and these are, in short, evils. Hence, also, fear is defined to be the expectation of evil. We fear, therefore, all things that are evil; such as infamy, poverty, disease, the want of friends, and death. The brave man, however, does not appear to be conversant with all evils; for it is necessary and beautiful to be afraid of some things, and not to be afraid of them is base; as for instance, not to be afraid of infamy. For he who is afraid of this, is a worthy and modest man; but he who is not afraid of it is impudent. He is, however, metaphorically called by some a brave man, for he has something similar to the brave man, since the brave man also is fearless. But perhaps it is not proper to fear poverty or disease, or in short, such things as neither proceed from vice, nor from ourselves; yet neither is he who is fearless with respect to these a brave man. We denominate him, however, brave from similitude; for some men, who in the dangers of war are timid, are liberal, and possess a proper confidence in the loss of money. Neither, therefore, is he

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timid who dreads insolent conduct towards his children and wife, or envy, or any thing of the like kind ; nor is he a brave man if he is confident when he is about to be whipt. With what kind of dreadful things, therefore, is the brave man conversant? Shall we say with such as are the greatest? For no one endures dreadful things better. But death is the most dreadful of things ; for it is the end [of life] ; and nothing farther appears to remain for him who is dead, either good or bad¹. But neither does the brave man appear to be conversant with every kind of death ; as, for instance, death in the sea, or from disease. With what kinds of death, therefore, is he conversant? Shall we not say, with those that are most beautiful? But these are the deaths which happen in war ; for such a death is attended with the greatest and most beautiful danger. And the truth of this is confirmed by the honors which cities and monarchs confer on those who conduct themselves bravely in war. He, therefore, may properly be called a brave man who is intrepid with respect to a beautiful death, and such things as are the causes of death when they are near. But things of this kind are especially such as happen in war. Nevertheless in the sea, and in diseases, the brave man is intrepid ; yet not in the same manner as sailors are ; for brave men, when they despair of their safety, indignantly bear a death of this kind ; but sailors have good hope of escaping from their experience. At the same time brave men act with fortitude in those things in which strength of mind is requisite, or it is beautiful to die ; but neither of these exists in such like destructions as we have mentioned.

¹ Aristotle says this, not from his own opinion, but from the opinion of the vulgar.

CHAPTER VII.

THE same thing, however, is not terrible to all men ; but we say that there is also something which is above man¹ ; this, therefore, is indeed terrible to every one endued with intellect. But the terrible things which do not exceed the endurance of human nature, differ in magnitude, and in the more and the less. And the like takes place in things pertaining to confidence. The brave man, however, is unterrified, as a man. He will therefore, indeed dread things of this kind, yet in such a manner as is proper, and as reason prescribes, for the sake of the beautiful in conduct ; for this is the end of virtue. But it is possible to be terrified at these in a greater and less degree, and it is also possible to dread things which are not dreadful, as if they were so. Of the errors, however, in the endurance of things terrible, one consists in dreading what it is not proper to dread, another, in dreading not as is proper, but another, in not dreading when it is proper, or something of this kind. And in a similar manner in what pertains to confidence. He, therefore, who endures and fears things which it is requisite to endure and fear, and for the sake of that for which it is requisite, and in such a way as, and when it is requisite, and in a similar manner he who thus confides, is a brave man ; for the brave man suffers and acts according to the importance of the thing, and conformably to reason. But the end of every energy is the end according to habit, [i. e. the beautiful in conduct] ; and to the brave man fortitude is beautiful.

¹ Such as violent thunder, earthquakes, and inundations of the sea.

The end, also, is a thing of this kind ; for every thing is defined by the end. For the sake of the beautiful in conduct, therefore, the brave man endures and performs all that pertains to fortitude. Of the characters, however, which exceed, he indeed who exceeds in fearlessness, is anonymous ; but it has been before observed by us, that many things are anonymous. He, however, who fears nothing, neither earthquakes, nor inundations, as it is said of the Celtæ, will be an insane person, or one who has no sense of pain ; but he who exceeds in confidence respecting things of a terrible nature, will be audacious. The audacious man also appears to be arrogant, and a pretender to fortitude. Such, therefore, as the brave man is with respect to things of a terrible nature, such does the audacious man wish to appear ; and hence, in those things in which he is able, he imitates him. On this account, also, many audacious persons have timidity united with audacity ; for in consequence of their audacity when danger is not imminent, they do not endure things of a dreadful nature [when they occur]. But he who exceeds in fearing is timid ; for he fears what he ought not, and in such a manner as he ought not to fear, and all such things are consequent to him ; but he is deficient in confiding. As he exceeds, however, in pains, he is more apparent. The timid man, therefore, is hopeless ; for he fears all things. But the brave man is the contrary ; for confidence is the province of the man who hopes for the best. The timid, the audacious, and the brave man, therefore, are conversant with the same things ; but they are differently affected towards them. For the timid and the audacious man exceed and are deficient ; but the brave man is disposed towards things dreadful in the middle way, and in such a manner as is proper. And audacious men, indeed, are precipitate, and wish to encounter dangers before they arrive ; but when they arrive they are deficient in fortitude. Brave men, however, are ardent in encountering danger, but before it arrives they are quiet. As we have said, therefore, fortitude is a medium conversant with those things of a dreadful nature, and such as pertain to confidence, which we have mentioned ; and it chooses and endures them, because it is beautiful to do so, or not to do so is base. But to die, in order to avoid poverty,

poverty, or on account of love, or something painful, is not the province of a brave, but rather of a timid man. For it is effeminate to fly from things laborious ; and such do not endure death because it is beautiful to endure it, but in order to fly from evil. Fortitude, therefore, is a certain thing of this kind.

CHAPTER VIII.

OTHER kinds of fortitude, also, are denominated according to four modes ; and in the first place, indeed, political fortitude, since this most resembles fortitude truly so called. For citizens appear to endure dangers, on account of the punishments and disgrace inflicted by the laws, and also on account of the honors they confer. Hence, the most brave men appear to be found among those with whom the timid are disgraced, and the brave are honored. Homer, likewise, introduces such persons, as, for instance, Diomed and Hector :

Shall proud Polydamas before the gate
Proclaim, his counsels are obey'd too late,
Which timely follow'd but the former night,
What numbers had been saved by Hector's flight¹.

And Diomed :

But ah ! what grief should haughty Hector boast ;
I fled inglorious to the guarded coast² ?

This species of fortitude, however, is especially similar to the before-mentioned, because it is produced from virtue ; for it is generated

¹ Iliad, Book 22.

² Iliad, Book 8.

through

through shame and a desire of the beautiful in conduct, for it is through a desire of honor and a flight from disgrace, which is dishonorable. Those also may be ranked among brave men, who are compelled to be brave by their rulers; but they are inferior to the former [i. e. the politically brave,] because their conduct is not produced through shame, but through fear, and is not the consequence of flying from what is base, but from what is painful; for they are compelled by their masters. Thus Hector—

On rush'd bold Hector, gloomy as the night;
 Forbids to plunder, animates the fight;
 Points to the fleet; for by the gods, who flies,
 Who dares but linger, by this hand he dies;
 No weeping sister his cold eye shall close
 No friendly hand his funeral pile compose.
 Who stops to plunder at this signal hour,
 The birds shall tear him, and the dogs devour².

And the generals scourge the soldiers if they desert their ranks. The same thing also is done by those who dispose their troops before fosses, and adopt other methods of the like kind; for all these employ force. It is necessary, however, not to be brave from necessity, but because it is beautiful to be so. But experience about particulars appears to be a certain fortitude; whence also Socrates thought that fortitude was a science⁴. And indeed, there are other such persons in other things; but soldiers are such in warlike affairs. For it seems that there are many vain terrors in war⁵, of which soldiers are especially aware. Soldiers, therefore, appear to be brave, because other persons do not understand the nature of these alarms. In the next place, they are especially able,

¹ In the 2nd book of the Iliad, v. 391, Agamemnon, and not Hector, thus addresses the Greeks; but in 15th book of the Iliad, v. 348, Hector addresses the Trojans in other words, but to the same effect. The conjecture, therefore, of Sylburgius is probable, that the transcribers of Aristotle, as the beginning only of this passage of Homer was cited by the philosopher, took from the 2nd book of the Iliad, what ought to have been taken from the 15th.

⁴ See the Laches and Protagoras of Plato.

⁵ Such as in antient battles, the crash of arms, the concourse of horses, &c.

from

from their experience, to attack their enemies without receiving any injury themselves. They also know how to guard against, and strike their enemies, in consequence of being able to use their arms, and having armour of such a kind, as is most excellent for the purpose of attacking, without being injured by their adversaries. They fight, therefore, like armed with unarmed men⁶, and like *athletæ* with those that are unskilled in athletic exercises. For in such like contests, not the most brave are the most adapted to fight, but those who are most strong, and whose bodies are in the most excellent condition. But soldiers become timid when the danger is excessive, and they are deficient in numbers and warlike apparatus. For [the merely skilful are] the first that fly; but those who act bravely, according to political circumstances, die remaining at their post, as it happened at the *Hermæus*; since to citizens flight is base, and death is more eligible than such a preservation. But the soldiers [in this battle at *Hermæus*] encountered the danger at first, as thinking themselves superior to their enemies; but when they saw the full extent of the danger, they fled, dreading death more than disgrace. The brave man, however, is not a person of this description. Anger, also, is referred to fortitude; for men likewise appear to be brave on account of anger, just as wild beasts rush on those that wound them; because brave men also are irascible. Whence Homer says,

——— Strength be to anger added.

And, ——— his ardour and his wrath he rous'd.

And, Pungent fury from his nostrils flow'd.

And, ——— his blood boil'd.

For every thing of this kind appears to signify the energy and impulse of anger. Brave men, therefore, act on account of the beautiful in conduct; but anger co-operates with them. And savage animals act through the influence of pain; for they act because they are wounded

⁶ This must be understood as applicable only to skilful soldiers.

or terrified ; since if they are in a wood, or in a marsh, they do not attack any one. Hence those persons are not brave who are impelled to danger by pain and anger, foreseeing nothing that is dreadful ; since thus asses also would be brave when they are hungry ; for they cannot, even by blows, be driven from their pasture. Adulterers, likewise, perform many audacious deeds through their lustful desire. Those, therefore, are not brave, who are impelled to danger through pain or anger. The fortitude, however, appears to be most natural, which subsists on account of anger, and which assumes deliberate choice, and that for the sake of which a thing is done, [or the final cause]. Men, also, when they are angry, are pained, but are delighted when they take vengeance on the authors of their anger. Those, however, who act under the influence of these causes are indeed pugnacious, but not brave ; for they do not act with a view to the beautiful in conduct, nor from the dictates of reason, but from the influence of passion. But they possess something similar to fortitude. Nor yet are those who are full of good hope brave : for in consequence of having frequently conquered, and conquered many, they are confident in dangers. But they are similar to brave men, because both these characters are confident. Brave men, however, are indeed confident, for the reasons we have already assigned ; but these, because they fancy they are superior to others, and that they shall suffer no evil from their opponents. Those also that are intoxicated act after this manner ; for they become full of good hope ; but when they are frustrated of their expectations, they fly from danger. It is, however, the province of a brave man to endure things which are, and appear to be dreadful to man, because it is beautiful to do so, and base not to endure them. Hence also it appears to be the part of a more brave man, to be fearless and without perturbation in sudden terrors, rather than in such as were foreseen. For this rather proceeds from habit, and in a less degree from preparation. For things indeed, which were foreseen, may be chosen from deliberation and reason ; but in things which suddenly happen, a man can only conduct himself fearlessly from the habit of fortitude. Those persons, likewise appear to be brave, who are ignorant of danger ; and they are not

not very remote from those who are full of good hope. They are, however, inferior to them, because they have no preconceived opinion of vanquishing the evil; but the former have. Hence, the fortitude of those who are full of good hope continues for a certain time; but the fortitude of those who are ignorant of danger ceases, as soon as the deception is apparent; as was the case with the Argives, when they met with the Lacedæmonians, and thought them to be the Sicyonians. And thus we have shown what kind of men the brave are, and those who appear to be brave.

CHAPTER IX.

SINCE, however, fortitude is conversant with confidence and fear, yet it is not similarly conversant with both, but in a greater degree with things of a terrible nature. For he who is without perturbation in these, and who conducts himself in them as he ought, is more brave than he who does so in things pertaining to confidence. Brave men, therefore, as we have before observed, are called brave, from enduring things of a painful nature. Hence also fortitude is unaccompanied with pain, and is justly praised; for it is more difficult to endure pain, than to abstain from pleasure. Nevertheless the end, according to fortitude, may appear to be pleasant, but to be obscured and obliterated by surrounding circumstances; just as it happens in gymnastic contests. For to pugilists, indeed, the end for the sake of which they contend is pleasing, viz. a crown and honours; but to be beat, since this pertains

to the flesh, is painful, as is likewise every labour. Because, however, the circumstances which produce pain are many, and that for the sake of which they contend is small, it appears to possess nothing delectable. If, therefore, a thing of this kind also pertains to fortitude, death indeed and wounds will be painful to a brave man, and to one who is unwilling to endure them. The brave man, however, endures them because it is beautiful so to do, or because it is base not to endure them. And by how much the more he possesses every virtue, and is more happy, by so much the more will he be pained by death¹. For such a man most eminently deserves to live, and he is knowingly deprived [by death] of the greatest goods; but this is painful. He is, however, no less brave; and perhaps he is more brave, because he chooses that conduct in battle which is beautiful, in preference to these goods. To energize, therefore, delectably, does not pertain to all the virtues, except so far as they come into contact with the end. But perhaps nothing prevents not only those from being most excellent soldiers, who are most brave; but also those who are less brave, and possess no other good; for these are prepared for danger, and to lose their life for a small gain. And thus much concerning fortitude. And it is not difficult from what has been said to adumbrate what it is.

¹ It must be carefully observed by the reader, that what is here said of the brave man being afflicted at death, applies only to the man who is brave according to politic fortitude, but not to him who possesses the fortitude which belongs to the cathartic and theoretic virtues; for an account of which virtues, see the notes on the 10th book.

CHAPTER X.

IN the next place, let us speak concerning temperance; for these [i. e. fortitude and temperance] appear to be the virtues of the irrational parts. That temperance, therefore, is a medium conversant with pleasures, has been already observed by us; for it is conversant in a less degree, and not similarly with pains; but about pleasures and pains intemperance also is employed. What the pleasures, therefore, are, with which temperance is conversant, we must now explain. Let pleasures, however, be divided into those pertaining to the soul, and those pertaining to the body. Thus for instance, the pleasures pertaining to the soul are, ambition, and the love of learning; for each of these is delighted with that which is the object of its desire, the body not being at all affected, but rather the rational part; and those who are conversant with such like pleasures, are neither denominated temperate, nor intemperate. Thus too, with respect to such other pleasures as are not corporeal; for we call those who are lovers of fables and narrations, and who consume the day in such casual circumstances as present themselves, triflers, but not intemperate. Nor do we call those intemperate who are pained by the loss of riches or friends. Temperance, however, will be conversant with corporeal pleasures, yet neither will it be conversant with all such pleasures. For those persons are not called either temperate or intemperate who are delighted with objects of sight, such as colours, and figures, and pictures; though it would seem that there is also a proper manner of being delighted with these, and that it is possible to be pleased with them, according to excess and defect,

defect. Thus too, in things pertaining to the hearing ; for no one calls those persons intemperate, who are excessively delighted with melodies, or players ; nor those temperate, who are delighted with them in a proper manner. Nor are those denominated temperate or intemperate, who are delighted with odours, except from accident. For we do not call those persons intemperate, who are delighted with the smell of apples, or roses, or odoriferous fumigations ; but we rather denominate those persons so, who are delighted with the smell of ointments and food ; for intemperate persons are pleased with these, because through these the recollection of the objects of their desires is produced. Others also may be seen, who when they are hungry are delighted with the smell of food ; but to be delighted with things of this kind is the province of an intemperate man ; for to such a one these things are objects of desire. Nor do other animals receive pleasure from these senses, except by accident. For neither are dogs delighted with the smell, but with the eating, of hares ; the smell producing the sense [i. e. causing them to perceive food present ;] nor is the lion delighted with the voice of the ox, but with eating him ; but he perceives through the voice of the ox that he is near, and is seen to be delighted with this perception. In like manner, neither is the lion delighted with seeing or finding a stag, or a wild goat ; but he is pleased on seeing that from which he shall obtain food. Temperance and intemperance, therefore, are conversant with pleasures of this kind, of which also irrational animals partake. Hence these pleasures appear to be servile and savage ; and they are the pleasures pertaining to the touch and the taste. Temperance and intemperance, however, appear to use the taste, but in a small degree, or not at all ; for the judgment of savors is the province of the taste ; which those persons employ who make trial of wines and season food. The intemperate, however, are not very much delighted with these savors, but with the enjoyment of the food ; the whole of which is effected through the touch, in meats and drinks, and in what are called venereal concerns. Hence, a certain person named Philoxenus, the son of Eryx, who was most voracious in eating, wished that he had a neck longer than that of a crane, as being one who was
delighted

delighted with the touch. The touch, therefore, with which intemperance is conversant is the most common of all the senses; and will appear to be justly disgraceful, because it exists in us not so far as we are men, but so far as we are animals. To be delighted, therefore, with, and especially enamoured of such pleasures, is beastly; for the most liberal of the pleasures which are perceived through the touch, are not to be numerated with these; such for instance as the pleasures in gymnastic exercises, produced through fiction and heat; since the touch of the intemperate man does not pertain to the whole body, but to certain parts of it.

CHAPTER XI.

Of desires, however, some appear to be common, but others peculiar and adventitious. Thus for instance, the desire of food is indeed natural; for every one, when in want, desires either dry or moist nutriment; and sometimes both. And, as Homer¹ says, both the young man, and he who is in the vigour of his age, desire the joys of love; but every one does not desire this or that food, nor the same food. Hence, this desire appears to be properly ours; and it possesses also something natural; for different things are pleasing to different persons, and the

¹ Aristotle alludes to Iliad, 24, v. 129, in which Thetis complains to Achilles that he is,

Mindless of food and love, whose pleasing reign
Sooths weary life, and softens human pain. POPE.

But the words, "*the young man, and he who is in the vigour of his age,*" are added by Aristotle, as Victorinus observes, for the purpose of elucidating the meaning of the poet.

same

same thing is more agreeable to some persons than to others. Few, therefore, err in natural desires ; and they err in these in one way, viz. in excess ; for to eat or drink what casually presents itself, till an excessive fulness is produced, is to surpass, in multitude, what is conformable to nature ; since natural desire is the replenishing of indigence. Hence, such persons are called gluttons, as replenishing the indigence [of nature] beyond what is becoming ; and those who are very servile become men of this description. But in those pleasures which are peculiar, or proper, many persons err, and in many ways ; for they are denominated lovers of things of this kind, either from being delighted with things which are not proper, or being pleased with them more than is proper, as is the case with the multitude, or not in such a way as is proper, or not in that respect in which it is proper. The intemperate, however, exceed in all things ; for they are delighted with some things with which it is not proper to be delighted, since they are odious ; and if it is requisite to be delighted with some of such things, they are delighted with them more than is proper, and after the manner of the multitude. That excess, therefore, in pleasures is intemperance, and that it is blameable, is evident. In pains, however, a man is not said to be temperate by enduring them, as in fortitude ; nor intemperate by not enduring them ; but he indeed is intemperate, who is pained more than is requisite, because he does not partake of pleasures ; so that the pleasure gives him pain [in consequence of being desired by him above measure]. And he is said to be a temperate man, who is not pained by the absence of pleasure, and by abstaining from it. The intemperate man, therefore, desires all pleasant things, or those which are most eminently pleasant ; and is led by desire, so as to choose what is most pleasant in preference to other things. Hence, also he is pained, both when he is frustrated of pleasure, and when he desires it ; for desire is accompanied with pain ; though it seems to be absurd that a man should be pained on account of pleasure. Those, however, who are deficient in pleasures, and are delighted with them less than is proper, are not very frequent. For an insensibility of this kind is not human ; since other animals also distinguish food, and are delighted with

with some kinds of it, and not with others. But he to whom nothing is delectable, and with whom one thing does not differ from another, is very remote from human nature ; such a one also is without a name, because he does not very frequently exist. The temperate man, however, with respect to these things, subsists in a middle condition ; for neither is he delighted with those things with which the intemperate man is especially delighted, but he is rather indignant with them ; nor in short, does he rejoice in things in which he ought not, nor is he very much delighted with any thing of this kind ; nor is he pained if it is absent ; nor does he desire it, except moderately, nor more than is proper, nor at a time when he ought not, nor in short, any thing of this kind. But such things as, being delectable, contribute to health, or to a good habit of body—these he desires moderately, and in such a way as is proper. He also desires other delectable things, which are not an impediment to these, or which are not adverse to the beautiful, in conduct, or above his income ; for he who is thus affected, loves such pleasures beyond their desert. The temperate man, however, is not a person of this description, but is one who acts conformably to right reason.

CHAPTER XII.

INTEMPERANCE, however, appears to be more similar to the voluntary than timidity ; for the former subsists on account of pleasure, but the latter on account of pain ; of which, the one indeed is eligible, but the other is to be avoided. And pain indeed astounds and disturbs the nature of its possessor ; but pleasure produces nothing of this kind. It is, therefore, more voluntary ; and on this account also it is more disgraceful.

graceful. For it is more easy to be accustomed to these things, since there are many such in life; and the being accustomed to them is unattended with danger. But the contrary takes place in things of a dreadful nature. Timidity, likewise, may appear not to be similarly voluntary with particulars. For timidity indeed, is without pain; but particulars so astound men through pain, that they throw away their arms, and act in other things indecorously; and on this account they appear to be violent. The contrary, however, takes place with the intemperate man; for particulars with him are voluntary; since he desires them, and his appetite is directed to them. But the whole [of an intemperate life] is less voluntary; for no one desires to be intemperate. We transfer also the name of intemperance to puerile errors; for they possess a certain similitude; but which of these is denominated from the other, is of no consequence to the present discussion. It is, however, evident, that the latter is denominated from the former; nor does the transition appear to be badly made. For that which desires what is base is to be punished, and which has an abundant increase. But desires in a child are especially a thing of this kind; for children live according to desire, and in these the appetite of the delectable especially flourishes. If, therefore, this appetite is not obedient, and subject to the governor [reason] it increases abundantly. For the appetite of the delectable is insatiable, and in the stupid man is every way diffused; and the energy of desire increases that which is allied to it, so that if the desires are great and vehement, they expel the reasoning power. Hence, it is necessary that they should be moderate and few, and in no respect adverse to reason; but we call a thing of this kind obedient, and reformed by correction; for as it is necessary that a child should live conformably to the mandate of his preceptor, thus also it is requisite that the part of the soul which energizes according to desire should live conformably to reason. Hence it is necessary that this part of the soul in the temperate man should accord with reason; for the end proposed by both [i. e. by reason and desire in the temperate man] is the beautiful in conduct. And the temperate man desires those things which it is proper to desire, and as, and when it is proper. But reason likewise thus ordains. And thus much concerning temperance.

THE

THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

IN the next place, let us speak concerning liberality. But it appears to be a medium about riches. For the liberal man is praised, not in warlike concerns, nor in those things in which the temperate man is praised, nor again, in judicial affairs, but in the giving and receiving of riches; and more in the giving, than the receiving. We call, however, riches every thing; the worth of which is measured by money. But prodigality and illiberality are excesses and defects about riches. And we always, indeed, ascribe illiberality to those, who pay more attention to riches than is proper; but combining, we sometimes attribute prodigality to the intemperate. For we call both the incontinent, and those who consume their property in intemperance, prodigals. Hence, men of this description appear to be most depraved; for at

one and the same time they have many vices. They are not, however, appropriately denominated. For he is a prodigal, who has one certain vice, viz. the consumption of his property. For he is a prodigal who is destroyed through himself; since the consumption of his property appears to be a certain destruction of himself, as through this the means of living are obtained. In this way, therefore, we consider prodigality.

With respect to these things, however, of which there is a certain use, it is possible to use them well or ill. But wealth is among the number of things useful. And he uses every thing in the best manner, who possesses the virtue pertaining to each thing. He, therefore, will use wealth in the best manner, who has the virtue pertaining to riches; and he is the liberal man. The use, however, of riches appears to be expense and donation; but the accepting and preservation of riches, is rather possession. Hence, it is more the province of a liberal man to give to those to whom it is proper, than to receive whence it is proper, and not to receive whence it is not proper. For it is more the province of virtue to benefit than to be benefitted, and to perform things which are beautiful, than not to perform things which are base. It is not, however, immanifest, that to giving, to benefit, and to act beautifully are consequent; but to receiving, to be benefitted, or not to act basely. Thanks, also, are presented to the giver, but not to the receiver; and praise is rather bestowed on the former than the latter. It is, likewise, more easy not to receive than to give; for men are less willing to bestow what is their own, than not to receive what belongs to another. Those, also, who bestow are called liberal; but those who do not receive, are not praised for liberality, but are no less praised for justice. Those, however, who receive, are not very much praised. But of all those who are loved on account of virtue, the liberal are nearly beloved the most; for they benefit others; and this consists in giving. The actions, however, according to virtue are beautiful, and are for the sake of the beautiful. The liberal man, therefore, gives for the sake of the beautiful, and gives rightly; for he gives to those to whom it is proper, and such things as are proper, and when

when it is proper, and whatever other particulars are consequent to giving rightly; and this he does either delectably, or without pain. For that which is conformable to virtue is delectable or without pain, but is in the smallest degree painful. But he who gives to those to whom it is not proper, or not for the sake of the beautiful, but from some other cause, is not liberal, but must be called by some other name. Nor is he liberal who gives with pain; for such a one would prefer riches to a beautiful action; but this is not the province of a liberal man. Nor does the liberal man receive from whence it is not proper to receive; for neither is such a kind of receiving the province of one who does not honor riches. Neither will the liberal man be readily disposed to ask a favor; for it is not the province of him who benefits, to be benefitted easily. But he will take whence it is proper; as, for instance, from his own possessions, not as a thing beautiful, but as necessary, in order that he may have the means of giving. Nor will he neglect his own affairs, because he wishes, through these, to supply the wants of certain persons. Nor will he give to any casual persons, in order that he may have to give to those to whom it is proper, and when it is proper, and where it is beautiful to give. It is, likewise, very much the province of a liberal man, so to exceed in giving, as to leave but little for himself; for it is the property of a liberal man not to consider himself. But liberality is denominated according to the property which is possessed; for the liberal does not consist in the multitude of gifts, but in the habit of the giver; and this habit gives according to the means of giving. Nothing, however, hinders, but that he may be a more liberal man who gives fewer things, if he gives them from less means. But those persons appear to be more liberal, who have not acquired property themselves, but have received it from others; for they have had no experience of want, and all men are more attached to their own works, as is evident in parents and poets. It is not, however, easy for the liberal man to be rich, since he is neither anxious to receive, nor preserve wealth, but is more disposed to give, and does not honor riches on their own account, but for the sake of giving. Hence, also, fortune is accused, because those who

most deserve to be, are in the smallest degree, wealthy. This, however, does not happen unreasonably; for it is not possible that he should be rich, who pays no attention to the means of obtaining wealth; as is also the case in other things. Nevertheless, the liberal man will not give to those to whom he ought not, nor when he ought not, and other things of the like kind; for if he did, he would no longer act conformably to liberality; and by thus consuming his wealth improperly, he would not have the means of giving to those to whom he ought to give. For as we have said, he is a liberal man who spends according to his property, and on things on which he ought to spend; but he who exceeds [his means] in spending is a prodigal. Hence, we do not call tyrants prodigals; for it does not seem to be easy by gifts and expenses to exceed the abundance of their possessions. Since, therefore, liberality is a medium which is conversant about giving and receiving riches, the liberal man will give and spend on things on which he ought, and as much as he ought, as well in small things as in great; and he will thus act willingly, and with pleasure. He will, likewise receive whence it is proper, and such things as he ought to receive. For since this virtue is a medium about giving and receiving, he will do both these in such a way as is proper; since a receiving of this kind is consequent to giving equitably; but a receiving which is not of this kind is the contrary. Things, therefore, which are consequent may subsist together in the same thing; but it is evident that contraries cannot. But if it should happen to the liberal man that he should spend beyond what he ought, and beyond what is becoming, he will be pained, yet moderately, and in such a manner as is proper. For it is the province of virtue to be pleased and pained with those things with which it is proper to be so, and in such a way as is proper. The liberal man, also, is very pliable in pecuniary contracts. For he may be injured, since he does not honor riches; and he is more indignant, if he has not spent what he ought, than pained, if he has spent what he ought not; for he does not assent to Simonides¹. But the

¹ Plutarch in his treatise *Whether an elderly man should engage in the management of public affairs*, relates of Simonides, that he said to those who accused him of avarice, "that being prodigal

prodigal errs, also, in these things. For he is neither pleased nor pained with things with which he ought, nor as he ought; but this will be more evident as we proceed.

It has, however, been observed by us that prodigality and illiberality are excesses and defects; and in two things, viz. in giving and receiving. For we place expense in the same class with giving. Prodigality, therefore, exceeds in giving and not receiving, but it fails in receiving. And illiberality, fails, indeed, in giving, but exceeds in receiving, except in small things. The peculiarities, therefore, of prodigality cannot be very much conjoined. For it is not easy for him who receives nothing, to give to every one; since the property of those private individuals rapidly fails, who also appear to be prodigals. For a man of this description does seem to be better, though not much, than the illiberal man; for he is easily cured by age, and by want, and may arrive at the medium. For he has the properties of the liberal man; since he gives, and does not receive; yet neither as he ought, nor in a becoming manner. If, therefore, he should happen to be accustomed to this, or in some other way should be changed, he would become liberal; for he would give to those to whom it is proper, and would not receive whence it is not proper. Hence, the prodigal does not appear to be depraved in his manners; for it is not the property of a bad, or ignoble, but of a stupid man, to exceed in giving and not receiving. But he who is prodigal after this manner, appears to be much better than the illiberal man, for the above-mentioned reasons, and also because the one benefits many, but the other no one, and not even himself. The multitude of prodigals, however, as we have said, receive whence they ought not, and according to this are illiberal. But they become prompt to receive, because through being willing to spend, they are unable to do this with facility; for the means of spending rapidly fail them. Hence, they are compelled to procure money elsewhere; but at the same time, because they pay no attention to the

deprived, through old age, of other pleasures, he could yet recreate his age by one pleasure, the delight of gain."

beautiful

beautiful in conduct, they receive negligently, and from every one indiscriminately. For they desire to give; but it is of no consequence to them how, or whence they give. On this account, neither are their gifts liberal; for they are not beautiful, nor for the sake of this very thing the beautiful in conduct, nor are they bestowed as they ought to be; but sometimes they cause those to be rich who ought to be poor, and give nothing to men whose manners are moderate, but bestow much on flatterers, or those who are the means of procuring them any other pleasures. Hence, also, most of them are intemperate; for as they spend their money easily, they likewise spend profusely, on things of an intemperate nature; and because they do not live with a view to the beautiful in conduct, they incline to pleasures. The prodigal, therefore, unless he is corrected, falls into these vices; but by care and diligence, he may arrive at the medium, and to what is becoming in conduct.

Illiberality, however, is incurable; for old age, and every infirmity appear to render men illiberal, and it is more congenial to them than prodigality. For the multitude are more desirous of gain, than disposed to give. Illiberality, likewise, extends widely, and is multiform; since there appear to be many modes of it. For consisting in two things, a deficiency in giving, and excess in receiving, it is not wholly and entirely present with all illiberal men, but sometimes it is divided; and some, indeed, exceed in receiving, but others are deficient in giving. For all those to whom such appellations apply, as, niggardly, tenacious, and sordid, are deficient in giving; but they do not desire the property of others, nor do they wish to receive, some, indeed, through a certain probity, and an avoidance of base conduct. For some of them seem to take care of their own property, or at least say that they do so, in order that they may not, at any time, be compelled to do any thing base. Of these characters, however, the skinflint, and every one of the like kind, is so denominated from giving to no one in excess. But others of these abstain from property which is not their own, through fear, because it is not easy for him who takes what belongs to others, to preserve his own property unviolated. Hence, they

they are disposed neither to receive nor give. Others, again, exceed in receiving, in consequence of receiving on all sides and every thing; such as those who perform illiberal works, together with panders, usurers, gamesters, sharpers, and other depredators, and those who for the sake of a little, subject themselves to great infamy. For all these receive whence they ought not, and what they ought not. The acquisition, however, of base gain appears to be common to these; for all of them endure disgrace for the sake of gain, and this small. For we do not call those illiberal, who receive great things whence they ought not, and such as they ought not, as, for instance, tyrants, the subvertors of cities, and the plunderers of temples, but we rather call them depraved and impious, and unjust. The gamester, indeed, the highwayman, and the sharper, are among the number of illiberal characters; for they are addicted to base gain; since for the sake of gain, they devote themselves to these employments, and endure disgrace. And some, indeed, expose themselves to the greatest dangers for the sake of what they may get; but others gain something from their friends to whom they ought to give. Both these, therefore, since they wish to enrich themselves whence they ought not, are addicted to base gain; and all such receivings are illiberal. Reasonably, also, is illiberality said to be contrary to liberality; for it is a greater evil than prodigality, and men err more in this than in the prodigality of which we have spoken above. And thus much concerning liberality, and the opposite vices.

CHAPTER II.

It would seem to follow that we should, in the next place, discuss magnificence; for it also appears to be a certain virtue which is conversant with riches. It does not, however, in the same manner as liberality, extend to all pecuniary actions, but only to those that are sumptuous. But in these it surpasses liberality in magnitude; for as its name signifies, it is a becoming costliness in great things. Magnitude, however, is a relative; for the same expense does not become the commander of a three-ranked galley, and the president of a public spectacle. The becoming, therefore, subsists with reference to him who spends, and to the thing on which he spends his money, and the money which is spent. He, however, who spends with decorum in small, or in moderate things, is not called magnificent; such as,

To vagrant mendicants I oft have giv'n¹;

but he who spends appropriately in great things. For the magnificent is a liberal man; but the liberal man is not, because liberal, magnificent. Of a habit, however, of this kind, the deficiency indeed is called parsimony; but the excess, vulgar ostentation, and ignorance of what is elegant; and such other appellations as belong to habits which do not exceed in magnitude about things in which great expense is becoming, but exhibit a splendid profusion, in things in which such profusion is not

¹ These are the words of Ulysses, when begging money of Antinous, *Odyss.* 17, v. 420.

proper.

proper. Concerning these, however, we shall speak hereafter ; but the magnificent resembles the scientific man ; for he is able to survey what is decorous, and can spend largely with elegance. For as we said in the beginning, habit is defined by energies, and by those things of which it is the habit. But the expenses of the magnificent man are great and becoming ; and such also are his deeds ; for thus the expense will be great, and adapted to the deed. Hence, it is necessary that the deed should be worthy the expense, and the expense worthy the deed, or even surpassing it. The magnificent man, therefore, spends after this manner for the sake of the beautiful in conduct ; for this is common to the virtues ; and he also spends with pleasure and largely, because an accurate attention to expense, is the province of a parsimonious man. The magnificent man, likewise, will rather consider how he may accomplish the most beautiful and becoming work, than the money it will cost, and how it may be accomplished with the least expense. It is necessary, therefore, that the magnificent should also be a liberal man ; for the liberal man spends what he ought, and as he ought. But in these things whatever is great pertains to the magnificent man, magnificence being as it were a certain magnitude of liberality. Since, however, liberality is conversant with the same things as magnificence, the magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work from an equal expense. For there is not the same virtue of possession and a work ; since the virtue of a possession is, to be of great worth, and most precious, as gold ; but the virtue of a work is to be great and beautiful. For the survey of a thing of this kind is admirable. But the magnificent is admirable ; and the virtue of a work is magnificence in magnitude. Among expenses, however, which we call honourable, are such as pertain to the worship of the gods, gifts dedicated to divinity, the building of temples, and sacrifices ; and in a similar manner such things as pertain to every demoniacal nature, and such as are bestowed on the community at large from a laudable ambition. Thus the expenses of the magnificent man will be of this kind, if he should think it requisite to furnish public spectacles splendidly, or three-ranked galleys, or to feast the city. But in all things, as we have said, it must be

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considered who the agent is, and what the means are which he possesses. For the expense ought to be such as is worthy of the means, and not only adapted to the work, but also to him by whom it is effected. Hence a poor cannot be a magnificent man; for he has not the means of spending much in a becoming manner. The poor man, therefore, who endeavours to do so is stupid; for such an endeavour is repugnant to his means and to the becoming. But that which is done rightly, is done according to virtue. Such expense, however, becomes those who possess hereditary wealth, or have procured it themselves, or have derived it from their ancestors, or by legacy. And it likewise becomes those who are noble and renowned, and other persons of the like kind; for all these have magnitude and dignity. The magnificent man, therefore, is especially a person of this description; and magnificence, as we have said, consists in such like expenses; for they are the greatest, and the most honourable.

With respect to private expenses, however, those pertain to the magnificent man which are incurred but once; such as marriage, and whatever also there may be of the like kind, and that about which the whole city is earnestly occupied, or those who are in a dignified situation. Also such expenses as pertain to the receiving and dismissing of strangers, together with gifts and remunerations. For the magnificent man does not spend sumptuously on himself, but on the public. But gifts have something similar to things consecrated to the gods. It is also the province of a magnificent man to build a house in a manner adapted to wealth, [for this also is a certain ornament;] and to bestow more upon those works which are more lasting; for these are most beautiful. It is likewise his province, in each of these to observe the becoming; for the same things are not adapted to gods and men, either in building a temple or a sepulchre. And every essence, indeed, is great in its own kind; and that is most magnificent which is great in a great thing; but that is so in the second place which is great in these things. For there is a difference between magnitude in a work, and magnitude in expense; since a ball, indeed, or a most beautiful jug possess the magnificence of a childish gift; but the price of these is small and illiberal.

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On this account it is the province of a magnificent man to do magnificently whatever he may do, in every genus of things. For a thing of this kind cannot easily be transcended, and the magnitude of the expense is appropriate. Such, therefore, is the magnificent man. But he who exceeds and is vulgarly ostentatious, exceeds by spending, as we have before observed, beyond what is becoming. For in small things, and which require but small expense, he consumes much money, and is discordantly splendid. Thus for instance, he will prepare a wedding-dinner through ostentation, and give money to players who are present at the entertainment, as if it were for the public advantage. And in plays he will introduce a purple curtain before the scenes, as is done by the Megarensians. He will likewise do every thing of this kind, not for the sake of the beautiful in conduct, but that he may display his wealth, and fancies, that on account of these things he shall be admired. In things likewise where much expense is required, he spends but little; but where little expense is required, he spends largely. The parsimonious man, however, is deficient in every thing; and when he has incurred a great expense, then looking to the completion of the work, by a too accurate investigation, he leaves it imperfect through too little expense. Every thing also which he does is accompanied with delay and consideration; and on this account he laments, and fancies that he does every thing on a larger scale than he ought. These habits, therefore, are vices; yet they do not bring with them disgrace, because they are neither injurious to others, nor base in the extreme.

CHAPTER III.

BUT magnanimity is conversant with great things, as is evident from the very name. What the quality of the things is, however, with which it is conversant, we must in the first place consider. But it makes no difference whether we survey the habit, or him who subsists according to the habit. He, however, appears to be magnanimous who deserving great things thinks that he deserves them; for he who thinks thus of himself undeservedly, is stupid. But no one who is endued with virtue, is either stupid or a fool. The above-mentioned character, therefore, is magnanimous. For he who deserves small things, and thinks that he deserves them, is a modest, but not a magnanimous man; since magnanimity consists in magnitude, just as beauty consists in a large body; for small men are elegant, and have symmetry of form, but are not beautiful. He, however, who thinks that he deserves great things, but thus thinks undeservedly, is proud; though not every one is proud, who deserving many things, thinks he deserves more. But he who estimates himself less than he deserves is pusillanimous, if deserving things of a moderate or small nature, he thinks himself to deserve still less than these. And he will especially appear to be a character of this kind who, deserving great things, [has this humiliating opinion of himself.] For what would he do if he were not deserving of such things? The magnanimous man, therefore, is in magnitude the summit, but in that which is requisite the middle; for he thinks himself deserving of that which he does deserve; but the other characters exceed and are deficient. Hence, if deserving great things he thinks that he deserves them, and

and especially if he deserves the greatest things, he will principally be conversant with one thing. What this is, therefore, must be assumed from desert, and desert is denominated with reference to external goods. We must, however, consider that as the greatest of external goods, which we attribute to the gods, after which those who are in a dignified situation especially aspire, and which is the reward of the most beautiful deeds. But honour is a thing of this kind ; for this is the greatest of external goods. The magnanimous man, therefore, is conversant with honour and dishonour, in such a manner as is proper. And indeed, without any reasoning process, the magnanimous appear to be conversant with honour ; for great men especially think themselves deserving of honour ; but they think so deservedly. The pusillanimous man, however, is deficient both with respect to himself, and the desert of the magnanimous man. But the proud man exceeds, indeed, with respect to himself, yet not with respect to the magnanimous man. The magnanimous man, however, if he is deserving of the greatest things, will be the best of men ; for a better character always deserves something greater, and the best of characters deserves the greatest of things. Hence it is necessary, that the truly magnanimous man should be a good man ; and that which is great in every virtue will appear to belong to the magnanimous man. Nor does it by any means accord with the character of the magnanimous man to fly, agitated [with fear,] or to injure any one. For on what account will he act basely, to whom nothing is great. But from a survey of particulars, the magnanimous man will appear to be ridiculous, if he is not a good man. Nor indeed, will he be worthy of honour if he is a bad man ; for honour is the reward of virtue, and is conferred on good men. Magnanimity, therefore, appears to be, as it were, a certain ornament of the virtues ; for it causes them to be greater, and does not exist without them. On this account it is truly difficult to be magnanimous ; for it is not possible to be so without integrity and worth.

The magnanimous man, therefore, is especially conversant with honour and dishonour. And with great honours, indeed, and those which are conferred by worthy men, he is moderately pleased, as being things familiar

familiar and adapted to him, or rather less than he deserves ; for there can be no honour equal to the desert of all-perfect virtue. Nevertheless, he will admit these honours, because they have not any thing greater to confer upon him. But he will entirely despise the honour which is paid him by casual persons, and for things of a trifling nature ; for these do not accord with his desert. And in a similar manner he will despise dishonour ; for it will not justly befall him. The magnanimous man, therefore, as we have said, is especially conversant with honour. Nevertheless, with respect to wealth also, and power, and all prosperous and adverse fortune, he will conduct himself in these moderately, in whatever manner they may take place. And neither in prosperity will he be very much elated, nor in adversity very much dejected. For neither is he affected with respect to honour, as if it were the greatest of things, since dominion and wealth are eligible on account of honour. Those, therefore, who possess these, wish through them to be honoured. To him, however, to whom honour is a small thing, other things also will be small. Hence likewise, magnanimous men appear to be supercilious. Prosperity, however, seems to contribute to magnanimity. For those that are nobly born are thought worthy of honour ; and also men in authority, and those that are rich ; for they surpass others. But every thing which excels in good, is more honourable. Hence also things of this kind cause men to be more magnanimous ; for they are honoured by certain persons on account of them. In reality, however, the good man alone is to be honoured ; but he who possesses both these, [i. e. good fortune and virtue,] is reckoned more deserving of honour. Those, however, who possess such like goods without virtue, neither justly think themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous men ; for magnanimity cannot exist without all-perfect virtue. But those who possess things of this kind become supercilious and insolent, and bad men ; for without virtue, it is not easy to bear prosperity elegantly. But not being able to bear prosperity, and fancying that they surpass other men, they despise them, and act in a casual manner. For they imitate the magnanimous man without resembling him ; and they do this in those things in which they are able. They do not, therefore,

therefore, act conformably to virtue, but they despise other men. The magnanimous man, however, justly despises others ; for he forms a true opinion [of men and things ;] but the opinion of the multitude is casually formed.

The magnanimous man also neither exposes himself to small dangers, nor is a lover of danger, because there are but few things which he considers to be of great importance. But he exposes himself to great dangers, and when he is in danger, is not sparing of his life, because he does not consider life as a thing of great importance. He is likewise disposed to benefit others, but is ashamed to be benefitted ; for the former is the province of one who surpasses, but the latter of one who is surpassed. And the benefit which he returns exceeds what he received. For thus it will come to pass, that he who first bestowed the benefit, will be his debtor, and will be benefitted by him. Magnanimous men also appear to remember those whom they have benefitted, but not those from whom they have derived any advantage ; for he who receives, is inferior to him who confers, the benefit. But the magnanimous man wishes to excel. Hence, neither does Thetis mention the benefits she had conferred on Jupiter, nor the Lacedæmonians those which they had conferred on the Athenians, but those which they had received from them. It is likewise the property of a magnanimous man to ask nothing of any one, or scarcely to do so, but to administer readily to the wants of others. And towards those indeed who are in a dignified situation, and in prosperous circumstances, to be great [in his behaviour,] but moderate towards those who are in a middle condition. For to surpass the former is difficult and venerable, but it is easy to excel the latter. And to conduct himself with dignity among the former is not ignoble, but among the lower class of men it is arrogant, in the same manner as it would be for a man to display his strength among the infirm. It is also the property of the magnanimous man not to betake himself to things which are held in honourable estimation, or where others possess the principal place. Likewise, to be at leisure, and given to delay, except where great honour is to be obtained, or some great work is to be accomplished ; and to perform a few things, indeed,
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but these great and celebrated. It is also necessary that he should openly hate and openly love; for to conceal love or hatred is the province of one who is afraid. It is likewise the property of the magnanimous man, to regard truth more than opinion. And also to speak and act openly; for this is the province of the man who despises others. Hence he uses the greatest freedom of speech; for this pertains to him who speaks freely. Hence too, he is a despiser of others, and a lover of truth, unless when he speaks ironically; but his language is ironical to the vulgar. The magnanimous man, likewise, is unable to live with any other person than a friend; for it is servile. Hence all flatterers are mercenary; and all humble men are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for to him nothing is great [in human affairs]. Nor is he mindful of injuries; for it is not the province of a magnanimous man to be mindful, and especially of evils; but rather to overlook them. Nor does he speak about men; for neither does he speak about himself, nor about another person. For he is not concerned, either that he himself may be praised, or that others may be blamed. Nor again, is he addicted to praise. Hence, neither does he defame any one, not even his enemies, unless in order to remove contumely from himself. And in necessary, or small affairs, he is by no means querulous and suppliant; for to be so is the province of a man who considers such affairs as of great consequence. He is likewise so disposed, as to prefer the possession of things beautiful and unattended with advantage, to such as are advantageous and useful; for this is more the province of one who is sufficient to himself. The motion, also, of the magnanimous man is slow, his voice is grave, and his diction stable. For he who is earnestly attentive to but few things is not prone to be hasty; nor is he vehemently strenuous, who considers nothing [in human affairs] as great. But acuteness of voice, and rapidity of motion are produced from vehemence, and considering human affairs as important. Such, therefore, is the magnanimous man.

He, however, who is deficient in magnanimity is pusillanimous; but he who exceeds, is proud and arrogant. Neither, however, do these characters appear to be bad; for they are not malevolent, but wander from

from the medium. For the pusillanimous man, indeed, deserving good things, deprives himself of what he deserves; and appears to have something depraved, in consequence of not thinking himself to deserve what is good. He, also, is ignorant of himself; for if he were not, he would aspire after things of which he is worthy, such things being good. Such men, however, do not appear to be stupid, but rather to be sluggish. But an opinion of this kind seems to render them worse; for every one desires what is adapted to his desert. They, likewise, withdraw themselves from beautiful actions and pursuits, as if they were unworthy of them; and in a similar manner, from external goods. But the proud and arrogant are stupid, and ignorant of themselves, and this obviously; for they endeavour to obtain honourable things, as if they deserved them, and afterwards are reprobated by others for so doing. They also study the ornament of dress, graceful deportment, and the like; and they wish that their prosperity may be apparent; and they speak of themselves, as if they were to be honoured on account of these things. Pusillanimity, however, is more opposed to magnanimity than pride and arrogance; for it more frequently occurs, and is a worse evil. Magnanimity, therefore, is as we have said, conversant with great honour.

CHAPTER IV.

It seems, however, that a certain virtue is conversant with honour, as we have before observed, which would appear to have a similar relation to magnanimity, that liberality has to magnificence; for both these virtues are remote from magnitude, but dispose us in such a way

as is proper, with respect to things moderate and small. But as in the receiving and giving of money there are a medium, excess and defect; thus, also, in the appetite of honour, there are the more and the less than is proper, and whence it is proper, and as it is proper. For we blame the ambitious man, as aspiring after honour more than is proper, and whence it is not proper [to obtain it;] and we blame the unambitious man, as not deliberately choosing to be honoured even for actions that are beautiful. Sometimes, however, we praise the ambitious man as virile, and a lover of beautiful conduct; but the unambitious man as modest and temperate, as we have before observed. But it is evident, that since the lover of a certain thing is said to be so multifariously, we do not always refer the lover of honour to the same thing; but when we praise him, it is because he desires honour more than the vulgar desire it, and when we blame him, it is because he desires it more than is proper. Since, however, the medium is anonymous, the extremes appear to contend for it as for a solitary place. But in those things in which there are excess and defect, there is also a medium. Men, also, aspire after honour more or less than is proper; and, therefore, they also aspire after it in such a way as is proper. Hence, this habit is praised, which is an anonymous medium about honour. It appears, however, with reference to ambition, to be a privation of ambition, and to be ambition with reference to a privation of ambition; and to be in a certain respect both with reference to both. This also appears to be the case in the other virtues. Here, however, the extremes are seen to be opposed to each other, because the middle is without a name.

CHAP.

CHAPTER V.

BUT mildness is, indeed, a medium conversant with anger. Since, however, the virtue which conducts itself moderately with respect to anger, is anonymous, and this is, also, nearly the case with the extremes, we refer mildness to the medium, though it appears to incline rather to the deficiency in anger, which deficiency is anonymous. But the excess may be called a certain angryness. For the passion is anger; but the causes of it are many and various. He, therefore, who is angry from causes, and with persons with which it is proper to be angry, and farther still, in such a manner as is proper, and when, and as long as it is proper, is praised. Hence, he will be a mild man, since mildness is praised. For the mild man wishes to be without perturbation, and not to be led by passion; but to be angry as reason may ordain in these things, and for as long a time as it prescribes. He appears, however, rather to err in the deficiency with respect to anger; for the mild man is not given to revenge, but is rather inclined to pardon. But the deficiency, whether it be a certain lenity, or whatever it may be, is blamed. For those who are not angry from causes for which it is proper to be angry, appear to be stupid, and this is also the case with those who are not angry as it is proper, nor when it is proper, nor with those persons with whom it is proper; since they appear to be without sensation, and to be void of pain. And, also, since they are not angry, they are not inclined to revenge. For it is servile for a man to endure the insolent behaviour of others towards himself, and his own relations. Excess, however, in anger has a

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manifold subsistence. For it is possible to be angry with persons and from causes with which it is not proper, and also more and less, and for a longer time than is proper. All these excesses, however, are not inherent in the same person; for it is not possible that they should be. For evil destroys itself, and if it is perfect and entire is intolerable. Those, therefore, who are irascible rapidly become angry, and with things and from causes with which they ought not to be angry, and also more than is proper; but they quickly cease to be angry, which is a most excellent thing. But this happens to them because they do not restrain their anger, but return an injury as soon as they have received it. Hence their anger, on account of its celerity, is manifest; but afterwards they cease to be angry. The extremely irascible, however, are excessively rapid in their anger, and are angry with every thing, and on every occasion, whence, also, they derive their appellation. But the bitterly angry, are with difficulty liberated from anger, and are angry for a long time; for they detain their anger [from bursting forth.] They cease, however, to be angry when they have taken vengeance on those that angered them; for vengeance appeases anger, producing pleasure instead of pain. But if vengeance does not take place, they are oppressed with a heavy burden; for because the manner in which they are affected is not apparent, neither does any one persuade them [to be appeased.] Time, however, is requisite for them to concoct their anger. But men of this description, are most troublesome to themselves, and to those who are especially their friends. We, likewise, call those men severe in their anger, who are angry from causes for which they ought not, and in a greater degree, and for a longer time than is proper, and who cannot be appeased without revenge or punishment. To mildness, however, we rather oppose the excess than the defect; for it is more frequent; since it is more human to revenge an injury. Severe men, also, are worse for the purpose of association. But that which we before observed, is also manifest from what we now say. For it is not easy to define how, and with what persons, and from what causes, and for how long a time, a man should be angry, and also to what extent he may be so rightly,

rightly, or erroneously. For he who transgresses in a small degree is not blamed, whether he inclines to the more, or to the less; since we sometimes praise those that are deficient, and call them mild; and sometimes we call those who are severely angry virile, as being men who are able to govern others. It is not, therefore, easy to explain in words, the quantity and mode of transgression which is blameable; for the judgment of this is situated in particulars, and in sense. Thus much, however, is evident, that the middle habit indeed is laudable, according to which we are angry with those persons, and from those causes that it is proper to be so, and in such a manner as is proper, and every thing else of the like kind. But the excesses and defects are blameable. And these, indeed, if they deviate but a little from the medium, are blameable in a small degree; if more, in a greater degree; and if much, they are very blameable. It is evident, therefore, that the middle habit must be retained. And thus we have discussed the habits pertaining to anger.

CHAPTER VI.

IN the associations, however, of men with each other, and in the communication of words and deeds, some persons appear to be placid and obsequious, who praise every thing with a view to the pleasure [of those with whom they associate,] and are not their opponents in any thing, in consequence of fancying that they ought not, by any means, to offend them. Others, on the contrary, are adverse to their associates in every thing, and are not at all concerned about who they may offend; and these are called morose and litigious. That the above-mentioned:

mentioned habits, therefore, are blameable, is not immanifest; and, also, that the medium between these is laudable, according to which a man admits what he ought, and as he ought, and is in a similar manner indignant. No name, however, is given to this medium; but it seems especially to resemble friendship. For he who subsists according to this middle habit, is such a one as we wish a worthy friend to be, if he also assumes, in conjunction with it, a love resembling filial love. But it differs from friendship, because it is without passion and a love resembling filial love, towards those upon whom it is exercised. For it does not admit every thing in such a manner as is fit, in consequence of loving or hating, but from a habit of approving or reprehending properly. For he who possesses this habit, will be similarly affable to those whom he does not, and to those whom he does know, to his associates, and to those with whom he does not associate, except that to each of these, his affability will be appropriate. For it is not fit similarly to pay attention, or give pain, to familiars and strangers. We have, therefore, universally shown, that he will conduct himself in his associations in such a manner as is proper; but referring his actions to the beautiful in conduct and the useful, his aim will be neither to give pain to, nor delight others, by obsequiousness. For this virtue appears to be conversant with the pains and pleasures which take place in associations. But when the possessor of this virtue cannot delight his associates worthily, or without injuring them, he is indignant, and deliberately chooses to give them pain, [rather than to injure them by obsequiousness.] He, also, will not permit another person to be obsequious to him in those things which are attended with no small disgrace, or injury, and the contrary to which produces but little pain; but he will rather be indignant. He will, likewise, associate differently with those who are in a dignified situation, and any casual persons, and with those who are more or less known to him. In a similar manner, also, in other differences, he will attribute to every one what it is fit for each person to receive. And he will, indeed, choose to give delight to others, as a thing of itself eligible, but will cautiously avoid giving them pain. And with respect to

to events, if they are greater, he will follow them; I mean, he will follow the beautiful in conduct and the advantageous; and for the sake of great pleasure afterwards he will give pain in a small degree. Such, therefore, is the middle character, but he is without a name. With respect, however, to those who delight others, he who aims at pleasing, and nothing else, may be called accommodating; but he who does this, in order that he may derive some pecuniary advantage, or such things as are procured through money, is a flatterer. And he who is indignant with every thing, we have already said, is morose and litigious. The extremes, however, appear to be opposed to each other, because the medium is anonymous.

CHAPTER VII.

THE medium of arrogance, also, is nearly conversant with the same things; but this medium, likewise, is anonymous. It will not, however, be foreign from the purpose to discuss such like habits; for by discussing each particular we shall know more of what pertains to manners, and shall be persuaded that the virtues are media, when we understand what takes place in all of them. With respect, therefore, to the associations of men with each other, we have already spoken concerning those who associate with a view to pleasure and pain. But let us now consider those who are men of veracity or falsehood, alike in words and deeds, and dissimulation. The arrogant man, therefore, appears to be one who pretends to things of a splendid nature which he does not possess, or to such as are more splendid than he possesses.

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The dissembler, on the contrary, denies what he possesses, or makes it to be less than it is. But the middle character, forming a just opinion of himself, is a man of veracity in his life, and in his words, acknowledging that he possesses what he does possess, and neither more nor less. Each of these, however, may be done for the sake of something, or for the sake of nothing. But such as a man is, such also will be his words and actions, and such also will be his life, unless he acts for the sake of something. Of itself, however, falsehood is bad and blameable; but truth is beautiful and laudable. Hence, the man of veracity, indeed, being a middle character, is laudable; but of the two characters who want veracity, both indeed are blameable; but the arrogant man more than the other. We shall, however, speak concerning each of these, and in the first place concerning the man of veracity. For we do not speak of the man who has veracity in compacts, and in things which pertain to injustice or justice; for this will belong to another virtue; but we speak of him who, though nothing of this kind should occur, is a man of veracity both in words and in his life, because he is such from habit. But such a one will appear to be a worthy man. For he who is a lover of truth, and who speaks the truth in things in which it is of no consequence whether he does or not, will, in a still greater degree, speak the truth in things in which it is of consequence. For he will avoid what is false as base, and which also he will of itself avoid; but such a man is worthy of praise. He will, however, [if it should be requisite to deviate from the medium] rather incline to what is less than the truth; for this appears to be more elegant, because excesses are troublesome and invidious. But he who pretends that he possesses things of greater consequence than he really does, and this for the sake of nothing else, resembles indeed the depraved man; for otherwise he would not be delighted with falsehood; yet he seems to be rather a vain than a bad man. If, however, he does this for the sake of something, such as glory or honour, he is not very blameable, as the arrogant man is; but if he does it for the sake of money, or of things which pertain to money, he is more base. But the arrogant man is not characterized by capacity or power, but by deliberate choice;

choice ; for he is arrogant according to habit, and because he is such a character. Thus also with respect to the man who is without veracity ; one delights in falsehood itself, but another delights in it in consequence of aspiring after glory or gain. Those, therefore, who are arrogant for the sake of glory, pretend to the possession of those things for which men are praised, or proclaimed to be happy ; but those who are arrogant for the sake of gain, pretend to be those characters with which others are delighted, and of which the non-possession may be latent ; such as to be a physician, or a prophet, or a wise man. On this account, most men pretend and arrogate to themselves things of this kind ; for they possess the above-mentioned qualities. Dissemblers, or the ironical, however, who speak less than the truth, appear indeed to be more elegant in their manners ; for they do not seem to speak for the sake of gain, but in consequence of avoiding fastidiousness. But these persons especially deny that they possess things of an illustrious nature ; as also Socrates did. Those, however, who pretend that they do not possess small things, and which are obvious, are called crafty or delicate deceivers, and are very contemptible men. Sometimes also, this species of dissimulation appears to be arrogance ; such, for instance, as the garments of the Lacedæmonians. For excess and very great deficiency, alike pertain to arrogance. But those who moderately use irony, and are ironical in things which are not very much known and obvious, appear to be elegant men. The arrogant man, however, seems to be opposed to the man of veracity ; for he is a worse character.

CHAPTER VIII.

SINCE, however, there is a certain relaxation in life, and rest from labour, and since this remission is accompanied with jesting, it appears that here also there is a certain elegant method of conversation, in which such things are said as are proper, and are delivered in a proper manner; and similarly with respect to hearing what it is proper to hear, and hearing it in such a way as is fit. But there is a difference in speaking to some persons rather than to others, and in hearing some things rather than others. It is evident, however, that in these things also there is an excess and deficiency with respect to the medium. Those, therefore, who exceed in the ridiculous, appear to be scurrilous and troublesome; for they entirely affect the ridiculous, and aim more at exciting laughter, than at speaking in a becoming manner, and not giving pain to the object of their ridicule. But those who do not say themselves any thing ridiculous, and are indignant with those who do, appear to be rustic and rigorous. Those, however, who jest elegantly, are called facetious and versatile, as being of a flexible genius; for of manners there appear to be such like motions. But as a judgment is formed of bodies from motions, so likewise of manners. Since, however, there is a redundancy of the ridiculous, and most men delight in jests and cavilling more than is proper; the scurrilous also are called versatile, as being polite and pleasant men. But that they differ, and in no small degree, is evident from what has been said.

To the middle habit also, dexterity is appropriate. But it is the province of a dexterous man to say and hear such things, as are adapted to

to a worthy and liberal man ; for there are certain things which it becomes such a one to say and hear in jest. And the jesting of a liberal differs from that of a servile man, and again, the jesting of an erudite differs from that of an inerudite man. But the truth of this may be seen, both from antient and modern comedies ; for in the former, the ridiculous consisted in obscenity ; but in the latter the suspicion of obscenity rather excited laughter. These things, however, differ in no small degree with respect to the decorous and elegant. Whether, therefore, is he who ridicules well to be defined by this, that he says what it becomes a liberal man to say ? Or by this, that he does not pain, or that he delights the hearer ? Or shall we say that a thing of this kind is indefinite ? For a different thing is odious and pleasing to a different person. He will also hear things of this kind, [viz. things which are adapted to a worthy and liberal man ;] for such things as a man endures to hear, such also he appears to do. He will not, therefore, do [or say] every thing ; for cavilling is a certain invective. Legislators, however, forbid certain invectives ; and perhaps it would be proper that they should also forbid cavilling. The elegant and liberal man, therefore, will so conduct himself, as if he were a law to himself. Hence, the middle character is a man of this description, whether he is to be denominated dexterous or versatile. But the scurrilous man is vanquished by the ridiculous, and neither spares himself, nor others, if he can excite laughter. He likewise says such things, as the elegant man would never say ; and some things that he says, the elegant man would not even endure to hear. The rustic man, however, is useless with respect to such conversations ; for contributing nothing, he is indignant with all of them. But relaxation and jesting appear to be necessary to the life of man. There are, therefore, the above-mentioned three media in life ; but all of them are conversant with the communion of certain words and actions. They differ, however, because one of them is conversant with truth, but the others are conversant with the delectable. But of the media which pertain to pleasure, one indeed is conversant with jests, but the other with the associations which belong to the rest of life.

CHAPTER IX.

WITH respect to shame, it is not fit to speak of it as of a certain virtue; for it resemble passion more than habit. It is defined, therefore, to be a certain dread of infamy; and similar to fear it is exercised about dreadful things. For those who are under the influence of shame become red, or blush; but those who have the fear of death upon them are pale. Hence both these appear to be in a certain respect corporeal; which seems rather to belong to passion than to habit. This passion, however, is not adapted to every age, but to youth. For we think it requisite that young persons should be bashful, because they commit many errors in consequence of living from passion, but are restrained from the commission of them by shame. And we praise indeed bashful young men; but no one praises a bashful old man. For we think that he ought not to do any thing for which he should be ashamed; for neither does shame pertain to a worthy man, since it is produced by bad conduct; for the things which cause shame are not to be done. But it makes no difference, whether some things are in reality base, but others only base according to opinion; for neither of these are to be done; so that shame is not to be admitted. A thing of this kind also, viz. to do something base, is the province of a bad man. But for a man to be so disposed, as to be ashamed, if he should do any thing that is base, and to fancy himself on this account to be a worthy character, is absurd. For shame pertains to voluntary actions; but a worthy man never voluntarily acts basely. Shame, however, from *hypothesis*, may seem

seem to be good ; for if a worthy man should act basely he would be ashamed. But this does not pertain to the virtues ; nor if impudence is a bad thing, and not to be ashamed when acting basely, will it be at all a more worthy thing, to be ashamed when performing base deeds. Neither is continence a virtue, but a certain mixt thing. This, however, we shall discuss hereafter. But let us now speak concerning justice.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

NOW, therefore, let us direct our attention to justice and injustice ; and consider with what kind of actions they are conversant ; what kind of medium justice is, and of what things the just is the medium. But let our survey be made according to the same method as the preceding discussions. We see, therefore, that all men are willing to call that kind of habit justice, through which we practise just things, [or are inclined to the works of justice,] and through which we act justly, and wish what is just. And after the same manner injustice is that habit through which men act unjustly, and wish what is unjust. Hence, these things must be first adumbrated by us ; since there is not the same mode of subsistence in the sciences, in powers, and in habits. For there is the same power indeed, and the same science of contraries ; but
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there is not the same habit of contraries. Thus for instance, contrary operations are not performed by health, but those only which are salubrious; for we say that a man walks in a healthy manner, when he walks in such a way as a healthy man walks. Frequently, therefore, a contrary habit is known from a contrary habit; but frequently habits are known from their subjects. For if a good habit of body is apparent, a bad habit of body will also be apparent. And from things which produce a good habit of body, this good habit will be known, and from this good habit its producing causes will be known. For if a good habit of body is a density of the flesh, a bad habit of body will necessarily be a rarity of the flesh; and that which produces a good habit of body, will be productive of density in the flesh. It follows, however, for the most part, that if one contrary is predicated multifariously, the other also will be multifariously predicated¹; as, if the just, so likewise the unjust. But justice and injustice are predicated multifariously, though through the proximity of their homonymy, this is latent; nor is it more apparent as is the case in those things which are remote². For the difference according to idea or form is great. Thus, for instance, *κλεις*, *clavis*, is predicated homonymously; for it signifies both that part which is under the neck of animals, and that by which gates are shut, [viz. a key]. We must consider, therefore, in how many ways an unjust man is denominated. But it appears that he is an unjust man who acts illegally, and he who takes to himself more of external goods than he ought, [or who is avaricious,] and also he who is unequal [i. e. who takes to himself less of evils than is equitable;] so that it is evident that he will be a just man who acts legally, and he who is equal or equitable. The just, therefore, will be both the legal and the equal; but the unjust will be the illegal and the unequal. Since, however, the unjust man is avaricious, he will be conversant with good, yet not with every kind of good, but with that in which there is prosperous and

¹ This dialectic precept is accurately discussed by Aristotle in the first book of his *Topica*.

² Viz. When a name signifies many things, very distant from each other, then it is manifest that it is predicated multifariously.

adverse

adverse fortune ; and which is indeed simply always good, but to a certain person not always. But men pray for and pursue this good, though they ought not. For they should pray indeed, that things which are simply good [such as riches, &c.] may also be good to them ; but they should choose such things as are good to their possessor, [such as virtue and wisdom]. The unjust man, however, does not always choose that which is more, but in things which are simply evil, he chooses the less. But because a less evil appears in a certain respect to be good, and of what is good, there is a desire of possessing more of it than is equitable, on this account the unjust man appears to be avaricious. He is also unequal, and acts illegally ; for this very thing the acting illegally, or inequality, comprehends all injustice, and is common to all injustice. Since, however, he who acts illegally is unjust, but he who acts legally is just, it is evident that every thing which is legal is in a certain respect just. For the things which are defined by the legislative science are legal ; and we say that each of these is just ; but the laws speak about every thing, looking either to that which is advantageous in common to all men, or to the best of men, or to those in authority, and this either according to virtue, or some other mode. Hence, after one manner we call those things just, which are capable of producing and preserving felicity, and the parts of it, by political communion. The law, however, ordains that the works of the brave man should be done, such as that a soldier shall not leave his rank, nor fly from the enemy, nor throw away his arms ; and likewise that the works of the temperate man shall be done, such as not to commit adultery, nor behave with insolent wantonness ; and also those of the mild man, such as not to strike another person, nor defame any one. And the law ordains similarly with respect to the other virtues and vices, partly commanding, and partly forbidding ; the law indeed, doing this rightly, which is rightly framed, but that which is rashly framed, erroneously. This justice, therefore, [i. e. legal justice] is indeed a perfect virtue, yet not simply, but with reference to another thing. And on this account justice frequently appears to be the best of the virtues ; nor is either the evening or the morning star

so admirable. We likewise say proverbially, *Every virtue is comprehended in justice*. And legal justice is especially a perfect virtue, because it is the use of perfect virtue. But it is perfect because he who possesses it, is also able to employ virtue towards another person, and not only towards himself. For many persons are indeed able to employ virtue in their own affairs, but not in the affairs of others. And on this account, it appears to have been well said by Bias, that *dominion shows the man*; for he who governs has relation to another person, and is now conversant with the communion of life. For the very same reason also, justice alone, of all the virtues, appears to be a foreign good, because it has reference to another person; since it performs what is advantageous to another, viz. either to a ruler, or to the community at large. He, therefore, is the worst of characters, who acts depravely both towards himself and towards his friends; but he is the best of men, not who acts virtuously towards himself, but towards another person; for this is a difficult work. This justice, therefore, is not a part of virtue, but is universal virtue; nor is the injustice which is contrary to it a part of vice, but universal vice. What the difference, however, is between virtue and this justice, is evident from what has been already said; for it is indeed, the same with it, but not essentially. For so far indeed, as it has reference to another person, it is justice, but so far as it is a habit of a certain description, it is simply virtue.

CHAP.

CHAPTER II.

WE investigate, however, that justice which is a part of virtue; for there is, as we say, such a justice; and in a similar manner we investigate the injustice which is a part of vice. But that there is such a justice is indicated by this, that he who energizes according to other depravities, acts unjustly, indeed, but does not assume to himself more of external good than he ought; such, for instance, as the man who throws away his shield through timidity, or he who speaks ill of another from asperity, or who does not give pecuniary assistance to another, through illiberality. But when he assumes to himself more than he ought, he frequently is not vicious according to any one of such vices, nor yet according to all the vices, but according to a certain depravity; for we blame him, and for injustice. There is, therefore, a certain other injustice, as being a certain part of universal injustice, and a certain something unjust, which is a part of the whole of the unjust that is contrary to law. Farther still, if one person, indeed, should commit adultery for the sake of gain, and should receive money for so doing, but another should give money and sustain an injury in his property, by doing it, in consequence of being under the influence of [strong] desire, the latter, indeed, will rather appear to be intemperate, than one who assumes to himself more than he ought, but the former will be unjust, but not intemperate; and it is evident that he will not, because he acts with a view to gain. Again, in all other unjust deeds, there is always a reference to a certain depravity. Thus, if a man commits adultery, the reference is to intemperance; if he abandons

his post in battle, the reference is to timidity; but if he strikes another person, to anger. If, however, he obtains money by it, the reference is to no other depravity, than to injustice. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain other injustice which ranks as a part, besides universal injustice, and which is synonymous with it; because the definition of each is in the same genus. For both possess their power in a reference to another person. But the injustice which ranks as a part is conversant with honour, or riches, or safety, or if all these could be comprehended in one name, it is conversant with them; and this on account of the pleasure which results from gain. Universal injustice, however, is conversant with all such things, as a worthy man is conversant with [in the exercise of justice]. That there are many kinds of justice, therefore, and that there is a certain justice which is different from universal virtue, is evident. What it is, however, and what kind of a thing it is must be explained.

The unjust, therefore, has been distinguished by us into the illegal and the unequal; and the just into the legal and the equal. But the prior injustice of which we have spoken subsists according to the illegal. Since, however, the illegal and the unequal are not the same, but different, as a part with reference to a whole; for every thing unequal is illegal, but not every thing which is illegal is unequal; hence, the unjust and injustice are not the same with these, but different from them, in the same manner as parts and wholes. For this injustice is a part of the whole of injustice; and, in a similar manner this justice is a part of the whole of justice. We must, therefore, speak concerning the justice and injustice which rank as parts, and after the same manner concerning the partially just and unjust. The justice, therefore, and injustice which are arranged according to universal virtue, and of which the former is the use of the whole of virtue, and the latter of the whole of vice, with reference to another person, we shall omit. It is, likewise, evident how the just and the unjust which are arranged conformably to these, are to be distinguished. For nearly most of those things which are legal are ordained from universal virtue: For the law orders men to live conformably to every virtue, and forbids them

them from acting conformably to any one of the vices. But the efficient causes of the whole of virtue, are those legal actions which are established by the laws for the purposes of public discipline. Concerning the discipline, however, of an individual, according to which he is simply a good man, whether it pertains to the political, or another science, will be determined hereafter¹. For perhaps it is not the same thing to be a good man, and a good citizen. But there is one species of the justice which subsists according to a part, and of the just pertaining to it, and which consists in the distributions either of honour, or riches, or such other things as may be divided among those who partake of the same polity. For in these it is possible that one person may share unequally, and equally with another. But another species of justice is that which possesses a corrective power in contracts. Of this, however, there are two parts. For of contracts some are voluntary, but others are involuntary. The voluntary, indeed, are, buying, selling, putting out money at interest, suretyship, lending any thing on hire, pledging, and hiring [a slave or an artificer.] But these contracts are said to be voluntary, because the principle of them is voluntary. And of involuntary contracts, some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, witchcraft, prostitution, deceiving the slave of another person, insidious murder, and bearing false witness. But the violent, are such as blows², bonds, death, plunder, mutilation, slander and contumely.

¹ i. e. In the third Book of the Politics, Chap. 4.

² The reader who is not an adept in the philosophy of Aristotle, will doubtless be surprised that he ranks *blows* among *contracts*. But in order to solve this apparent absurdity, it must be observed, that *particular justice* is divided by Aristotle into the *distributive* and the *commutative*; and that the *commutative* is that which gives rectitude to contracts, and commutations, through which a thing is transferred from one person to another, and universally, to actions, through which one person acts, and another suffers. Under the word *εἰσπραγματά*, therefore, i. e. *contracts*, Aristotle, also, comprehends *commutations* of every description.

CHAPTER III.

SINCE, however, the unjust man is unequal, and, also, the unjust belongs to the unequal, it is evident that there is a certain medium of the unequal; but this is the equal. For in whatever action there is the more and the less, there is also the equal. If, therefore, the unjust is unequal, the just will be equal; which, indeed, without any reasoning process, is manifest to all men. But since the equal is a medium, the just will be a certain medium. The equal, however, is in two things at least. It is necessary, therefore, that the just, which is a medium and equal, should be referred to a certain thing, and to certain things. And so far, indeed, as it is a medium it is referred to certain things; but these are the more and the less. And so far as it is equal, it is referred to two things; but so far as it is the just, it is referred to certain things. Hence, it is necessary that the just should be in four things at least; for the persons to whom the just pertains are two, and the things in which it consists are two. And there will be the same equality between the persons to whom justice pertains, and the things in which it consists; for as is the relation of the former to each other, such, also, is that of the latter. For if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal things. Battles, however, and accusations hence originate, when either equal persons do not obtain equal things, or those that are not equal have an equal distribution of things. This, also, is evident from distribution according to desert; for all men acknowledge, that the just in distributions should be made according to

to a certain desert. All men, however, do not say that there is the same desert; but democratic men, indeed, say that desert is liberty; and of the oligarchists, some say that it is wealth, but others that it is nobility; but the aristocrats say that it is virtue. The just, therefore, is something analogous; for the analogous is not only the peculiarity of monadic number [or number consisting of units,] but of number universally¹. For analogy or proportion is equality of ratio, and consists in four things at least. That disjunct proportion, therefore, consists in four terms is evident; and this is also the case with continued proportion. For this uses one thing as two things; as, for instance, as A is to B, so is B to C. Hence, B is twice assumed; so that if B is placed twice, the analogous things will be four. But the just, also, consists in four things at least, and the reason is the same; for the persons to whom justice is distributed, and the things which are distributed, are similarly divided. As the term A, therefore, is to B, so will C be to D. And, therefore, alternately, as A is to C, so is B to D. Hence, the whole will be compared with the whole, which the distribution conjoins; and if they are thus compounded they will be justly conjoined. The conjunction, therefore, of the term A with C, and of B with D, forms the justice which is in distribution; and the just is the medium of that which is foreign from the analogous. For the analogous is a medium; and the just is analogous². Mathematicians,

¹ i. e. Of number applied to things, such as ten men, eight horses, &c.

² Because distributive justice is a certain proportionality, it has certain properties of proportionality. The first property is, that things which are proportional to each other, are, also, alternately proportional. Thus, because, as 10 is to 5, so is 8 to 4, it will be alternately as 10 is to 8, so is 5 to 4. And this property, also, accords with distributive justice. For let there be two persons, one of whom has laboured for one month, but the other for two months; distributive justice in this case requires, that if one pound in money is given to him who has laboured for one month, two pounds should be given to him who has laboured for two months. And then it will be as he who has laboured for two months, is to him who has laboured for one month, so are two pounds to one pound. Hence, alternately, as he who has laboured for two months is to two pounds, so is he who has laboured for one month to one pound.

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cians, however, call such an analogy or proportion as this geometrical; for in geometrical proportion it happens that the whole is to the whole as all the parts to all. But this proportion is not continued; for the same thing is not assumed as the person to whom a distribution is made, and as the thing distributed. This justice, therefore, consists in proportion; but the unjust is foreign from proportion. And hence, one person has more, but another less [than he ought;] which, also, happens to be the case in actions. For he, indeed, who does an injury has more, but he who is injured has less of good than he ought. The contrary, however, takes place in evil; for a less evil has the relation of good with respect to a greater evil. For a less is more eligible than a greater evil. But the eligible is good; and that which is more eligible is a greater good. This, therefore, is one species of the just.

The second property is, when there is the same ratio of the first term to the second, as of the third term to the fourth, there is, also, the same ratio of the first and third terms taken together, as of the second and fourth taken together. Thus, if there is the same ratio of 10 to 5 as of 8 to 4, there is, also, the same ratio of 10 and 8 taken together, to 5 and 4 taken together, viz. there is the same duple ratio. For as 10 is to 5, or as 8 is to 4, so is 18 to 9. This property, also, accords with distributive justice. For the same ratio which he who has laboured for two months has to two pounds in money, he who has laboured for one month has to one pound; and the same ratio, also, have two persons who have laboured for three months to three pounds. Distributive justice, therefore, so distributes common goods, that as the persons are to each other, so are the goods distributed to such persons, and as are all the persons taken together, so are all the things distributed collectively taken.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IV.

THE other remaining species of justice is corrective, which is conversant both with voluntary and involuntary contracts. But the form of this justice is different from the former. For the justice which is distributive of common things, [or things of a public nature,] always subsists according to the above-mentioned proportion. For if the distribution is made from common property, it will be according to the same ratio as the things introduced have to each other; and the unjust which is opposed to this justice, is foreign from proportion. The just, however, which is in contracts, is, indeed, a certain equality, and the unjust is inequality; yet not according to geometrical, but arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference, whether a worthy deprives a bad man of his property, or a bad a worthy man; nor whether a worthy or a bad man commits adultery. But the law only looks to the difference of the injury, and uses the persons as if they were equal, though the one, indeed, should injure, but the other should be injured, and though the one should do, but the other should suffer, harm. Hence, this injustice, since it is unequal, the judge endeavours to equalize. For when one man, indeed, inflicts a blow, but another is struck, or one man kills, but another is killed, the suffering and the action are divided into unequal parts; but the judge, by the punishment which he inflicts, endeavours to produce an equality, by detracting from the gain. For in things of this kind, in short, though to some things the name will not be appropriate, the injury is denominated gain, and the endurance of the injury loss. But when

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the suffering is measured, the one is called loss but the other gain. Hence, of the more and the less, the equal is the medium. With respect to loss and gain, however, the one is more, but the other less contrarily; for the more of good, but the less of evil is gain, and the contrary is loss; of which the equal is the medium, which we say is the just. Hence, the justice which is corrective will be the medium of loss and gain. Hence, too, when men contend with each other [about legal affairs] they fly to the judge; but to go to a judge is to go to justice. For a judge is nothing else than as it were animated justice. They, also, search for a judge who is a medium; and some persons call judges mediators, as if they should obtain justice if they obtained the medium. The just, therefore, is a certain medium, since the judge is also. But the judge equalizes, and as if a line were cut into unequal parts, he takes away from the greater section that by which it exceeds the half, and adds it to the less section. When, however, the whole is divided into two equal parts, then men say they have what is their own, when they obtain the equal. But the equal is the middle of the greater and the less according to arithmetical proportion¹. Hence, also,

¹ Any line, or any number, may be divided into unequal parts. But between unequal lines and numbers, both an arithmetical and a geometrical medium may be obtained. An arithmetical medium, therefore, is *that which exceeds the less quantity, not in the same ratio by which it is exceeded by the greater, but by the same quantity*. But a geometrical medium is *that which exceeds the less quantity in the same ratio, but not by the same quantity, by which it is exceeded by the greater*. Thus, for instance, the arithmetical medium between the numbers 9 and 3 is 6, because 6 exceeds 3 as much as it is exceeded by 9; yet not in the same ratio. For 6 exceeds 3 in a duple ratio, but is exceeded by 9 in a sesquialter ratio; since 9 contains 6 once, and the half of 6 besides. On the contrary 6 is a geometrical medium between 3 and 12, because it is exceeded by 12 not in the same quantity, but in the same ratio by which 6 exceeds 3. But that it exceeds and is exceeded in the same ratio is evident. For as 6 exceeds 3 in a duple ratio, so, likewise, it is exceeded by 12 in a duple ratio.

Hence, if a line of 12 inches is divided unequally into two parts, the one consisting of 9 and the other of 3 inches, a line which is an arithmetical medium is to be found, and which is a line of 6 inches. By this middle line, therefore, the unequal parts may be reduced to an equality. For if from the greater part, i. e. from the line of 9 inches, that is taken away through which it exceeds the middle line of 6 inches, i. e. if 3 inches are taken away and

added

also, the just (*δικαιον*) is denominated; because it is divided into two equal parts (*οτι διχα αἰσιν*), just as if it should be said to be *διχατον*; and a judge is called *δικαστης*, as if he were *διχαστής*, or one who divides a thing into two equal parts. For if when two things are equal, that which is taken from the one, is added to the other, the latter will exceed what the former then becomes, by two such parts. For if what is taken away from one of the equal things were not added to the other, the one would exceed the other by one such part only. The thing, therefore, to which something is added exceeds the medium by one part; and the medium, also, exceeds by one part that from which something is taken away. By this, therefore, we may know, what ought to be taken away from him who has more, and what ought to be added to him who has less. For it is necessary to add to him who has less, that by which the medium exceeds, but to take away from the greatest that by which the medium is exceeded. Let there be three lines AA, BB, CC, equal to each other, From AA let AE be taken, and added to CC, and let that part be CD. Hence, the whole line DCC, will exceed the line AE, by the line CD, and the line FC; and, therefore, it will exceed the line BB by the line CD*.

A	E	A
B		B
C	F	CD

This,

added to the less part, or the line of 3 inches, those two lines will become equal, and the whole line of 12 inches, will be divided into two equal parts. In a similar manner an unequal division takes place in contracts. For one person gains and receives more, for instance, 900*l.*; but another loses, and receives less, for instance, 300*l.* The judge, however, that he may reduce the contract to an equality, ought to find the arithmetical medium between the more and the less, i. e. between 900*l.* and 300*l.*, which medium is 600*l.* But having found this medium, he ought to take from him who has more that by which he exceeds, and give it to him who has less; for thus the loss and gain will be equalized, and divided into half, so that each will have 600*l.* And this is commutative justice.

* Let each of the three equal lines AA, BB, and CC, be supposed to be 10 inches. Then if one inch is taken from AA and added to BB, all the lines will become unequal, so that AA

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will

This, also, takes place in other arts; for they would be subverted, unless that which suffers, suffers the same in quantity and quality as that which acts. But these appellations, loss and gain, are derived from voluntary contracts. For when a man obtains more than his own he is said to gain, but when he has less than what he had at first, he is said to have lost; as in buying and selling, and such other things as the law permits. When, however, men have neither more nor less, but give as much as they receive, they are said to have their own, and neither to lose, nor gain. Hence, the just is the medium of a certain gain and loss in things which are not voluntary; so that each of those who form a contract may have as much afterwards as before.

CHAPTER V.

To some persons, however, retaliation appears to be simply just, and this also was the opinion of the Pythagoreans; for they defined the just to be simply retaliation. But retaliation is neither adapted to distributive nor to corrective justice; though Rhadamanthus [in

will be 9 inches, BB will be 11 inches, and CC 10 inches. Hence, CC will be an arithmetical medium between AA thus diminished, and BB thus increased, viz. between 9 and 11. If, therefore, from BB thus increased, i. e. if from 11 inches 1 inch be taken away, by which it exceeds the medium 10 inches, and that 1 inch be added to AA thus diminished, or to 9 inches, all the three will have 10 inches, and, therefore, all will be equal to each other, and to the medium.

Eschylus]

Eschylus] appears to assert, that justice is this, "and that the punishment will be equitable when a man suffers the same thing as he has done." For retaliation is frequently discordant. Thus for instance, if a magistrate should strike a man, it is not proper that the man should strike him in return; and if any one strikes a magistrate, he ought not only to be struck, but to be punished more severely. Again, there is a great difference between the voluntary and the involuntary. But commercial intercourse is preserved by a justice of this kind, if the retaliation is made according to proportion, and not according to equality. For by analogous retaliation, the union of a city becomes permanent. For men either endeavour to return evil for evil; for it appears to be slavery if they cannot retaliate; or they wish when they benefit others to be themselves benefitted in return; since if this does not take place there is no compensation, by which the permanent union of society is effected. Hence, the temple of the *Graces* is built in a conspicuous part of the city, for the purpose of producing remuneration; for this is the peculiarity of *grace* or *favour*. For it is requisite to return a favour to him who has conferred one, and he again should begin to confer a favour. But a conjunction according to a diameter, produces the retribution which is according to analogy. Thus for instance, let the builder of a house be A, a shoemaker B, the house C, and the shoe D.

A	B
The builder of a house.	A shoemaker.
C	D
The house.	The shoe.

It is necessary, therefore, that the builder of the house should receive from the shoemaker his work, and give his work to him in return. Hence, if the first equality is that which is according to analogy, and afterwards a retaliation is made, it will be that which we have mentioned; but if not, there will neither be equality, nor will the bond of society remain; for nothing hinders but that the work
of

of the one may be more excellent than the work of the other. It is necessary, therefore, that these should be equalized. But this also takes place in the other arts; for they would be subverted, unless that which is passive suffered the same in quantity and quality, as the agent effects. For the communion of society is not produced from two physicians, but from a physician and a husbandman, and in short, from different, and not from equal characters; but it is necessary that these should be equalized. Hence, it is requisite that all things should be capable of being compared with each other of which there is an exchange; and for this purpose money was adopted, and becomes, in a certain respect, a measure. For it measures all things; so that it likewise measures excess and defect; and therefore determines how many shoes are equal to a house, or to nutriment. It is necessary, therefore, that such as the ratio is of the builder of a house to a shoemaker, such should be the ratio of the number of shoes to a house, or to nutriment. For if this does not take place, there will neither be exchange, nor communion. And it will not take place, unless the things compared are in a certain respect equal. Hence, it is necessary, as has been before observed, that all things should be measured by one certain thing; and this is, in reality, indigence, which connects all things. For if mankind were not in want of any thing, or if they were not similarly in want, either there would be no exchange, or not the same. But money was adopted by compact, as a subsidiary exchange for indigence; and on this account money was called (*ρομισμα*), because it is not established by nature, but by law, (*ρομφ*); and it is in our power to change it, and render it useless. Retaliation, therefore, will then take place, when there is an equalization. Hence, as the husbandman is to the shoemaker, so is the work of the shoemaker to the work of the husbandman. But it is necessary to bring them to the form of proportion, when an exchange takes place; for without this, one of the extremes will have both the excesses. When, however, each person has his own, they will thus be equal, and communicate with each other, because this equality can be produced among them.

Let

Let the husbandman be A, the nutriment C, and the work of the shoemaker, equal to the nutriment, be D.

A
The husbandman.

B
The shoemaker.

C
The nutriment.

D
The work of the shoemaker equal to the nutriment.

But without this retaliation there would be no communion of society. That indigence, however, connects, as being one certain thing, is evident, because when men are not in want of each other, either both, or one of them, no exchange takes place, as it does when one is in want of what the other possesses; as, for instance, wine, for which an exportation of corn is granted. It is, necessary, therefore, that this should be equalized. In order to future exchange, however, if nothing should at present be wanted, that it may be obtained when it is wanted, money becomes as it were a surety to us. For it is requisite that he who brings money, should take what he wants in exchange for it. Money, therefore, also suffers this very same thing; for it does not always possess an equal power, but at the same time it is more permanent. Hence, it is necessary that all things should be estimated; for thus there will always be an exchange; and if there is an exchange, there will be communion. Money, therefore, as a measure having made things commensurate, equalizes them. For there would be no communion without exchange, nor exchange without equality, nor equality without commensuration. In reality, therefore, it is impossible that things which so much differ, should become commensurate; but for the purposes of indigence, this is sufficiently possible. Hence, it is necessary that there should be one certain thing [as a measure], and this from assumption. Hence, it is called (*νομισμα*) money. For this causes all things to be commensurate; since all things are measured by money. Let a house be A, ten minæ B, and a bed C. A, therefore, will be the half of B, if the house is worth five minæ, or is equal to

to the value of five minæ. But let the bed C be the tenth part of B. It is evident, therefore, how many beds are equal in value to the house, viz. five. That such, however, was the exchange before there was money is manifest; for it makes no difference whether five beds, or as much as the worth of five beds, are given for the house. Thus, therefore, we have shown what the unjust, and also what the just is.

But these things being determined, it is evident that a just action is a medium between doing and receiving an injury; for the former is to have more, but the latter less [than is just.] Justice, however, is a medium, not after the same manner with the former virtues, but because it pertains to a medium¹ [between the more and the less;] but injustice pertains to extremes. And justice, indeed, is that according to which a just man is said to act justly from deliberate choice, and to distribute justice both to himself, in making a compact with another person, and to another who makes a compact with another; yet not so, as to attribute more of what is eligible to himself, and less to his neighbour, and the contrary of that which is hurtful, but so as to distribute the equal [to himself and others] according to analogy. And he adopts the same mode of conduct towards another person who forms a compact with another. Injustice, on the contrary, is that according to which an unjust man is said to act unjustly from deliberate choice, and to distribute injustice both to himself and others; but this is the excess and deficiency of that which is beneficial or hurtful, contrary to the analogous. Hence, injustice is excess and deficiency, because it pertains to excess and deficiency. To the unjust man himself, indeed, it is an excess of that which is simply beneficial, but a deficiency of that which is hurtful; but to others it distributes in a manner wholly similar; and in whatever way the distribution may happen to be made, it is contrary to the analogous. Of an unjust

¹ For the other virtues are certain mediocrities, because they are mediæ between two vices, one of which errs through excess, and the other through deficiency. On the contrary, justice is not a medium between two vices after this manner, but it is opposed to injustice alone, which errs by giving to one person more, and to another less, but gives to neither what is equal.

action,

action, however, the less extreme is, to be injured, and the greater, to injure. After this manner, therefore, we have discussed justice and injustice, and have shown what is the nature of each; and similarly we have discussed universally the just and the unjust.

CHAPTER VI.

SINCE, however, it is possible that he who acts unjustly may not yet be unjust, from what kind of iniquitous deeds will a man be unjust, according to each species of injustice? For instance, will it be as a thief, or as an adulterer, or as a robber? Or thus, indeed, will the difficulty still remain? For a man may have connexion with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from a principle of deliberate choice, but from passion. Hence, in this case he acts unjustly, but is not unjust; as neither is a thief, though he may have committed theft, nor an adulterer though he may have committed adultery; and in a similar manner in other things. In what manner, therefore, retaliation subsists, with reference to justice, has been shown by us before. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant that what we at present investigate, is the simply just, and the politically just. But this justice takes place among men connected together in society, and these liberal and equal men, either according to analogy, or according to number, with a view to a sufficiency of the necessaries of life. Hence, those among whom this is not found, have no political justice towards each other, but a certain justice, and which subsists according to a similitude to political justice. For there is justice among those with whom there is also law; but there is law among those with whom there is injustice.

For justice is the judgment of the just and the unjust. But with those with whom there is injustice, there is also acting unjustly; but with all those with whom there is acting unjustly, there is not injustice. But injustice consists in a man distributing to himself more of what is simply good, and less of what is simply evil [than he ought.] Hence, we do not suffer a man to govern, but reason; because he does this to himself [i. e. distributes to himself more of what is good, and less of what is evil,] and becomes a tyrant. He, however, who governs, is the guardian of justice; but if of justice, he is also the guardian of the equal. But since if he is a just man, it does not appear that he possesses more of external good than others; for he does not distribute more of what is simply good to himself, unless it belongs to him by analogy; hence, he distributes the simply good to another; and on this account it is said that justice is a foreign good, as we have before observed. A certain reward, therefore, must be given to him; but this is honour and a gift. Those persons, however, to whom these are not sufficient, become tyrants. But despotic and paternal justice [or the justice of a master towards his servants, and of a father towards his children,] are not the same with this, but similar to it. For there is no injustice simply of a man towards his own property; but a possession [or a slave], and a child, while he is little and not yet separated from his parents, are as it were a part of the man. And no one deliberately chooses to injure himself. Hence, there is no injustice of a man towards himself; and consequently neither is there injustice, nor political justice. For justice is conformable to law, and subsists among those with whom law is naturally adapted to exist. But these are persons with whom there is an equality of governing, and being governed. Hence, there is more of political justice between a man and his wife, than between a father and his children, or a master and his servants. For this latter is economical justice; but this is different from political justice.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VII.

WITH respect, however, to political justice, one kind is natural, but the other legal. And the natural, indeed, is that which has every where the same power, and this not because it appears or does not appear to be justice. But the legal is that respecting which from the first it is of no consequence, whether it is established in this or in that way, but when it is established, is of consequence; such, for instance, as that captives shall be redeemed for a mina¹; or that a goat shall be sacrificed and not two sheep². And farther still, such laws as are promulgated about particulars; such as that sacrifices shall be offered to Brasidas³, and whatever is established by public decrees. To some persons, however, all political justice appears to be of this kind, because that which has a natural subsistence is immutable, and every where possesses the same power; just as fire burns both here and in Persia; but just things are seen to be mutable. This, however, is not entirely, but only partially the case; though perhaps with the gods⁴,

¹ The Lacedæmonians and Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, agreed that the captives on both sides, should be redeemed for one mina.

² The Thebans in Egypt established a law that a goat should be sacrificed to Jupiter, and not two sheep. See the 2nd book of Herodotus.

³ The Amphibolitæ ordered sacrifices to be offered to Brasidas the Lacedæmonian king, who fell fighting bravely in the Peloponnesian war.

⁴ By *the gods* here, Aristotle means the celestial bodies, which being deified bodies, were called by the antients gods. Natural causes, therefore, with these, cannot even accidentally be changed from their mode of operation. Thus the motion of the sun can never be changed.

it is by no means to be admitted [that justice is mutable;] but with us there is something which is naturally mutable, though not every thing. But at the same time justice is partly from nature and partly not. What, however, the justice is which is from nature is evident from contingencies, and things which have a various subsistence, and also what the justice is which is not from nature, but is legal, and established by compact, since both are similarly mutable. The same distinction, likewise, will be adapted to other things. For the right hand is naturally more excellent, [i. e. is more adapted to motion] than the left; though it is possible that some persons may be ambidexter. The justice, however, which is from compact and utility resembles measures. For the measures of wine and corn are not every where equal; but with those who buy wine and corn they are greater, and with those who sell them less. In a similar manner justice, which is not natural, but human, is not every where the same; since neither are polities, but every where one polity alone is conformable to nature, viz. that which is the most excellent. Every thing just, however, and every thing legal are, as universals to particulars. For actions are many, but each of them is one thing; for it is a universal. But an unjust action and the just differ, and also a just action and the just. For the unjust subsists either by nature or by order. But the very same thing which when done is an unjust action, is not so before it is done, but is unjust; and in a similar manner with respect to a just action. But that which is common is rather called *a deed justly done*; (*δικαιοπραγημα*) but the correction of an unjust deed, *a just deed*, (*διναιωμα*.) With respect to each of these, however, what the quality and number of their species are, and what the particulars are with which they are conversant, we shall hereafter consider.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VIII.

SINCE, therefore, things just and unjust, are those which we have enumerated, a man then indeed does an injury, or acts justly, when he thus acts voluntarily; but when involuntarily, he neither does an injury, nor acts justly, except from accident. For it happens that the things which he does are either just or unjust; but a deed unjustly done, and a just action, are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary; for when an action is voluntary, it is blamed; but at the same time it is then a deed unjustly done. Hence, there will be something unjust, which is not yet a deed unjustly done, unless the voluntary is added to it. But I call the voluntary indeed, as has been before observed, that which a man does of things which it is in his power to do knowingly, and not ignorantly, viz. not being ignorant of the circumstances of the action; as for instance, who it is he strikes, and with what he strikes, and on what account, and when he does this, neither from accident, nor by compulsion; as would be the case, if some one taking his hand, should strike another person with it. For he would then not strike willingly, because it was not in his power to avoid giving the blow. It may happen, however, that he who is struck is a father; but he who strikes him may merely know that he is a man, or some one of those who are present, but may be ignorant that it is his father. A similar distinction also must be made in that for the sake of which a thing is done, and concerning the whole action. Hence, that which is not known, or which is not known indeed, but is not in the power of him who acts, or which he is compelled to do, is done involuntarily.

involuntarily. For we both do and suffer many things which have a natural subsistence knowingly, no one of which is either voluntary or involuntary ; such as to grow old, or to die. That which is accidental, however, similarly takes place in things unjust and just. For if a man returns a deposit unwillingly, and from fear, he cannot be said either to perform a just deed, or to act justly ; except from accident. In a similar manner he who from compulsion and unwillingly, does not return a deposit, must be said to be unjust, and to do an unjust deed from accident. But of voluntary actions, some indeed we perform with previous choice, and others without previous choice ; with previous choice, such as have been the subjects of previous deliberation, but without it, such as have not been deliberated on previously.

Since, therefore, there are three kinds of harm in social communion, those which are accompanied with ignorance are errors, when a man neither apprehends who the person that is injured is, nor the mode, nor the instrument, nor that for the sake of which the harm is done. For in this case, he will think either that *he* has not struck the person, or not with this instrument, or not this person, or not on this account, but something else happened different from what he expected. Thus one man may strike another not for the purpose of wounding, but of stimulating him, and in so doing may accidentally wound him ; or he may not strike the person whom he intended to strike, or not in the way he intended. When, therefore, harm is done unintentionally, it is a misfortune ; but when it is done not unintentionally, yet without vice, it is an error. For a man then errs, when the principle of the cause is in himself ; but he is unfortunate when the principle is external to him. When, however, harm is done knowingly, but without previous deliberation, it is a deed unjustly done ; as for instance, whatever happens to men through anger, or other passions which are necessary or natural. For those who injure others, and err through the influence of these passions, act indeed unjustly, and their deeds are unjustly done ; nevertheless they are not yet unjust on account of these actions, nor depraved ; for the harm which they did was not through depravity. But when a man injures another from deliberate choice, he

he is unjust and depraved. Hence, those deeds which are the effect of anger are well judged not to be the result of previous design. For the principle of action is not in him who is angry, but in him who excited his anger. Again, [when one man hurts another from anger] there is no controversy about the deed, as to its having been done, but about the justice of it; for anger is excited on account of apparent injustice. For here there is no controversy about the existence of the thing, as there is in contracts, in which it is necessary that one of the contractors should be a depraved character, unless his conduct is the effect of oblivion; but acknowledging the fact, they controvert the justice of it. He, however, who hurts another person deliberately, is not ignorant of the deed. Hence, the one of these thinks he is injured, but the other thinks he is not. But he who does harm to another person from deliberate choice, acts unjustly; and he who injures another, according to those deeds which are done unjustly, is unjust; when he acts contrary to proportion, or to the equal. In a similar manner also, he is just, when he acts justly from previous choice; but he acts justly, if he only acts willingly. Of involuntary actions, however, some deserve to be pardoned, but others do not. For such involuntary errors as are not only committed ignorantly, but also through ignorance, deserve to be pardoned; but such as are not committed through ignorance, but ignorantly, yet from passion neither natural nor human, do not deserve to be pardoned.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IX.

It may, however, be doubted whether a distinction has been sufficiently made by us, between being injured, and injuring. In the first place, indeed, if the thing is as Euripides asserts it to be, when he absurdly says, "To speak briefly I may kill my mother, both of us being willing; or I being unwilling, and she willing." For is it true or not, that a person can be willingly injured? Or is every one unwillingly injured, in the same manner as every one who does an injury does it willingly? Or do some persons suffer an injury voluntarily, and others involuntarily? And a similar enquiry may also be made with respect to obtaining justice; for to act justly is wholly a voluntary thing. Hence, the being injured and obtaining justice, are deservedly opposed in a similar manner to each other, so that they are either voluntary or involuntary. It may, however, appear to be absurd, that in obtaining justice, the whole should be voluntary; for some persons obtain justice unwillingly. And this also may be doubted, whether every one who suffers something unjust is injured; or whether as it is in acting, so it is in suffering? For it is possible in both these to obtain what is just from accident. And it is evident that the like may also take place in things unjust. For it is not the same thing, to do unjust things, and to do an injury; nor is it the same thing to suffer unjust things, and to be injured. The like also takes place in acting justly and obtaining justice. For it is impossible to be injured unless there is some one who does the injury; or to obtain justice, unless there is some one who acts justly. But if to do an injury is simply to hurt some one willingly, and to hurt
willingly

willingly is to do so knowing the person who is hurt, and the instrument, and the manner in which he is hurt; but the intemperate man willingly hurts himself; if this be the case, he will be voluntarily injured, and it will be possible for a man to injure himself. This, however, is also one of the things which are dubious, whether it is possible for a man to injure himself. Farther still, a man may voluntarily, through intemperance, be injured by another person; so that it will be possible for a man to be injured voluntarily. Or shall we say that the definition [which we have given of doing an injury, viz. that it is to hurt some one voluntarily,] is not right, but we must add the words, *to hurt, knowing the person who is hurt, and the instrument, and the manner in which he is hurt*, contrary to his will? A man, therefore, may be hurt, and suffer unjust things willingly; but no one is willingly injured. For no one wishes to be injured, not even the intemperate man; but he acts contrary to his will. For neither does any one wish for that which he does not fancy to be good; but the intemperate man does that, which he does not think ought to be done. But he who gives what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave to Diomed,

“ For Diomed’s brass arms of mean device,
For which nine oxen paid, a vulgar price,
He gave his own of gold divinely wrought,
A hundred beeves the shining purchase bought.”

is not injured; for it is in his power to give [or not to give.] But to be injured is not in his power, but it is necessary that the person should exist by whom the injury is done. Concerning the being injured, therefore, it is evident that it is not voluntary.

Of those things, however, which we proposed to discuss, two particulars remain to be explained; whether he does an injury who distributes to another person more than he deserves, or the person who receives the distribution. For if what we before observed is possible, and he who distributes, but not he who possesses more, does the injury, if any one distributes to another more than to himself, knowingly and willingly, he will himself injure himself; which modest men appear to do. For

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a worthy man distributes less to himself than to others. Or shall we say that neither is this thing simple? For he who distributes less to himself than to others [of certain good things,] will vindicate to himself more of some other good, if it should so happen; as for instance, of renown, or of that which is simply beautiful in conduct. Again, the doubt is also dissolved from the definition of doing an injury; for he who does it suffers nothing contrary to his will. Hence he is not, on this account, injured; but even admitting that he is, he is only hurt. It is also evident that he who distributes [more than the receiver deserves,] does an injury, but not the receiver. For it is not the person in whom injustice is inherent who does the injury, but he to whom to do this is voluntary; but this is the man from whom the principle of the action proceeds, which is in the distributor, but not in the receiver.

Farther still, since to act is predicated multifariously, and things inanimate in a certain respect kill, the hand as well as the servant by the command of his master; these indeed do not act injuriously, but they do unjust things. Again, if a man being indeed ignorant judges, he does not do an injury according to the legally just, nor is his judgment unjust, yet in a certain respect it is unjust. For the legally just differs from the first justice, [or that which has a natural subsistence.] But if he should judge unjustly knowingly, he will vindicate to himself more either of favour, or of vengeance. As, therefore, if some one should partake of a deed unjustly done, thus also he who on account of these things judges unjustly, will possess more; for in those things he who adjudges a field to another person, receives in return, not a field, but money. Men, however, are of opinion that it is in their power to do an injury, and that on this account it is easy to be just. But it is not so; for to have connexion with the wife of a neighbour; to strike another person, and to give money with the hand, are things easy, and in the power of those who do them; but to do these things with a certain disposition of mind¹, is neither easy, nor in the power

¹ In order to be unjust, it is not sufficient merely to do an injury, but it is also requisite that it should be done with promptitude and delight. For this disposition of mind likewise habit is necessary, which is not acquired without difficulty and length of time.

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of those who do them. In a similar manner, also, the multitude fancy that there is no portion of wisdom in knowing what is just, and what is unjust, because it is not difficult to understand those things about which the laws speak. These things, however, are not just, except from accident, but they are then just, when they are performed after a certain manner, and distributed after a certain manner. But this is a greater work than to know things that are salubrious. For there, indeed, it is easy to know honey and wine, and hellebore, and burning and cutting; but how it is necessary to distribute these, in order to produce health, and to whom, and when they are to be distributed, is as great a work as to be a physician. On this very account the multitude fancy that it is no less the province of a just [than of an unjust] man, to do an injury; because the just man is no less, but is even more able to do each of these, [than the unjust man]. For according to them, a just man may have connexion with the wife of another man, and may strike another person, and a brave man may throw away his shield, and betaking himself to flight may run where he pleases. To act cowardly, however, and to do an injury, is not merely to do these things, except from accident, but it consists in doing them with a certain disposition of mind [i. e. with promptitude and delight;] just as to perform the office of a physician, and to restore to health, does not merely consist in cutting, or not cutting, in giving or not giving medicine, but in doing these after a certain manner. But just things subsist among those with whom there is a participation of things which are simply good; and in these there is also excess and defect. For to some beings, as perhaps to the gods, justice is not a good, because in them there is no excess, [or deficiency;] but to others, as to men incurable and vicious, no part of things simply good is beneficial, but all of them are noxious; and to others they are useful to a certain extent; and on this account justice is a human good.

CHAPTER X.

It now follows that we should speak concerning equity, and the equitable, and show how equity, indeed, subsists with reference to justice, and the equitable with reference to the just; for to those who consider rightly, the equitable appears to be neither simply the same, nor yet different in genus from the just. And at one time, indeed, we praise the equitable, and the man of equity; so that, also, transferring this name to other things, we praise a man by calling him *a more equitable*, instead of *a good* man, manifesting by this, that it is a better appellation. But at another time, to those who follow reason, it appears to be absurd, that the equitable, if it is something different from the just, should be laudable. For either the just is not a worthy thing, or the equitable is not just, if it is different from the just; or if they are both worthy things, both are the same. The doubt, therefore, concerning the equitable, nearly happens through these particulars. All these, however, are after a certain manner right, and there is nothing in them which is contrary and adverse to itself. For the equitable being something that is just, is a better just thing; and is not better than the just, as if it were some other genus. The just, therefore, and the equitable are the same thing; and both of them being worthy things, the equitable is the more excellent of the two. A doubt, however, still remains, that though the equitable is indeed just, yet it is not the legally just, but is a correction of it. But the cause of this is, that every law, indeed, is universal; but it cannot speak universally with rectitude about certain particulars. In those things,

things, therefore, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but in which this cannot be done rightly, the law assumes that which happens for the most part, not being ignorant of the fault which has been committed. And in thus doing, it acts no less rightly; for the fault is not in the law, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the thing; for such directly is the matter of the things which pertain to action. When the law, therefore, speaks universally, and something after this should happen besides, then it is right to correct what the legislator has omitted, and the error which he has committed in speaking simply, since the legislator himself would adopt such correction if he were present, and would have legally established this if he had known it. Hence, the equitable is just, and is better than a certain justice. It is not, however, better than what is simply just, but it is better than the justice which errs through speaking simply [and generally.] And this is the nature of the equitable, that it is a correction of law, where law is deficient on account of speaking universally. For this is the cause why all things are not according to law, that concerning certain things it is impossible to establish a law. Hence, a decree is necessary; for of the indefinite the rule also is indefinite, just as of a Lesbian building the rule is leaden; since the rule is bent conformable to the figure of the stone, and does not remain the same. Thus, also, a decree is adapted to things themselves. It is evident, therefore, what the equitable and the just are, and what the justice is which the equitable excels. It is likewise manifest from this who is an equitable man. For he who deliberately chooses and practises things of this kind, and who is not an accurate distributor of justice in the rigid sense of the word, but remits something of the rigour of the law, though the law is favourable to such rigour, is an equitable man. And the habit itself is equity, being a certain justice and not a different habit.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XI.

From what has been said, also, it is evident whether it is possible for a man to injure himself or not. For there are some just things established by law, which pertain to the whole of virtue. Thus, for instance, the law does not order a man to destroy himself; and it forbids what it does not command. Again, when one man hurts another contrary to law, who has not hurt him, he does an injury willingly; but he does an injury willingly, who does it knowing the person whom he injures, and the instrument, and the manner in which he does it. But he who destroys himself through anger, does this willingly contrary to right reason, which the law does not permit. Hence, he does an injury; but to whom? Is it not to the city, but not to himself? For he voluntarily suffers; but no one is voluntarily injured. Hence, also, the city punishes him, and a certain disgrace is attached to him who destroys himself, as one who injures the city. Farther still, it is not possible for a man to injure himself in that way in which he is unjust, who only acts unjustly, and is not entirely depraved; for this character is different from him. For the unjust man is in a certain respect so depraved, as the timid man is; but not as possessing the whole of depravity. Hence, neither according to this improbity does he do himself an injury; for if he did, the same thing might be taken away and added at the same time to the same thing; but this is impossible. It is, however, necessary that the

the just and the unjust should always exist in more than one person. Again, he who does an injury does it voluntarily, and from deliberate choice, and with a precedency in time. For he who injures another because he has been injured by him, does not appear to act unjustly; but he who injures himself, suffers and does the same things at the same time. Farther still, a man would be injured willingly. To which may be added, that no one does an injury without a particular species of injustice; but no one commits adultery with his own wife, nor does any one dig through his own wall, nor commit a theft on his own property. In short, the impossibility that a man should injure himself is evident from the conclusions made by us respecting the being voluntarily injured. It is likewise evident, that both to be injured and to injure are bad things; for the one is to have less, but the other more than the medium; in the same manner as the salubrious in medicine, and that which contributes to a good habit of body in the gymnastic art. At the same time, however, it is worse to injure [than to be injured.] For to do an injury is accompanied with vice, and is blameable; and with vice which is either perfect, and simply vice, or nearly so. For not every thing which is voluntary is accompanied with injustice; but to be injured is without vice and injustice. Essentially, therefore, it is less bad to be injured than to do an injury; but from accident nothing prevents it from being a greater evil. Art, however, pays no attention to this; but it says that the pleurisy is a greater disease than a lame foot, though it may happen that the latter may be a greater evil than the former, if a man, in consequence of being lame, should fall, and thus be taken by enemies, and put to death. Metaphorically speaking, however, and from similitude, the whole man is not just to the whole of himself, but one part of him towards another part; yet not according to every kind of justice, but according to the despotic, or economic; for in these discussions, it must be admitted that the rational differs from the irrational part of the soul. And if we look to these, it appears that there is a certain injustice of a man towards himself, because

because it is possible in these parts for a man to suffer something adverse to his own appetites. As, therefore, between a governor and him who is governed, there is a certain justice towards each other, this is also the case between these parts of the soul. After this manner, therefore, we have discussed justice, and the other ethical virtues.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

SINCE, however, we have before observed that it is necessary the medium [in conduct] should be chosen, and neither excess nor deficiency, but the medium is [to act] as right reason prescribes, let us now consider what right reason is. For in all the above-mentioned habits, as in other things, there is a certain scope, to which he who possesses reason, looking, acts with intension and remission; and there is a certain boundary of media, which we say are situated between excess and defect, and which exist conformable to right reason. Thus, to speak, however, is indeed true, but is not at all clear. For in other pursuits, also, with which science is conversant, it is, indeed, true to say that it is not proper to labour either more or less, nor to be indolent, but to labour moderately, and as right reason prescribes. He, however, who

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alone knows this will know nothing more; as, if on inquiring what kind of things are to be administered to the body, it should be said, they are such as medicine, and he who possesses the medical art prescribe. Hence, it is necessary with respect to the habits of the soul, that this should not only be truly said, but that it should also be definitely shown what right reason is, and what is the definition of it. But we have distributed the virtues of the soul, and have said, that some of them are ethical, and others dianoëtical [or belonging to the discursive power of the soul.] With respect to the ethical virtues, therefore, we have indeed discussed them; but with respect to the remaining virtues, these we shall discuss, after we have first spoken concerning the soul. It has, therefore, been before observed by us, that there are two parts of the soul, that which possesses reason, and that which is irrational. But now we shall make a division after the same manner of the part which possesses reason; and it must be admitted that there are two parts possessing reason; one, indeed, by which we survey those kind of beings, the principles of which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, and the other, by which we survey things of a contingent nature. For since the objects of knowledge are specifically different, it follows that there are, also, different species of knowledge. For it is necessary that knowledge should be similar to the thing known, and that the knowledge of that which is necessary should be necessary, but contingent of that which is contingent. For all knowledge subsists according to similitude and affinity; since it is a certain adaptation and contact of that which is known, and that which knows. But of these parts of the soul, the one is called scientific, but the other ratiocinative; for to consult and reason are the same thing. No one, however, consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do; so that the ratiocinative power is one certain part of the rational part of the soul. It must, therefore, be shown what is the best habit of each of these. For this is the virtue of each. But virtue is referred to its proper work.

CHAP.

CHAPTER II.

THERE are, however, three things in the soul, which have dominion over action and truth, viz. sense, intellect, and appetite. But of these, sense is the principle of no one action; which is evident from this, that brutes have, indeed, sense, but have no communion with action [so as to have dominion over it.¹] What, however, affirmation and negation are in the discursive energy of the rational part, that pursuit and avoidance are in appetite. Hence, since ethical virtue is a habit accompanied with deliberate choice, but deliberate choice is an appetite adapted to consultation; hence, it is necessary that reason should be true, and the appetite right, if the deliberate choice is good, and that the one should assert, and the other pursue the same things. This discursive energy of the soul, therefore, [by which we judge that something is to be desired] is practical reason, and practical truth. But of the discursive energy of reason which is contemplative, and neither practical nor effective, the good and the evil are truth and falsehood; for this is the work of the whole of the discursive power. The work, however, of the practical, and at the same time discursive energy of reason, is truth subsisting in concord with right appetite. The principle, therefore, of action, whence motion is derived, is deliberate choice, though this principle is not the final cause of action. But appetite, and that reason which is for the sake of something, [or which is directed to the final cause] are the principles of deliberate

¹ For this pertains to beings who are capable of deliberate choice.

choice. Hence, deliberate choice is not without intellect, and the discursive energy of reason, nor is it without the ethical habit; for good conduct, and the contrary to it in action, are not without the discursive energy of reason and manners. The discursive energy, however, of reason itself, does not move any thing, except that which is for the sake of something, and is practical; since this has dominion over that which is effective. For every one who effects any thing, does it for the sake of something; and that which is effected is not simply the end, but is a relative and pertains to something, though this is not the case with that which is practicable. For good conduct is the end of action; but appetite is directed to the end. Hence, deliberate choice is either orectic intellect, or appetite possessing a discursive energy; and man is a principle of this kind. Nothing, however, that has been done is an object of deliberate choice. Thus, for instance, no one deliberately chooses to subvert Troy; for neither does any one deliberate about what is past, but about that which is future and contingent. But it is not possible that what has been done should not be done. Hence, Agatho says rightly,

All things to God are possible but one,
That to undo which is already done.

Of both the intellective parts, therefore, the work is truth. Hence, those habits according to which each of these parts enunciates the truth are the virtues of both.

CHAP:

CHAPTER III.

ASSUMING, therefore, a more elevated exordium, let us again speak concerning these virtues. Let, therefore, the habits by which the soul enunciates truth in affirming or denying, be five in number. But these are art, science, prudence, wisdom, and intellect; for it is possible that both *hypolepsis*¹ and opinion may assert what is false. What science therefore is, will be from hence evident, if it is necessary to investigate accurately, and not to follow similitudes. For all of us are of opinion that it is not possible for that which we know scientifically to subsist otherwise than it does. But with respect to things which may subsist otherwise, of these when they are out of our view we are ignorant whether they exist or not. The object of scientific knowledge, therefore, is from necessity. Hence, it is eternal. For all beings which are simply from necessity are eternal; but things eternal are without generation and incorruptible. Again, all science appears to be capable of being taught, and the object of scientific knowledge may be obtained by discipline. But all doctrine is produced from things previously known, as we have said in the Analytics; for it partly subsists through induction, and partly from syllogism. Induction, therefore, is indeed a principle, and the principle of uni-

¹ As *dianoia* is the discursive or syllogistic energy of the soul; *hypolepsis* is the assent of the soul to each term of a syllogistic process; and *opinion* is the assent of the soul to the conclusion solely of a syllogism.

versal;

versal²; but syllogism is from universal. The principles, therefore, from which syllogism consists are things of which there is no syllogism³. Hence, they are obtained by induction. Science, therefore, is indeed a demonstrative habit, and such other things as we have added to the definition of it in the Analytics. For when a man believes that a thing is after a certain manner⁴, and the principles of it are known to him, he has a scientific knowledge of that thing. For if the principles are not more known to him than the conclusion, he will have a scientific knowledge from accident. Let these things, therefore, be admitted concerning science.

CHAPTER IV.

OF that, however, which may subsist otherwise than it does, [or which has a various subsistence, and is contingent,] there is something which is effective, and something which is practicable. But production and action differ. Credibility, however, may be obtained concerning these things from exoteric discussions, so that the practice habit in conjunction with reason, is different from the effective, or productive habit in conjunction with reason. And neither are they contained by each other; for neither is action effection; nor is effection action. But since the building art is a habit effective in conjunction with reason,

² Viz. So far as it excites the perception of the universal which is latent in the soul.

³ Viz. The knowledge of them is not obtained by a syllogistic process.

⁴ Viz. When he believes that the thing cannot subsist otherwise than it does.

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and neither is there any art which is not a habit effective in conjunction with reason, nor any such habit which is not art; art and habit effective in conjunction with true reason will be the same. All art, however, is conversant with generation, and machinates and contemplates in order that something may be produced which is capable either of existing, or not existing; and of which the principle is in the maker, but not in the thing made. For art neither belongs to things which necessarily are, or are necessarily generated, nor to things which have a natural subsistence; for these contain in themselves the principle. Since, however, production and action are different, it is necessary that art should pertain to production, but not to action. And after a certain manner, fortune and art are conversant with the same things, as, also, Agatho says,

▲ Art fortune loves, and fortune art.

Art, therefore, as we have said, is a certain habit effective in conjunction with true reason. But the privation of art, on the contrary [or the inartificial habit,] is a habit effective in conjunction with false reason, about that which may have a various subsistence.

CHAPTER V.

WITH respect to prudence, we shall apprehend what it is, if we survey who those are whom we denominate prudent persons. It appears, therefore, to be the province of a prudent man to be able to consult well about things which are good and advantageous to him,
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not partially, as about what contributes to health or strength, but about what universally contributes to a happy life. But this is indicated by our calling men prudent about any thing, when they reason well, with a view to some worthy end, in things in which there is no art. So that in short, he who is adapted to consultation will be a prudent man. No one, however, consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things which it is impossible for him to perform. Hence, if science indeed subsists in conjunction with demonstration; but of those things of which the principles may have a various subsistence, of these there is no demonstration; for all these are contingent; and if it is not possible to consult about things which subsist from necessity, prudence will neither be science nor art. It will not be science, because that which is practicable may have a various subsistence; and it will not be art, because the genus of action is different from the genus of production. It remains, therefore, that it is a true habit in conjunction with reason, practical about human good and evil. For the end of production indeed is different from the production, but the end of action is not always different from action. Hence we are of opinion that Pericles, and such like persons, are prudent men, because they are able to survey what is good for themselves, and for mankind; and we also think that economists and politicians are persons of this description. Hence, also, we call temperance by this name, (*σωφροσύνη*), as preserving prudence. (*ὡς σωζούσα τὴν φρόνησιν*). But it preserves an opinion of this kind. For the delectable and the painful do not corrupt or distort every opinion; such as that a triangle has or has not angles equal to two right; but those opinions which pertain to what is practicable. For the principles indeed of practicable things are those things for the sake of which they are performed. But to him who is corrupted through pleasure or pain, the principle is not immediately apparent, nor does he perceive, that for the sake of this, and through this, it is necessary to choose and perform all things. For vice is destructive of the principle. Hence it is necessary that prudence should be a habit in conjunction with true reason, practical about human good. Moreover, of art indeed there is a virtue, but of prudence

prudence there is not. And in art indeed, he who voluntarily errs, is to be preferred to him who errs involuntarily ; but in prudence he who voluntarily errs is a subordinate character, in the same manner as in the virtues. It is evident, therefore, that prudence is a certain virtue, and not art. But since there are two parts of the rational soul, prudence will be the virtue of the doxastic part, [or that part which forms opinions of things]. For both opinion and prudence are conversant with that which may have a various subsistence. Nor yet is prudence a habit alone in conjunction with reason ; of which this is an indication, that there may be an oblivion of such a habit, [i. e. it may be lost through oblivion ;] but there cannot be of prudence.

CHAPTER VI.

SINCE, however, science is an assent to universals and things which have a necessary subsistence, but there are principles of things demonstrable, and of every science ; for science is accompanied with reason ; this being the case, there will neither be science, nor art, nor prudence of the principle of the object of science. For the object of science is demonstrable ; but art and prudence are conversant with things which may have a various subsistence ; neither, therefore, will wisdom be that through which this principle is known ; for it is the province of a wise man to have demonstration about certain things. Hence, if the habits by which we enunciate the truth, and are never deceived about things which cannot, or which can have a various subsistence, are science

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and prudence, wisdom and intellect, but no one of these three, can be the habit by which we know principles; but by the three, I mean prudence, wisdom and science; it remains that intellect is the habit by which principles are known.

CHAPTER VII.

WE attribute, however, wisdom in the arts, to those who are most accurately skilled in the arts. Thus we say that Phidias was a wise sculptor, and Polycletus a wise statuary. Here, therefore, we signify nothing else by wisdom, than that it is the virtue of art. But in short, we think that certain persons are wise, not partially, and that they are not any thing else than wise men, as Homer says in his *Margites*,

The gods nor miner him, nor ploughman made;
Nor wise in any thing beside;

so that it is evident that wisdom will be the most accurate of the sciences. Hence it is necessary that the wise man should not only know those things which are inferred from principles [or the conclusions of scientific reasoning,] but that he should also perceive and enunciate the truth about principles themselves. Wisdom, therefore, will be intellect and science, and will possess as a head [or summit] the science of the most honourable things, [i. e. of divine natures]. For it would be absurd for any one to fancy that the political science, or prudence, is a thing of all others the most excellent, unless man is the best of every

every thing the world contains¹. If, however, what is salubrious and good is to man one thing, and another to fishes, but that which is white and that which is straight are always the same², all men will acknowledge that a wise is the same, but the prudent man is a mutable character. For they will say that the being is prudent who surveys what is excellent in particulars according to the nature of each, and to him they will commit these particulars. Hence also they say that some brutes are prudent, viz. such as appear to have a providential power about what pertains to their life. It is evident, however, that the political science and wisdom are not the same. For if it should be said that wisdom is that which is conversant with what is useful to mankind, there will be many kinds of wisdom; since there is not one science which is conversant with the good of all animals, but a different science is conversant with a different good; unless indeed there is one medical science which extends to all beings. Nor is it of any consequence, if it should be said that man is the most excellent of all other animals; *for there are many animals naturally more divine than man, such as those most apparent beings from which the world is composed*³. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that wisdom is the science and intellect of things most honourable by nature. Hence the multitude say that Anaxagoras and Thales, and such like persons, were indeed wise, but not prudent men, in consequence of perceiving that they were ignorant of what was advantageous to them [with respect to a corporeal

¹ There are many, however, of the present day who are stupid enough to think that the world was made for man; and that man, according to the rambling conceptions of Young is,

“Midway from *nothing* to the *deity*.”

² Viz. the colour which has the power of dispersing the sight, is always white; and the line which is the shortest between two points, is always a right line.

³ Meaning the stars, which according to both Aristotle and Plato, are divine animals. From this passage, and from what is more largely said on this subject, by Aristotle in his Treatise on the Heavens, and in the 12th book of his Metaphysics, the audacity of those moderns is wonderful (if any thing pertaining to such men can be wonderful) who have asserted that Aristotle was not a polytheist, or a believer in the existence of divine beings, the immediate progeny of one first cause of all things, and who, as Maximus Tyrius says, “are the sons of God, ruling together with him.”

life;] and they say, that they knew indeed things superfluous and admirable, difficult and divine, but which are useless, because they did not investigate human good. Prudence, however, is conversant with human affairs, and with those things which are the subjects of consultation; for we say that this is especially the work of a prudent man, to consult well. But no one consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things of which there is not a certain end, and this, practical good. He, however, simply consults well, who conjectures, by a reasoning process, what is best to man among practicable things. Nor is prudence only directed to universals, but it is also necessary that it should know particulars; for it is practical; but action is conversant with particulars. Hence, also, some persons who have only experimental knowledge without science, are more adapted for practical affairs, than those who possess a scientific knowledge [without experience]. For he who knows that light flesh is easily concocted, but is ignorant what flesh is light, will not produce health; but he will rather produce it who knows that the flesh of birds is light and salubrious. Prudence, however, is practical; so that it is necessary to possess both, [viz. a knowledge of what is to be done universally, and in particular circumstances,] or rather the latter than the former. But prudence here also [i. e. among the practical powers,] will be a certain architectonic power [or a power belonging to a master art].

CHAPTER VIII.

THE political science, however, and prudence are indeed the same habit, though they have not the same essence. But of the science
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pertaining to a city, the one part which is legislative, is as it were architectonic prudence, but the other, in the same manner as particulars, is denominated by a common name, the political science. This, however, is practical, and occupied in consultation; for a decree is a thing practicable as the extreme¹. Hence those alone who possess the political science are said to act in a political capacity; for they alone act, in the same manner as manual artificers. That also appears to be especially prudence which a man employs about himself, and about one thing; and this is called by a common name prudence. But of these species of prudence, the one is economy, another legislation, and another the political science; and of this last, one part pertains to consultation, but another is judicial. For a man, therefore, to know his own concerns will be one species of knowledge. Nevertheless it possesses a great difference. And he who knows things pertaining to himself, and is conversant with them, appears to be a prudent man; but those who apply themselves to the management of public affairs, are busily employed in a multitude of concerns. Hence also Euripides says,

How can the name of *wise* to me belong,
 Who might have mingled in the martial throng;
 Unvex'd with business, and exempt from care,
 Taking of spoils my honourable share;
 Yet chose by over-anxious thoughts to move
 The direful hate of all-commanding Jove?

For these men explore what is good for themselves, and are of opinion that it is necessary to do this. From this opinion, therefore, it comes to pass that these men are prudent; though perhaps it is not possible for a man to know his own concerns without economic and political prudence. Again, how a man ought to manage his own affairs, is a thing immanifest and requires consideration. But as an indication of the truth of what has been said, a youth may become a geometrician and a mathematician, and may be skilled in things of this kind; but it

¹ A decree (*το ψήφισμα*) may, as Aquinas observes, be called (*το ἄκρον*) the extreme, because it is the application of a law universally established, to the performance of particulars.

does

does not appear that he will be prudent. The cause, however, of this is, that prudence pertains to particulars, which become known from experience; but youth is without experience, which is produced by length of time. Since this also deserves to be considered, why a boy may become a mathematician, but cannot be wise, or a physiologist? Shall we say it is because mathematical objects subsist by an ablation from matter; but the principles of the objects of wisdom and physiology, are derived from experience? And with respect to metaphysical principles indeed, youth do not believe in, but admit them; but with respect to mathematical principles it is not immanifest what they are. Farther still, error in consultation either pertains to universals, or particulars. For [in order that a man may not drink heavy, and therefore, bad water, it is requisite he should know,] either that all heavy water is bad, or that this particular water is heavy. But it is evident that prudence is not science; for it pertains to the extreme, as we have before observed; since that which is practicable is a thing of this kind. It is, therefore, indeed opposed to intellect. For intellect is conversant with terms, [i. e. universals,] which are the extremes upward, and above which there are no other principles; but prudence is conversant with the extremes downward [which are particulars,] of which there is no science, but only a sensible perception, and this not a sensible perception of peculiarities; but such as that by which we perceive in mathematics that a triangle is the extreme²; for we stop there. It is therefore, rather *this* sense which is prudence, but of *that* there is another species³.

² If it belongs to the mathematical science to demonstrate concerning things essentially inherent in triangle, and demonstration is of that which is universal, an individual and particular triangle, so far as it is such, is not the object of science, but of sense. Yet it is not an object of sense, in the same manner as colour, or sound, or any thing else, of which some one of the senses forms a judgment, but as an *individual particular* thing. But that this is a sensible object, Aristotle shews by saying, "for we stop there." For he who descends from universals stops at particulars as the downward extremes.

³ By *this* sense, Aristotle means the *common sense*, which is impartible, and is able to distinguish what it is in which contraries, and things of an heterogeneous nature differ from each other; but by *that* sense, he means any one of the partial senses, such as the sight, the hearing, &c.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IX.

To investigate, however, and to consult differ; for to consult is to investigate something. But it is necessary to discuss good-consultation, and show what it is, whether it is a certain science, or opinion, or good-conjecture, or some other genus. It is not, therefore, science. For men do not investigate about things which they know; but good-consultation is a certain consultation; and he who consults investigates and reasons. Neither is it good-conjecture; for good-conjecture is without reasoning, and is something which is accomplished with celerity; but men consult for a long time, and say that the objects of consultation ought to be performed rapidly, but that consultation should be done slowly. Again, sagacity and good-consultation also differ from each other; but sagacity is a certain good-conjecture. Neither, therefore, is any good-consultation opinion. But since he who consults badly errs, but he who consults well consults rightly; it is evident that good consultation is a certain rectitude. Nor is good consultation either science or opinion; for of science indeed, there is no rectitude, because there is no error; but truth is the rectitude of opinion; and at the same time every thing of which there is an opinion is definite and determined. Nevertheless good-consultation is not without reasoning. It falls short, therefore, of *dianoia* [or the discursive energy of reason;] for this is not yet enunciation; since opinion, is not investigation, but is now a certain enunciation. He, however, who consults, whether he consults well or ill, investigates something and reasons. But good-consultation is a certain rectitude of consultation;
on

on which account, it must in the first place be inquired what consultation is, and with what it is conversant.

Since, however, rectitude is multifariously predicated, it is evident that not every rectitude is good-consultation. For the incontinent and the bad man, obtain from reasoning that which they propose to see ; so that they will have consulted rightly, but have procured for themselves a great evil. But to have consulted well appears to be a certain good ; for such a rectitude of consultation, as becomes the mean of obtaining good, is good consultation. Good, however, may be obtained by false reasoning ; and a man indeed may obtain that which ought to be done, yet not through a proper medium, but the middle term may be false*. Hence, neither will that be good-consultation according to which that is obtained which ought to be obtained, yet not through a proper medium. Farther still, it is possible that one man may obtain the object of his wishes by consulting for a long time, but another, by consulting rapidly. Hence neither is that yet good-consultation ; but the rectitude which subsists according to utility, and to what is proper, and as, and when it is proper. Again, it is possible *simply* to consult well, and also with a view to a *certain* end. Good consultation, therefore, *simply* is that which proceeds with rectitude to an end simply ; but a *certain* good consultation, is that which proceeds with rectitude to a *certain* end. Hence, if to consult well is the province of prudent men, good consultation will be a rectitude according to utility with a view to a certain end, of which prudence is the true hypothesis.

* As when a man steals in order to relieve a worthy person in distress. But as he who proves a true conclusion through false premises does not reason well ; so he who, in order to obtain a good end, assumes a bad medium, does not consult well.

CHAPTER X.

INTELLIGENCE, however, and the privation of intelligence, according to which we denominate men intelligent or unintelligent, is neither wholly the same with science or opinion; for if it were all men would be intelligent. Nor is intelligence some one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, for it would be conversant with health; or geometry, for it would be conversant with magnitudes. For neither is intelligence conversant with things which always are, and are immoveable, nor with things which are passing into existence; but with those which may be the subject of doubt and consultation. Hence it is conversant with the same things as prudence; yet intelligence and prudence are not the same. For prudence, indeed, is of a commanding nature; for the end of it is, what ought, or what ought not to be done. But intelligence is alone of a judiciary nature. For intelligence is the same as right intelligence; since intelligent men are also rightly intelligent. Intelligence, however, is neither the possession, nor the acquisition of prudence. But as he who learns is said to understand what he learns, when he uses science, the like also takes place in the use of opinion in forming a judgment of those things with which prudence is conversant, and judging of them well, when another person is speaking. For what is well is the same with what is beautifully done. And hence the name intelligence was derived, according to which men are said to be rightly intelligent, viz. from intelligence in learning; for we frequently use the verb *to learn* as equivalent to the verb *to understand*.

CHAPTER XI.

BUT what is called upright decision, according to which we say that men decide rightly, is the right judgment of the equitable man. As an indication of this, however, we say that the equitable man is especially inclined to pardon others, and that it is equitable to pardon certain things. But pardon is an upright judiciary decision of the equitable man ; and the decision is upright which is made by a man observant of truth. All these habits, however, reasonably tend to the same thing. For we speak of upright decision, intelligence, prudence, and intellect with reference to the same persons, when we say that they are men of upright decision, are endued with intellect, are prudent and intelligent. For all these powers pertain to the extremes [downward,] and to particulars. And an intelligent man, and one who decides rightly, or a man disposed to pardon, will be one who possesses a judiciary power about things with which the prudent man is conversant ; for things of an equitable nature are common to all good men, in their intercourse with others. Every thing, however, of a practicable nature pertains to particulars, and the [downward] extremes. For it is necessary that a prudent man should have a knowledge of these ; and intelligence and equitable decision are conversant with things of a practicable nature ; but these are extremes. And intellect pertains both to the upward and downward extremes. For intellect, and not the discursive energy of reason, is conversant with both first and last terms, [i. e. with universal principles ;] the one indeed, i. e. the intellect, which is the principle of the demonstrative sciences, is conversant with
immutable

immutable and first terms ; but the intellect, which is occupied in practical affairs, [or which is the principle of prudence,] is conversant with the extreme, and with that which is contingent, and the other proposition ¹. For these are the principles of that for the sake of which a thing is done [or the final cause ;] for universal is from particulars. Of these, therefore, it is necessary to have a sensible perception ; but this is [the practical] intellect. Hence, these [habits] appear to be natural. And no one indeed is wise by nature ; but every one possesses naturally the power of deciding rightly, together with intelligence and intellect. But as an indication of this, we are of opinion that these habits are attendants on the ages of the life of men ; and we say that this age [i. e. old age] possesses intellect and upright decision, as if nature were the cause of this. Hence, also, intellect is both the principle and the end ² ; for from these demonstrations are framed, and with these they are conversant. Hence, [in practical affairs] it is no less necessary to attend to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of elderly or prudent men, than to demonstrations ; for in consequence of possessing an eye from experience, they perceive the principles [of things of a practicable nature]. And thus we have shown what wisdom and prudence are, and with what particulars each is conversant, and that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

¹ i. e. It assents to certain immediate particulars, which are assumed as minor propositions, in order to produce the particular conclusions of prudence, through which what is here and now to be done, is inferred.

² i. e. The practical intellect is both the principle and the end of practical demonstrations. For the principles of practical demonstrations are things from which it is concluded what is to be done ; but the end is *good*, which is proposed as a thing to be obtained through actions.

CHAPTER XII.

SOME one, however, may doubt concerning these, in what their utility consists. For wisdom, indeed, contemplates none of those things from which men will obtain felicity ; since it is not conversant with any thing which is in generation, [or which is becoming to be, or passing into existence]. But prudence, indeed, does consider those things from which human felicity is derived, yet on what account is it necessary that it should, since prudence is conversant with just and beautiful things, and which are good to man ? We do not, however, become at all more practically virtuous by knowing these things, since the virtues are habits ; as neither are things said to be salubrious, or to conduce to a good habit of body, because they have an active power, but because they proceed from habit. For we are not at all more practical, from possessing the medical or gymnastic art. But if a man is not to be considered as prudent for the sake of these things, but for the sake of becoming worthy, they will not be at all useful to those who are worthy. Again, neither will prudence be useful to those who are not worthy ; for it is of no consequence whether they are prudent, or are persuaded by others that are ; since this will be sufficient, in the same manner as in what pertains to health. For when we wish to be well, we do not at the same time learn the medical art. To which we may add, that it will appear to be absurd, that prudence, which is subordinate to wisdom, should possess a greater authority ; for that which is effective governs and presides in every thing. These things, therefore, must be discussed, for now the doubt is concerning them alone. In the first place, therefore,

fore, we say, that these virtues [wisdom and prudence] are necessarily eligible *per se*, since they are the virtues of each part of the soul¹, though neither of them should effect any thing. In the next place, they do indeed effect something, yet not in the same manner as medicine produces health; but as health produces the energies of a good habit of body, thus also wisdom produces felicity. For being a part of the whole of virtue, by the possession and the energy of it, it renders a man happy. Farther still, the work is accomplished by prudence and ethical virtue. For virtue renders the scope proposed by the agent right; but prudence gives rectitude to things which tend to the scope. A virtue, however, of this kind, does not belong to the fourth, or nutritive part of the soul, because its energies are not in our power, [nor are rational, either essentially or by participation]. But with respect to our not being at all more adapted to the practice of things beautiful and just, through prudence, [in answer to this objection] we must begin a little higher, assuming the following principle:—For as we say that certain persons who perform just things, are not yet just, such as those who do what is ordered by the laws, either unwillingly, or from ignorance, or from some other cause, and not on account of the things themselves, though they do those things which ought to be done, and such as a worthy man ought to do; thus also, as it seems, it is possible to do every thing with a certain disposition of mind, so as to be a good man. I mean for instance, that it is possible to do every thing [with which virtue is concerned] from deliberate choice, and for the sake of the things which are done. Virtue, therefore, produces a right deliberate choice; but it is not the business of virtue, but of some other power, to render the deliberate choice disposed to embrace what truly contributes to the end².

It is requisite, however, to speak more clearly on this subject. There

¹ viz. Wisdom is the virtue of the contemplative, and prudence of the practical intellect.

² I was under the necessity here of paraphrasing the words of Aristotle, in order to render his meaning intelligible.

is,

is, therefore, a certain power which is called skill. But this is a power of such a kind, that by its assistance those things may be performed and obtained, which contribute to the proposed scope. And if, indeed, the scope is beautiful, this power is laudable ; but if the scope is bad, this power becomes craft : on which account, also, we say that prudent men are skilful, and not crafty. Prudence, however, is not this power, yet does not subsist without it. But habit is not acquired by this eye of the soul without virtue, as we have said, and is evident. For the syllogisms of practical affairs rank as a principle ; since the end is a thing of this kind, and that which is best, whatever it may be. Let the end, for instance, be something casual ; but this is not apparent except to a good man. For depravity distorts [the judgment,] and produces deception about the practical principles. Hence, it is evident, that it is impossible for any one to be a prudent, unless he is a good man.

CHAPTER XIII.

AGAIN, therefore, let us direct our attention to virtue. For as prudence is not the same, indeed, but is similar to sagacity, thus, also, natural virtue subsists similarly, with reference to that which is properly so called. For the several manners appear to all men to subsist in a certain respect naturally ; since we are just, and temperate, and brave, and possess the other virtues immediately from our birth. At the same time, however, we investigate something else, as that
which

which is properly good, and are of opinion that such-like virtues are inherent after another manner. For the physical habits are inherent in children and brutes; but they are seen to be noxious without intellect. Thus much, indeed, is apparent, that as it happens that a strong body, which is moved without sight, very much errs in its motions, in consequence of being deprived of sight; this, likewise, is the case here [with respect to the physical virtues¹.] But if the possessor of these virtues obtains intellect, also, he will excel in his actions. The habit, however, being similar, will then be properly virtue. Hence, as in the doxastic part of the soul, [or that part which is characterised by opinion,] there are two species, skill and prudence; thus, also, in the ethical part, there are two species, one of which is physical virtue, but the other is virtue properly so called. And of these, virtue properly so called, is not without prudence. Hence, it is said, that all the virtues are prudences. And Socrates², indeed, investigated

¹ In the physical virtues which are the forerunners of the other virtues, the possession of the senses in perfection, and especially of the most honourable of the senses, the sight and hearing, may be called corporeal prudence. In the second place, corporeal strength may be denominated corporeal fortitude. In the third place, corporeal beauty, may be called corporeal temperance. For as temperance consists in the symphony and consent of the powers of the soul, so beauty in the body consists in a certain symmetry of its organical parts. And in the fourth place, health may be called corporeal justice. For justice is that habit which keeps the parts of the soul free from sedition; and health is that which produces concord and arrangement among the disorderly elements of the body.

These physical virtues are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said, that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament; or that they are the result of energies in a former life.

² Socrates in the Republic of Plato, calls the virtues prudences or sciences, because the energies of all the virtues are according to right reason. Hence, he gives them this appellation, from the better and superior part of the soul, just as we denominate man simply a rational animal, though he contains both rational and irrational powers. But we thus denominate him, because his irrational powers are in a certain respect rendered rational, by being obedient to reason, and because it is more appropriate to denominate him from the more excellent and ruling

gated partly with rectitude, and partly with error. For because he thought that all the virtues are prudences he erred; but it is well said by him, that the virtues are not without prudence. But as an indication of this, all men now, when they define virtue, add to the definition habit, and that they energise according to right reason. And right reason is that which subsists according to prudence. All men, therefore, appear in a certain respect to prophesy, that a habit of this kind, which subsists according to prudence, is virtue. It is necessary, however, to change, in a small degree, the definition; for not only a habit according to right reason, but also a habit in conjunction with right reason³, is virtue. But prudence is right reason energising about things of this kind. Socrates therefore thought, that the virtues, indeed, were reasons; because all of them are sciences; but we think that they subsist in conjunction with reason. Hence, it is evident, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be a good man properly, without prudence; nor a prudent man without ethical virtue. After this manner, also, the reasoning may be dissolved, by which some one may contend, that the virtues are separated from each other; for the same person is not naturally well adapted to all the virtues. Hence, he has now obtained *this*, but not yet *that* virtue; for this may, indeed, happen according to the physical virtues, but is not possible in those virtues, according to which a man is said to be simply a good man. For all the virtues are present, at the same time that prudence, which is one virtue, is present. But it is evident, that though prudence were

ruling part. Hence, there is no real disagreement between Socrates and Aristotle, in what is here said of the virtues; the former denominating them according to what is the characteristic of their essence; but the latter considering the virtues, and that which characterises them, as different things.

³ "A man performs something *according to reason*, both when he is excited by another, and when he regards the end, in the same manner as nature produces according to reason; but he acts *in conjunction with reason*, when he acts from knowledge; and regarding the end, operates according to reason." Paraphrase on the Nicomachean Ethics. The translation by Mr. Bridgman.

not

not a practical thing, it would be necessary, because it is the virtue of a part of the soul, and because deliberate choice will not be right without prudence, nor without virtue; for one of these is the end, but the other causes us to do things which contribute to the end. Prudence, however, neither has dominion over wisdom, nor over the better part of the soul, as neither has the medical science dominion over health; for it does not use health, but considers how it may be obtained. It prescribes, therefore, for the sake of health, but has no dominion over it. Again, to say that prudence rules over wisdom, is just as if some one should say, that the political science rules over the gods, because it orders every thing which is done in the city.

THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

AFTER these things, making another beginning, it must be observed by us, that there are three species of things which are to be avoided in manners, viz. vice, incontinence, and brutality. But the contraries to two of these are indeed evident; for we call one of the contraries virtue, and the other continence. To brutality, however, it will be most appropriate to say, that the virtue is opposed, which is a certain heroical¹ and divine virtue, as Homer represents

¹ Heroical virtue is that virtue by which men act with rectitude, magnificently, and enthusiastically, or under the influence of divine inspiration, both in practical affairs, and according to intellectual energy. For the sake of the liberal and philosophical reader, the following account of the heroic character is subjoined, from the manuscript Scholia of Proclus, on the Cratylus.

represents Priam saying of Hector, that he was a very good man :

[Wretch that I am! my bravest offspring slain,
You the disgrace of Priam's house remain!
Mestor the brave, renown'd in ranks of war,
With Troilus, dreadful in his rushing car;]
And last, great Hector, more than man divine,
For sure he seem'd not of terrestrial line²!

Hence, if, as it is said, men from being men become gods³ through excess of virtue, the habit which is opposed to a brutal habit, will, indeed,

If any apology were necessary for the insertion of this extract, it will be sufficient merely to add, that independent of its excellence, the manuscript from which it is taken, is among the number of the rarest at present existing.

“ Every where, the extremities of a-prior, are conjoined with the summits of a secondary order. Thus for instance, our master Hermes, (*ο δεισιπιδης ημων ερμης*), being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a god. But Plato calls the whole extent between gods and men, dæmons; and they, indeed, are dæmons by nature. Those dæmons, however, that are now mentioned, together with the demigods, or heroes, are not dæmons and heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the gods; but they are only so from habitude, being souls who naturally deliver themselves to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, the elevated and the magnificent; and such heroes it is necessary to honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to the exhortation of the Athenian guest. This heroic genus of souls, therefore, does not always follow the gods, but is undefiled and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends, indeed, for the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly liberated from matter. Hence, souls of this kind are easily led back to the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while, on the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls, are either never led back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a very inconsiderable period of time.

“ Each

² Priam, in Homer, complains that the bravest of his sons, Mestor, Troilus, and Hector, had fallen in battle, and that cowardly sons only survived. I have given the whole passage; for Aristotle only cites what relates to Hector. The passage is to be found in *Iliad*, 24. v. 255, &c. The translation is by Pope.

³ The wisest of the ancients, never supposed that men, however exalted their virtue might be while living, actually become at length gods; for this was an opinion that prevailed only during the

indeed, be such as this. For as there is neither the vice nor virtue of a brute, so neither is there of a god ; but the one habit, indeed, is more honourable

" Each of the gods, also, is perfectly exempt from secondary natures ; and the first, and more total of dæmons are likewise established above a habitude of this kind. They employ, however, terrestrial and partial spirits in the generations of some of the human race ; not physically mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables, therefore, through the similitude of appellation, conceal the things themselves. For spirits of this kind, are similarly denominated with the gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence, they say, either that gods have connexion with women, or men with goddesses. But if they were willing to speak plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, Thetis, and the other divinities produce their respective series, beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things ; each of which series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other ; such as the angelical, dæmoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. The lowest powers, therefore, of these orders, have much communion with the human race : for the extremities of first, are consascent with the summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural operations, and to the production of our species. On this account it frequently appears, that from the mixture of these powers with men, heroes are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human nature. But not only a dæmoniacal genus of this kind, physically sympathizes with men, but a different
genus

the corruption of the heathen religion, and especially during the decline and fall of the Roman empire. This opinion, in short, is diametrically opposite to the most fundamental principles of heathenism, as is evident from the golden verses ascribed to Pythagoras, and from the writings of Plato ; not to mention other respectable authorities which might be adduced in confirmation of this assertion. It is necessary to observe, therefore, that very good men were said by the ancients to become gods, through the similitude which they bear to divinity. Hence, Plato, in the *Sophista*, calls the Elean guest, or stranger, *a god*. In short, as Proclus well observes, Plato, in many places, venerates the participants of the gods by the same names as the gods, and calls them gods. Thus, not only the Athenian guest in the *Laws*, but also Socrates in the *Phædrus*, calls a divine soul, a god. Nor is it wonderful that beings who are always united to the gods, and who complete one golden chain together with them, should be denominated gods. Plato, likewise, in many places, calls dæmons gods, though they are essentially subordinate to, and subsist about the gods. For in the *Phædrus* and *Timæus*, and other dialogues, you will find that he extends the appellation of gods as far as to dæmons.

Hence, according to Plato, and the wisest of the heathens, that nature is simply a god, which is characterised by a superessential unity. Intellectual natures are gods according to union. Divine souls are gods according to participation. Dæmons are gods according to a contact with the gods. And the souls of men are gods through similitude.

honourable than virtue, and the other is of a different genus from vice. Since, however, the existence of a divine man is rare, (just as the Lacedæmonians

genus sympathizes with other animals, as nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags, or serpents.

" But how is it that at one time the gods are said to have connexion with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the gods? We reply, that the communion of gods with goddesses gives subsistence to gods, or dæmons eternally; but heroic souls, having a twofold form of life, viz. *doxastic* and *dianoetic*, the former of which is called, by Plato, in the *Timæus*, *the circle of difference*, and the latter, *the circle of sameness*, and which are characterised by the properties of *male* and *female*;—hence, these souls at one time exhibit a deiform power, by energising according to the masculine prerogative of their nature, or *the circle of sameness*, and at another time according to their feminine prerogative, or *the circle of difference*; yet so, as that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, and without merging themselves in the darkness of body. They likewise know the natures prior to their own, and exercise a providential care over inferior concerns, without, at the same time, having that propensity to such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the souls which act erroneously, according to the energies of both these circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens of practical or intellectual virtue—these differ in no respect from *gregarious* souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of sameness is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains all various fractures and distortions.

" As it is impossible, therefore, that these heroic souls can act with equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is necessary that they should sometimes descend and energise, principally according to their *doxastic* part, and sometimes according to their more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energise naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this account heroes are called *demigods*, (*ἡμιθεοί*), as having only one of their circles illuminated by the gods. Such of these, therefore, as have the circle of sameness unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life, and are moved about it, according to a deific energy—these are said to have a god for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through a defect with respect to the *doxastic* form of life. But such, on the contrary, as energise without impediment, according to the circle of difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time *enthusiastically*, or in other words, under the inspiring influence of divinity—these are said to have a mortal for their father, and a goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine cause*. Hence, when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal; but when the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence, too, Achilles in Homer,

* Let it, however, be carefully observed, that this divine cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy, or tendency in illuminating deity.

acts

Lacedæmonians, when they very much admire a man, are accustomed to say, O divine man,) thus, also, the brutal nature is rare among men; but when it does exist, it is principally found among the barbarians. Some men, however, become brutalized through diseases and mutilations of the body. And we thus denominate, by a defamatory appellation, those who surpass other men in vice. But of such a disposition of the soul as this, we shall hereafter make mention; and we have before spoken concerning vice. Let us now, therefore, speak concerning incontinence, and effeminacy, and luxury, and concerning [their opposites,] continence and endurance. For each of these must not be considered, as if they were the same habits with virtue and vice, nor yet as if they were of a genus different from them. It is necessary, however, as we have done in other things, having first premised what is apparent, [i. e. what is commonly admitted as true,] and proposed doubts, in the next place, to show every thing which is especially probable, about these passions; but if not every thing, at least the greater part, and the principal. For if such doubts as are difficult are dissolved, and those things which are probable are left, we shall have sufficiently accomplished our purpose.

Continence, therefore, and endurance, appear to be among the number of worthy and laudable things; but incontinence and effeminacy, among the number of things bad and blameable. And the continent man, and he who abides in the decision of reason, are the same person; and the incontinent man is the same with him who departs from the decision of reason. And the incontinent man, indeed, knowing that the things are bad, does them through passion; but the continent man knowing that desires are bad, does not follow them, in consequence of being obedient to reason. And all men, indeed, admit

acts with rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and divinely-inspired energy, as being the son of a goddess. And such is his attachment to practical virtue, that even when in Hades, he desires a union with body, in order that he may assist his father. While on the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to generation, and meddled with mortal concerns no farther than absolute necessity required."

that

that the temperate man is continent, and possesses the virtue of endurance; but with respect to a man of this description, some say that he is, in every respect, temperate, but others say that he is not. And some confusedly say, that the intemperate man is incontinent; and the incontinent man is intemperate; but others say that they differ from each other. But with respect to the prudent man, sometimes they say that he cannot be incontinent; and sometimes, that certain persons who are prudent and skilful, are incontinent. And farther still, men are said to be incontinent of anger, of honour, and of gain. Such, therefore, are the assertions concerning continence and incontinence.

CHAPTER II.

It may, however, be doubted, how he who thinks rightly can act incontinently. Some say, therefore, that it is impossible for a man to act incontinently who knows that he ought not; for it would be a dreadful thing, when science is inherent as Socrates thought, that any thing else should have dominion, and draw the man about like a slave. For Socrates in short, opposed reason, by this opinion, as if there were no such thing as incontinence; since he said that no one acted contrary to what he apprehended it was best to do, except from ignorance [of what was best]. This assertion, therefore, is adverse to those things which are clearly apparent; and it is requisite to inquire concerning the passion, if any one acts incontinently through ignorance, what the mode of this ignorance is? For it is evident, that he who acts incontinently does not think he ought so to act, till he is under the influence of

of the passion. There are, however, certain persons who admit some of these things, but not others. For they grant indeed, that nothing is better than science; but they do not admit that no one acts contrary to what appears to him to be better. And on this account they say, that the incontinent man, not having science but opinion, is vanquished by pleasures. If, however, it is opinion, and neither science nor a strong but a weak hypolepsis which resists, as it is in those who are dubious, pardon is to be granted to him who yields to strong desires; but improbity is not to be pardoned, nor any thing else which is blameable. The incontinent man, therefore, is vanquished by desire, prudence at the same time resisting; for this is most strong. But this is absurd; for the same person will be, at the same time, prudent and incontinent. No one, however, will say that it is the province of a prudent man to perform voluntarily the most base actions. To which may be added, what we have before shown, that the prudent is a practical man; for he is conversant with particulars, and possesses the other virtues.

Again, if the continent man consists in having strong and base desires, the temperate will not be a continent man, nor the continent a temperate man; for it is not the province of the temperate man to have too much [desire] or to have base desires. But it would be requisite that he should, if this were admitted; for if, indeed, the desires are good, the habit which prevents a man from following them is bad; so that not all continence will be good. If, however, the desires are weak, but not bad, there is nothing venerable [in continence;] and if they are bad and weak there is nothing great in it. Farther still, if continence gives permanency to every opinion, and even to false opinion, it is a bad thing; and if incontinence produces a departure from every opinion, there will be a certain incontinence which is good; such as that of Neoptolemus in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles. For he is to be praised for not persevering in what he was persuaded to do by Ulysses, because it was painful to him to lie. Again, that reasoning of the sophists which is denominated lying or dissembling, is perplexed with doubt. For with these men, in consequence of wishing to produce an

assent to paradoxes, in order that when they obtain their end, they may appear to be skilful persons, the syllogism formed by their reasoning becomes very dubious. For the discursive energy of reason is bound, when the person whose assent they wish to procure is unwilling to persist, because the conclusion does not please him; but is unable to proceed, because he cannot dissolve the argument. From a certain reason, however, it may happen, that imprudence, together with incontinence, is a virtue. For a man through incontinence may do the contrary to what he apprehends ought to be done; but he apprehends that good things are evil, and that they ought not to be done. Hence, he will do what is good, and not what is evil. Again, he who performs and pursues what is delectable, in consequence of being persuaded, and deliberately choosing so to do, will appear to be a better character than the man who does so, not from reasoning, but from incontinence; for he may be more easily cured, because he may be induced to change his opinion. But the incontinent man is obnoxious to the proverb, in which we say, "*When water suffocates, what occasion is there to drink?*" For if indeed, he were persuaded to do what he did, if he had been induced to change his opinion he would have desisted; but now not being persuaded, he nevertheless acts in this manner. Farther still, if incontinence and continence are conversant with all things, who is the man that is simply incontinent? For no one has every species of incontinence; and we say that some persons are simply incontinent. Such, therefore, are the doubts which happen on this subject. But of these, it is necessary to take away some, and to leave others; for the solution of a doubt is the discovery [of what is investigated.]

CHAPTER III.

IN the first place, therefore, it must be considered, whether the incontinent act knowingly, or not, and in what manner they act knowingly. In the next place, with what kind of things the incontinent and the continent man are conversant. I mean, whether they are conversant with all pleasure and pain, or with certain definite pleasures and pains; and whether the continent and the enduring man are the same, or different characters. And in a similar manner we must consider such other things as are allied to this theory. The beginning, however, of the speculation is, whether the continent and incontinent man differ in the things with which they are conversant, or in the mode in which they are conversant with them. My meaning is this, whether the incontinent man is alone incontinent, or not, because he is conversant with these particular things? or, whether it is because he is thus affected, or not? or whether it is from both these? In the next place, whether incontinence and continence are conversant with all things, or not? For he who is simply incontinent is not conversant with all things, but with those things with which the intemperate man is conversant; nor is he denominated incontinent from being simply affected towards these; for if he were, incontinence would be the same with intemperance; but from being affected towards them in this particular manner. For the intemperate man, indeed, is led [by his desires] from deliberate choice, thinking that it is always necessary to pursue the present delight; but the incontinent man does not think this is necessary; yet pursues it. With respect, therefore, to the as-

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sertion that it is true opinion and not science, through which men act incontinently, it is of no consequence to the present discussion ; for some of those who form opinions of things, entertain no doubt of their truth, but think that they know accurately. If, therefore, those who form an opinion, act in a greater degree contrary to their opinion, than those who have a scientific knowledge, because they believe negligently, science will in no respect differ from opinion. For some persons believe no less firmly in things of which they form an opinion, than others in things which they know scientifically. But this is evident from Heraclitus¹. Since, however, we say that a man knows scientifically in a twofold respect ; for both he who possesses science, indeed, but does not use it, and he who uses it, are said to have scientific knowledge ; it makes a difference whether a man possessing science, but not contemplating, does what he ought not to do, or whether possessing science and contemplating, he acts improperly. For this appears to be absurd, but it is not if he does not contemplate. Again, since there are two modes of propositions, [i. e. universal and particular propositions,] nothing hinders but that he who possesses both these, may act contrary to science ; using indeed the universal proposition, but not the particular one ; for particulars are practicable. There is a difference also, as to the universal ; for one difference, indeed, is in the man himself, but the other is in the thing. Thus, for instance, a man may know that dry food is beneficial to every man, and that this person is a man ; or that a thing of such a kind is dry food ; but whether this is a thing of such a kind, he either does not know, or he does not energise as if he did know. There is an immense difference, therefore, according to these modes ; so that no absurdity follows for a man thus to know ; but for him to know in any other way it would be wonderful. Farther still, science may be inherent in men in a way different from that which we have just now mentioned. For we see that habit differs in possessing,

¹ "Thus Heraclitus fancied that he knew, with scientific accuracy, the things which he opined ; as for instance, that there is no such thing as motion, and other notions which he maintained." Paraphrase on the Nicomachean Ethics. The translation by Mr. Bridgman.

indeed,

indeed, but not using science ; so that a man possesses, in a certain respect, and does not possess science ; as is the case with him who is asleep, or insane, or intoxicated. But in this way men are disposed, who are under the influence of the passions ; for anger, and the desire of venereal pleasures, and certain other things of this kind, evidently produce a change in the body ; and in some persons, also, they produce insanity. It is manifest, therefore, that the incontinent man must be said to be affected similarly to these persons. Nor is it any indication of the contrary if such persons utter sentences which are the progeny of science ; for those who are under the influence of these passions, will recite demonstrations, and the verses of Empedocles. And those who first learn [a science] connect indeed the words, but do not yet know their meaning ; for it is necessary that science should increase with advancing age ; but this requires time. Hence, it must be admitted that the incontinent speak after the manner of players, [i. e. without attending to the meaning of what they say].

Again, the cause of this may also be physically surveyed as follows : Opinion, indeed, is either universal or particular, of which latter sense is now the mistress. But when one reason is produced from both these, it is necessary that, so far as pertains to theory, the soul should enunciate the conclusion, but so far as pertains to practice, should immediately act. Thus, for instance, if every thing sweet ought to be tasted, but this thing is sweet as being some one of particulars, it necessarily follows, that he who is able, and is not impeded, must at the same time that he says this, act, [i. e. taste the sweet thing]. When, therefore, the universal proposition is indeed inherent, which prohibits a thing from being tasted ; but another proposition says, that every thing which is sweet is delectable ; and another that this particular thing is sweet ; and this causes the man to energise ; and when, also, desire happens to be inherent—then the universal proposition, indeed, says, this thing is to be avoided, but desire leads [to the fruition of it]. For each of the parts of the soul is able to move, or excite. Hence it happens, that a man acts incontinently both from reason, in a certain respect,

respect, and opinion ; though opinion is not essentially, but from accident, contrary to reason. For desire, but not opinion, is contrary to right reason. Hence, on this account, also, brutes are not incontinent, because they have not a perception of universal, but an imagination and memory of particulars. With respect to the manner, however, in which ignorance is dissolved, and the incontinent man again becomes in possession of scientific knowledge, the reasoning is the same as concerning him who is intoxicated or asleep, and is not peculiar to this passion ; but the explanation of it must be obtained from physiologists. Because, however, the last proposition is the opinion of the sensible object, and is the mistress of actions, he who is under the influence of passion either has not this proposition, or he has it in such a way, that from possessing he has not a scientific knowledge of it, but merely enunciates it, just as he who is intoxicated recites the verses of Empedocles ; and likewise because the last proposition is not universal, and does not appear to be similarly scientific with that proposition which is universal. That also which Socrates* investigated, appears in this case to happen. For the passion is not produced, when that which

* Here Aristotle obviously shows, that in apparently opposing Socrates, (or, which is the same thing, Plato), he in reality explains his opinion. For when, as Aristotle informs us in the 2d. chapter, Socrates said, "That no one acted contrary to what he apprehended it was best to do, except from ignorance of what was best," his meaning was, that no one acted contrary to what he thought was best, when he possessed science properly so called ; viz. when he had not only a scientific knowledge of the universal, but also of the particular proposition. But the incontinent man errs, because he alone knows, scientifically, the universal proposition, that a certain thing universally is not to be done ; but he does not know that this particular thing is not to be done, and that it is not now to be done.

Conformably to this also, Plato says, that all errors are involuntary, because there is need of a false proposition, to the existence of error. And the falsehood takes place about the major proposition. Thus Orestes says, "My mother has killed my father : Every woman who kills her own husband ought to be killed : My mother, therefore, ought to be killed." Here it is evident, that Orestes erred through the major proposition. For though every woman who kills her husband ought to be killed, yet not by her own son. Since, therefore, the major proposition is false, on this account Orestes is said to have erred involuntarily, because we fall into falsehood involuntarily. For no one willingly admits what is false, since all men naturally love truth.

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is science, properly so called, is seen to be present ; nor is this science drawn about [so as to co-operate with passion,] but this must be asserted of the sensitive power. And thus much concerning the knowledge and ignorance of the incontinent man, and how he may act incontinently accompanied with knowledge.

CHAPTER IV.

BUT whether any one is simply incontinent, or all that are incontinent are partially so, and if there is any one who is simply incontinent, what the things are with which he is conversant, must in the next place be shown by us. That the continent, therefore, and men of endurance, and that the incontinent and effeminate, are conversant with pleasures and pains, is evident. Of those things, however, which produce pleasure, some indeed are necessary ; but others, though they are eligible of themselves, yet have excess. But necessities indeed, are things which have reference to the body ; I mean such things as pertain to food, and the use of venereal pleasures, and such-like corporeal concerns, about which we place intemperance and temperance. Other things, however, are not indeed necessary, yet are eligible of themselves ; I mean such as victory, honour, wealth, and such-like good and delectable things. Those, therefore, who exceed in these contrary to the right reason which is in them, we do not indeed denominate simply incontinent, but with an addition we call them incontinent of riches, of gain, of honour, and of anger ; but we do not call them simply incontinent, as being different from those that are so, and denominated from similitude ; just as the name of a certain person who was victorious
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in the Olympic games, was *Anthropos*, i. e. *man*; for he had as a *proper* the *common* name of man, and yet at the same time he was different [from man universal, or the species man, as being an individual]. As an indication of this, incontinence indeed, is blamed, not only as an error, but also as a certain vice, either simply, or partially; but no one blames those who are incontinent of honour, or gain, &c. as simply bad. With respect, however, to those who are conversant with corporeal enjoyments, with which we say the temperate and intemperate man are conversant, he who without deliberate choice pursues the excesses of delectable, and avoids the excesses of painful things, viz. hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and every thing pertaining to the touch and the taste, yet contrary to deliberate choice and the reasoning power, is called incontinent, not with an addition of this or that thing, as of anger, but he is only simply called incontinent. But as an indication of this, those who are conversant with the one are called effeminate, but not those who are conversant with the other. Hence, we arrange the incontinent and intemperate, and also the continent and temperate man, in the same class, but not those who are incontinent of honour, or gain, &c. because they are, in a certain respect, conversant with the same pleasures and pains. Though, however, they are conversant with the same things, yet not after the same manner; for the intemperate, indeed, pursue depraved pleasures from deliberate choice, but the incontinent do not. Hence, we rather call him intemperate, who either not at all desiring, or desiring slightly, pursues excessive pleasures, and avoids moderate pains, than him who pursues the one and avoids the other, in consequence of being influenced by vehement desire. For what would the former character do, if he were impelled by robust desire, and suffered violent pain from the want of necessary things? Since, however, of desires and pleasures, some rank in the genus of things beautiful and worthy; for of things delectable, some are naturally eligible, others are contrary to these, and others have an intermediate subsistence, agreeably to the division we have before made; and these last are such as riches, gain, victory and honour: in all these, therefore, and things of the like kind, and in those that have
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an intermediate subsistence, men are not blamed for being merely influenced by the passions, and for desiring and loving, but for the manner in which they are influenced by them, and for indulging them to excess. Hence, with respect to those who are vanquished by the passions, or pursue any thing naturally beautiful and good, contrary to reason, such as those who pursue honour more than is proper, or are irrationally attached to their parents and children; for these also rank among the number of things that are good, and those who pay attention to these are praised; yet there is at the same time a certain excess even in these things, if any one, like Niobe, contends about them even with the gods, or like Satyrus, who for his attachment to his father was called *Philopator*; for he appeared through this attachment to be very infatuated. There is, therefore, no depravity, indeed, in these things, for the reason already assigned, because each of these things is naturally eligible of itself; but the excesses of them are bad, and are to be avoided. This, however, is not the case with incontinence; for incontinence is not only to be avoided, but is also among the number of blameable things. But from the similitude of the passion, in speaking about each of these, it is usual to add the term incontinence, just as we say, that a man is a bad physician, or a bad player, whom we should not simply call a bad man. As, therefore, we do not here call these, simply bad men, because each of these is not a vice, but similar to vice from analogy; so likewise there, [viz. in the immoderate pursuit of honour, gain, &c.] those things only are to be considered as incontinence and continence, which are conversant with the same things as temperance and intemperance. But with respect to incontinence in anger, we speak of it from similitude. Hence, also, by making an addition, we say that a man is incontinent of anger, just as we say, that he is incontinent of honour or gain.

CHAPTER V.

SINCE, however, some things are naturally delectable, and of these some are simply so, but others to the genera of animals and men; but other things are not naturally delectable, but some things are pleasing in consequence of mutilations, and others are so partly from custom, and partly from depraved natures—this being the case, similar habits may be perceived in each of these. But by savage habits, I mean such a habit as that of the woman who is said to have cut open the bellies of pregnant women, and to have devoured the foetus; or such habits as certain savage nations about Pontus are said to possess. For of these, some are delighted to feed on raw, and others on human flesh, and others at banquets feast each other with their own children. Or such a habit as Phalaris is said to have possessed; [for he is reported to have eaten his own son]. These habits, therefore, are savage. Some of these habits, however, are produced in certain persons from disease and insanity, as was the case with him who immolated and eat his mother¹, and also with him who eat the liver of his fellow-servant. But other savage habits, either originate from disease, or from custom, such as evulsions of the hairs, biting the nails, and besides these eating coals and earth; to which may be added the venereal connexion of males with males. For these habits are produced in some persons by

¹ Ο Ξέρξης ο των Περσων βασιλευς μανεις, εφαγη την εαυτου μητερα κρουεργησας. ASPASIUS.—i. e. “Xerxes, king of the Persians, being insane, eat his mother, having for this purpose torn her in pieces.”

nature,

nature, but in others from custom ; as being accustomed to them from childhood. No one, therefore, would call those in whom nature is the cause of these habits, incontinent ; as neither are women called incontinent, because in the venereal connexion, they are not active, but passive. And in a similar manner those are not called incontinent, who are in a diseased condition from custom. The possession, therefore, of each of these, is something beyond the boundaries of vice, in the same manner as a savage nature. But when possessing these propensities to subdue, or be subdued by them, is not simple continence or incontinence, but is only so from similitude, just as he who subsists after this manner with respect to anger is incontinent of this passion, but passion is not to be called incontinent. For every vice, folly, timidity, intemperance and ferocity when excessive, is either savage or the effect of disease. For he who is naturally so disposed as to be afraid of every thing, even though a mouse should make a noise, is timid according to a savage timidity ; but he who is afraid of a cat is timid from disease. And among the number of the stupid, those who are most irrational from nature, and live only from sense, resemble savage animals, as is the case with some nations of remote barbarians ; but those who are so from disease, such as epilepsy, or insanity, these are in a morbid state. It is, however, possible, that some one may sometimes possess these habits, and yet not be vanquished by them ; I mean, as if, for instance, Phalaris desiring to eat his son should refrain from so doing, or should abstain from absurd venereal pleasure. And it is not only possible to have these propensities, but also to be vanquished by them. As, therefore, with respect to depravity, that which pertains to man, is simply said to be depravity ; but that which subsists with an addition, is said to be a savage or diseased depravity, but is not simply depravity ; after the same manner with respect to incontinence, it is evident that one kind is savage, but another the effect of disease, while that alone is simply incontinence which subsists according to human intemperance. It is evident, therefore, that incontinence and continence are alone conversant with those things with which

intemperance and temperance are conversant, and that another species of incontinence subsists about other things, which is denominated metaphorically, and not simply.

CHAPTER VI.

LET us, however, now consider whether the incontinence of anger is not less base than the incontinence of desires. For anger, indeed, seems to hear something of reason, but to hear it negligently ; just like hasty servants, who run away before they have heard the whole of what is said to them, and thus err in the performance of what they are ordered to do ; or like dogs who bark at a noise alone, before they perceive whether he who makes it is a friend or not. Thus also anger, through the heat and celerity of its nature, hears, indeed, reason, but does not hear its mandates, in consequence of impetuously tending to vengeance. For reason, indeed, or the imagination, render it evident that something has been done attended with insolence or contempt ; but anger, as if syllogistically concluding that it is necessary to be hostile to one who has acted in this manner, is immediately enraged. Desire, however, if sense, or reason [corrupted by sense,] only says that a thing is delectable, rushes to the enjoyment of it. Hence, anger in a certain respect follows reason ; but desire does not. Desire, therefore, is more base than anger. For he who is incontinent of anger, is after a manner vanquished by reason ; but he who is incontinent of desire, is subdued by desire, and not by reason. Again, it is more pardonable to follow the natural appetites, since such desires as are common to all men are
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more pardonable, and so far as they are common. But anger and asperity are more natural than desires which are excessive, and which are not necessary. Thus one who was accused of striking his father said, as an apology for it, that his own father, and even his grandfather, committed the same fault; and pointing to his child, he likewise, said he, will strike me when he becomes a man; for this is a family failing. A certain person, also, being dragged about by his son, ordered him to stop at the gates of his house; for he likewise had dragged his father as far as to that place. Farther still, those who act more insidiously are more unjust. The irascible man, therefore, is not insidious, nor is anger, but he is open in what he does. Desire, however, is fraudulent, as it is said of Venus,

The Cyprian goddess skill'd in weaving wiles.

And as Homer says, [speaking of her cestus,]

In this was every art, and every charm,
To win the wisest, and the coldest warm;
Fond love, the gentle vow, the gay desire,
The kind deceit, the still reviving fire,
Persuasive speech, and more persuasive sighs,
Silence, that spoke, and eloquence of eyes¹.

Hence, if this incontinence is more unjust, it is also more base than that which pertains to anger, and this is simply incontinence, and in a certain respect vice. Again, no one who is pained acts insolently [i. e. lasciviously] towards another person; but every one who acts from the impulse of anger, acts with pain. He, however, who conducts himself insolently towards another, acts with pleasure. If, therefore, those things with which it is especially just to be angry are more unjust, the incontinence, also, which subsists through desire is more unjust; for anger is not

¹ Iliad 14, v. 214, &c. The translation by Pope. I have given the whole passage to which Aristotle alludes; for he only quotes the two last words of the first line of the original and the last line.

attended

attended with insolence². Hence, it is evident that the incontinence which is conversant with desires, is more base than that which is conversant with anger, and, also, that continence and incontinence are conversant with corporeal pleasures. The differences, however, of these must be assumed. For as we said in the beginning, some desires are human and natural, both in their genus and magnitude; but others are savage; and others subsist from mutilations and diseases. But with the first of these, temperance and intemperance are alone conversant. Hence, we neither call brutes temperate, nor intemperate, except metaphorically, though one genus of animals differs in short from another, in insolence, in salaciousness, and in voracity. For they have neither any deliberate choice, nor reasoning process, but they revolt from nature, in the same manner as insane men. Ferocity, however, is a less evil than vice, but it is more terrible; for that which is most excellent, is not corrupted through this, as it is in men; but those that labour under this malady are deprived of it, [i. e. of reason.] It is just, therefore, as if that which is inanimate should be compared with that which is animated, in order to know which of the two is the worse. For the improbity is always more innoxious which is without a principle; but intellect is a principle. Hence, a similar thing takes place, as if injustice should be compared with an unjust man; for it is possible that the one may be worse than the other. For a bad man may be the cause of an infinitely greater number of evils than a brute.

² By *ἄπειρος* here, or *insolence*, Aristotle probably means the insolence which accompanies lasciviousness.

CHAPTER VII.

WITH respect, however, to the pleasures and pains which subsist through the touch and the taste, and also with respect to the desires and aversions pertaining to these, about which intemperance and temperance have been before defined; it is possible, indeed, that a man may be so disposed, as to be vanquished by those pleasures and pains, to which the multitude are superior; and it is also possible, that he may vanquish those by which the multitude are vanquished. But of these characters, he who is vanquished by pleasures is incontinent, and he who vanquishes them is continent. He, also, who is vanquished by pains is effeminate, but he who vanquishes them is a man of endurance. The habits, however, of most men are between these, though they rather verge to the worse habits. Since, however, of pleasures, some are necessary, but others are not, and those that are necessary are so to a certain extent; but the excesses and defects are not necessary; and the like also takes place in desires and pains;—this being the case, he who pursues the excesses of pleasures, or who pursues pleasures excessively, or from deliberate choice, and on their own account, and not from any thing else which may happen, is an intemperate man. For this man will necessarily not repent of his conduct; so that he is incurable. But he who is deficient in the pursuit of pleasures, is opposed to this character; and he who subsists in a medium between both, is the temperate man. In a similar manner, also

also, he is intemperate, who avoids corporeal pains, not because he is vanquished by them, but from deliberate choice. But of those who pursue pleasures, yet not from deliberate choice, one, indeed, is led to the pursuit through pleasure; but another through an avoidance of pain; so that they differ from each other. It will, however, be obvious to every one, that he is a worse character, who not desiring, or desiring but slightly, does any thing which is base, than him who desires vehemently; and also that he who not being angry strikes a man, is a worse character than the man who strikes another through the impulse of anger. For what would such a one do, if he were influenced by passion. Hence, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent man. Of the characters, therefore, that we have mentioned, the one has more the form of effeminacy, but the other is incontinent. But the continent is opposed to the incontinent, and the man of endurance to the effeminate man. For endurance, indeed, consists in resisting, but continence in subduing. It is one thing, however, to resist, and another to subdue, just as it is one thing not to be vanquished, and another to vanquish. Hence, continence is more eligible than endurance. But he who fails in those things in which the multitude resist, and are able to resist, is effeminate and luxuriously delicate. For luxurious delicacy is a certain effeminacy; as when a man draws his garment on the ground lest he should be pained by the labour of holding it up; and [by his manner of living] imitates one who is ill, yet does not think he is miserable, though he resembles one who is miserable. The like, also, takes place with respect to continence and incontinence. For it is not wonderful if a man is vanquished by strong and transcendent pleasures or pains, but he deserves to be pardoned, if, though vanquished, he makes a resistance, like the Philoctetes of Theodectes, when bit by a viper, or the Cercyon of Carcinus in his Alope¹; or like those who endeavouring to restrain their laughter burst

¹ "Carcinus was a tragic poet, and Alope was the daughter of Cercyon, who understanding that the chastity of his daughter had been violated, could no longer bear to live, through the grief which he felt on the occasion."—ASPASIUS.

forth

forth into a profuse laugh, as it happened to Xenophantus. But he is very blameable who is vanquished by those pleasures which the multitude are able to resist, and is unable to oppose them, and this not through the nature of his race, or from disease, as is the case with the Persian kings with whom effeminacy is hereditary, and who on this account are as females when compared to males. The jocose man, also, appears to be intemperate, but he is effeminate; for jesting is a relaxation, since it is a repose [from serious and laborious pursuits]. But the jocose man ranks among the number of those who exceed in this relaxation. With respect to incontinence, however, one kind is precipitate, but another is from imbecility. For some, indeed, having deliberated, do not persist in what they have deliberated, on account of passion; but others, in consequence of not having deliberated, are led [captive] by passion. For some persons, just as those who have previously tickled themselves, are not tickled by others, so these, in consequence of previously perceiving, and foreseeing [the future perturbation] and having pre-excited themselves, and their reasoning power, are not vanquished by passion, whether it be delectable, or painful. But persons of acute feelings, and those who are melancholy, are especially incontinent, according to precipitate incontinence. For the former, indeed, through celerity, and the latter through vehemence, do not wait for the decision of reason, because they are disposed to follow the imagination.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE intemperate man, however, as we have before observed, is not inclined to repentance; for he persists in his deliberate choice; but every incontinent man is inclined to repent. Hence, the thing is not as we doubted it might be; but the intemperate man, indeed, is incurable, and the incontinent man is curable. For depravity appears to resemble the diseases of the dropsy and consumption, but incontinence seems to resemble the epilepsy; since the former, indeed, is continued without interruption, but the latter is not a continued improbity. And in short, the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice; for vice, indeed, is latent, but incontinence is not latent. But of these characters, the precipitately incontinent are better than those who possess reason, indeed, but do not abide in its decisions; for the latter are vanquished by a less passion, and not without previous deliberation, like the former. For the man who is incontinent from imbecility, resembles those who become rapidly intoxicated, and from a little wine, and from less than that through which most men become intoxicated. That incontinence, therefore, is not a vice is evident; but perhaps it is partially so. For incontinence is contrary, but vice is conformable to deliberate choice. The intemperate, and the incontinent man, however, are similar in their actions, just as Demodocus said of the Milesians: viz. "The Milesians are not indeed foolish, yet they act as if they were so." Thus, also, incontinent men are not indeed unjust, yet they act unjustly. Since, therefore, the incontinent
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man is one who does not pursue corporeal pleasures in excess and contrary to right reason, from persuasion, but the intemperate man because he is intemperate, is persuaded to pursue such pleasures;—this being the case, the former is easily induced to change his opinion, but the latter is not. For virtue preserves the principle [of right conduct,] but depravity corrupts it; and in actions *that for the sake of which* [or the end] is the principle, in the same manner as hypotheses are principles, in the mathematics. Hence, neither in the mathematics, nor here, are principles to be taught, but virtue, either physical or ethical, is the cause of right opinion concerning the principle [of conduct]. A man of this description, therefore, is temperate, but the contrary character is an intemperate man. There is also a certain person who through passion departs from right reason, whom passion, indeed, so subdues, that he does not act conformably to right reason; but yet passion does not so far subdue him as to cause him to be persuaded, that pleasures of this description ought to be largely pursued. This person is the incontinent man, who is better than the intemperate, and is not absolutely a bad man. For in him that which is best, the principle [of right conduct] is saved. But there is another person contrary to this [viz. the continent man] who persists [in the decision of reason] and is not diverted from it through passion. From these things, therefore, it is evident, that one of these habits is worthy, but the other bad.

CHAPTER IX.

WHETHER, therefore, is he the continent man who persists in any kind of reason, and in any kind of deliberate choice, or he who persists in right reason? And whether is he the incontinent man, who does not persist in any kind of deliberate choice, nor in any kind of reason, or he who persists in a false reason, and in an erroneous deliberate choice, as it was doubted by us before? Or shall we say that the continent man is one who persists from accident in any kind of reason and deliberate choice, but essentially in true reason, and right deliberate choice, but that the incontinent man does not thus persist? For if any one chooses, or pursues, that thing on account of this, he pursues, indeed, and chooses this thing *per se*; but the former thing from accident. We speak, however, of that which is *per se* simply. Hence, it is possible that the one may persist in any kind of opinion, but that the other may abandon any kind of opinion; but the one simply persists in true opinion, and the other does not. There are, however, some persons who are disposed to persist in an opinion, and these are those who are called pertinacious, such as the obstinate, and those who are not easily persuaded to relinquish their opinion, who have, indeed, something similar to the continent man, in the same manner as the prodigal has to the liberal, and the audacious to the confident man; but in many things they are different. For the confident man, indeed, is not changed through passion and desire; since when it so happens, he is easily persuaded. But the pertinacious man is not persuaded by reason; since most of this description admit desire, and are led by pleasures.

pleasures. Those persons, however, are pertinacious, who have certain opinions of their own, and also unlearned and rustic men. And those, indeed, who have certain opinions of their own, are pertinacious through pleasure and pain. For they rejoice when they are victorious, if they are not induced to change their opinion, and they are grieved, when their opinions, as if they were decrees, are without efficacy. Hence, they resemble the incontinent more than the continent man. But there are certain persons who do not persist in their opinions, yet not through incontinence, such as Neoptolemus in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles; since he did not persist in his opinion, yet, not on account of pleasure, but on account of the beautiful in conduct. For to him it was beautiful to speak the truth, though he was persuaded by Ulysses to lie. For not every one who does any thing on account of pleasure is intemperate, or a bad, or an incontinent man; but he is intemperate who does it on account of base pleasure. Since, however, there is a character of such a kind as to be delighted less than is proper with corporeal pleasures, and not to abide in the decisions of reason, the continent man is a medium between this character, and the incontinent man. For the incontinent man, indeed, does not abide in the decisions of reason, because he is delighted with corporeal pleasures more than is proper, but this man, because he is delighted with them less than is proper. The continent man, however, abides in the decision of reason, and is not changed through any thing else. It is also necessary, if continence is a good thing, that both the contrary habits should be bad, as it appears that they are. Because, however, one of these characters [viz. the man who is delighted less than is proper with corporeal pleasures,] exists but among a few men, and is rarely seen; hence, as temperance appears to be contrary to intemperance alone, thus, also, continence to incontinence. But since many things are denominated from similitude, the continence also of the temperate man follows according to similitude. For both the continent and the temperate man, do nothing contrary to reason, through the influence of corporeal pleasures; but the one, indeed, [viz. the continent man] possesses, but the other does not possess depraved desires. And the one, indeed, is
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a man of such a description, as not to be delighted contrary to reason, but the other is delighted, indeed, yet is not led by this delight. The incontinent, and the intemperate man, also, resemble each other, though, indeed, they are different characters. Both, however, pursue corporeal delights; but the latter, indeed, thinking that it is proper, and the other not thinking that it is proper, to pursue them.

CHAPTER X.

NOR is it possible that the same person can at one and the same time be prudent and incontinent; for it has been shown by us that a prudent man, is at the same time a man of worthy manners. Again, a man is not only prudent from knowing what ought to be done, but also from acting properly; but the incontinent man does not act properly. Nothing, however, prevents the incontinent man from being skilful. Hence, also, sometimes certain persons appear to be prudent, but incontinent, because skilfulness differs from prudence, in the way we have before explained; and these, so far as pertains to reason, indeed, are near to each other, but they differ according to deliberate choice. Neither, therefore, does the incontinent man [possess reason,] as one who knows and contemplates, but as one who is asleep, or intoxicated. And he acts, indeed, voluntarily; for after a certain manner he acts knowing both what he does, and for the sake of what he acts as he does. But he is not depraved; for his deliberate choice is good; so that he is half depraved, and not unjust, because he is not insidious. For one incontinent man, indeed, [i. e. the man who is incontinent from debility] does not persist in what he has deliberated; and

and he who is of a melancholy temperament, [i. e. the man who is precipitately incontinent,] is not in short, disposed to deliberate. The incontinent man, therefore, resembles a city, which decrees, indeed, every thing that is proper, and has good laws, but uses none of them, as Anaxandrides revilingly said,

“ The state consults, but its own laws neglects.”

But the bad man resembles a city, which uses indeed laws, but uses bad laws. Incontinence, however, and continence, are conversant with that which exceeds the habit of the multitude; for the continent man persists more, but the incontinent man less, than the multitude are able to do, [in the decisions of reason]. The incontinence, however, of the melancholy, is more easily cured, than the incontinence of those who deliberate, indeed, but do not persist in doing what they have deliberated to do. Those also, who are incontinent from custom, may be more easily cured than those who are naturally so; for it is more easy to change custom than nature. For on this very account it is difficult to change custom, viz. because it resembles nature, as Evenus also says,

“ By long attention custom is produc'd,
And is at length as nature to mankind.”

We have shown, therefore, what continence and incontinence, and also what endurance and effeminacy are, and how these habits subsist with reference to each other.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XI.

THE discussion, however, of pleasure and pain, pertains to him who philosophizes about the political science ; for he is the architect [as it were] of the end, looking to which we say that one thing is evil, but another is simply good. Again, it is likewise necessary that we should make these the objects of consideration. For we admit that ethical virtue and vice, are conversant with pleasures and pains ; and most men assert that felicity is accompanied with pleasure. Hence, also, they denominate the *blessed man*, (*μακάριον*), from *especially rejoicing*. (*ἀπὸ τοῦ μαλίστ' αὖ χαιρῆν*). To some, therefore, no pleasure appears to be good, neither essentially, nor from accident ; for good and pleasure are not the same thing. But to others, some pleasures appear to be good, but many of them to be bad. Others again in the third place assert, that, though all pleasures were good, yet at the same time that which is most excellent cannot be pleasure. In short, therefore, they say, pleasure is not good, because all pleasure is a generation tending to a sensible nature [as to its end ;] but no generation is allied to ends ; as no act of building a house, [i. e. the energy of building, *οικοδομησις*,] is allied to the house. Again, the temperate man avoids pleasures. Farther still, the prudent man pursues a freedom from pain, and not the delectable. To which may be added, that pleasures are an impediment to the energy of prudence, and this in proportion to the delight which they afford ; as is the case with venereal pleasure ; for no one, when engaged in this pleasure, can intellectually perceive any thing. Again, pleasure is not the offspring of art ; though every thing which

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is good is the work of art. Farther still, children and brutes pursue pleasures. But that all pleasures are not worthy is indicated by this, that some are base, and disgraceful, and pernicious ; for some pleasures produce disease. It is also evident that pleasure is not the best of things, because it is not an end, but generation. Such, therefore, nearly are the assertions respecting pleasure.

CHAPTER XII.

THAT it does not happen, however, from these arguments that pleasure is neither good, nor the best of things, is evident from the following considerations:—In the first place, indeed, because good is predicated in a twofold respect ; for one kind of good is simply and absolutely good, but another is good to a certain person. And natures and habits receive the same division ; so that this will also be the case with motions and generations. With respect to those pleasures likewise which appear to be bad, some indeed are simply bad, but are not bad to a certain person, but to him are eligible ; and some are not pleasures to this person, except once and for a short time, but they are not eligible to him. And some are not pleasures, but only appear to be so, viz. those which are attended with pain, and are for the sake of a remedy, such as those of the sick. Again, since of good one kind is energy, but another is habit, those pleasures which restore their possessor to his natural habit are delectable. In desires, however, there is the energy of an indigent and imperfect habit and nature. There are also pleasures which are unaccompanied with pain and desire, such as the energies of contemplation, nature in these not being indigent.

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[But that some pleasures are delectable of themselves, and others only on account of the indigence which they remove ;] is indicated by this, that men are not pleased with the same delectable thing when the indigence of nature is removed, and when it is not. For in the former case, they are delighted with things simply and absolutely pleasant, but in the latter, with their contraries. For they are then delighted with things sharp and bitter, none of which are either naturally, or absolutely delectable ; so that neither are the pleasures. For as things delectable are to each other, so likewise are the pleasures produced by these. Farther still, it is not necessary that something else should be better than pleasure, as some say the end of generation is better than generation ; for pleasures are not generations, nor are all of them accompanied with generation, but they are energies, and an end. Nor do pleasures happen when things are passing into existence, but from the use of things. Nor is the end of all pleasures something different from them, but of those only which lead to the perfection of nature. Hence, it is not well said, that pleasure is a sensible generation ; but it must rather be said that it is the energy of habit according to nature ; and instead of saying that it is a sensible, it must be said that it is an unimpeded generation. It appears, however, to be a certain generation, because it is properly good ; for they fancied that energy is generation ; but it is different from it. To say, also, that pleasures are bad, because some delectable things produce diseases, is what may likewise be said of things salubrious ; for some of these are bad as to pecuniary affairs. In this respect, therefore, both will be bad, and yet they are not on this account bad. For contemplation is likewise sometimes injurious to health ; yet the pleasure proceeding from each habit, is neither an impediment to prudence, nor to any habit, but the pleasures which are an impediment to these are such as are foreign ; since the pleasures arising from contemplation and discipline, produce in a greater degree contemplation and learning. But it reasonably happens that no pleasure is the work of art ; since neither is there an art of any other energy but of power ; though the arts pertaining to unguents and cooking, appear to be the arts of pleasure. With respect to


to the assertions also, that the temperate man avoids pleasures, and that the prudent man pursues a life unattended with pain, and that children and brutes pursue pleasure—all these are solved after the same manner. For since we have shown how all pleasures are, in a certain respect, simply good, and how they are not good, hence, children and brutes pursue such pleasures as are accompanied with desire and pain, and are corporeal, and the prudent man pursues a freedom of pain from these; for of such a kind are these pleasures; [viz. they are accompanied with pain]. Children and brutes also pursue the excesses of these according to which the intemperate man becomes intemperate. Hence, the temperate man avoids these; since there are also pleasures which belong to the temperate man.

CHAPTER XIII.

It is also admitted, that pain is an evil and is to be avoided; for one kind of pain, indeed, is simply evil, but another in a certain respect, because it is an impediment. That, however, which is contrary to what is to be avoided, so far as it is something to be avoided and is evil, is good. Pleasure, therefore, is necessarily something good. For the solution of Speusippus is not appropriate, viz. that pleasure is contrary to pain, just as the greater is contrary to the less and the equal; since no one will say that pleasure is a certain evil¹. But

¹ If pleasure is opposed to pain, as the greater is to the less and the equal, then it will be opposed as excess to defect; and pleasure will be of itself an evil.

nothing prevents a certain pleasure from being the best of things, if certain pleasures are bad, just as a certain science, [viz. wisdom,] is the best of sciences, though some sciences are bad. Perhaps too, it must necessarily be the case, that if of every habit there are unimpeded energies, whether felicity is the energy of all the habits, or of some one of them, this energy, if it is unimpeded, is most eligible. But this is pleasure; so that a certain pleasure will be the best of things, many pleasures, if it should so happen, being simply bad. And on this account all men are of opinion that a happy is a delectable life, and they reasonably connect pleasure with felicity. For no energy is perfect when it is impeded; but felicity is among the number of perfect energies. Hence, the happy man requires the goods pertaining to the body, and external possessions, and also good fortune, lest [the want of] these should be an impediment [to his felicity]. Those, however, who say, that a man, if he is a good man, may be happy, though he should be tormented in a wheel, and fall into the greatest calamities, say nothing to the purpose², whether they assert this willingly or unwillingly. Because, however, the happy man requires good fortune, prosperity appears to some persons to be the same with felicity, though it is not the same; since prosperity, when it is excessive, is an impediment to felicity. Perhaps, likewise, it is no longer just to call prosperity [when it is excessive] good fortune; for the definition of prosperity has a reference to felicity. That all brutes too, and all men, pursue pleasure, is an indication that pleasure is in a certain respect the best of things.



"That fame which crowds of human kind extol,
Will ne'er completely perish."

Because, however, neither the same nature, nor the same habit, either is, or appears to be the best, neither do all men pursue the same

² The distinction mentioned in a former note must here be carefully remembered, viz. that the felicity of the worthy man, in the most calamitous circumstances, will not be *essentially* destroyed, but will be as it were in a *dormant state*.

pleasure,

pleasure, though pleasure is pursued by all men. Perhaps, also, they pursue not the pleasure which they fancy, nor that which they say they pursue, but the same pleasure; *for all things naturally possess something divine*³. Corporeal pleasures, however, obtain the inheritance of the name, because men are for the most part occupied in them, and all animals partake of them. Because, therefore, these pleasures alone are [generally] known, these are the only pleasures which are fancied to have an existence. It is, however, evident, that unless pleasure is good, and also energy, it will not be possible for the happy man to live delectably. For on what account would delight be requisite to a happy life, if it is not good? But it would also be possible for life to be happy, though attended with pain; for pain will neither be evil nor good, if pleasure is not good. Why, therefore, is pain to be avoided? Neither, therefore, will the life of the worthy man be more delectable, unless his energies are more delectable.

³ This is most Platonically said by Aristotle, that all men pursue the same pleasure, by which he means the pleasure which is good; *because all things naturally possess something divine*. For in consequence of every thing possessing this symbol, or impression of divinity in its essence, there is in every being an innate desire of the first principle, as the end of all things; and hence prior to appetite, there is a certain occult perception of that which is first. Hence, too, in consequence of this natural sense or perception, which is entirely concealed from the other senses, things heavy and light choose in a rectilinear direction a place adapted to their natures, and reject the contrary. Hence, the roots of trees pursue moisture, and avoid dryness; and leaves sagaciously turn from the shade, and joyfully associate to themselves the light of the sun, in conjunction with his invigorating warmth. Through this wonderful sense and appetite, therefore, all things are converted to the first without knowing the first; and as the great Theodorus, the Platonist, says, "*All things pray except the first.*" In a similar manner, also, the soul, prior to manifest knowledge and the election of the will, from a natural sense and inclination impressed in her essence through *the one*, desires *the one itself*.

CHAPTER XIV.

WITH respect, however, to corporeal pleasures, we must direct our attention to the assertions of those who say, that some pleasures are very eligible, viz. such as are worthy; but not corporeal pleasures, with which the intemperate man is conversant. Why, therefore, are the pains contrary to these pleasures depraved? For good is contrary to evil. Or shall we say, that necessary pleasures are so far good, because that which is not evil is good, or that they are good to a certain extent? For in those habits and motions, in which there is no excess of that which is better, there is no excess of pleasure; but in those in which there is an excess of what is better, there is also an excess of pleasure. But of corporeal goods there is an excess; and the bad man becomes bad by pursuing the excess of pleasure, and not necessary pleasures. For all depraved men are delighted with meats and wine, and venery, but not in such a manner as is proper. And they are affected in a contrary way with respect to pain; for they do not avoid the excess of pain, but pain altogether. For pain is not contrary to excess, but to him who pursues excess. Since, however, it is not only necessary to speak the truth, but also to assign the cause of a false assertion; for this contributes to credibility; since when the cause why a thing seems to be true, though it is not, appears to be reasonable, it then gives greater credibility to the truth;—this being the case, it must be shown why corporeal pleasures appear to be more eligible. In the first place, therefore, they appear to be so, because they expel pain, and because excessive, and in short, corporeal pleasure,

sure, is pursued on account of the excesses of pain, as a remedy. But the remedies are vehement, and on this account corporeal pleasures are pursued, because they become more apparent when placed by that which is contrary to them. Pleasure, therefore, does not appear to be good, for these two reasons, as we have before observed; because some pleasures, indeed, are the actions of a depraved nature, either from the birth of the animal, as those of a brute, or they originate from custom, such as those of bad men; but other pleasures are remedies, because they are the pleasures of that which is in want, and it is better to have them, than for them to be passing into existence; and others happen to be the pleasures of that which is in a perfect condition¹. From accident, therefore, they are worthy pleasures. Again, pleasures that are vehement, are pursued by those who are incapable of being delighted with other pleasures. These, therefore, procure for themselves certain thirsts. Hence, when pleasures are innoxious, they are not to be reprehended; but when they are noxious, they are bad. For those that pursue these pleasures have no other with which they are delighted, and if neither these, nor any others are present, the vulgar are in pain, through [the indigence of] nature. For the animal always labours, as physical arguments testify, since as physiologists say, to see and to hear are painful, but we are now accustomed to these [energies, and therefore do not perceive the pain]. In a similar manner in youth, in consequence of the augmentation which then takes place, we are affected like those who are intoxicated, and youth is a delectable [period of human life]. But the melancholic naturally always require a remedy; for their body experiences a continual molestation from its temperament, [through the acrimony of the bile;] and they are always agitated with vehement appetite. Pleasure, however, always expels pain, as well the pain which is contrary to pleasure, as that which is casual, if the pleasure is strong; and on this account

¹ i. e. When desire is satisfied, as Aspasius explains the word *τελειουμενον*; or according to the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, "when those who desire are *perfected*, and restored to an entire condition of nature."

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the melancholic become intemperate and depraved. But the pleasures which are without pain have no excess; and these are such as are derived from things naturally delectable, and which are not accidentally so. I mean, however, by things delectable from accident, remedies; for because it happens that we are cured of a malady, the part which is sane performing something, on this account, the remedies appear to be delectable. But by things naturally delectable, I mean, those which produce the action of such a nature, [i. e. which produce an energy essentially adapted to such a nature]. Nothing, however, which remains the same, is always delectable, because our nature is not simple, but there is also something in it *different*, according to which it is corruptible². Hence, if the one part does any thing, this to the other nature is preternatural. But when both the parts are

² Aristotle, in asserting that our nature contains something which is *different*, and through which it is corruptible, evidently alludes to, and accords with the doctrine of his divine master Plato, in the *Timæus*, respecting the composition of the soul. For he there composes it from *essence*, *sameness*, and *difference*. To understand which, it is necessary to observe, that there are five genera of being, from which all things, after the first being, are composed; viz. *essence*, *permanency*, *motion*, *sameness*, and *difference*. For every thing must possess *essence*; must *abide* in its cause, from which, also, it must *proceed*, and to which it must be *converted*; must be the *same* with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time *different* from others, and distinguished in itself. Plato, however, for the sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of the soul, viz. *essence*, *sameness* and *difference*; for the other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. As *sameness*, therefore, predominates in intelligible and impartible essences, but *difference* in things sensible and partible, hence, the soul by its alliance to a sensible nature, contains in itself something which is *different*, and through which, in its irrational part, it is subject to the fatality of death. For again, Plato in the same dialogue, asserts that the soul is a medium between an essence indivisible, and always subsisting according to *sameness* of being, and a nature divisible about bodies; viz. it is a medium between *intellect*, and the whole of a *corporeal life*.

When Aristotle also says, that *nothing which remains the same is always delectable to us, because our nature is not simple*, we may hence infer, that it is impossible for the human soul always to remain in one condition of being, though that condition should be attended with the highest felicity of which it is capable. Hence, as the rational soul is immortal, it must necessarily circulate. For when in a state of the most exalted felicity, becoming at length weary of its blessedness, it gradually falls into a subordinate condition of being, and from this fallen condition, again gradually rises to the acme of its felicity.

equalized,

equalized, that which is performed, neither appears to be painful nor pleasing. For if there is any being, the nature of which is simple, to this being the same action will always be most delectable. Hence, God always rejoices according to one simple pleasure; for there is not only an energy of [corporeal] motion, but also of immobility; and pleasure exists more abundantly in rest than in motion. But mutation is the sweetest of all things, according to the poet, through a certain depravity. For as a depraved man is mutable, so, likewise, is the nature which requires mutation; for it is neither simple, nor good. And thus we have spoken concerning continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, and have shown what each of them is, and how some of them are good, but others bad. It now remains that we speak concerning friendship.

THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

AFTER these things, it follows that we should discuss friendship; for it is a certain virtue, or subsists in conjunction with virtue. And besides this, it is most necessary to life; for no one would choose to live without friends, though he possessed every other good. For the rich, princes and magistrates, appear to be especially in want of friends. For what advantage is there in a prosperity of this kind, if beneficence is taken away, which is especially exerted towards friends, and is most praised when thus exerted? Or how can prosperity be preserved and saved without friends? For by how much the greater, by so much the more insecure it is. But in poverty and other misfortunes, friends are considered to be the only refuge. Friendship, also,

is useful to youth, in preventing them from error, and to elderly men, by the attention which it pays to their wants, and the assistance it affords to their deficiency in action, arising from the imbecility of age. To those likewise in the acme of life it is useful, because it aids them in the performance of beautiful actions.

“ When two in concord meet.”

For they are more able through it both to conceive and act. Friendship, also, appears to be naturally inherent in that which begets towards that which is begotten; and this not only in the human race, but likewise in birds, in ~~most animals~~, in those of the same nation towards each other, and especially among men; and hence, we praise those that are philanthropic. It may also be seen in travelling, how accommodating and friendly every man is to man. It seems too, that friendship connects cities together; and legislators pay more attention to it than to justice. For concord appears to be something similar to friendship; but this legislators are especially desirous of effecting, and they principally expel sedition, which is hostile to concord. And when the citizens, indeed, are friends, there is no need of justice; but though they are just they require friendship. Among just things, also, that which is especially just, appears to be of a friendly nature. Nor is friendship alone necessary, but it is also a beautiful thing. For we praise those who are lovers of friends; and an abundance of friends appears to be one among the number of beautiful things. Again, some are of opinion that the same persons are good men and friends. There is, however, no small controversy concerning friendship. For some consider it to be a certain similitude, and that similar persons are friends; whence, also, it is said, “like tends to like, a jackdaw to a jackdaw,” &c. Others on the contrary say,

* A hemistich of Homer, *Iliad* 16, v. 224, and so known as to become proverbial.

that

that all such persons are potters to each other². And they investigate concerning these things from a higher and more physical origin: Euripides, indeed, saying,

“ Earth when she’s dry, rejoices in the rain ;
And venerable heav’n with rain when fill’d,
On earth delights to fall.”——

And Heraclitus asserting “ that what is adverse is advantageous ; that the most beautiful harmony results from things of a different nature ; and that all things originate from strife.” Others, however, are of a contrary opinion respecting friendship, and among these is Empedocles. For he says, “ that the similar aspires after the similar.” Such of these doubts, therefore, as are of a physical nature we shall omit ; for they are not adapted to the present speculation. But we shall direct our attention to such of them as pertain to human affairs, and to the manners and passions of men ; such as, whether there is friendship among all men, or it is not possible that depraved men can be friends ? And whether there is one, or many species of friendship ? For those who are of opinion that there is but one species of it, because it receives the more and the less, do not found their opinion on a sufficient argument. For things specifically different receive the more and the less ; but of these we have spoken before.

* Alluding to the following verse of Hesiod, which gave rise to the above-mentioned proverb :

Και κεραμεις κεραμει ποτεις, και τελλον τελλον.

i. e. “ The potter envies the potter, and the carpenter the carpenter.”

CHAPTER II.

THESE things, however, will perhaps become evident, when that which is the object of friendly love is known; for it seems that not every thing is beloved, but that only which is the object of love; but this is either what is good, or what is delectable, or what is useful. That, however, may appear to be useful through which some good or pleasure is procured. Hence, the good and the delectable will be objects of love, as ends. Whether, therefore, do men love that which is [simply] good, or that which is good to them? For these sometimes are discordant. A similar enquiry, also, may be made concerning the delectable. It appears, however, that every one loves that which is good to himself; and that good is that which is simply the object of love, but that what is good to each person, is the object of love to each. Each person, however, loves not that which is really good to him, but that which appears to be so. But this makes no difference; for that which appears to be good, will be the object of love. Since, however, there are three things through which love is produced, [viz. the good, the delectable, and the useful,] in the love of things inanimate, there is not said to be friendship; for there is no reciprocal love, nor a wish that any good may befall them. For it would be perhaps ridiculous to wish that some good might befall wine; but if a man does, he wishes that it may be preserved, in order that he may have it. But it is said to be requisite to wish well to a friend for his own sake; and those who entertain this wish for their friends, are said to be benevolent, though the same wish should not be made by them. For it is

is said that benevolence, in reciprocal regard, is friendship; to which perhaps it should be added, if the benevolence is not latent. For many persons are benevolent to those whom they never saw, in consequence of believing them to be worthy or useful men. And those whom they never saw may also be benevolent to them. They appear, therefore, indeed, to be benevolent to each other; but how can it be said that they are friends, when they are ignorant of the manner in which they are mutually affected? Hence, it is necessary, in order to their being friends, that they should be benevolent to, and wish well to each other, on account of one of the things we have mentioned, [viz. on account of the good, the delectable, or the useful.]

CHAPTER III.

THESE, however, are specifically different from each other; and, therefore, the loves also, and the friendships differ. For there are three species of friendship, equal in number to the objects of friendly love; since in each there is a reciprocal love which is not latent. But those who love each other, wish well to each other, so far as they love. Those, therefore, who love each other on account of utility, do not mutually love for their own sake, but so far as they obtain some good from each other. This is also the case with those who love on account of pleasure. For they do not love those who are versatile, because they possess certain qualities, but because they afford them pleasure. And those who love on account of utility, possess this friendly love on account of the good which they derive from it. Those, likewise, who love on account of pleasure, love on account of that which is delectable to

to them. And the attachment of these is not personal, but is produced so far as the object of their attachment is useful or delectable. These friendships, therefore, are accidental; for the object of their attachment is not beloved, so far as he is such a person as he is, but so far as he administers to them some good, or some pleasure. Such friendships, therefore, are easily dissolved, the objects of them not remaining in a similar condition; for if they are no longer delectable or useful, they cease to be beloved. And the useful is not permanent, but at a different time becomes different. Hence, that through which they were friends being dissolved, their friendship also is dissolved, in consequence of existing for the sake of it. A friendship, however, of this kind, appears especially to subsist among elderly men; for those who have arrived to this period of life, do not pursue the delectable, but the useful; nor is the delectable pursued by such young men in the acme of life, as make utility the object of their pursuit. But such persons do not very much live together; for sometimes they are not pleasing to each other. They do not, therefore, require an association of this kind, unless they are useful; for they are delectable to each other so far as they hope for some good. Among these friendships, also, [viz. those of utility,] hospitable friendship is ranked. But the friendship of young men appears to subsist on account of pleasure; for they live according to passion, and especially pursue that which is delectable to them, and that which is present. In consequence of the mutation of age, however, other things become delectable; on which account they rapidly become and cease to be friends. For their friendship is changed together with that which is delectable. But the mutation of such a pleasure is rapid. Young men also are amorous; for much of the amatory propensity subsists according to passion, and on account of pleasure. Hence they love, and rapidly cease to love, frequently changing in the same day. They wish, however, to spend the day with each other, and to live together; for thus they obtain what friendship requires. The friendship, however, of good men, and of those who are similar in virtue, is perfect; for they similarly wish well to each other, so far as they are good; but they are good of themselves. But those

those who wish well to their friends for their sake, are especially friends; for they are thus affected towards them on their own account, [i. e. personally,] and not from accident. The friendship, therefore, of these remains as long as they are good men; but virtue is stable. And each of these is simply good, and good to his friend; for good men are simply good, and are useful to each other. In a similar manner, also, they are delectable to each other; for good men are simply and mutually delectable. For to each their proper actions, and such-like actions, [viz. such as are similarly virtuous,] are attended with pleasure. But the actions of good men are such as these, or resemble them. It reasonably follows, also, that such a friendship is stable; for all such things subsist in it connectedly as ought to be present with friends. For all friendship is on account of good, or on account of pleasure, either simply, or to him who loves, and this according to a certain similitude. But in this friendship [i. e. in the friendship founded on virtue], all the above-mentioned particulars are essentially inherent; since in this all the rest are similar, and that which is simply good is also simply delectable. These things, however, are especially lovely; and in these the most excellent love and friendship principally subsist. But it is likely that such friendships are rare; for persons of this description are few. Farther still, virtuous friendship requires time and custom; for according to the proverb, it is not possible for men to know each other till they have eaten a peck of salt together. Nor is it proper for one person to become intimate with, or a friend to another, till he appears to be amiable to him, and worthy of belief. But those who rapidly perform towards each other the offices of friendship, wish indeed to be friends, but are not, unless they are amiable, and know that they are so. They rapidly, therefore, contract the wish to be friends, but they do not contract friendship. Hence, virtuous friendship is perfect according to time, [as being lasting,] and according to other things, and consists from all these. Each friend, likewise, is in this friendship similar to each, which is a thing necessary to friends.

CHAPTER IV.

THE friendship, however, which subsists on account of the delectable, has a similitude to virtuous friendship ; for good men also are delectable to each other. This is likewise the case with the friendship which subsists on account of utility ; for good men are also such [i. e. useful] to each other. But among these [viz. those who are friends through the delectable] friendships are especially permanent, when an equality, as for instance, of pleasure subsists between them. And not only so, but likewise from the same thing, as is the case with men of versatile manners, and not as between the lover and the beloved person. For these are not delighted with the same things, but the lover is delighted with [the sight of] the beloved person, and he who is beloved is delighted with the attention which is paid him by the lover. When the flower of age, however, is no more, sometimes the friendship also ends. For to the one the sight of his friend is no longer pleasing, and to the other bland attention is no longer paid. Many of these, however, continue permanent in their friendship, if each loves the manners of each from custom, in consequence of possessing similar manners. Those, however, who do not reciprocally exchange delight in amatory affairs, but utility, are friends in a less degree, and their friendship is less permanent. But the friendship of those who are friends on account of utility, is dissolved together with advantage ; for they were not friends of each other, but of the profitable. On account of pleasure, therefore, and on account of utility, it is possible for bad men to be friends to each other, and also for worthy with bad men, and for those who

who are neither good nor bad with each other, and with the good or the bad ; but it is evident that the good alone can be friends through or on account of themselves. For bad men are not delighted with each other, unless each derives some advantage from the other. And the friendship of good men alone is unattended with calumny ; for it is not easy to believe any thing [bad] of him, who has been tried by us for a long time. Among these also there is mutual credibility, and a confidence that the one will not injure the other, and such other particulars as are thought worthy to be ranked in true friendship. In other friendships, however, there is nothing to prevent things of this kind from taking place. For since men denominate friends those who are connected together on account of utility, in the same manner as cities (for to cities warlike confederacies appear to take place for the sake of advantage); and since those likewise are called friends who like boys love each other on account of pleasure, perhaps, indeed, it is necessary that we also should call such persons friends, and should admit that there are many species of friendship. And we must denominate, indeed, the friendship of good men so far as they are good, that which is primarily and properly so called ; but we must admit that the rest are called friendships from similitude. For they are friends so far as there is something good and similar among them ; since the delectable is something good to the lovers of pleasure. These friendships, however, are not very much conjoined, nor do the same persons become friends on account of the useful and the delectable ; for things which are from accident are not very much united. But friendship being distributed into these species, bad men, indeed, will be friends on account of pleasure or advantage, through which they are similar ; but good men will be friends on their own account ; for they are friends so far as they are good. These, therefore, are simply friends ; but those from accident, and from being assimilated to these.

CHAPTER V.

As, however, in the virtues, some men are said to be good according to habit, but others according to energy, thus also it is in friendship. For those friends who live together are delighted with, and impart good to each other; but those who are asleep, or are separated by places, do not indeed energize, and yet they are so disposed as to be able to energize in such a way as friendship requires. For places do not dissolve friendship simply, but only the energy of it. If, however, the absence is long, it seems to produce an oblivion of friendship; whence it is said, that *taciturnity dissolves many friendships*. But neither elderly nor austere men appear to be adapted to friendship; for in them there is but little of pleasure. No one, however, can constantly associate with one who is sorrowful, or with one who is not pleasant. For nature appears especially to avoid the painful, and to aspire after the pleasing. But those who admit the company of each other, and yet do not live together, rather resemble benevolent persons than friends; since nothing is so much the province of friends as living together. For those who are in want aspire after advantage. Those, also, who are blessed constantly associate with each other; for it is not in the smallest degree fit that these should lead a solitary life. But it is not possible for men to live together whose company is not delightful, and who are not pleased with the same things, which fellowship appears to possess. The friendship, therefore, of good men is eminently friendship, as we have frequently observed. For that which is simply good

good or delectable, appears to be lovely and eligible ; but to every one that is lovely and eligible which is to him a thing of this kind. A good man, however, is lovely and eligible to a good man through both these. Dilection, however, is similar to passion, but friendship to habit ; for dilection is no less exerted towards inanimate things. But reciprocal love exists in conjunction with deliberate choice ; and deliberate choice is from habit. We likewise wish well to those whom we love for their own sake, not according to passion, but according to habit. And those who love a friend, love that which is good to themselves ; for a good man becoming a friend, becomes a good to him to whom he is a friend. Each, therefore, loves that which is good to himself, and they mutually impart to each other that which is equal, both in wishing well and affording delight ; for equality is said to be friendship. But these things are especially present with the friendship of good men.

CHAPTER VI.

FRIENDSHIP, however, subsists in a less degree among austere and elderly men, in proportion as they are more morose, and less delighted with associations ; for these appear to be especially friendly, and effective of friendship. Hence, young men rapidly become friends, but not elderly men ; for they do not become friends to those with whom they are not delighted. In a similar manner neither do the austere become rapidly friends. But men of this description are indeed benevolent to each other ; for they wish well, and afford assistance to the wants of each other. They are not, however, very much

much friends, because they do not constantly associate, nor are delighted with each other; which things appear to be especially of a friendly nature. But it is not possible to be a friend to many, according to perfect friendship, as neither is it possible to love many at one and the same time; for this resembles excess; and a thing of this kind is naturally adapted to take place towards one person. Moreover, it is not easy for many persons to please the same person very much at one and the same time, nor perhaps would it be a good thing if it were easy. Experience and custom, likewise, are necessary [to a perfect friendship] which are very difficult things. But it is possible to please many persons, on account of utility and delight; for there are many of this description, [viz. who are thus to be pleased,] and a little experience is sufficient for this purpose. Of these two, however, the friendship which subsists through the delectable is more similar, [to true friendship,] when the same things are effected by both persons, and they are delighted with each other, or with the same things; as is the case in the friendships of young men; for there is more of the liberal in these friendships. But the friendship which subsists on account of utility, is the friendship of merchants, [and of those who are occupied in sordid and illiberal pursuits]. And those who are blessed, indeed, [viz. who are as happy as the condition of human nature will permit,] are not in want of any thing useful or delectable, [because they already possess every thing of this kind]. For they wish to live with certain persons; and they endure what is painful but for a short time; since no one could endure it continually, not even good itself, if it were attended with molestation. Hence, they search for friends who can procure them delight. It is, however, perhaps necessary to search for good men who are such, [i. e. who are delectable,] and who are also such to their friends; for thus those things will be present with them, which ought to be present with friends. But men in authority and power, appear to use their friends by making a distinction between them; for some are useful, and others delectable to them. The same things, however, are not very much effected by both these. For neither do they search for those who are delectable
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in conjunction with virtue, nor for those who are useful for worthy purposes; but aspiring after pleasure, they search for men of versatile manners, and for those who are skilful in accomplishing what they are ordered to do. But these qualifications are not very much found in the same person. We have, however, already observed, that the worthy man is at the same time pleasing and useful. But such a one will not be the friend of the man who surpasses others in power and authority, unless he also surpasses others in virtue; but if he does not, he who surpasses will not equalize according to the analogous. Men of this description, however, are rare. The above-mentioned friendships, therefore, are in equality. For either the same things are effected by both, and they mutually wish the same things, or they exchange one thing for another, as for instance, pleasure for utility. But that these are friendships in a less degree, and that they are less permanent, has been already observed by us. They appear, however, through a similitude and dissimilitude of the same thing, to be and not to be friendships. For from their similitude to the friendship which is according to virtue, they appear to be friendships; since the one of these has the delectable, but the other the useful. But both these are inherent in virtuous friendship. They differ, however, in this, that virtuous friendship is free from calumny, and is stable; but these are rapidly changed, and they also differ in many other things. And from this dissimilitude to the friendship which is according to virtue, they do not appear to be friendships.

CHAPTER VII.

There is, however, another species of friendship, which subsists according to transcendency; such as that between a father and his son, and in short between a more elderly and a younger man, between a husband and his wife, and between every governor and him who is governed. But these friendships, also, differ from each other. For there is not the same friendship between parents and children, as there is between governors and the governed; nor between a father and son, as between a son and his father; nor between a husband and wife, as between a wife and husband. For the virtue and also the work of each of these are different; and the things are different on account of which they love. Their loves, therefore, and their friendships are different. Hence, neither are the same things effected by each towards each, nor is it fit they should be required. But when children, indeed, bestow on their parents those things which offspring ought to bestow on those by whom they were begotten, and parents bestow on their children, those things which it is proper to bestow on their offspring, then the friendship between such as these will be stable and worthy. It is, however, necessary in all the friendships which subsist according to transcendency, that the love should be analogous; as for instance, that the better character should be beloved in a greater degree than he loves, and that this should also be the case with the more useful character, and in a similar manner with each of the rest. For when love exists according to desert, then in a certain respect equality is produced; which appears to be the peculiarity of friendship. The
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equal, however, does not appear to subsist similarly in just things and in friendship. For in just things, indeed, the equality which is according to desert, ranks in the first place; but that which is according to quantity in the second place. But in friendship, the equality which is according to quantity, ranks in the first place, and that which is according to desert in the second place. This, however, becomes evident if there is a great interval of virtue or vice, or affluence, or of some other things; for then they are no longer friends, nor do they think themselves qualified to be so. But this is most apparent in the gods; *for they most abundantly transcend in every thing that is good*¹. It is also evident in kings; for those who are much inferior to them, do not think themselves worthy to be their friends. Nor do those who are of no worth aspire to be the friends of the best or the wisest of men. In such as these, therefore, there is no accurate definition, as long as they are the friends of some one. For many things being taken away, the friendship may yet remain; but if they are separated by a great interval from each other, as is the case with man and divinity, friendship no longer remains. Whence, also, it is doubted, whether friends would wish for their friends the greatest of goods, such, for instance, as for them to be gods; for in this case they would no longer be friends to them. Neither, therefore, would they be a good to them; for friends are a good to each other. Hence, if it is well said, that a friend wishes well to his friend for his sake, it is requisite that he should remain such as he is. But he wishes the greatest good may befall him, still remaining a man. And perhaps he does not wish that every good may befall him; for every one especially wishes to obtain good himself.

¹ A good man in consequence of being similar to, may be said to be the friend of, divinity; but then as from the transcendency of the divine nature, there is no reciprocation of similitude, when it is also said that God is the friend of good men, nothing more is to be understood by this assertion, than that divinity is participated by him through proximity, alliance and aptitude, as much as is possible to human nature. And in this way, the following beautiful passage of Diogenes must be understood:—"All things are the possessions of the gods; good men are the friends of the gods; and friends have all things in common. It is impossible, therefore, that a man beloved by the gods should not be happy, or that a wise and just man should not be beloved by the gods."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE multitude, however, appear from ambition to be more desirous of being beloved than of loving. Hence, the multitude love flatterers. For a flatterer is a friend who is surpassed [by him whom he flatters,] or pretends to be so, and also professes to love in a greater degree than he is beloved. But to be beloved appears to be proximate to the being honoured, after which the multitude aspire. It seems, however, that they do not choose honour on its own account, but from accident. For the multitude are delighted when they are honoured by those in power, through the hope [of the benefits they may thence derive;] for they fancy they shall obtain from them that of which they are in want. They are delighted, therefore, with honour, as an indication that they shall be benefitted. But those who aspire after honour from worthy and intelligent men, desire to confirm their own opinion of themselves. They rejoice, therefore, that they are worthy persons, believing in the judgment of those who say that they are worthy; but they are delighted to be beloved *per se*. Hence, it would seem that this is a better thing than to be honoured, and that friendship is a thing eligible of itself. Friendship, however, seems to consist more in loving than in being beloved; of which this is an indication, that mothers rejoice in loving [their children]. For some mothers give their children to be privately educated by others, and love them knowing them to be their own offspring, but are not anxious to be beloved in return if both cannot be effected, but it appears to them to be sufficient if they see their children doing well. And they love their offspring, though the offspring are unable to pay that attention to their mother which is fit,
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because they are ignorant of her. Since, therefore, friendship consists rather in loving than in being beloved, and we praise those who are lovers of friends, to love appears to be the virtue of friends. Hence, those in whom this exists according to desert, are stable friends, and the friendship of such as these is stable. But thus, also, those who are unequal may especially become friends; for thus they will be equalized. Equality, however, and similitude are friendship, and especially the similitude of those who resemble each other in virtue; for being of themselves stable, they are also stable towards each other, and neither require any thing depraved, nor are subservient to any thing of this kind, but, as I may say, they prohibit what is base. For it is the province of good men, neither to err themselves nor permit their friends to be subservient to erroneous conduct. But depraved men have no stability; for they do not remain similar to themselves; but are only friends for a short time, being delighted with the depravity of each other. Useful, however, and pleasing men, remain friends for a longer time; for they continue friends as long as they impart to each other pleasure and advantage. But the friendship which subsists on account of utility, appears to be composed from contraries; such as the friendship of the poor with the rich man, and of the unlearned with the learned man. For he who is in want of any thing, aspiring to the possession of it, recompenses with something else him from whom he obtains what he wants. Hither, also, may be referred the lover and the beloved, the beautiful and the deformed. Hence, lovers sometimes appear to be ridiculous when they think they ought to be beloved as much as they love. If, therefore, they are similarly amiable, perhaps it is fit they should thus think; but it is ridiculous if they possess nothing of this kind. Perhaps, also, neither does one contrary desire another essentially, but only from accident. But the appetite is directed to the medium; for this is good. Thus, for instance, it is good to a dry thing not to become moist, but to arrive at the medium [between dryness and moisture;] and in a similar manner to a hot thing, and to other substances. These things, however, must be omitted; for they are more foreign than is proper.

CHAPTER IX.

It seems, however, as we said in the beginning, that both friendship and justice are conversant with and exist in the same things; for in all society there appears to be a certain justice and friendship. Men, therefore, call their fellow-sailors, and fellow-soldiers friends, and in a similar manner those who associate with them in other employments. But such as is the extent of their associations, such also is the extent of their friendship; for such likewise is the extent of justice. The proverb too rightly says, "that all things are common among friends;" for friendship consists in communion. Among brothers, however, and associates, all things are common; but among others they are limited to certain bounds, and to some indeed more so, but to others less; for with respect to friendship, also, some are friendships in a greater and others in a less degree. Just things, also, differ; for there is not the same justice between parents and children, as between brothers towards each other, nor as between associates and fellow-citizens. And the like takes place in other friendships. Injuries, therefore, are different towards each of these, and they receive an increase, by how much the more the persons injured are friends. Thus, for instance, it is a more dire thing to defraud an associate of money than a fellow-citizen; and not to assist a brother than to refuse assistance to a stranger; and to strike a father, than to strike any other person. But the just is naturally adapted to be increased at one and the same time with friendship, as subsisting in the same things, and being equally extended. All communions or societies, however, resemble the parts of the political
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or civil communion. For men journey together with a view to a certain advantage, and in order to procure something which pertains to human life. Political communion, also, appears to exist for the sake of advantage, to have been established with a view to this from the beginning, and to continue so. For the attention of legislators is directed to this, and they say that what is advantageous in common is just. Other communions, therefore, partially aspire after utility. Thus, sailors aspire after the utility pertaining to navigation, or to the acquisition of wealth, or something of the like kind; but soldiers aspire after the utility pertaining to war, whether riches are the object of their desire, or victory, or the capture of cities. The like, also, takes place among tribes and the populace. Some communions, however, appear to have been formed on account of pleasure, such as the communion from the celebration of festivals, or from societies instituted to promote good fellowship; for these subsist for the sake of sacrificing and association. But all these appear to be subject to political communion; for political communion does not aspire after present advantage, but to that which pertains to the whole of life; performing sacrifices, and for this purpose forming assemblies, bestowing honours on the gods, and affording a cessation from labour, in conjunction with pleasure. For ancient sacrifices and assemblies appear to have been instituted after collecting the fruits of the earth, as first fruits. All communions, therefore, appear to be parts of the political communion. But such-like friendships follow such-like communions.

CHAPTER X.

THERE are, however, three species of a polity, and as many deviations from them, which are, as it were, the corruptions of these polities. But the polities indeed are, a kingdom, an aristocracy, and the third is derived from the distribution of honours through the medium of wealth, which as it seems may be appropriately called a timocracy. Most men, however, are accustomed to call it [simply] a polity. But of these, a kingdom is the best, and a timocracy is the worst. The deviation, also, from a kingdom, is indeed a tyranny; for both are monarchies. They differ, however, very much from each other. For the tyrant, indeed looks to his own advantage; but the king to the advantage of those whom he governs. *For he is not a king who is not sufficient to himself, and who does not surpass his subjects in every kind of good.* But a man of this description is in want of nothing. Hence, his attention will not be directed to what is advantageous to himself, but to the benefit of those whom he governs; for he who is not a person of this description, will be a certain elected king. A tyrant, however, is the contrary to a king [properly so called;] for he pursues his own good. And from this it is more evident that he is the worst of rulers; for that which is contrary to the best is the worst. But the transition from a kingdom is into a tyranny; for a tyranny is the depravity of a monarchy. And a depraved king becomes a tyrant. The transition from an aristocracy is into an oligarchy, through the vice of the governors, who distribute civil offices in a manner contrary to desert; bestow upon themselves all, or the greater part of every thing

thing that is good, and always appoint the same persons magistrates, paying more attention to wealth than to any thing else. Those, therefore, that govern are few, and are depraved instead of being the most worthy men. But the transition from a timocracy is into a democracy; since these polities border on each other. For in a timocracy, also, the multitude have dominion, and all those that are rich are equal. A democracy, however, is in the smallest degree depraved; for it deviates but little from the form of a polity, [i. e. from a timocracy]. After this manner, therefore, polities are especially changed; for thus they are changed the least, and the most easily. The resemblances, however, and as it were paradigms of them may be derived from families. For the communion, or society, between a father and his children, has the form of a kingdom; for a father pays attention to his children [for their own sakes]. Hence, also, Homer calls Jupiter father; for the intention of a kingdom is to be a paternal government. But among the Persians the government of a father is tyrannical; for they use their children as slaves. The government, likewise, of a master towards his servants is tyrannical; for in this government that alone which is advantageous to the master is performed. This, therefore, appears to be right; but the Persian government is erroneous. For of things that are different, the governments also are different. But the government of man and wife appears to be aristocratic. For the man governs according to desert, and in those things in which it is proper for the man to govern; but he permits his wife to rule over such things as are adapted to be governed by a woman. If the man, however, has dominion in all things, the government is changed into an oligarchy; for he does this contrary to desert, and not so far as he is the better character. But it sometimes happens that women in consequence of being heiresses, govern [even in things pertaining to men]. The government, therefore, in this case, is not according to virtue, but is through wealth and power, in the same manner as in oligarchies. And the government of brothers resembles a timocracy; for they are equal, except so far as they differ in their ages. Hence, if there is a great difference in their ages, the friendship

is no longer fraternal. But a democratic government is especially to be seen in those families which are without a master; for here all govern equally. In those families, also, where he who governs is a man of a weak understanding, every one has the power of acting as he pleases.

CHAPTER XI.

IN each of the polities, however, friendship appears to have the same extent as justice. And the friendship, indeed, between a king and his subjects, consists in transcendency of beneficence; for he benefits his subjects, since being a good man, he is attentive to their interest like a shepherd, in order that they may do well. Whence, also, Homer calls Agamemnon the shepherd of the people. Such, likewise, is paternal friendship; but it differs in the magnitude of the benefits which it confers. For the father is the cause of the existence of his child, which appears to be a thing of the greatest consequence, and also procures him nutriment and education. The same things, likewise, are attributed to progenitors; for a father is naturally adapted to rule over his children, and progenitors over the offspring of their children, and kings over their subjects. But these friendships consist in transcendency; on which account, also, parents are honoured. The just, therefore, in these is not the same, but subsists according to desert; for thus, also, the friendship subsists. There is, likewise, the same friendship between a husband and wife, as in an aristocracy; for it subsists according to virtue, and a more ample good is attributed to the better character, and that which is adapted and appropriate is attributed

attributed to each. For thus, also, justice is effected. But the friendship of brothers resembles that of associates; for they are equal, and of the same age; and persons of this description, apply themselves for the most part to the same disciplines, and are similar in their manners. The friendship, therefore, which exists in a timocracy resembles this; for in this government it is requisite that the citizens should be equal and worthy persons. Hence, they alternately and equally govern. Such, therefore, is the friendship of brothers. In corrupt politics, however, as the justice is but small, so likewise is the friendship, and it exists in the smallest degree in the worst polity. For in a tyranny there is either no friendship, or very little; since, among those with whom there is nothing common between the governor and the governed, there is not any friendship; for neither is there any justice. But the friendship between them, resembles that which is between an artist and his instrument, between the soul and the body, and between a master and his servant; for these indeed are benefitted by those that use them. There is not, however, any friendship with, nor justice towards things inanimate, as neither is there towards a horse or an ox, or towards a slave so far as he is a slave, since there is nothing common between these. For *a slave is an animated instrument; but an instrument is an inanimate slave*. So far, therefore, as he is a slave, there is no friendship between him and his master; but there may be so far as he is a man. For it appears that there is a certain justice due from every man towards every man who is able to partake of law and compact; and therefore there may also be a friendship between any one man and another, so far as each is a man. In tyrannical governments, however, there is but little friendship and justice; but there is very much of each in democracies; for among those that are equal many things are common.

CHAPTER XII.

ALL friendship, therefore, as we have before observed, consists in communion ; but it may be divided into that which subsists between kindred, and that which subsists between associates. But political friendships, the friendships of those of the same tribe, of those who sail together, and such like, are more similar to the friendships of associates ; for they appear to exist as it were from compact. Among these, also, hospitable friendship may be ranked. The friendship, likewise, of kindred appears to be multiform, and the whole of it depends from paternal friendship. For parents love their children, as being something of themselves ; but children love their parents, as being something proceeding from them. Parents, however, have a greater knowledge of their offspring, [so as to know more accurately that they are their offspring,] than the offspring know that they proceeded from their parents ; and that from which a thing is generated has a greater familiarity and alliance with the thing produced, than the thing produced has with its maker. For that which originates from a thing is the property of that from which it originates ; as a tooth, or a hair, or any thing else, is the property of its possessor ; but that from which a thing originates is not the property of any one of the things which originate from it, or is so in a less degree¹. The

¹ When cause and effect are of such a nature, that the latter derives its existence from the former, then the effect is the property of the cause ; since previously to proceeding from, it was contained in it. But the cause is not, properly speaking, the property of the effect ; for the effect only participates of the cause, but does not contain the whole of it in itself.

love

love also of parents to their children is superior to that of children to their parents, by length of time ; for parents love their children as soon as they are born ; but children their parents in process of time, when they begin to understand or perceive that they are their parents. From these things, likewise, it is evident on what account mothers love their children more [than fathers love them]. Parents, indeed, therefore, love their children as themselves ; for those that proceed from them are as it were their other selves, by being separated from them ; but children love their parents, as proceeding from them. Brothers, however, love each other, in consequence of being born from the same parents ; for sameness with their parents causes them to be the same with each other. Hence it is said, that they have the same blood, the same root, and such like expressions. They are, therefore, in a certain respect, one and the same in separate bodies. The being educated together also, and equality of age, greatly contribute to friendship ; for [according to the proverb,]

“ Equal delights in equal age.”

And those who are accustomed to the same things are associates. Hence, also, fraternal friendship is assimilated to the friendship of associates. Cousins, likewise, and the remaining kindred become conjoined from the friendship of brothers, in consequence of [mediately] originating from the same persons. Some, however, become more united in friendship, and others less, in consequence of the source of their race being nearer, or more remote. But the friendship of children towards their parents, and of men towards the gods, is as towards that which is good and transcendant. For parents and the gods confer the greatest benefits ; for they are the causes of existence and of being nourished, and when they are of a proper age, of being educated. A friendship, also, of this kind, possesses the delectable and the useful in a greater degree than the friendship of strangers, because their life is in a greater degree more common. Those things, however, are to be found in fraternal friendship, which exist in the friendship of associates ;

3 x 2

and

and in a greater degree in those that are worthy, and in short, in those that are similar, in proportion as they are more familiar, and love each other from their birth; and in proportion as those who are born from the same parents, who are nourished together, and similarly educated, are more similar in their manners. In this friendship, likewise, the proof which is obtained from time, is most abundant, and most firm. And things pertaining to friendship subsist analogously in the remaining gradations of kindred. But the friendship between man and wife appears to be according to nature; for man is more a connubial than a political animal; and this by how much more a family is prior to, and more necessary than a city, and the procreation of offspring is more common to all animals. In other animals, therefore, the communion proceeds thus far, [i. e. as far as to the procreation of offspring;] but men and women not only cohabit for the sake of begetting children, but also with a view to the necessities and conveniences of life. For their employments are immediately divided, and those of the husband are different from those of the wife. Hence, they assist each other, referring their own private possessions to the common [good of the family]. On account of these things, therefore, both the useful and the delectable appear to be contained in this friendship. It will also exist on account of virtue, if the husband and wife are worthy characters. For there is a virtue pertaining to each, and they will rejoice in a thing of this kind. Children, however, appear to be a bond; and hence those marriages that are without children are more swiftly dissolved. For children are a common good to both the husband and wife; and that which is common connects. To inquire also how a husband ought to live with his wife, and in short, one friend with another, appears to be nothing else than to inquire how justice subsists between them. For it does not appear that there is the same justice between one friend and another, nor between one stranger, one associate, and one disciple, with another.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XIII.

SINCE, therefore, there are three kinds of friendship, as was observed in the beginning, and according to each some are friends in equality, but others according to transcendency; for similarly good men are friends, and [between worthy men who are not equally worthy,] the more may be the friend of the less worthy, and in a similar manner with respect to friendships which subsist on account of delight, and on account of utility, they may be equal or unequal, and different in the advantages with which they are attended;—this being the case, it is requisite that those friends who are equal should be equalized in loving and other things, [pertaining to friendship,] but that those who are unequal, should render to themselves that which is analogous in transcendencies¹. Accusations, however, and complaints reasonably take place in that friendship alone or principally, which is founded in utility. For those who are friends on account of virtue, are readily disposed to benefit each other; for this is the peculiarity of virtue and friendship. But with those who contend with each other in kindness, there are no accusations nor contests; for no one is indignant with him who loves and benefits him; but if he is grateful, he will recompense him by benefitting him in return. He, however, who transcends [in the benefits which he confers,] obtaining that which he desires, will not accuse his friend; for each aspires after good. Nor do accusations

¹ Viz. By how much more one friend is better than another, by so much the more he ought to be beloved.

and

and complaints very much take place in the friendships which are founded in pleasure; for at one and the same time both obtain the object of their desire, if they rejoice to live together. He, however, will appear to be ridiculous who accuses him by whom he is not delighted, when it is not possible to spend his time with him. But the friendship which is founded in utility, is full of accusations and complaints; for since they make use of each other with a view to advantage, they are always in want of more, and fancy they have less than is proper, and blame their friends because they do not obtain as much as they are in want of, though they deserve to obtain it. But those who benefit are not able to supply as much as those who are benefitted require. It appears, however, that as the just is twofold, for one kind is unwritten, but the other is legal, thus also with respect to the friendship which is founded in utility, one kind indeed is ethical, but the other is legal. Accusations, therefore, then especially take place, when compacts are formed and dissolved, not with a view to the same friendship [as that by which they are united]. But the legal friendship founded in utility, is that which subsists by compacts; one kind indeed, being entirely venal, from hand to hand, [viz. such as takes place in buying and selling;] but another kind is more liberal, in which one thing is to be given for another at a stated time, but from compact. In this friendship, however, that which is owing is manifest, and is not ambiguous, but a friendly delay is permitted to take place. Hence, with some of these, there are no judicial processes, but they think it is requisite to love those who form compacts, from the obligation of fidelity. But the ethical friendship does not consist in compacts, but what it gives, it gives as to a friend, and this is also the case with whatever is imparted by the one to the other. He, however, who gives thinks it fit that he should receive in return an equivalent, or more than an equivalent, as if he had not given but lent; but if he does not receive the retribution which he expected from the contract, he accuses his friend. And this happens because all or most men wish to obtain things which are truly beautiful, but deliberately choose what is advantageous. But it is beautiful to benefit, not with a view to

to be benefitted in return ; and it is advantageous to be benefitted. He therefore, who is able, ought to make a retribution equivalent to the benefit he has received, and willingly ; for a friend must not return kindness unwillingly. If, therefore, he has erred from the first, and has been benefitted by an improper person ; for he was not benefitted by a friend, nor by one who did this for his sake ;—if this be the case retribution must be made, as if he had been benefitted by compact. Hence, he who has been benefitted by such a one, ought to promise that he will make a retribution if he can ; but if he cannot, he who conferred the benefit ought not to think it fit that he should be recompensed, so that if possible, retribution is to be made. In the beginning however, it is requisite when a benefit is offered, to consider by whom it is offered, and with what view, so as either to accept or refuse it. But it may be doubted, whether retribution is to be measured by the advantage of him who receives it, or by the beneficence of him who made it. For those who receive it say in extenuation that they receive such things from benefactors as are of little use to them, and which they might have received from others ; but on the contrary, the benefactors say that they bestow the greatest things which it was in their power to give, and which could not be obtained from others, and that they conferred them in dangerous circumstances, or such-like necessities. Since, therefore, this friendship subsists on account of utility, the measure of it is the advantage of him who is benefitted ? For he is the person who is in want, and his friend assists him, in order that he may receive an equal benefit in return. The assistance, therefore, afforded by him who is benefitted, will be as great as that which he received. And as much or even more must be given by him in return ; for it is more beautiful and becoming. But in those friendships which are founded in virtue, there are no accusations ; and the deliberate choice of him who benefits resembles a measure. For the authority of virtue and manners consists in deliberate choice.

CHAPTER XIV.

DISSENSIONS, however, take place in those friendships which subsist according to transcendency ; for each thinks it fit that he should have more than the other. But when this takes place, the friendship is dissolved. For the better character of the two thinks it is proper that he should have more than the other ; for more ought to be distributed to a good man. This is also the case with him who is the more useful person of the two ; for they say it is not fit that he who is useless should have an equal portion with him who is useful ; since ministrant offices will take place, and not friendship, unless what is done from friendship is according to the desert of the deeds. For they are of opinion, that as in pecuniary negotiations, those who employ a greater sum of money receive more profit, thus also it ought to be in friendship. The contrary, however, is the opinion of him who is indigent, and who is the worse character ; for these think that it is the province of a good friend to assist those that are in want. For what advantage say they is there in being the friend of a worthy or powerful man, if no benefit is to be derived from him. It seems, however, that each thinks rightly, and that it is requisite to distribute more to each from friendship, yet not of the same thing, but more of honour indeed to him who transcends, but more of gain to him who is indigent ; for honour indeed is the reward of virtue and beneficence, but gain is the auxiliary of indigence. This also appears to be the case in politics. For he is not honoured who is the cause of no good to the community ; since that which is common is given to him who benefits the community ;
but

but honour is something common. For it is not possible for a man at one and the same time to be enriched and honoured by the community; since no one endures to have less in all things. Hence to him who is inferior in wealth honour is given; but money to him who is to be bribed by gifts. For distribution according to desert equalizes and preserves friendship, as we have before observed. In this manner, therefore, it is requisite to act towards those who are unequal; and he who is benefitted either in wealth, or in virtue, should remunerate him by whom he is benefitted with honour, thus recompensing him as far as he is able. For friendship requires that which is possible, and not that which is according to desert. For a recompense according to desert is not possible in all things, as in honours conferred on the gods and parents; since no one can bestow these according to desert; but he who pays homage to them to the utmost of his power appears to be a worthy man. Hence, though it would seem not to be lawful for a son to abandon his father, yet it is lawful for a father to abandon his son. For a return ought to be made by him who is a debtor. But a son can do nothing worthy of the benefits he has received from his father; so that he will always be his debtor. Those, however, to whom others are indebted have the power of abandoning their debtors; and, therefore, a father has this power. At the same time, however, no father perhaps will abandon his son, unless the son is transcendently depraved; for exclusive of natural friendship, it is human not to refuse giving assistance when it is wanted. But if the son is depraved, he is either to be avoided by his father, or his father must not be anxious to assist him. [A depraved son, however, sometimes hates his father, or at least does not very much endeavour to assist him¹]. For the multitude wish to be benefitted; but they avoid acting beneficently, as a useless thing. And thus much concerning these particulars.

¹ This sentence within the brackets, I have added from Mr. Bridgman's translation of the Paraphrase On the Nicomachean Ethics, by an anonymous Greek writer, as what follows it in the text seems to require it, as is well observed by Wilkinson.

THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

IN all friendships, however, which are of a dissimilar species, the analogous, as we have already observed, equalizes and preserves friendship. Thus for instance, in the political friendship, to the shoemaker a retribution is made for his shoes, according to their worth, and to the weaver, and other artificers. Here, therefore, a common measure, money, is employed; and to this every thing is referred, and by this is measured. But in the amatory friendship, sometimes indeed the lover accuses the object of his love, that though he loves her beyond measure, he is not beloved in return, though if it should so happen, he has nothing which can excite love. Frequently, however, she who is beloved complains that her lover, having formerly promised

every thing, now performs nothing [that he had promised]. But things of this kind happen, when the one indeed loves the object of his love on account of pleasure, but the other loves her lover on account of utility; and these things are not present with both. For since the friendship exists on account of these things, a dissolution of it takes place, when those things are not accomplished which are the final causes of their love. For they do not love each other, but what each possesses, which is not stable. Hence, such also are their friendships, [viz. they are not stable]. The friendship, however, which is founded in manners, [i. e. virtuous friendship] since it exists *per se*, [or independent of eternal circumstances] is permanent, as we have before observed. But friends also disagree when other things happen to them, and not those which were the objects of their desire; for when a man does not obtain that which he desired, it is just as if he obtained nothing. Thus, a certain person promised a harper that he would reward him in proportion to the excellence of his singing. But in the morning, when the harper demanded the fulfilment of his promise, he said that he had returned pleasure for pleasure¹. If, therefore, this, [i. e. pleasure] had been the wish of each, the harper would have been sufficiently recompensed; but if the object of the one was delight, and of the other gain, and if the object of the one was accomplished, but not of the other, the compact between them was not well fulfilled. For a man will attend to those things of which he is in want, and for the sake of them will give what is requisite. With respect, however, to the recompense which ought to be made, whether ought it to be estimated by him who gives, or by him who receives? For he who gives first, seems to leave to the receiver what the recompense should be; which they say Protagoras² also did. For when he had taught any thing, he ordered the learner to estimate what appeared to him to be the worth of the knowledge he had gained, and he received accord-

¹ Plutarch attributes this deed to Dionysius the Syracusan tyrant.

² See my translation of the Protagoras of Plato.

ing

ing to his valuation. But in things of this kind, to some persons it is sufficient to say,

Sufficient be the price a friend appoints ³.

Those, however, who having first received money, afterwards perform nothing which they had promised to do, on account of the excessive magnitude of their promise; are deservedly accused; for they do not perform what they had agreed to accomplish. But the sophists perhaps are compelled to do this, because no one would give money for those things which they know. These, therefore, because they do not perform that for which they received a reward, are justly blamed. With those persons, however, among whom there is no compact for services performed, we have already observed that those who first give to others on their own account, are not to be blamed; for of this kind is the friendship which is founded in virtue. Retribution, also, must be made according to deliberate choice; for this is the province of a friend, and of virtue. This conduct, likewise, as it seems should be adopted by those who are associates in philosophy; for the worth of philosophy is not to be measured by money, nor can any honour be conferred equivalent to its dignity. But perhaps it is sufficient that a recompense as great as possible is made, in the same manner as towards the gods and parents. Where, however, the gift is not such as this, but is conferred with a view to a certain thing, [i. e. with a view to some recompense,] a remuneration perhaps ought especially to be made, which to both friends will appear to be according to desert. But if this should not happen to take place, it may not only appear to be necessary, but also to be just, that he who first received, should determine what is an equal compensation. For if as much advantage or pleasure is returned as was received, the remuneration will be according to desert. For this also appears to take place in traffic; and

³ This verse is from the *Works and Days* of Hesiod; but the half of it only is quoted by Aristotle.

in some places there are laws which forbid any judicial processes respecting voluntary contracts; as if it were fit that in communions of this kind there should be no other judge, nor any other law, but that all differences should be decided by the person in whom trust is reposed, and by whom such contracts are used. For they think that he who was intrusted to estimate the retribution, will judge more justly than he who reposed that trust; since for the most part, those who possess, and those who wish to receive any thing, do not estimate equitably. For every one thinks that his own property and what he gives are of great value. At the same time, however, the retribution should be as great as it is determined to be by those who receive the gift. Perhaps, however, a thing is not to be estimated to be worth so much as it appeared to its possessor, but to be worth as much as he would have estimated it to be before he possessed it.

CHAPTER II.

SUCH particulars, however, as the following are dubious, viz. whether all things are to be assigned to a father, and he is to be obeyed in all things? Or whether the sick man ought indeed to obey the physician; and he who votes for the general of an army, ought to give the preference to a man skilled in warlike concerns? And in a similar manner, whether it is proper to be subservient to a friend rather than to a worthy man? And whether remuneration is rather to be made to a benefactor than to an associate, if it is impossible to make it to both? It is not therefore easy to determine all such particulars accurately; for they have many and all-various differences, in magnitude and parvitude,

tude, in the beautiful and the necessary. But it is not immanifest that not all things are to be given to the same person ; and that for the most part benefits are rather to be returned to those from whom they were received, than gifts are to be bestowed on associates : just as it is more proper to return a loan to him from whom it was borrowed, than to make a present to an associate. Perhaps, however, this must not always be done. For if any one should be made a prisoner by robbers, it may be inquired whether he who redeems him should be redeemed in his turn, be he whom he may : or, whether the price of redemption should be given to him who demands it as his due, though he has not been taken prisoner ; or whether in preference to all these, a father ought to be redeemed ? For it would seem that a man should rather ransom his father than himself. Universally, therefore, as we have said, a debt ought to be paid ; but if the donation surpasses in the beautiful or the necessary, we should incline to it, [rather than to the discharge of a debt]. For sometimes it is not equitable to return a benefit which another person has first conferred, when he indeed conferred the benefit knowing that it was bestowed on a worthy man, but the retribution will be made to one whom he who is to make it believes to be a depraved man. For neither sometimes is a loan to be granted to him who has lent. For the one indeed, [i. e. the depraved man] thinking that he shall receive back what he has lent, grants a loan to the worthy man, but the other, [i. e. the worthy man,] does not expect that what he has lent will be returned by the depraved man. Whether, therefore, the thing thus exists in reality, the merit of the parties is not equal, or whether it does not thus exist, but it is fancied that it does, they will not appear to act absurdly. Therefore, as it has frequently been observed, assertions concerning passions and actions are similarly definite and certain with the things about which they are conversant. It is not, therefore, immanifest, that the same things are not to be bestowed on all men, nor all things on a father, as neither are all things to be sacrificed to Jupiter. Since, however, different things are to be returned to parents, brothers, associates and benefactors, a retribution is to be made to each of such things as
are

are proper and appropriate. And thus indeed men appear to act. For they invite their kindred to weddings; since the genus of these is common, and, therefore, the actions also which are conversant with this are common. For the same reason, likewise, they think it especially necessary that kindred should be present at funerals. But it would seem that it is especially necessary to supply our parents with nutriment, because we are their debtors; and it is more beautiful to supply with these things the causes of our existence than ourselves. Honour also is to be paid to parents as to the gods; yet not every honour is to be paid to them. For neither is the same honour to be paid to a father and mother; nor again, to a wise man, or the general of an army; but to a father paternal, and to a mother maternal honour is to be paid. To every elderly man, likewise, honour is to be paid according to his age, by rising from our seat, and resigning it to him, and by other things of the like kind. To associates again, and brothers, freedom of speech must be granted, and a participation in common of all things. To kindred, also, to those of the same tribe, to fellow-citizens, and to all the rest of mankind, we should endeavour to distribute what is appropriate, and judiciously determine what pertains to each according to familiarity and virtue, or use. A judgment, therefore, may more easily be made respecting those who are of the same genus; but in those of a different genus, the decision is more difficult. We must not, however, on this account desist, but determine as far as circumstances will permit.

CHAPTER III.

THE dissolution also of friendships is attended with a doubt, viz. whether friendship is to be dissolved with those who do not continue to be our friends? Or shall we say that with those who are friends on account of advantage and delight, when they no longer possess these, it is by no means absurd that the friendship should be dissolved? For they were the friends of these things [viz. of things advantageous and delectable,] and these failing, it is reasonable to suppose that they will no longer be attached to each other. He, however, may be [justly] accused, who loving another person on account of advantage or delight, pretends that he loves on account of manners, [i. e. virtuously]. For as we said in the beginning, numerous dissensions take place among friends, when they are not in reality such friends as they fancy they are. When, therefore, any one is deceived, and apprehends that he is beloved on account of his manners, though at the same time he does nothing that is virtuous, he should blame himself. But when he is deceived by the pretensions of the other, it is just to accuse the deceiver, and more so than those who adulterate money, because the improbity pertains to a more honourable thing. If, however, he admitted him into his friendship as a good man, but he becomes a bad man, or should appear to have become a bad man, is he still to be beloved? Or is this not possible? Since not every thing deserves to be beloved, but that only which is good. Neither, therefore, is a bad man to be beloved, nor is it necessary that he should. For it is not fit to be a lover of what is depraved, nor to be assimilated

to a bad man. And we have already observed that the similar is a friend to the similar. Is the friendship, therefore, to be immediately dissolved? Or shall we say, not with all persons, but with those who are incurable on account of their depravity? For assistance ought rather to be given to the manners of those who are capable of being corrected, than to their worldly possessions, because this is better, and more adapted to friendship. He, however, who dissolves such a friendship will appear not to act at all absurdly; for he was not a friend to this man, or to a man of this description. Hence, as he cannot restore him being thus changed, to virtue, he abandons him. But if the one indeed continues [such as he was at first,] and the other should become more worthy, so as very much to transcend in virtue, is the latter still to use the former as a friend? Or is this not possible? This, however, becomes especially evident in a great interval, as in the friendships formed from childhood. For if one of these should still remain a child in understanding, but the other should be a most excellent man, how can they be friends, when they are neither addicted to the same pursuits, nor delighted and pained with the same things? For neither will these be present with them towards each other. But without these they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. Concerning these particulars, however, we have already spoken. Shall we say, therefore, [that when the friendship is dissolved,] the one ought nevertheless so to conduct himself towards the other as if he had never been his friend? Or is it necessary that he should still retain the memory of their past friendship? And as we think it is proper to gratify friends rather than strangers, thus also shall we say, something must be conceded to former friends, on account of pristine friendship, when the dissolution of it was not occasioned by an excess of depravity?

CHAP.

CHAPTER IV.

WITH respect, however, to friendly offices, and those things by which friendships are defined, they seem to proceed from the conduct of a man towards himself. For he is defined to be a friend who wishes well to another, and performs things which are really or apparently good for his sake; or who wishes his friend to exist and live for his sake; just as mothers are affected towards their children, or friends who [for a time,] are offended with each other. Others, however, define a friend to be one who lives with another person, and who chooses the same things, or mutually grieves and rejoices with him. But this also especially happens to mothers. By some one of these particulars, likewise, they define friendship. Each of these, however, exists in the worthy man towards himself; but they exist in other men, so far as they apprehend themselves to be worthy. For it seems, as we have before observed, that virtue and a worthy man are a measure to every one; since a worthy man accords with himself, and aspires after the same things with his whole soul, [i. e. with both the rational and irrational part]. Hence, he wishes for himself both real and apparent good, and acts conformably to his wishes. For it is the province of a worthy man to labour in what is good, and this for his own sake; since he labours for the sake of his dianoëtic part, which each of us appears to be, [i. e. in which our very essence consists]. He also wishes that he *himself* may live and be preserved, and especially this part, by which he is wise; for to a worthy man existence is a good thing. Every one, however,

however, wishes well to himself. But there is no one, who if he should become a different person from what he is, would choose [having lost his identity,] that the person into whom he is changed should possess all things. For now also God possesses good, *but he [always] remains such as he is, whatever that may be*¹. It would seem, however, that each of us is that which energizes intellectually, or that each of us is principally this. Such a man also wishes to live with himself; since he does this willingly. For the remembrance of what he has done is delightful to him, and his hopes of what is future are good; but such things are delectable. He abounds likewise in his dianoëtic part with contemplations; and he is especially pained and pleased in conjunction with himself. For the same thing is always painful and pleasing to him, and not a different thing at a different time; since, as I may say, he is without repentance, [i. e. he does nothing of which he has occasion to repent²]. Since, therefore, each of these things is present with the
 worthy

¹ Aristotle speaks thus reverentially, of the ineffable principle of things conformably to the practice of all the great philosophers and theologians of antiquity, who for the most part, as I have shown in my translation of Plato, passed over this immense principle in silence, as well knowing it is only to be apprehended by extending in silence the ineffable parturitions of the soul, to its ineffable co-sensation. Hence, it was venerated by the Egyptians, as a *thrice unknown darkness*.

² What Aristotle here says concerning the worthy man living with himself, accords with what Plato, in the *Timæus*, asserts of the soul of the world. For among other prerogatives possessed by this soul, he says, "That the demiurgus, or its fabricating cause, established the world one single solitary nature, able through virtue to associate with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And on all these accounts he rendered the universe a happy god." On which passage, Proclus beautifully observes as follows: "In what is now said, Plato clearly shows what the solitude is which he ascribes to the world, and that he calls that being solitary which looks to itself, and its own apparatus, and to the proper measure of its nature. For those who live in solitude are the saviours of themselves, so far as pertains to human causes. The universe, therefore, is after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to, and possessing the power of preserving itself, not through any diminution, but through a transcendence of power. He also adds, that it is sufficient to itself through virtue. For among partial animals [such as men,] he alone who possesses virtue, is able to associate with, and love himself. But every bad man looking to his inward baseness, is indignant with himself, and his own essence, but is stupidly astonished by external things, and pursues an association with others, in consequence

worthy man towards himself, but he is disposed towards his friend in the same manner as towards himself; for a *friend is another self*; this being the case, the friendship also of these appears to be something, and those with whom these things are present appear to be friends. At present, however, we shall omit the consideration whether or not there can be friendship between a man and himself. But it would seem that there may be friendship between a man and himself, when the rational and irrational parts are no longer two things but one thing [through their union and consent³]; and also because an excess of friendship resembles the regard which a man has for himself. The particulars likewise which we have mentioned are seen to take place among the multitude though they are depraved characters. Shall we say, therefore, that so far as they are pleasing to themselves, and apprehend themselves to be worthy, so far as they participate of these things? For these things are not inherent, nor do they even appear to be inherent in any one of those who are very depraved and wicked; and nearly indeed they are not inherent even in those who are merely depraved. For they are discordant with themselves; and like the incontinent, they desire one thing, but wish another; for they choose delectable things which are noxious, instead of those things which appear to them to be good. Others again, through timidity and indolence abstain from doing those things which they think are best for themselves. But those by whom many and dreadful deeds are performed, and who are hated on account of their depravity, fly from life, and destroy themselves. Depraved men, likewise, search for those with whom they may pass their time, but fly from themselves; for they recollect when they are alone the many crimes they have committed, and expect the evils which are attendant on such wickedness

quence of not being able to look into himself. The worthy man, however, perceiving himself beautiful, rejoices and is delighted, and bringing forth in himself beautiful conceptions, embraces the converse with himself. For we naturally become familiar with the beautiful, but turn away from deformity."

³ I have here adopted the reading mentioned by Eustratius, as more conformable to the meaning of Aristotle.

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will befall them; but they forget these when they are with others. Possessing likewise nothing amiable, they are not affected in a friendly manner towards themselves. Persons, therefore, of this description, neither rejoice nor condole with themselves; for their soul is in a state of sedition, and one part of it indeed is pained on account of depravity, when it abstains from certain things, but the other part is delighted. And the one part indeed draws *this*, but the other *that* way, the soul as it were being lacerated [by sense and reason]. If, however, it is not possible for him to be at one and the same time pained and pleased, yet after a short time he is pained that he was pleased, and wishes that these delectable things had not befallen him; for bad men are full of repentance. The bad man, therefore, does not appear to be disposed in a friendly manner even towards himself, because he possesses nothing amiable. But if it is very miserable to be in this condition, every one should strenuously fly from depravity, and endeavour to be worthy; for thus a man will be disposed in a friendly manner towards himself, and will become the friend of others.

CHAPTER V.

BENEVOLENCE, however, resembles indeed friendship, yet is not friendship; for benevolence may be exerted towards unknown persons, and latently; but friendship cannot. These things, therefore, have been asserted before. But neither is it dilection; for it has not either impulse or appetite; and these are consequent to dilection. And dilection indeed subsists in conjunction with custom; but benevolence may

may be suddenly produced. Thus the spectators sometimes become suddenly benevolent towards those who contend for prizes at public solemnities; and unite with them in their wishes for success; but they do not at all co-operate with them. For as we have said, they become suddenly benevolent towards them, and love them superficially. Benevolence, therefore, appears to be the beginning of friendship; just as the pleasure received through the sight is the beginning of love; for no one loves who has not been previously delighted with the form [of the beloved object¹]. He, however, who is delighted with this form, does not love the more on that account, but his love is then more ardent, when he longs for the object of his love, when absent, and desires her presence. Thus, also, it is impossible for men to be friends, unless they have been first benevolent. But those who are benevolent [only] do not on this account love each other the more; for they only wish well to those to whom they are benevolent; but they

¹ This observation of Aristotle, that the beginning of love is through the sight, reminds me of a very beautiful passage in the romance of Achilles Tatius, entitled the Loves of Clitophon and Leucippe, and which I earnestly recommend to the attentive perusal of every one who is incontinent in amatory concerns. The passage is as follows: (lib. I.) Οὐκ οἶδας οἷον εἶναι ἐρωμένην καὶ βλέπομένην, μείζονα τῶν ἐργῶν ἔχει τὴν πόσιν· ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντανακλῶμενοι, ἀποματίζουσιν ὡς ἐν καθήκοντι τῶν σωματίων τὰ εἶδωλα· ἡ δὲ τοῦ καλλοῦ ἀπορροή, δι' αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰρρευσσα, ἔχει τινα μίξιν ἐν ἀποσίτασι· καὶ ὀλίγον εἰς τῆς τῶν σωματίων μίξεως· κενὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ σωματῶν συμπλοκή· ὀφθαλμὸς γὰρ φιλίας προξένος, i. e. "Do you not know that there is a greater pleasure in looking at, than in embracing the beloved object? For the eyes when looking at each other, express the images of bodies as in a mirror. But the efflux of beauty, flowing through the eyes into the soul, has a certain mingling in an apostacy from body, [viz. the beauty proceeding from one body through the eyes, is mingled with the beauty proceeding from the other, separate from body]. And the pleasure arising from the mingling of bodies is small; since the connexion of bodies is inane. For the eye is the conciliator of love."

The pleasure, therefore, arising from this mingling of forms through the eyes is greater than that which is produced by copulation, because the mingling in the former case is in a certain respect incorporeal, being the mixture of forms in the imagination. For the imagination neither alone consists of parts, nor is without parts. For if it was partible alone, it could not preserve in itself many impressions of forms, since the subsequent would obscure the pre-existent figures; for no body can contain at once, and according to the same situation, a multitude of figures, but the former will be obliterated by the succession of the latter. And if it was alone impartible, it would not be inferior to the rational power of the soul, which surveys all things impartibly.

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do not co-operate with them in any thing, nor do they endure any molestation for their sake. Hence it may be metaphorically said, that benevolence is sluggish friendship ; but by length of time and custom it may become friendship, yet not that friendship which is founded in utility, nor that which is founded in delight ; for benevolence does not subsist on account of these things. For he indeed, who is benefitted, distributes benevolence in return for the favours he has received, in so doing acting justly. But he who wishes prosperity to the actions of any one, hoping that through him he shall be enriched, does not appear to be benevolent to him, but rather to himself ; as neither is he a friend if he pays attention to him with a view to a certain advantage. In short, benevolence is produced through virtue, and a certain probity, when some one appears beautiful, or brave, or the like to another person ; in the same manner as we said it was produced towards those who contend for prizes at public solemnities.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCORD likewise appears to pertain to friendship ; on which account, it is not an agreement in opinion ; for this indeed may exist between those who are ignorant of each other. Nor are those said to be concordant who are unanimous about any thing, as about the celestial bodies ; for it does not belong to friendship to be concordant about these things. But cities are said to be concordant, when they are unanimous about things which contribute to the general good, and when they deliberately choose the same things, and do what has been deemed in common, fit to be done. Men are, therefore, concordant
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about practical affairs, and of these, about such as surpass others in magnitude, and which may befall two persons or all men. Thus cities are in concord when it appears to all the citizens that magistrates should be elected, or that a warlike compact should be formed with the Lacedæmonians, or that Pittacus should be the archon, because he also is willing to accept this office. But when each of the citizens wishes to be himself the archon, as was the case among the Phœnicians, then they are in a state of sedition. For concord does not consist in each person forming the same conception about a thing, whatever that thing may be, but when they agree in wishing the same thing to the same person; as when the people and worthy men agree in wishing that the most excellent men may govern; for thus all the citizens obtain what they desire. Concord, however, appears to be political friendship, as also it is said to be; for it is conversant with what is advantageous, and with those things which relate to the purposes of life. But a concord of this kind exists among worthy men; for these are in concord with themselves and with each other, since they are, as I may say, conversant with the same things. For the wishes of men of this description are permanent, and do not undergo a flux and reflux, like the Euripus. For their will is directed to things just and advantageous; and these they desire in common. But bad men cannot be concordant, except in a small degree; just as they cannot likewise be friends; since they desire in things advantageous to have the greater part themselves, but in labours and ministrant services they are deficient. Each, however, wishing that these things may befall himself, he explores how he may prevent others from obtaining that which he desires. For concord perishes when justice, which is a common good, is not preserved. It happens, therefore, that they are in a state of sedition, compelling indeed each other, but being themselves unwilling to do what is just.

CHAPTER VII.

BENEFACTORS, however, appear to love in a greater degree those whom they benefit, than those who are benefitted do their benefactors, and the cause of this is investigated as a thing not conformable to reason. To most men, therefore, the cause appears to be this, that these are debtors, and those the persons to whom they are indebted. Hence, as in loans, debtors wish their creditors not to be in existence, but creditors are concerned for the safety of their debtors; thus, also, benefactors wish those whom they have benefitted to exist, in order that they may obtain a recompense; but those who are benefitted, are not concerned about making a recompense. Epicharmus, therefore, perhaps would say, that these things are asserted by most men, in consequence of looking to the depravity of mankind; but to act in this manner seems to be conformable to human nature. For the multitude are unmindful of the benefits they have received, and are more desirous to be benefitted than to benefit. It would seem, however, that the cause of this is more natural, and does not resemble that which pertains to the loan of money; for creditors do not love their debtors, but wish them to be preserved, for the sake of receiving what they have lent. But benefactors love, and are fond of those they have benefitted, though at present they derive no advantage from them, nor are likely to derive any in future. And this, also, happens to be the case with artificers; for every artist loves his own work, more than he would

would be beloved by it, if it should become animated. Perhaps, however, this particularly happens to be the case with poets; for they love their own poems beyond measure, and have an affection for them as if they were children. Similar therefore to this is that which pertains to benefactors; for he who is benefitted is their work. Hence, this person is more dear to them than a work is to him by whom it is produced. The cause however of this is, that existence is to all beings eligible and lovely; but we exist in energy; for we exist by living and acting. He, therefore, who produces a work, is in a certain respect in energy [in the work]. Hence, he loves the work with a parental affection, because existence also is dear to him. But this is natural; for what the agent is in capacity, is indicated by the work in energy. At the same time, also, to the benefactor, that which results from the action is beautiful, so that he is delighted with him in whom it is inherent; but to him who is benefitted nothing is beautiful in the benefactor, but if any thing is, it is utility; and this is in a less degree delightful and lovely. The energy, however, of present good is delectable, as is likewise the hope of future, and the memory of past good; but that good is most delectable, which subsists in energy, and in a similar manner that which is lovely. To him who benefits, therefore, the work remains; for a beautiful deed is lasting; but to him who is benefitted, the advantage passes away. The memory, likewise, of beautiful deeds is delectable; but the memory of useful actions, is not very delightful, or is so in a less degree. It appears, however, that the contrary takes place with respect to expectation. And dilection, indeed, resembles production; but to be beloved is similar to the being passive. To love, therefore, and such things as pertain to friendship, are consequent to those who excel in action. Again, all men love in a greater degree things which are laboriously obtained. Thus, for instance, men love the wealth which they have themselves procured, more than that which they have received from others. It appears, therefore, that to be benefitted is a thing unattended with labour; but that to benefit is laborious. On this account, also, mothers love
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their children in a greater degree than fathers; for the part which they sustain in the generation of them is more laborious than that which fathers sustain, and they in a greater degree know that they are their own offspring. But it would seem that this reasoning also is adapted to benefactors.

CHAPTER VIII.

It may however be doubted, whether a man ought to love himself more than some other person? For those are reprehended who love themselves transcendently; and they are called, as a thing disgraceful, lovers of themselves. And a bad man, indeed, appears to do every thing for the sake of himself, and in a greater degree the more he is depraved. Hence, he is accused as doing nothing without a view to his own advantage. But the worthy man does every thing on account of the beautiful in conduct, and he acts in a greater degree in this manner, and for the sake of his friend, the more worthy he is; but he neglects to act for his own sake. The deeds however of men are discordant with these assertions not unreasonably. For they say that he who is eminently a friend, ought to love his friend in an eminent degree; but he is eminently a friend who wishes well to him who is the subject of this wish for his sake, though no one should know it. These things, however, are especially inherent in a man towards himself, and therefore every thing else by which a friend is defined. For we have before observed that all friendly offices proceed from himself, and pervade

pervade to others. And all proverbs accord with this; such as that [*friends*] *are one soul*; that *among friends all things are common*; that *friendship is equality*; and that *the knee is near to the leg*. For all these things are especially present with a man towards himself; since a man is especially a friend to himself; and therefore he is especially to be beloved by himself.

It may, however, be reasonably doubted, which of these arguments it is requisite to follow, since both of them are accompanied with probability? Perhaps, therefore, it is necessary to divide such-like arguments, and to distinguish how far, and in what respect each of them is true. If, therefore, we understand in what manner each of these denominates a man a lover of himself, perhaps the thing will become manifest. Those, therefore, who consider this as a disgraceful thing, call those men lovers of themselves, who distribute to themselves the greater part, in wealth and honours, and corporeal pleasures. For the multitude aspire after these things, and are earnestly employed in endeavouring to acquire them, as being the best of things; and on this account they become objects of contention. Hence, those who vindicate to themselves more of these things than is fit, are subservient to desires, and in short to passions, and the irrational part of the soul. But the multitude are persons of this description. Hence, also, the appellation was derived from the multitude, who are depraved. Justly, therefore, are those reprehended, who are in this way lovers of themselves. That the multitude, however, are accustomed to denominate those who distribute to themselves things of this kind, lovers of themselves, is not immanifest. For he who always earnestly endeavours to act justly, or temperately, or to act according to any other of the virtues, the most of all things, and in short, who always vindicates to himself that which is beautiful in conduct;—such a man will never be called by any one a lover of himself, nor will he be blamed by any one. It would seem, however, that such a man as this, is in a greater degree a lover of himself; for he distributes to himself things which are most eminently beautiful and good, is gratified in his most principal part [intellect,] and in all things is obedient to it. But as that which is
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the most principal thing in a city, appears to be most eminently the city, and this is the case in every other system of things; thus, also, that which is most principal in man is especially the man. He, therefore, who loves this principal part of himself, is especially a lover of himself, and is gratified with this. Hence, also, one man is denominated continent, and another incontinent, because in the former intellect has dominion, but has not in the latter, in consequence of every man being this, [i. e. intellect]. Men, likewise, appear to have performed things, and to have performed them willingly, which they have especially performed in conjunction with reason. That every man, therefore, is principally intellect, and that the worthy man principally loves this, is not immanifest. Hence, he will be especially a lover of himself, according to a different species of self-love from that which is disgraceful, and differing as much from it as to live according to reason differs from living according to passion, and as much as the desire of that which is beautiful in conduct, differs from the desire of that which appears to be advantageous. All men, therefore, approve of and applaud those who in a manner superior to others endeavour to perform beautiful actions. But if that which is really beautiful in conduct was that for which all men contended, and if they endeavoured to perform the most beautiful deeds, whatever is becoming would be possessed by all men in common, and the greatest of goods by every one particularly; since virtue is a thing of this kind. Hence, it is necessary that a good man should be a lover of himself; for he himself is benefitted by acting well, and he also benefits others. But it is not proper that a depraved man should be a lover of himself; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours, in consequence of being subservient to base passions. With the depraved man, therefore, there is a dissonance between what he ought to do, and what he does; but *with the worthy man, those things which he ought to do, he also does.* For every intellect chooses that which is best for itself; and the worthy man is obedient to intellect. That, however, which is asserted of the worthy man is true, that for the sake of his friends and his country, he will do many things, even though it should be requisite to die for them;

them ; for he will give up riches and honours, and in short those goods which are the objects of contention with mankind, in order that he may vindicate to himself that which is beautiful in conduct. For he will rather choose to be very much delighted for a short time, than to experience a small delight for a long time, and to live worthily for one year, than casually for many years. He will also prefer one beautiful and great action, to many and small actions. And this perhaps happened to be the case with those who have died [for their country, or their friends]. Worthy men, therefore, choose a great good for themselves ; and will give up their riches in order that they may obtain a greater number of friends. For thus, indeed, riches befall the friend of the worthy man, but that which is really beautiful befalls the worthy man himself ; but he distributes to himself the greater good. There is also the same mode of conduct with him as to honours and dominion ; for he will give up all these to his friend ; for this to him is beautiful and laudable. Reasonably, therefore, does he appear to be a worthy man, who chooses that which is beautiful in conduct instead of these things. It may likewise happen, that he may give up actions to his friend, and that it may be better for him to be the cause of their being performed by his friend, than to do them himself. Hence, in all laudable things, the worthy man appears to distribute to himself more of that which is truly beautiful. After this manner, therefore, as we have said, it is necessary that a man should be a lover of himself, but it is not proper he should be so in the way in which the multitude love themselves.

CHAPTER IX.

WITH respect to the happy man, also, it is doubted, whether he will be in want of friends or not? For it is said, that those who are blessed and sufficient to themselves have no need of friends; because things truly good are present with them. As they are, therefore, (say they) sufficient to themselves, they are not in want of any thing; but a friend being a man's other self, imparts to him those things which he cannot obtain through himself. Whence, also, it is said, "When divinity is propitious, what need is there of friends?" It seems, however, to be absurd that those who attribute every good to the happy man, should not give him friends, which appear to be the greatest of external goods. But if it is the province of a friend rather to benefit than to be benefitted, and if it is also the province of a good man and of virtue to benefit, and it is better to do good to friends than to strangers, the worthy man will want those who may be benefitted by him. Hence, likewise, it is enquired, whether there is more need of friends in adversity than in prosperity; because he who is unfortunate is in want of those by whom he may be benefitted, and the fortunate are in want of those whom they may benefit. Perhaps, however, it is also absurd to make the blessed man a solitary being; for no one would choose to possess every good by himself; since man is a social animal, and is naturally adapted to live with others. This, therefore, will also be the case with the happy man; for he possesses those things which are naturally good. But it is evident, that it is better to pass the time with friends and worthy men, than with strangers and casual persons. Hence,

Hence, the happy man has need of friends. In what respect, therefore, is the first assertion true [that the happy man is not in want of friends?] Is it because the multitude think those persons to be friends who are useful to them? The blessed man, therefore, will not be in any want of such persons, since real good is present with him. Neither, therefore, will he be in want of those who are friends on account of the delectable, or he will want them but for a short time; for since his life is delightful, he will be in no want of adventitious pleasure. But not being in want of friends of this description, he does not appear to be in want of friends.

This, however, perhaps is not true. For it was observed by us in the beginning, that felicity is a certain energy; but with respect to energy, it is evident that it is in generation, or is passing into existence¹, and is not present with him who energizes, like a certain possession. But if to be happy consists in living and energizing, and the energy of the good man is of itself worthy and delectable, as we observed in the beginning; if also that which is appropriate ranks among the number of things that are delightful, but we are more able to survey our neighbours than ourselves, and their actions than our own; and if the actions of worthy men that are friends, are delightful to good men, (for both have those things which are naturally delectable)—if this be the case, the blessed man will be in want of such friends as these, since he deliberately chooses to survey worthy and appropriate actions. But the actions of a good man who is a friend are of this description. It is likewise thought to be necessary that the happy man should live delectably. The life, therefore, of a solitary man is indeed difficult; for it is not easy for a man to energize continually by himself, but with others, and towards others it is easy. The energy, therefore, will be more continued which is delectable by itself; which should necessarily be present with the blessed man. For the worthy man, so far as he is worthy, rejoices in the actions which are conformable to

¹ *γεννᾶται*. This word both with Aristotle and Plato signifies an extension of subsistence, and not mere existence, like the words *τελεῖται*, and *τεθνήκει*.

virtue, but is indignant with those which proceed from vice ; just as a musician is delighted with beautiful melodies, but is pained with those that are bad. A certain exercise of virtue likewise will be produced from living with good men, as also Theognis says. To those, however, who consider this affair more physically, it appears that a worthy friend is naturally eligible to a worthy man ; for it has been said by us, that what is naturally good, is of itself to a worthy man good and delectable. To live, however, is in animals defined by the power of sense, but in men by the power of sense or intellection. But power is referred to energy ; and that which has the principal authority in a thing consists in energy. It seems, therefore, that to live is properly either to perceive sensibly, or intellectually ; and to live is among the number of things which are good and delectable ; for it is a definite thing. But that which is definite pertains to the nature of the good, [as it also appeared to the Pythagoreans ;] and that which is naturally good, is also good to the worthy man. Hence to live appears to all men to be delightful. A depraved and corrupted life, however, ought not to be assumed, nor a life of pain ; for such a life is indefinite, as well as the things which belong to it. This, however, will be more evident in what we shall say concerning pain hereafter. But if to live is itself good, it is also delectable. And it appears that it is so from this, that all men aspire after it, and especially worthy and blessed men ; for to these life is most eligible, and the life of these is most blessed. He, however, who sees, perceives that he sees, he who hears perceives that he hears, and he who walks perceives that he walks ; and in a similar manner in other things there is something which perceives that we energize. But we may perceive that we perceive, and we may understand that we understand. For us, however, to perceive that we perceive, or to understand that we understand, is for us to be ; for we have said that our very being consists in perceiving sensibly or intellectually. But for a man to perceive that he lives, is among the number of things essentially delectable ; for life is naturally good. And for a man to perceive that good is present with him is delightful. But to live is eligible, and especially to good men, because existence is to them

them good and delectable; for having a co-sensation of essential good they are delighted. As, however, the worthy man is disposed towards himself, thus also he is disposed towards his friend; for a friend is another self. As, therefore, it is eligible to every one for himself to exist, thus also or similarly it is eligible to him for his friend to exist. But we have said, that existence is eligible, because it is for a man to perceive himself, which is good; and a sensation of this kind is of itself delightful. It is necessary, therefore, that he should at the same time perceive that his friend exists; but this will be effected by living together with him, and in a communication with him of words and thoughts, for it would seem that in this way men are said to live together, and not as cattle, by feeding in the same place. If, therefore, existence is of itself eligible to the blessed man, since it is naturally good and delectable, the like also must be asserted of a friend; and hence a friend will be among the number of eligible things to the happy man. But that which is eligible to him, ought to be present with him; or in this respect he will be indigent. The man, therefore, who is to be happy will require worthy friends.

CHAPTER X.

ARE numerous friends, therefore, to be procured? or, as it appears to be elegantly said of hospitality,

Want not, nor be of multitudes, a guest;

may it also in friendship be appropriately said, that a man should
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neither

neither be without a friend, nor again should have an excessive multitude of friends? This assertion, therefore, will indeed appear to be very much adapted to those who regard utility in friendship; for to be alternately subservient to many persons is laborious, and life is not sufficient to them to perform this. Hence, more friends than are sufficient for the proper purposes of life, are superfluous, and are impediments to a worthy life. Hence there is no need of them. And with respect to the friends that are procured for the sake of pleasure, a very few of these are sufficient; in the same manner as sauce to food. But whether or not ought a good man to have many worthy friends? Or shall we say that there is a certain measure of a multitude of friends; in the same manner as there is of a city? For a city will not consist of ten men, nor is it any longer a city if it is composed of a hundred thousand men.¹ Perhaps, however, one certain number of citizens cannot be assigned; but every number may be admitted which is between certain definite terms. Of friends, therefore, there is also a certain definite multitude; and perhaps those persons are *not numerous*² with whom it is possible for a man to live; for this appears to be a thing of a most friendly nature. But that it is not possible for a man to live with many, and distribute himself among them, is not immanifest. Farther still, it is necessary [if the friends are numerous] that they should be friends to each other, if all of them intend to pass the time with each other; but this among many friends is laborious. It is likewise difficult to rejoice and grieve appropriately together with many persons; for it is probable that it may at one and the same time happen, that a man ought to rejoice together with one person, and grieve together with

¹ For in a city consisting of a hundred thousand persons, the citizens cannot be known to each other, and therefore it will not be so much a city as a region. Besides in a city properly so called, there must be orderly and good government; but it is impossible in a community of a hundred thousand men, for the governors to know the way in which every man lives, though this is essentially necessary to good government. Hence in London, which is said to consist of a million of inhabitants, it is well known that twenty or thirty thousand persons rise every morning, without knowing how they shall subsist through the day.

² In the original, *οὐ πολλοί*; but it should evidently be, *οὐ πολλοὶ ἄλλοι* another.

another. Perhaps, therefore, it is well not to endeavour to have a great number of friends, but as many as are sufficient for the purposes of social life; for it would seem that it is not possible to be very much a friend to many persons. Hence, neither is it possible to love many; for love is a certain excess of friendship. But this is confined to one person; and, therefore, vehement love must be confined to a few. That this indeed is the case, seems to be verified by things themselves. For there are not many friends according to that friendship which subsists among associates; but the friendships which are celebrated, are said to have subsisted between two persons. Those, however, who are the friends of many persons, and are familiarly conversant with all of them, appear to be the friends of no one, except politically, and these persons are also called obsequious. It is possible, therefore, to be politically a friend to many persons, though he who is so should happen not to be obsequious, but a truly worthy man; but it is not possible to be a friend to many, on account of virtue, and for their own sake. But we must be satisfied if we can find a few such, [i. e. who are true friends].

CHAPTER XL.

BUT whether is there more need of friends in prosperity, or in adversity? For in both they are sought after. For those who are in adversity require assistance, and those who are in prosperity, are in want of associates, and those whom they may benefit; since they wish to confer favours on others. In adversity, therefore, friends are more necessary;

necessary ; on which account, when this is the case, there is need of useful friends. In prosperity, however, friends are a more worthy and beautiful possession ; on which account also, men whose circumstances are prosperous, search for worthy friends ; for it is more eligible to benefit these, and with these to pass through life. For the presence itself of friends is delightful both in prosperity and adversity ; since the grief of those who are in affliction is lightened when their friends participate of their sorrow. Hence, likewise, it may be doubted whether friends share a part of the affliction of their friends, as if it were a part of a burden ? Or is this not the case ; but the presence of friends being delightful, the conception that they participate of the sorrow produces a diminution of the grief ? Whether, therefore, those who are in affliction are alleviated through these causes, or through some other cause, we shall omit to investigate. What we have mentioned, however, appears to happen. But the presence of friends appears to be something mixed ; for the sight itself of friends is delectable, and especially to those in adverse circumstances, and it becomes a certain auxiliary against affliction. For a friend possesses a consoling power, both in his presence and his words, if he is dexterous ; since he knows the manners of his friend, and with what he is pleased and pained. It is painful, however, to perceive that our friend is afflicted by our misfortunes ; for every one avoids being the cause of pain to his friends. Hence those who are of a virile nature are careful to prevent their friends from being afflicted in conjunction with themselves ; unless they perceive that by subjecting their friends to a little pain, they shall themselves experience an alleviation of great affliction. And, in short, they do not permit others to lament with them, because they are not themselves addicted to lamentation. But women who are weaker than the rest of their sex, (*γυναικα*), and men who resemble them, are delighted with those who groan with them, and love them as their friends, and the associates of their sorrow. In all things, however, it is necessary to imitate the better character. But the presence of friends in prosperity is attended with a pleasing association, and with the conception that they are delighted with our good fortune. Hence, it would

would seem to be necessary, that in prosperity we should readily and cheerfully invite our friends to partake of our good fortune; for it is beautiful to be beneficent; but that we should be remiss in inviting them to partake of our ill fortune. For it is requisite to impart to our friends as little as possible of evils. Whence it is said,

“That I am wretched is sufficient”¹.

But friends are then especially to be called upon, when having received small molestations, we can be greatly benefitted by their presence. On the contrary, it is perhaps proper to go to those who are in adversity uncalled and cheerfully. For it is the province of a friend to benefit, and especially to benefit those who are in want, and who do not think fit to solicit relief; for this is better and more delectable to both. With fortunate friends, however, we should cheerfully co-operate; for in prosperity also there is need of a friend. But we should slowly betake ourselves to a friend, in order to be benefitted by him; for it is not beautiful to be readily and cheerfully disposed to be benefitted. It is perhaps, however, requisite to be cautious that we do not conduct ourselves unpleasantly, in rejecting the beneficence of our friends; for this sometimes happens to be the case. The presence, therefore, of friends appears to be eligible in all things.

¹ Eurip. in Oreste.

CHAPTER XII.

WHETHER, therefore, as to lovers the sight of the beloved object is most delectable, and they prefer this sense to the rest, because love especially subsists and is produced from this, thus also, it is most eligible to friends to live together? For friendship is communion. And in the same manner as a man is affected towards himself, he is also affected towards his friend. But it is eligible to every one to perceive with respect to himself, [that he exists and lives;] and, therefore, this is also eligible with respect to a friend. This energy, however, is effected among friends by living together; so that this is reasonably desired by them. And that in which to every one his very being consists, or for the sake of which he chooses to live, in this he wishes to pass his life with his friends. Hence some friends indeed drink together, others play at dice together, others engage in gymnastic exercises and hunt together, or philosophize together. But they severally pass their time together in that to which of all things in life they are most attached. For wishing to live with their friends, they do these things, and communicate with them in these, through which they are of opinion they associate together. The friendship, therefore, of bad men is depraved; for being unstable, they communicate with each other in bad things; and they become depraved, being assimilated to each other. But the friendship of worthy men is worthy, and is mutually increased by mutual converse. They also appear to become better

better by energizing with and correcting each other. For they mutually express those things with which they are delighted ; whence it is said,

“ From good men what is good is learnt ¹. ”

And thus much concerning friendship. It remains to discuss, in the next place, pleasure.

¹ Theognis, v. 35.

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THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

AFTER these things perhaps it follows that we should discuss pleasure¹; for this appears to be especially familiar and allied to our race. Hence those who educate youth regulate them by pleasure and pain, as by a rudder. But it appears to be a thing of the greatest consequence with respect to the virtue of manners to rejoice in those things in which it is proper to rejoice, and to hate those things which it is proper to hate. For these things extend through the whole of life, and have a prepon-

¹ Aristotle in the 7th book considered pleasure so far as it is the matter of continence; but in this book he considers it so far as it is the companion of felicity. Hence it appears that those critics were egregiously mistaken, who fancied that what is said concerning pleasure near the end of the 7th book, is spurious. But such mistakes with mere verbalists, are by no means wonderful.

CHAPTER II.

EUDOXUS, therefore, thought that pleasure was good itself, because all animals are seen to desire it, both such as are rational and such as are irrational. But in all things the eligible is good, and that which is especially eligible is the best of things. And because all things tend to the same thing, it is an indication that the object to which they tend, is to all things that which is most excellent. For every thing discovers that which is good to it, in the same manner as it discovers nutriment. Hence that which is good to all things, and which all things desire, is good itself. These arguments, however, are rendered credible, more through the virtuous manners of their author than through themselves; for it appears that he was a remarkably temperate man. It does not seem, therefore, that he made these assertions as the friend of pleasure, but because he believed them to be true. It likewise appeared to him to be no less evident that pleasure is good itself, from the contrary. For pain is of itself avoided by all animals; and in a similar manner, the contrary to pain is eligible to all animals. But that is especially eligible, which we choose not on account of something else, nor for the sake of another thing. It is, however, acknowledged that pleasure is a thing of this kind; for no one asks another person what the final cause is why he is delighted? as if pleasure were a thing eligible of itself, and which renders the good to which it is added more eligible; such for instance as to act justly and temperately. The good, therefore, is itself increased by itself. This argument, therefore, evinces that pleasure ranks among the number of goods,

goods, and that it is not more good than another good. For every good in conjunction with another good, is more eligible than when it is alone. Plato also subverts an argument of this kind, that pleasure is not good itself; for he says that a delectable life, in conjunction with wisdom, is more eligible than without it. But if the mixed life is better [than a life of pleasure alone,] pleasure will not be good itself; for good itself will not become more eligible by any thing being added to it. It is evident, however, that neither will any thing else be good itself, which in conjunction with something which is of itself good, becomes more eligible¹. What, therefore, is the thing of this kind, of which we also participate? For a thing of this kind is the object of

¹ What is here asserted, by Aristotle, apparently in opposition to the doctrine of Plato in the *Philebus*, may be easily solved, by directing our attention, with Proclus, to the three orders of good, which are employed by Plato as so many steps in ascending to the supreme good. These three orders are, that good which is imparticipable and superessential; that which is imparticipable and essential; and that which is essential and participable. Of these, the last is such as our nature contains: *the good which ranks among forms or ideas is essential*; and that which is beyond forms is superessential. Or we may say, that *the good* which subsists in us may be considered as a habit, in consequence of its subsisting in a subject; the next to this ranks as essence, and a part of essence, I mean *the good* which subsists among forms; and the last ranks as that which is neither a habit nor a part. When, therefore, Socrates, in the *Republic*, says, "That to the multitude pleasure seems to be *the good*, and to the more elegant it seems to be prudence," he signifies that good which is resident in our nature, and which from its being an impression of the ineffable principle of things, may be called the summit or flower of our essence. And when he also says that the idea of *the good* is the greatest discipline, which renders both such things as are just, and other things which employ it, useful and profitable, and that we do not sufficiently know it;—these assertions accord with *the good* which is in us, with that which is in forms, and with that which is understood to be prior to all things. For *the idea of the good* signifies a participated form, a separate intelligible, and that which has a separate subsistence prior to intelligibles; since the term *idea*, according to Plato, indicates *that object of desire which is established prior to all things, viz. prior to all things belonging to a certain series*. Thus for instance, *the good* in our nature is prior to every thing else pertaining to the soul; *the good* which ranks among forms is prior to every thing which is the source of essential perfection; and *the good* which reigns in the intelligible world is prior to every series, and to all things.

In consequence of this triple meaning, therefore, of the term *the good*, the objections of Aristotle are made as if Plato, in what he says of good in the *Philebus*, directed his attention to the supreme good, the principle of all things, and not to that good which is resident in our nature, and is derived from the supreme good.

investigation.

investigation. Those, however, who deny that it is good which all beings desire, say nothing to the purpose; for we say that the thing which appears to all beings to exist, does exist. But he who subverts this belief, does not assert that which is very much more credible. For if they denied that to be good which is desired by beings destitute of intellect, there would be some truth in what they say; but if they also deny that to be good which beings endued with prudence and wisdom desire, how will they say any thing which can be admitted? Perhaps, also, even in bad men there is a certain natural good, which transcends their depravity*, and which aspires after its proper good. Neither does that which is asserted of the contrary to pleasure appear to be well said. For it does not follow, say they, that if pain is an evil, pleasure is good; since evil is opposed to evil, and both good and evil are opposed to that which is neither. And these things, indeed, are asserted by them not badly, yet they are not true when applied to the present subject. For if both pleasure and pain were bad, it would be requisite that both should be avoided; but if neither is bad, neither is to be avoided, or each is similarly to be avoided. But now, indeed, it appears that pain is avoided as an evil, and that pleasure is chosen as a good. In this manner, therefore, they are opposed to each other.

* Conformably to this, also, Plato in his *Laws* says, "That in the souls of certain vicious persons, there is *something divine*, and a power of distinguishing well."

CHAPTER III.

NEITHER does it follow that if pleasure is not among the number of qualities, it is not on this account good; for neither are the energies of virtue qualities, nor is felicity a quality. They say, therefore, that good is definite, but that pleasure is indefinite, because it receives the more and the less. Hence, if they form this judgement from the being delighted, the same thing will also take place in justice, and the other virtues, in which men evidently assert that there is more and less of things of this kind; for some are more just and brave than others. It is likewise possible to act justly and to live temperately, in a greater and less degree. But if they admit this to take place in pleasures, they do not seem to have assigned the cause of it; if some pleasures indeed are unmingled, but others are mingled. What however hinders, but that in the same manner as health, which is a definite thing, receives the more and the less; this, also, may be the case with pleasure? For there is not the same symmetry in all things, nor is there always one certain symmetry in the same thing, but suffering a remission, it remains for a certain time, and differs in the more and the less. A thing of this kind, therefore, may also happen to pleasure. As they likewise admit that good itself is perfect, but that motions and generations are imperfect, they endeavour to show that pleasure is motion and generation. They do not, however, appear to assert this well, since

since pleasure is not motion. For to all motion swiftness and slowness appear to be appropriate, and though not *per se*, such as to the motion of the world¹, yet they are appropriate with reference to another motion. But neither of these is inherent in pleasure. For it is possible, indeed, to be rapidly delighted, in the same manner as it is possible to be swiftly enraged; but it is not possible for the delight itself to be swift or slow, not even with reference to something else. It is possible, however, that walking and augmentation, may be swift or slow, and every thing else of the like kind. Hence, it is possible to be changed quickly and slowly into pleasure; but it is not possible to energize swiftly according to it; viz. to be delighted swiftly according to it.

And in what manner will pleasure be generation? For it appears that not any casual thing is generated from any casual thing, but that a thing is dissolved into that from which it was generated. And that of which pleasure is the generation, of this pain is the corruption. They also say, that pain is the indigence of that which is according to nature; but that pleasure is the complete fulness of it. But these are corporeal passions. If, therefore, pleasure is the complete fulness of that which subsists according to nature, that in which this fulness takes place will also be delighted. Hence, the body will be delighted; but it does not appear that this is the case. Pleasure, therefore, is not complete fulness. But complete fulness, indeed, taking place, some one may be delighted, and when cut he may be pained. This opinion, however, appears to have originated from the pleasures and pains pertaining to food; for when we are in want of nutriment, and have been previously pained in consequence of this want, we are delighted with being completely filled. This, however, does not happen to be the case in all pleasures. For mathematical pleasures are unattended with pain, and also those sensible pleasures which subsist through the

¹ Viz. Of the inerratic sphere. For this sphere in consequence of the equability of its motion, receives neither swiftness nor slowness, as is demonstrated in the treatise On the Heavens; but if it is compared with the motions of the planets, it will be found that its motion is much swifter than their motions.—EUSTRATIUS.

smell, the hearing, and the sight. Many recollections, also, and hopes are unattended with pain. Of what, therefore, will these be the generations? For in these there has been no previous indigence of any thing, of which these may be the complete fulness. But to those who adduce disgraceful pleasures [in confirmation of this opinion, it may be said that these are not simply] delectable. For it must not be admitted, that if these are delightful to those who are badly disposed, they are also simply delectable, but that they are so to these only; as neither are those things simply salubrious, or sweet, or bitter, which appear to be so to those who are diseased; nor, again, are those things white which appear to be so to those whose eyes are dimmed with rheum. It may likewise be said in reply, that pleasures are indeed eligible, yet not from these things; just as to be rich is eligible, yet not by treachery; and to be well is eligible, yet not by eating any kind of good. Or it may be said, that pleasures are specifically different. For those pleasures which are produced by worthy, are different from those which are produced by base pursuits, and it is not possible for any one to be delighted with the pleasure of a just man who is not just, or with the pleasure of a musician who is not a lover of music; and in a similar manner in other things. A friend, also, who is a different person from a flatterer, appears to evince that pleasure is not good, or that pleasures are specifically different; for it seems that the association of a friend is with a view to good, but of a flatterer, with a view to pleasure; and the one is reprobated, but the other is praised, in consequence of their associations being directed to different ends. Besides, no one would choose to live, possessing a puerile understanding through the whole of life, and being delighted as much as possible with those things which are the objects of puerile delight; nor would any one choose so to rejoice in doing something most base, as never to be grieved for having done it. We likewise earnestly apply ourselves to many things, though they should procure us no pleasure, such as to see, to recollect, to know, and to possess the virtues. But it makes no difference, if pleasure follows these things from necessity; for we should choose these,

these, though no pleasure should be produced from them. That pleasure, therefore, is not good itself, and that all pleasure is not eligible, appears to be evident, as likewise that some pleasures are eligible of themselves, but differ in species, or in the things from which they are produced. And thus much may suffice with respect to what is asserted by others concerning pleasure and pain.

CHAPTER IV.

WHAT pleasure, however, is, or what kind of thing it is, will become more evident, by resuming the consideration of it from the beginning. For the sight, indeed, seems to be perfect at any time; since it is not indigent of any thing, which taking place afterwards, will give perfection to its form. But pleasure seems to resemble a thing of this kind; for it is a certain whole. Nor can a pleasure be assumed at any time, the form of which would be perfected by the accession of a longer time. Hence, neither is it motion; for all motion is in time, and is referred to a certain end. Thus, for instance, the motion which exists in building a temple is perfect, when it effects that which it desires to accomplish. It is perfect, therefore, either in the whole of the time, or in this time. But in the parts of the time, all the motions are imperfect, and are specifically different from the whole motion, and from each other. For the composition of the stones is different from the erection of the pillar at right angles, and these motions are different from the fabrication of the temple. And the motion, indeed, employed

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in building the temple is perfect; for it is in want of nothing to the proposed end; but the motion employed in laying the foundation and the roof is imperfect; for each pertains to a part. The motions, therefore, are specifically different, and it is not possible to assume a motion perfect in its species in any time, except the whole time. The like also takes place in walking and other motions. For if lation is a motion from one place to another, the specific differences of this motion are, flying, walking, leaping, and the like. And not only so, but in walking itself there is a difference; for the motion from one place to another in walking, is not the same in the stadium and a part of the stadium, and in the different parts of it. Nor is the mutation of place the same in passing through this line and that, [viz. in passing through a curve and a straight line]. For not only a line is passed through, but a line existing in place; and this line is in a different place from that. We have, therefore, accurately discussed motion elsewhere, [i. e. in the 5th book of the Physics]. Hence, it appears that motion is not perfect in every time, but that the multitude of motions are imperfect, and specifically different, since they are formalized by proceeding from one place to another. The form however of pleasure is perfect in any time. It is evident, therefore, that motion and pleasure are different from each other, and that pleasure is something whole and perfect.

This would also seem to be evident, from the impossibility of being moved except in time, but the possibility of being delighted without time, [i. e. in an instant;] for that which is effected in *the now*, or an instant, is a certain whole. From these things, however, it is manifest, that it is not well said that pleasure is motion or generation; for motion and generation are not predicated of all things, but of those only which may be distributed into parts, and are not wholes. For there is not generation of sight, nor of a point, nor of the monad; nor is there either motion or generation of these. Neither, therefore, is there of pleasure; for it is a certain whole. Hence, from what has been said, it is evident that a certain pleasure is conjoined with every
sense

sense in energy, which energizes without being impeded¹. But the energy of the sense is perfect which is well disposed towards the most beautiful of the objects that fall under that sense; for perfect energy appears to be especially a thing of this kind. It is, however, of no consequence, whether it is said, that the sense itself energizes, or that in which it exists. But in every thing, the energy is the most excellent of that which is disposed in the best manner towards the most excellent of the things which are subject to it. But this energy will be most perfect and most delightful. For there is pleasure according to every sense; and in a similar manner, according to every discursive energy of the soul, and every contemplation. But the most perfect energy is the most delectable; and that is the most perfect which is the energy of that which is well disposed towards the best of the things subject to it. Pleasure, however, perfects energy. But pleasure does not perfect energy after the same manner as the object of sense perfects sense, when both are in a good condition; just as neither are health and a physician similarly the cause of being made well. It is evident, however, that pleasure is produced according to each of the senses; for we say that things which are seen, and things which are heard are delectable. And it is also evident, that they are especially delectable when the sense is most excellent, and energizes about the most excellent object. But where the sensible object, and that which perceives it, are things of this kind, there will always be pleasure, the agent and patient being present. Pleasure, however, perfects energy, not as an inherent habit, but as a certain supervening end, such as the flower of age in those who are in their acme. As long, however, as that which is sensible or intelligible, is such as it ought to be, and also that which judges or contemplates, pleasure will be in energy; for when that which is passive and that which is active are similar, and subsisting after the same manner with reference to each other, the same thing is naturally adapted to be produced. How,

¹ I have here adopted the emendation proposed by Eustratius.

therefore,

therefore, does it happen that no one is continually delighted? Is it because he becomes [at length] weary? For all human concerns are incapable of energizing continually. Neither, therefore, can pleasure be generated in an uninterrupted continuity; for it is consequent to energy. Some things, however, delight when they are new; but afterwards for this reason [because pleasure cannot be generated incessantly] do not similarly delight. For at first, indeed, the discursive power of the soul inclines towards, and intently energizes about these, in the same manner as those who look intently at any thing. Afterwards, however, an energy of this kind is no longer produced, but it becomes remiss. Hence, the pleasure also is obscured. It may, however, be thought that all men aspire after pleasure, because all of them desire to live; but life is a certain energy; and every one energizes about and in those things which he especially loves. Thus, for instance, the musician energizes with the hearing about melodies, but the lover of disciplines, energizes with the discursive power of his soul about theorems, and in a similar manner the lover of other pursuits. But pleasure perfects energies; and it likewise perfects life, which is the object of desire. Reasonably, therefore, do all men aspire after pleasure; for it gives perfection to the life of each, which is an eligible thing. We shall, however, omit for the present to consider, whether we choose to live on account of pleasure, or choose pleasure for the sake of living; for these things appear to be conjoined, and do not admit of being separated. For pleasure is not produced without energy, and pleasure gives perfection to every energy.

CHAP.

CHAPTER V.

HENCE, also, pleasures appear to be specifically different; for we are of opinion that things specifically different, are perfected through [perfections] specifically different. For this appears to be the case both with natural and artificial productions; as, for instance, with animals and trees, pictures and statues, houses and furniture. In a similar manner, therefore, we are of opinion, that energies specifically different, are perfected by things that differ in species. But the energies of the discursive powers of reason, differ from the energies of the senses, and these are specifically different from each other. Hence, also, the pleasures which give perfection to these are specifically different. This, however, will also become apparent from hence, that each of the pleasures is intimately familiarized with the energy which it perfects. For appropriate pleasure co-increases energy; since those who energize in conjunction with pleasure, energize about every thing more accurately, and with more exquisite judgement. Thus, for instance, those become [more excellent] geometricians, who are delighted to geometrize, and they understand in a greater degree every thing geometrical. The like also takes place with the lovers of music, the lovers of architecture, and the lovers of the other arts; for each of these makes a proficiency in his proper employment, if he delights in it. Pleasures, therefore, co-increase energies; but things which
co-increase

co-increase are appropriate ; and to things which are specifically different, the things also which are appropriate, are specifically different. Again, this will in a greater degree become apparent, from considering that pleasures which are produced from different things are an impediment to energies. For the lovers of the flute cannot attend to discourse if they hear any one playing on the flute, in consequence of being more delighted with the melody of the flute, than with the present energy [i. e. than with what is said]. The pleasure, therefore, which is produced by the melody of the flute, corrupts the energy of discourse. And in a similar manner, this also happens in other things, when a man energizes at one and the same time about two things ; for the more delectable energy expels the other ; and this in a still greater degree, if it very much surpasses in pleasure, so as to render it impossible to energize according to the other energy. Hence, when we are very much delighted with any thing, we do not in any great degree perform any thing else ; but when we are only moderately pleased with certain things, we can do others. Thus, those who, in the theatres eat sweetmeats, are especially accustomed to do this when the performers act badly. Since, however, appropriate pleasure gives accuracy to energies, and renders them more lasting and better, but foreign pleasures corrupt them, it is evident that these pleasures differ very much from each other. For nearly foreign pleasures effect the same thing as appropriate pains, [i. e. as the pains which are consequent to certain energies]. Thus, if it is unpleasant and painful to any one to write or to any one to reason ; the former, indeed, will not write, and the latter will not reason, in consequence of the energy being painful. From appropriate pleasures and pains, therefore, that which is contrary happens about energies. But those pleasures and pains are appropriate, which are essentially consequent to energy. And with respect to foreign pleasures, we have already observed, that they effect something similar to pain, for they corrupt, though not in a similar manner.

Since, however, energies differ in probity and depravity, and some of them, indeed, being eligible, but others to be avoided, and others being

being neither, pleasures, also, have a similar mode of subsistence ; for there is an appropriate pleasure in every energy. The pleasure, therefore, which is appropriate to a worthy energy is worthy, but that which is appropriate to a bad energy, is depraved ; for the desires, indeed, of things truly beautiful are laudable, but of base things are blameable. The pleasures however which are in energies, are more appropriate to the energies than desires are. For desires, indeed, are separated [from energies,] by times, and by nature ; but pleasures are proximate to energies, and are so indistinct from them, as to render it dubious, whether energy is the same with pleasure. It does not appear, however, that pleasure is either the discursive energy of reason or sense ; for it would be absurd [to suppose that it is ;] though on account of the inseparability of pleasure from energy, it seems to certain persons to be the same with it. As, therefore, energies are different, so likewise pleasures. But the sight differs from the touch in purity, and the hearing and the smell from the taste. Hence, the pleasures also of these senses similarly differ ; and those which pertain to the discursive energy of reason, likewise differ, and both these differ from each other. It seems, however, that there is an appropriate pleasure to every animal, just as there also is an appropriate work ; for this pleasure is that which subsists according to energy. And this will be apparent from a survey of each particular. For there is one pleasure of a horse, another of a dog, and another of a man ; and as Heraclitus says, an ass would prefer straw to gold ; because food is more delectable to asses than gold. The pleasures, therefore, of animals specifically different, are likewise specifically different, but it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasures of the same animals are without a [specific] difference. There is no small variety, however, in pleasures among men ; for the same things are painful to some and pleasing to others ; and to some, indeed, they are painful and odious, but to others delectable and lovely. This, likewise, happens to be the case in sweet things ; for the same things do not appear sweet to a man in a fever, and to one who is well ; nor does the same thing appear to be hot to

him who is weak, and to him who is of a good habit of body. And in a similar manner this happens to be the case in other things. In all such things as these, however, that [is simply delectable,] which appears to be so to the worthy man. But if this is well said, as it appears that it is, and virtue is the measure of every thing, and a good man so far as he is good, those things will be pleasures which appear to be so to the good man, and those things will be delectable in which he rejoices. It is, however, by no means wonderful, if things which appear to him to be of a troublesome nature, should to another person, [of a different character,] appear to be delectable. For many corruptions and noxious circumstances happen to men; but these are not [simply] delectable, except to these persons, and to those who are thus disposed. With respect, therefore, to those pleasures which are acknowledged to be base, it is evident that they are not to be called pleasures, except by corrupt men. But with respect to those pleasures which appear to be worthy, what is the quality of the pleasure, or what shall we say the pleasure is, which is proper to men? Or shall we say, that this is evident from energies? For pleasures are consequent to these. Whether, therefore, there is one energy, or whether there are many energies of the perfect and blessed man, the pleasures which give perfection to these, may be properly called the pleasures of man; but the remaining pleasures, in the same manner as the energies, may be denominated the pleasures of man secondarily and multifariously.

CHAP.

CHAPTER VI.

HAVING therefore spoken concerning the virtues, and friendships, and pleasures, it remains that we should delineate felicity, since we admit that it is the end of human concerns. Hence, by recapitulating what we have before said, the discussion will be more concise. We have said then, that felicity is not a habit; for if it were, it might be present with him who passes the whole of his life in sleep, living the life of a plant, and also with him who is involved in the greatest calamities. If, therefore, these things cannot be admitted, but felicity must rather be referred to a certain energy, as we have before observed, but of energies, some are necessary and eligible on account of other things, and others are eligible of themselves;—if this be the case, it is evident that felicity must be admitted to be some one of the energies which are of themselves eligible, and not one of those which are eligible on account of something else. For felicity is not indigent of any thing, but is sufficient to itself. But those energies are eligible of themselves, from which nothing except the energy is the object of investigation. But the actions which are conformable to virtue, appear to be things of this kind; for to perform beautiful and worthy deeds is among the number of things which are of themselves eligible; and among diversions, this is also the case with those that are delectable; since they are not chosen on account of other things. For those who are addicted to them are rather injured than benefitted, in consequence

of neglecting their bodies and possessions. Many of those, however, who are said to be happy men, fly to diversions; on which account those who are versatile in such-like methods of spending their time are esteemed by tyrants. For they render themselves pleasing in those things which they desire; and they are in want of persons of this description. These things, therefore, appear to pertain to felicity, because men in authority and power are at leisure for these. Perhaps, however, persons of this description are no indication [that these things pertain to felicity]. For neither virtue, nor intellect, from which worthy energies proceed, consists in dominion and power. Nor, if these men not having tasted of genuine and liberal pleasure, fly to corporeal pleasures, must it be supposed that on this account these pleasures are more eligible; for children also fancy that things which are honoured by them, are the best of things. It is reasonable, therefore, to admit, that as different things appear to be honourable to children and men, so likewise to bad and worthy men. Hence, as we have frequently said, those things are honourable and delectable, which are so to the worthy man. But the energy to every one is most eligible which is according to an appropriate habit; and to the worthy man the energy is most eligible which is according to virtue. Felicity, therefore, does not consist in diversions. For it is absurd to admit that diversion is the end [i. e. the chief good of man,] and that the whole of life is to be busily employed, and molestations endured for the sake of indulging in sports; since, as I may say, we choose all things for the sake of something else, except felicity; for this is the end. But to act seriously, and to labour for the sake of diversion, appears to be foolish and very puerile. He, however, who engages in sports, in order that he may act seriously, which Anacharsis thought was proper, appears to be right; for diversion resembles repose. But as men are incapable of labouring incessantly, they require relaxation. Relaxation, however, is not an end; for it subsists for the sake of energy. But a happy life appears to be conformable to virtue; and this is a worthy life, and does not consist in amusements. We likewise say that serious pursuits are better than those that are ridiculous and accompanied

accompanied with jesting and sport, and that the energy of the better part and the better man, is always more worthy. But the energy of that which is better is more excellent, and more adapted to felicity. Any casual person, also, and a slave may enjoy corporeal pleasures no less than the best of men. No one, however, would ascribe felicity to a slave, unless they also ascribe to him a worthy life. For felicity does not consist in sports and corporeal pleasures, but in the energies according to virtue, as we have before observed.

CHAPTER VII.

IF, however, felicity is an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is an energy according to the most excellent virtue; and this will be the virtue of the most excellent [part or power¹]. Whether, therefore, this be intellect, or something else
which

¹ Aristotle having spoken of the physical virtues in the 6th book, (p. 463,) and having largely discussed the ethical and political virtues, as far as to the present book, now directs his attention to the virtues called theoretic, or contemplative. In order, however, to show that the division made by Plato and the best of his disciples, of the virtues, is also adopted by Aristotle, the following summary account of them from the Platonic Olympiodorus is subjoined:

The first of the virtues are the *physical*, which (as has been before observed) are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Of these virtues Plato speaks in the *Politicus* and the *Laws*. The *ethical* virtues which are above these, are ingenerated by custom, and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues, also, are to be found in some
brute

which appears to rule and be the leader by nature, and to have a conception of things beautiful and divine; or whether it is itself divine, or the most divine of all our parts;—the energy of this, according to its proper virtue, will be perfect felicity. But we have said that this energy is contemplative. And this appears to accord with what we before asserted, and also with truth. For this energy is the most excellent; since intellect is the best of all our parts, and of objects of knowledge those are the most excellent about which intellect is con-

brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the *Laws*. They pertain, however, at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the *political* virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument: through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible power, and through temperance, the power of the soul which is characterized by desire; but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the *Republic*. These virtues, too, follow each other. Above these are the *cathartic* virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly discusses these virtues in the *Phædo*. Prior to these, however, are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically; for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the political; for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the *Thætetus*.

I omit to mention another gradation of the virtues besides these, viz. the paradigmatic, because they are not mentioned by Aristotle. But for an account of them, I refer the reader to my translation of Plato, vol. iv, p. 273.

I shall only add, that to the superficial reader it will doubtless appear that Aristotle has omitted to mention the cathartic virtues, and that these virtues therefore form no part of the peripatetic system of ethics. To this I reply, that Aristotle does not indeed expressly mention these virtues, but that he evidently alludes to their existence in the eighth chapter of this book, when he says that *the ethical virtues are connected with the passions, and subsist about the composite from soul and body*. Hence, as the theoretic virtues are not connected with the passions, and therefore as he says, the life according to intellect is divine, with respect to human life, these virtues evidently require to their existence a previous purification from the passions; and this purification from the passions constitutes the cathartic virtues.

versant.

versant. This energy also is most continued: for we are able to contemplate more incessantly than to perform any action whatever. We likewise think that pleasure ought to be mingled with felicity; but the energy *according to wisdom* is acknowledged to be the most delectable of all the energies according to virtue. Wisdom, therefore, appears to possess pleasures admirable both for their purity and stability. It is reasonable also to think that those who *possess* knowledge, live more pleasantly than those who *investigate*. That too, which is called self-sufficiency, will especially subsist about the contemplative energy. For of the necessities of life, the wise and the just man, and the rest of those who possess the moral virtues, are in want; but even when they are sufficiently supplied with these, the just man is in want of those towards whom, and together with whom, he may act justly; and in like manner the temperate and the brave man, and each of the rest. But the wise man when alone is able to contemplate; and by how much the wiser he is, by so much the more does he possess this ability. Perhaps, indeed, he will contemplate better when he has others to co-operate with him; but at the same time he is most sufficient to himself. This energy alone, likewise, will appear to be beloved for its own sake, for nothing else is produced from it besides contemplation. But from things of a practical nature we obtain something more or less besides the action itself. Felicity also appears to consist in leisure; for we engage in business that we may be at leisure, and we wage war that we may live in peace. The energies therefore of the political virtues consist either in political or in military transactions; but the actions which are conversant with these appear to be full of employment. This indeed is perfectly the case with military transactions: for no one chooses to wage war, or prepare for it, for the sake of waging war; since he would appear to be perfectly a homicide who should make enemies of his friends for the sake of fighting and slaughter. The energy too of the politician is of a busy nature, and, besides the management of public affairs, is employed in procuring dominion and honour, or a felicity for himself and the citizens different from the political energy, which, also, as something different, we evidently investigate.

investigate. If, therefore, political and military actions surpass in beauty and magnitude all other virtuous actions, but these are of a busy nature, aspire after a certain end, and are not eligible for their own sakes; but the energy of intellect, which is contemplative, appears to excel other energies in ardor, and to desire no other end besides itself; if also it possesses a proper pleasure, which increases its energy, and has, in addition to this, self-sufficiency, leisure and unwearied power, so far as the condition of human nature will permit, with whatever else is attributed to the blessed, and appears to subsist according to this energy;—if such be the case this will be the perfect felicity of man when it receives a perfect length of life: for nothing belonging to felicity is imperfect. Such a life, however, will be more excellent than that which is merely human; for man will not thus live so far as he is man, but so far as he contains in himself something divine. And as much as this part excels the composite, so much does its energy surpass the energy belonging to every other virtue. If, therefore, intellect is divine with respect to man, the life, also, according to intellect will be divine with respect to human life. Nor ought we, according to the exhortation of certain persons, to be wise in human affairs, since we are men, nor to regard mortal concerns, since we are mortal; but as much as possible we should immortalize ourselves, and do every thing in order to live according to our most excellent part. For this part, though it is small in bulk, far excels all things in power and dignity. It would seem, also, that each of us is this part^a, since that which obtains dominion is also more excellent. It would therefore be absurd for a man not to choose his own life, but the life of something else. That too which was before asserted, accords with what is now said: for that which is intimately allied to any nature is most excellent and pleasant to that nature; and hence, a life according to intellect will be most excellent and pleasant to man, since this part is most eminently man. This life, therefore, is also most happy.

^a The *true man*, both according to Aristotle and Plato, is intellect: for the essence of every thing is the *summit* of its nature.

CHAPTER VIII.

BUT *that* felicity ranks in the second place which subsists according to another virtue¹; for the energies according to this virtue are human. For we act justly and bravely, and perform other things, conformable to the virtues, towards each other, in contracts, in necessities, in all-various actions, and in the passions, preserving to every one that which is fit and decorous. All these things, however, appear to be human. Some things, likewise, appear to happen from the body, and the virtue of manners is in many instances conjoined, and rendered familiar with the passions. Prudence, also, is conjoined with the virtue of manners, and the virtue of manners with prudence; since the principles indeed of prudence, subsist according to the ethical virtues, and the rectitude of the ethical virtues subsists according to prudence. These, however, are connected with the passions, and will subsist about the composite [or that which consists of soul and body]. But the virtues of the composite are human. The life, therefore, and the felicity conformable to them, will also be human. The felicity, however, of intellect is separate; for thus much may be asserted concerning it²; since to discuss it accurately is a greater undertaking,

¹ Viz. The felicity which consists in an active life, or in the exercise of prudence, and the moral virtues.

² Aristotle says this, because he professedly discusses these things in the 3rd book of his treatise *On the Soul*.

than is adapted to the present treatise. It would also seem that this felicity requires but little of external supply, or less than ethical felicity. For let it be admitted that both require necessities, and this equally; (though the political character labours in a greater degree about the body and things of this kind) since this is but of small consequence; yet it makes a great difference with respect to energies. For the liberal man will be in want of wealth, in order to perform liberal deeds, and also the just man, in order to make retributions. For the wills of men are immanifest, and those who are not just pretend they wish to act justly. But the brave man will be in want of power, in order to effect something conformable to the virtue of fortitude; and the temperate man will be in want of the means of acting temperately. For how will this man, or he who possesses any one of the other virtues, become manifest? It becomes, however, an object of enquiry whether deliberate choice possesses greater authority in virtue, or whether it is possessed by actions, virtue subsisting in both these. It is evident, therefore, that the perfect will be in both. But many things are requisite to the perfection of actions; and in proportion as they are greater and more beautiful, a greater number of things are necessary. To him, however, who energizes according to *theoretic virtue*, there is no need of things of this kind so far as pertains to this energy, but, as I may say, they are impediments to his contemplation. Yet so far as he is a man, and lives with many others, he also chooses to perform actions conformable to virtue. He will therefore require external things in order that he may act like a man.

But that perfect felicity is a certain contemplative energy, may become apparent from hence, that we consider the gods to be especially blessed and happy. What kind of actions, however, is it fit to ascribe to them? Shall we say just actions? Or will they not appear ridiculous if they form contracts and return deposits, and do other things of the like kind? Shall we say then that they are brave; sustaining things of a terrible nature, and encountering dangers because it is beautiful so to do? Or that they are liberal? But to whom will they give? It would, however, be absurd to suppose that there
is

is money with them, or any thing of this kind. And if they are temperate, what will this temperance be? Or is not the praise unapt which celebrates them as not having depraved desires? But if we should enumerate every thing pertaining to actions, it would appear to be small, and unworthy of the gods³. All men, however, acknowledge that they live; and therefore that they energize; for it must not be supposed that they pass their life in sleep like Endymion. Hence, if action is taken away from that which lives, and in a still greater degree production, what remains except contemplation? So that the energy of God, since it excels in blessedness, will be contemplative⁴.

And

³ All the virtues subsist in divinity, but according to a *divine* and not a *human* characteristic; for the virtues are good, and all goodness originates from divinity. Prior, likewise, to beings which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. Aristotle, therefore, when he excludes from the gods all the virtues except the theoretic, intends only to signify that they do not subsist in them as they do in us, but are in them essentially different, as being characterized by a divine intellect.

⁴ This contemplative energy of divinity is beautifully illustrated by Proclus as follows, in his admirable M. S. Commentary on the Parmenides of Plato:—"It is by no means proper to disbelieve in the indivisible knowledge of divinity, which knows sensibles without possessing sense, and divisible natures without possessing a divisible energy, and which without being present to things in place, knows them prior to all local presence, and imparts to every thing that which every thing is capable of receiving. The unstable essence, therefore, of apparent natures is not known by him in an unstable, but in a definite manner; nor does he know that which is subject to all-various mutations dubiously, but in a manner perpetually the same. For by knowing himself, he knows every thing of which he is the cause, possessing a knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is co-ordinate to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of every thing is superior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity, therefore, knows, without busily attending to the objects of his intellection, because he abides in himself, and by alone knowing himself, knows all things. Nor is he indigent of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know sensible natures; for it is himself that produces all these, and that in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himself, comprehends an united knowledge of them, according to cause, and in one simplicity of perception. Just as if some one having built a ship, should place in it men of his own formation, and in consequence of possessing a various art, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and afterwards launch the ship into the new-created main. Let us suppose too, that he causes these to have an existence by merely conceiving them to exist, so that by imagining all this to take place, he gives an external subsistence to his inward phantasms, it is evident that in this case, he will contain the cause of every thing

And of human energies, therefore, that which is most allied to this [energy of God,] will be most adapted to procure felicity. But as an indication of the truth of this, other animals which are perfectly deprived of an energy of this kind, do not partake of felicity. For the whole life of the gods is indeed blessed; but that of men is blessed so far as they possess a certain similitude of such an energy as this. Of other animals, however, no one is happy, because they do not in any respect participate of contemplation. As far, therefore, as contemplation extends itself, so far also is felicity extended, and the felicity of those beings is greater, in whom there is more of the contemplative energy, and this not from accident, but according to contemplation; for this is of itself honourable. Hence, felicity will be a certain contemplation. External prosperity, however, will be requisite [to him who energizes according to theoretic virtue,] since he is a man; for human nature is not sufficient to itself for the purposes of contemplation; but it is also requisite that the body should be well, and that it should be supplied with food, and other necessities. It must

thing which happens to the ship through the winds on the sea, and that by contemplating his own conceptions, without being indigent of outward conversion, he will at the same time both fabricate and know these external particulars. Thus, and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of the universe, possessing the causes of all things, both gives subsistence to, and contemplates whatever the universe contains, without departing from the speculation of himself. But if with respect to intellect, one kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident that there is not the same intellectual perfection of all things, but that where intelligibles have a more total and undistributed subsistence, there the knowledge is more total and indivisible, and where the number of forms proceeds into multitude and extension, there the knowledge is both one and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing the Orphic verses, in which the theologist says:

“ Ἀυτὴ δὲ Ζηνὸς καὶ ἐν ὀμμάτων πατρὸς ἀνάντος,
 Ναιῶν' ἀθάνατοι τε θεοὶ, θνητοὶ τ' ἀνθρώποι,
 Ὅσα τε πύ γεγάσκα, καὶ ὑπέρου ὅσα ἐμέλλον.

i. c.

“ There in the sight of Jove, the parent king,
 Th' immortal gods and mortal men reside,
 With all that ever was, and shall hereafter be.”

not,

not, however, be supposed, that because it is not possible for a man to be blessed without external goods, the happy man will therefore require many of these, and such as are great; for neither a condition of being sufficient to itself, nor judgement, nor action, consists in an excess [of external goods]. But it is possible for those who have no dominion over the earth and sea to perform beautiful deeds; since a man, from moderate possessions, may be able to act according to virtue. The truth of this, however, may be clearly seen; for private persons appear to act no less equitably, but even more so than potentates. But moderate possessions are sufficient for this purpose; for the life of him will be happy who energizes according to virtue. And Solon perhaps well defined those who are happy, by saying, that they are such as are moderately furnished with external possessions, and who perform the most beautiful actions, and live temperately; since it is possible for those whose possessions are but moderate, to do those things which ought to be done. Anaxagoras likewise appears to have thought that the happy man was neither the rich man nor the potentate, when he says, "that it would not be at all wonderful, if I should be considered by the multitude as an absurd and miserable man." For the multitude judge from external circumstances, having a sensible perception of these alone. The opinions, also, of the wise seem to accord with these assertions. Things of this kind, therefore, are attended with a certain credibility. A judgement, however, is to be formed of the truth in practical affairs from deeds and the life; for in these that which possesses principal authority consists. Hence, it is requisite to consider what has been before said, by referring it to deeds and the life of a man. And when the assertions accord with deeds, they are to be admitted, but when they are dissonant, they are to be considered as nothing but words. But the man who energizes according to intellect, who cultivates this, and is mentally disposed in the best manner, is also it would seem most dear to divinity. For if any attention is paid by the gods to human affairs, as it appears there is, it is also reasonable to suppose that they will be delighted with that which is most excellent, and most allied to themselves; but this is intellect;

intellect ; and likewise that they will remunerate those who especially love and honour this, as taking care of that which is dear to themselves, and acting rightly and well. It is however not immanifest, that all these things are especially present with the wise man. Hence, he is most dear to divinity. It is also probable that the same man is most happy. So that thus, also, the wise man will be especially happy.

CHAPTER IX.

ARE we therefore to think, that if these things and the virtues, and likewise friendship and pleasure, have been sufficiently delineated, our purpose is completely effected? Or shall we say, as has been before observed, that the end in practical affairs is not to survey and know each particular, but rather to perform it? Neither, therefore, is it sufficient in virtue to know it, but there should also be an endeavour to possess and use it ; or in some other way must we strive to become good men? If, therefore, words were sufficient of themselves to make men worthy, they ought justly, as Theognis says, to be valued at a great price, and it would be necessary to procure them. Now, however, they appear to be sufficiently powerful to exhort and excite liberal young men, and to make those whose manners are noble, and who are truly lovers of beautiful conduct, obedient to virtue ; but they are incapable of exhorting the multitude to probity. For the multitude are not naturally adapted to be obedient from shame, but from fear ; nor to abstain from bad conduct through the disgrace with which it is attended, but through punishment. For living from passion, they pursue

pursue their pleasures, and those things through which they may be procured ; but they avoid the pains opposed to these. They have not, however, any conception of that which is beautiful in conduct, and truly delectable, in consequence of not having tasted of it. What discourse, therefore, can dispose such men to orderly conduct? For it is not possible, or at least, it is not easy to obliterate by words, things which have been for a long time impressed in the manners. But perhaps we must be satisfied, if every thing being present with us, through which we are accustomed to become worthy, we may be able to partake of virtue.

Some, however, are of opinion that men become good from nature, others that they become good from custom, and others from doctrine. As to goodness from nature, therefore, it is evident that this is not in our power, but that it is inherent in those who are truly fortunate, through a certain divine cause. But it must be considered whether it is not true, that words and precepts are not accompanied with power towards all men, but it is requisite that the soul of the auditor should have been previously excited by manners, to rejoice and hate properly, like land which is intended to nourish seed. For he who lives under the influence of passion, will not attend to the reasoning which dissuades him from such a life. How, therefore, is it possible to induce one who is so disposed, to alter his mode of conduct? In short, passion does not appear to yield to reason, but to violence. Hence, it is necessary, that manners should pre-exist, in a certain respect appropriate to virtue, in order that their possessor may love what is beautiful, and be indignant with what is disgraceful in conduct. To obtain, however, a right education for virtue, from our youth, is difficult, without being nurtured by laws which enforce the offices of virtue. For to live temperately and accustomed to endurance, is not pleasing to the multitude, and especially to youth. Hence, it is necessary that education, studies and pursuits, should be ordained by laws ; for by custom they will cease to be painful. But perhaps it is not sufficient for youth to obtain a right education, and to have proper attention paid

paid to them, but it is also necessary, when they have arrived at the perfection of manhood, that they should study and be accustomed to these things; and in these we shall likewise require the assistance of the laws; and in short, through the whole of life. For the multitude are more obedient to necessity than to reason, and to punishment than to the beautiful in conduct. Hence, some persons are of opinion that legislators ought indeed to excite men to virtue, and exhort them to it for the sake of the beautiful in conduct, because worthy men will precede from their manners obey their exhortations; but that castigations and punishments should be inflicted on those who disobey them, and who are naturally more unapt; and that the incurable should be entirely exterminated from the community. For, say they, the worthy man, and he who lives with a view to the beautiful in conduct, will be obedient to reason; but the bad man who aspires after pleasure, is to be punished by pain, like a beast of burden. Hence, they add, it is necessary that such pains should be employed, as are especially contrary to the pleasures which they embrace.

If, therefore, as we have said, it is requisite that he who is to be a good man should be well educated, and accustomed to virtuous conduct, and afterwards should thus live in worthy studies and pursuits, and neither unwillingly nor willingly perform base deeds; and if these things may happen to those who live conformably to a certain intellect and right order, possessing power and strength;—if this be the case, the paternal mandate, indeed, is neither accompanied with strength nor necessity, nor in short the mandate of one man, unless he is a king, or a person endued with a similar authority; but the law possesses a necessarily-compelling power, being a mandate proceeding from a certain prudence and intellect. And those, indeed, who are adverse to the impulses of depraved men, though they are right in so doing, are hated [by the multitude]. Law, however, when it ordains what is equitable, is not attended with molestation. But in the city of the Lacedæmonians alone, the legislator appears to have paid attention to education and studies, or pursuits; while in most cities things of this

this kind are neglected, and every one, after the manner of the Cyclops, lives as he pleases.

By these no statutes and no rights are known,
No council held, no monarch fills the throne ;
But high on hills or airy cliffs they dwell,
Or deep in caves whose entrance leads to hell.
Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care,
Heedless of others, to his own severe^s.



It is best, therefore, that a common and right attention should be paid to the citizens, and that there should be an ability of effecting this. But if these things are neglected in common, it would seem to be fit that every one should contribute to the promotion of his children and friends in virtue, or should pre-determine to do so. From what has been said, however, it would seem that this may especially be effected by him who possesses the power of a legislator. For attentions to the general welfare are effected through the laws ; but equitable attentions are accomplished through worthy men. It does not, however, seem to make any difference, whether the laws are written or unwritten, nor whether one person or many are disciplined by them, as neither does it make any difference in music and gymnastic, and other disciplines. For as in cities legal institutions and manners are efficacious, so in families paternal mandates and manners ; and they are still more efficacious on account of alliance, and the benefits conferred by parents on their children. For children previous to these mandates loved their parents, and are naturally disposed to be obedient to them. Farther still, private differs from public education, in the same manner as in medicine [particular differ from universal prescriptions]. For *universally*, indeed, abstinence and quiet are advantageous to one who has a fever ; but to this particular person perhaps they are not. And he who is a master in the pugilistic art will not perhaps enjoin the same mode of fighting to all his pupils. It would seem, however, that par-

^s Odyss. lib. 9. v. 112, &c. Aristotle quotes the last line but one only of these verses. The translation is by Pope.

particulars will be more accurately managed, when private attention is paid to them; for then each individual will in a greater degree obtain that which is adapted to him. But the physician, the master of gymnastic exercises, and every other artist, will in the best manner pay attention to an *individual*, if they know *universally* what is beneficial to all persons, or to persons of a certain description; for sciences are said to be, and are in reality, of that which is common. Nothing, however, perhaps hinders, but that a man may pay attention to one certain thing in a proper manner, though he is destitute of science, while he accurately surveys from experience what happens to each particular thing, just as some persons appear to be most excellent physicians to themselves, but are unable to give medical assistance to another person. Perhaps, however, it would seem [notwithstanding this] to be no less requisite for him who wishes to become an artist and to be theoretic, to proceed to that which is universal, and to know this as far as it can be known; for we have already observed, that sciences are conversant with this. Perhaps also it is requisite, that he who wishes to make others better by the attention which he pays to them, whether they be many or few, should endeavour to become skilled in legislation, if we can be rendered good men through the laws. Hence, it is not the province of any casual person to render some man, or one committed to his care, fitly disposed to become virtuous, but if it belongs to any one to effect this, it is the province of the man of science; just as in medicine, and the other arts, to which a certain attention and prudence pertain. Is it requisite, therefore, after this to consider whence or how a man may acquire a legislative skill? Or, as in other arts, is this to be learned from those who are conversant with the management of public affairs? For this appears to be a part of the political science. Or shall we say that a similar thing does not seem to take place in the political science, and the other sciences and powers. For in the others, the same persons are seen to impart the powers, and to energize from them; as is evident in physicians and painters. But the sophists profess indeed to teach politics, yet no one of them acts in a political capacity. And it would seem that those who are engaged in the management of public

public affairs, do this by a certain power and experience, rather than by the exercise of the reasoning faculty. For they do not appear either to write or speak about things of this kind, though perhaps this would be better than to compose forensic or popular orations; nor again, is it seen that they have made either their own children political characters, or some other children of their friends. It is reasonable, however, to suppose that they would have done this, if they had been able; for neither could they have left any thing better to cities, nor could they have deliberately chosen any thing more excellent than this power, either for themselves, or their dearest friends. Nevertheless experience appears to contribute in no small degree [to the management of public affairs;] for otherwise men would not become more political through being accustomed to political affairs. Hence, experience seems to be necessary to those who desire to be skilled in the political science. Those sophists, however, who profess to teach the political science, appear to be very far from possessing this ability; for, in short, they neither know what kind of a thing it is, nor what the things are with which it is conversant. For if they did, they would not suppose it to be the same with the rhetorical art, or inferior to it; nor would they think it is easy for him to act the part of a legislator, who has collected the most celebrated and approved laws; since they say that the best laws are to be selected, just as if the selection did not require intelligence, or as if to judge rightly was not one of the greatest of things, in the same manner as in what pertains to music. For skilful men judge rightly respecting the works in which they are skilled, and understand through what means, or in what manner they may be accomplished, and what the appropriate adaptations of them are; but to the unskilful it is sufficient not to be ignorant, whether a work is well or ill done, in the same manner as in the painter's art. Laws, however, resemble political works. How, therefore, can any one be adapted to become a legislator from these, or to judge which of them are the best? For neither does it appear that men become skilled in medicine, by reading medical books; though these books not only endeavour to point out the cures, but likewise the remedies which are to be applied,

and the methods of cure, distinguishing also the habits of each person. It seems, however, that these things are beneficial to skilful persons, but useless to the unscientific. Perhaps, therefore, collections of laws and polities, may be useful to those who are able to survey and judge what is well-established or the contrary, and what the appropriate adaptations are in these; but those who discuss things of this kind without the political habit, will never be able to judge well, except from chance; though perhaps they will become more intelligent in these particulars. Since, therefore, the politicians prior to us have omitted to investigate legislation, it will perhaps be better for us to consider it more attentively, and in short to discuss a polity [universally,] in order that the philosophy which pertains to human affairs may as much as possible be brought to perfection. In the first place, therefore, if any thing has been well said by the ancients on this subject, we shall endeavour to relate it. In the next place, from the collections which have been made of polities, we shall endeavour to survey what the nature is of the things which preserve and corrupt cities and the several polities, and from what causes some of them are well but others ill-governed. For these things being surveyed, perhaps we shall be able in a greater degree to perceive what kind of polity is the best; how each is to be arranged, and what laws and manners it should use. We shall begin, therefore, the discussion of politics¹.

¹ From this it is evident that the treatise on Politics ought immediately to follow the Nicomachean Ethics; but as there are two other treatises on Ethics, viz. the Great and the Eudemian Ethics, I deemed it better to bring together all that Aristotle has written on morals, previously to presenting the reader with his Politics.



